According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian (...) models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ( [1982] ). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. (shrink)

Are proneness to forgive, optimism and gratitude associated with life satisfaction? The main aim of the current study was to examine whether and how life satisfaction is related to propensity to forgive one's transgressor. Additionally, it also explored the relationship between life satisfaction and other chosen psychological variables, such as optimism and gratitude. The study involved 338 persons between 16 and 83 years of age. For the measurement of psychological variables the following research tools were used: Satisfaction With Life Scale, (...) Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory, Gratitude Questionnaire, and Learned Optimism Test. Among the study participants satisfaction with life was positively correlated with the conviction about a permanent and ubiquitous nature of positive events, optimism and gratitude. The study also observed a negative correlation between satisfaction with life, the motivation for revenge and avoidance motivation, and the perception of a permanent and ubiquitous nature of adverse events. (shrink)

Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...) After having distinguished between enabling and constitutive relevance, I defend the claim that at least some facts about subpersonal states and events are constitutively relevant to some personal-level phenomenon, and therefore can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level explanations. I draw some of the possible consequences of my claim for our understanding of personal-level behavior by focusing on the phenomenon of addiction. (shrink)

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...) is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also (...) unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. (shrink)

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, (...) we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory. (shrink)

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often (...) necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to establish a dialogue between the philological reform proposed by the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset in his books, called “new philology”, and the methodology established by Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history for analysing the semantics of concepts in their contexts. The thesis is that Ortega’s new philology as a technique of historical reason is a precedent, sometimes direct and sometimes indirect, of the Begriffsgeschichte. El objetivo de este artículo es el de establecer un diálogo (...) entre la reforma filológica que el filósofo José Ortega y Gasset propone en su obra, denominada “nueva filología”, y la metodología que establece la historia conceptual de Reinhart Koselleck para el análisis de la semántica de los conceptos en sus contextos. La tesis que se sostiene es que la nueva filología de Ortega en tanto que técnica de la razón histórica supone un precedente, a veces directo y otras indirecto, de la Begriffsgeschichte. (shrink)

Bayesian cognitive science is a research programme that relies on modelling resources from Bayesian statistics for studying and understanding mind, brain, and behaviour. Conceiving of mental capacities as computing solutions to inductive problems, Bayesian cognitive scientists develop probabilistic models of mental capacities and evaluate their adequacy based on behavioural and neural data generated by humans (or other cognitive agents) performing a pertinent task. The overarching goal is to identify the mathematical principles, algorithmic procedures, and causal mechanisms that enable cognitive agents (...) to take uncertainty into account and weigh it appropriately in producing adaptive behaviour. -/- The appeal of Bayesian cognitive science derives from its transparency, normativity, and unifying power. Resources from Bayesian statistics allow cognitive scientists to characterise transparently, in terms of random variables and probabilistic dependencies between them, the inductive problems that many mental capacities are presumed to solve. Given this characterisation, researchers can define an upper bound on one’s performance on that problem and use it as a benchmark for interpreting experimental results, formulating hypotheses about why and when deviations from optimal performance should be expected, and seeking explanations of mental capacities within one encompassing theoretical framework. -/- Although critics question the testability, explanatory power, and plausibility of Bayesian models of mental capacities, Bayesian cognitive science has proved itself to be an incredibly fruitful research programme. Fuelled by empirical and theoretical results from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, and evolution, Bayesian cognitive science has: advanced our understanding of why cognitive systems should keep track of uncertainty and use it to facilitate adaptive behaviour; clarified how the brain might encode information about the uncertainty of its stimuli and perform computations with probability distributions; and crystallised the insight that cognitive agents’ management of uncertainty might be grounded in predictive processes aimed at avoiding surprising exchanges with the environment. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the greatest value of the Bayesian framework in cognitive science consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian cognitive scientists assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious, as unification in science is a heterogeneous notion, which may have little to do with explanation. While a crucial feature of most adequate explanations in cognitive science is that they reveal aspects of the causal mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be (...) explained, the kind of unification afforded by the Bayesian framework to cognitive science does not necessarily reveal aspects of a mechanism. Bayesian unification, nonetheless, can place fruitful constraints on causal–mechanical explanation. 1 Introduction2 What a Great Many Phenomena Bayesian Decision Theory Can Model3 The Case of Information Integration4 How Do Bayesian Models Unify?5 Bayesian Unification: What Constraints Are There on Mechanistic Explanation?5.1 Unification constrains mechanism discovery5.2 Unification constrains the identification of relevant mechanistic factors5.3 Unification constrains confirmation of competitive mechanistic models6 ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

In his short essay, “Some Character-Types Met With in Psycho-Analytic Work,” published in 1916 in the review Imago, Freud identifies Ibsen’s drama Rosmersholm (1886) as a perfect example of an Oedipus complex in a modern setting. The story is well known. After the suicide of his wife Beata, brought about by the impossibility of bearing children and by the misery of an existence sacrificed to social and religious duties, John Rosmer, a Protestant pastor, has lost his old faith and is (...) desirous of founding a new morality aimed at joy and tolerance. He lives in a completely spiritual relationship with the young maid Rebecca, the expression of a daring liveliness and unrestricted femininity. Their .. (shrink)

In this volume, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and (...) directions in the discipline. (shrink)

The role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in influencing creative thinking has been investigated by many researchers who, while succeeding in proving an effective involvement of PFC, reported suggestive but sometimes conflicting results. In order to better understand the relationships between creative thinking and brain activation in a more specific area of the PFC, we explored the role of dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC). We devised an experimental protocol using transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS). The study was based on a 3 (kind of stimulation: (...) anodal vs. cathodal vs. sham) × 2 (priming: divergent vs. convergent) design. Forty-five healthy adults were randomly assigned to one stimulation condition. Participants’ creativity skills were assessed using the Product Improvement subtest from the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT). After 20 min of tDCS stimulation, participants were presented with visual images of common objects. Half of the participants were instructed to visualize themselves using the object in an unusual way (divergent priming), whereas the other half were asked to visualize themselves while using the object in a common way (convergent priming). Priming was aimed at inducing participants to adopt different attitudes toward the creative task. Afterwards, participants were asked to describe all of the possible uses of the objects that were presented. Participants’ physiological activation was recorded using a biofeedback equipment. Results showed a significant effect of anodal stimulation that enhanced creative performance, but only after divergent priming. Participants showed lower skin temperature values after cathodal stimulation, a finding which is coherent with studies reporting that, when a task is not creative or creative thinking is not prompted, people show lower levels of arousal. Differences in individual levels of creativity as assessed by the Product Improvement test were not influential. The involvement of DLPFC in creativity has been supported, presumably in association to shift of attention modulated by priming. (shrink)

A partir del contexto que la crisis de la modernidad delimita, la función de la técnica ha sido objeto de controversia en el pensamiento del siglo XX. Esta aportación pretende dar cuenta de la concepción que Ortega y Blumenberg tuvieron de la técnica y de cómo se articula esa idea en su filosofía. A su vez, también pretende establecer los puntos de unión que existen en las ideas sobre la técnica que ambos filósofos defendieron en tanto que estas ideas tienen (...) validez para pensar hoy nuestra realidad. La comprensión de la técnica como el medio propio del ser humano para la realización de su proyecto vital y para su autoafirmación ofrece una mirada positiva frente a discursos que demonizan la técnica. (shrink)

Superoscillating functions are band-limited functions that can oscillate faster than their fastest Fourier component. The study of the evolution of superoscillations as initial datum of field equations requires the notion of supershift, which generalizes the concept of superoscillations. The present paper has a dual purpose. The first one is to give an updated and self-contained explanation of the strategy to study the evolution of superoscillations by referring to the quantum-mechanical Schrödinger equation and its variations. The second purpose is to treat (...) the Dirac equation in relativistic quantum theory. The treatment of the evolution of superoscillations for the Dirac equation can be deduced by recent results on the Klein–Gordon equation, but further additional considerations are in order, which are fully described in this paper. (shrink)

This book will gather contributions from international scholars with the aim of exploring the political reflection of Deleuze-Guattari’s and Foucault’s critical encounter with psychoanalytic thought: their possible connections, their divergences and the fields of reflection that this encounter opens, the problems and debates that lead Foucault and Deleuze to engage with psychoanalysis.

The Cognitive Reserve (CR) hypothesis suggests that the brain actively attempts to cope with neural damages by using pre-existing cognitive processing approaches or by enlisting compensatory approaches. This would allow an individual with high CR to better cope with aging than an individual with lower CR. Many of the proxies used to assess CR indirectly refer to the flexibility of thought. The present paper aims at directly exploring the relationships between CR and creativity, a skill that includes flexible thinking. We (...) tested a sample of 72 adults (aged between 45 and 78) assessing both their level of CR and their creativity. To evaluate CR we used the proxies commonly used in literature, namely, three subtests from the WAIS (vocabulary, similarities, and digit span) and the years of education. We also used an ad-hoc test asking people to report how frequently they tend to perform activities that are believed to increase CR. We used verbal creativity tasks (alternative uses and generation of acronyms) to assess individual levels of creativity. We asked participants to describe their main occupation (present or past) and coded each occupation as creative or not creative. Results (controlling for age-related differences) showed that scores from the WAIS correlated positively with creativity performance, even though correlations varied across the subtests. Focusing on the frequency and type of activities that people perform, and comparing individuals who have or had a creative job to those with a routine job, a clear relationship between creativity and CR emerged. This effect was more relevant than the level of job complexity. Implications for the study of CR and aging are discussed. (shrink)

According to the reward-prediction error hypothesis of dopamine, the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain signals a discrepancy between the predicted and currently experienced reward of a particular event. It can be claimed that this hypothesis is deep, elegant and beautiful, representing one of the largest successes of computational neuroscience. This paper examines this claim, making two contributions to existing literature. First, it draws a comprehensive historical account of the main steps that led to the formulation and subsequent (...) success of the RPEH. Second, in light of this historical account, it explains in which sense the RPEH is explanatory and under which conditions it can be justifiably deemed deeper than the incentive salience hypothesis of dopamine, which is arguably the most prominent contemporary alternative to the RPEH. (shrink)

Veissière and collaborators ground their account of culture and social norms in the free-energy principle, which postulates that the utility of an outcome is equivalent to its probability. This equivalence would mean that their account entails that complying with social norms has always adaptive value. But, this is false, because many social norms are obviously maladaptive.

How should the information that a proposition p is a mystery impact your credence in p? To answer this question, we first provide a taxonomy of mysteries; then, we develop a test to distinguish two types of mysteries. When faced with mysteries of the first type, rational epistemic agents should lower their credence in p upon learning that p is a mystery. The same information should not impact agents’ credence in p, when they face mysteries of the second type. Our (...) account of mystery complements existing explications of abduction. We illustrate its significance by examining the mystery of consciousness. (shrink)

Un análisis de la evolución de la macrodominancia de nuestra especie, de los excesos corporativos, de la generación de poblaciones de marginados de la calidad de vida posible y del acceso al conocimiento crítico. La responsabilidad de nuestra especie en la degradación cultural de vastos sectores de la población mundial y de las condiciones para una biodiversidad sustentable.

The corporate social responsibility and industrial relations studies have evolved mostly in parallel. In this paper, we integrate the IR with the CSR perspective, highlighting their similarities and differences. In particular, the study adopts a framework which includes a wide set of CSR-related issues to explore what unions and companies negotiate under the umbrella of CSR. It analyses and compares the national sectoral agreements of two key industries in the Italian economy, i.e. Metal and Chemical. We find that these two (...) sectors exhibit differences because the CSR-related issues covered by the two contracts are formally labelled as CSR in the Chemical contract, and not labelled as CSR in the Metal contract. We also find similarities regarding the CSR-related issues covered and not covered by the national contracts, and the binding processes centrally negotiated for their implementation. We interpret the similarities in light of the specificities of the Italian IR system, and the differences in light of the negotiation traditions of the two sectors under study, which induce the actors in the Metal sector to focus more on what differentiates the CSR and IR perspectives, and the actors in the Chemical sector to focus more on what the CSR and IR perspectives share. (shrink)

The relation between probabilistic and explanatory reasoning is a classical topic in philosophy of science. Most philosophical analyses are concerned with the compatibility of Inference to the Best Explanation with probabilistic, Bayesian inference, and the impact of explanatory considerations on the assignment of subjective probabilities. This paper reverses the question and asks how causal and explanatory considerations are affected by probabilistic information. We investigate how probabilistic information determines the explanatory value of a hypothesis, and in which sense folk explanatory practice (...) can be said to be rational. Our study identifies three main factors in reasoning about a explanatory hypothesis: cognitive salience, rational acceptability and logical entailment. This corresponds well to the variety of philosophical accounts of explanation. Moreover, we show that these factors are highly sensitive to manipulations of probabilistic information. This finding suggests that probabilistic reasoning is a crucial part of explanatory inferences, and it motivates new avenues of research in the debate about Inference to the Best Explanation and probabilistic measures of explanatory power. (shrink)

Partendo dalle definizioni che Ricoeur e Merleau-Ponty assegnano al concetto di filosofi a, è mia intenzione mostrare come non una metafisica tradizionalmente intesa, quanto un ideale metafisico insito in una teoria filosofica della conoscenza appaia e sia necessario ai fini dell’investigazione dell’esperienza. Ritengo che la dialettica tra trascendenza ed immanenza della verità nella storia, nonostante le diverse declinazioni dovute agli interessi dei due pensatori, possa contribuire a rendere un’immagine unitaria e, a più riprese, interdipendente di Ricoeur da Merleau-Ponty e di (...) quest’ultimo alla luce della revisione ermeneutica operata all’interno della fenomenologia dal filosofo di Valence.En partant des définitions que Ricoeur et Merleau-Ponty donnent du concept de philosophie, c’est mon intention de montrer comment non pas une métaphysique au sens traditionnel, mais un idéal métaphysique logé dans une théorie philosophique de la connaissance apparaît et est nécessaire dans la perspective d’une investigation de l’expérience. Je soutiens que la dialectique entre transcendance et immanence de la vérité dans l’histoire, quelles que soient les différentes déclinaisons qu’elle connaît dans les intérêts des deux penseurs, peut contribuer à donner une image unitaire et, à plusieurs reprises, à montrer une interdépendance de Ricoeur à l’égard de Merleau-Ponty et de ce dernier à l’égard de la révision herméneutique opérée à l’intérieur de la phénoménologie par le philosophe de Valence.By starting from the definitions that Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty give to the concept of philosophy, I intend to show how a metaphysical ideal lodged in a philosophical theory of knowledge, and not a metaphysics in the traditional sense, appears and is necessary when viewed from the perspective of experience. I hold that the dialectic between transcendence and immanence of the truth in history, despite the difference of interest in how it is developed by the two thinkers, can contribute to the formation of an unified image and, in several ways, to showing an interdependence of Ricoeur in relation to Merleau-Ponty and of Merleau-Ponty in relation to the hermeneutical revision effected within phenomenology by the philosopher from Valence. (shrink)

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk (...) precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought. (shrink)