A recent article by Kuhn1 showcases the plethora of proposed solutions for the mind-body problem as it is understood in current ’consciousness science’. Perusing this article, philosophers will likely find it surprising to see the inclusion of for instance Indian idealism and Bhuddist thought, but neither German, nor British or US idealists, which seems especially unbalanced when instead of them theories like Kastrup’s analytical idealism (Hegel for physicists?) or Hoffmann’s interface theory (Kant for psychologists?) are included. The listings of dualist, (...) panpsychist and further theories seems equally eclectic, with for instance Descartes no more than a side-note in a number of entries, but several listings of religious ideas of body and soul. A possible problem with such omissions is of course that not taking philosophical history more seriously comes with the peril of repeating (now) avoidable errors. Nevertheless, judging from the disclaimers, Kuhn is well aware of this and most likely sees his list as more of a ’sociology of consciousness science’, i.e. a list of people and ideas that are currently circulating in this field. -/- It can in any case be taken from Kuhn’s monumental work effort, that it is often assumed that a solution to the mind-body problem would be either (in the wider sense) materialistic (including nonreductive and quantum theories), dualistic, panpsychistic (including monist theories) or idealistic. The core problems faced are then those of emergence (of consciousness), interaction (between brain and mind), de/combination (of ‘mind dust’ or a unity into proper subjects) or emanation, where the emanation problem is the problem of explaining in detail(!) how the physical world and our scientific theories arise from a given idealistic setup. To me it seems more likely that all these views have a point, but that none manages to cover the whole picture – and that it therefore might be possible to integrate these views into ’consensus models’, if we do not look at the proposed solutions, but the initial intentions and/or intuitions for setting them up (much like as if we would mediate a social conflict). (shrink)

As we read his work, John Rawls was developing an innovative approach to political philosophy, and Political Liberalism struggles with different ways to model these new insights. This article presents four models of political liberalism, particularly focusing on understanding the nature of overlapping consensus and its relation to public reason. Beyond clarifying Rawls’s insights, we aim to spur readers to reassemble the rich elements of Political Liberalism to produce tractable and enlightening models of political life among free (...) and equal citizens under conditions of deep diversity to advance the public reason project. (shrink)

The paper considers the problem of how a distributed system of agents (who communicate only via a localised network) might achieve consensus by copying beliefs (copy) from each other and doing some belief pruning themselves (drop). This is explored using a social simulation model, where beliefs interact with each other via a compatibility function, which assigns a level of compatibility (which is a sort of weak consistency) to a set of beliefs. The probability of copy and drop processes occurring (...) is based on the increase in compatibility this process might result in. This allows for a process of collective consensus building whilst allowing for temporarily incompatible beliefs to be held by an agent. (shrink)

The introductory essay to this collection correctly observes that there are many “challenges for rapprochement” between anthropology and (the rest of) cognitive science. Still, the possibilities of fruitful interchanges provide some hope for the parties getting back together, at least on an intermittent basis. This response offers some views concerning the “incompatibility” of psychology and anthropology, reviews why cognitive anthropology drifted away from cognitive science, and notes two areas of contemporary interest within cognitive anthropology that may lead to a re-engagement.

Contemporary bioethics is a peculiar creature. What was once a subdivision of moral theology and philosophy tended mainly within the confines of schools of arts and sciences or seminaries has now become a quasi-profession whose practitioners come from a wide variety of disciplines. Perhaps still more intriguing is that the of this discipline routinely engage the public at the hospital bedside, in the institutional boardroom, and through public policy consultation. Bioethicists have actively embraced these roles as the natural outgrowth of (...) their research and study. Contemporary bioethics is thus a It is study and research but completes itself in public engagement. (shrink)

With questions raised as to whether or not nursing knowledge should be developed from extant conceptual/theoretical models or from practice-based environments, this paper utilizes Kuhn's disciplinary matrix and Laudan's model of consensus formation to explore the changing nature of the discipline's structural matrix. Kuhn's notion that a discipline's structural matrix includes symbolic generalizations, models and exemplars, and Laudan's view that a maturing discipline embraces factual, methodological, and axiological (goals and aims) knowledge, and that context and discourse are (...) also involved in advancing a discipline is described as a means for reconciling the source of nursing knowledge. This paper posits that shared axiological goals connect both theorists and practitioners, and resolve potential conflicts as to viable sources of nursing knowledge. Through shared goals that include humanization, meaning, quality of life, caring, consciousness, transcendence, and presence, which bridge both theoretical and practice approaches, nursing's charge to contribute to the good of society is fulfilled. (shrink)

1. Introduction; Elisabeth A. Lloyd and Eric Winsberg.- Section 1: Confirmation and Evidence.- 2. The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong?; Naomi Oreskes.- 3. Satellite Data and Climate Models Redux.- 3a. Introduction to Chapter 3: Satellite Data and Climate Models; Elisabeth A. Lloyd.- Ch. 3b Fact Sheet to "Consistency of Modelled and Observed Temperature Trends in the Tropical Troposphere"; Benjamin D. Santer et al..- Ch. 3c Reprint of "Consistency of Modelled and (...) Observed Temperature Trends in the Tropical Troposphere"; Benjamin D. Santer et al..- 4. The Role of ’Complex’ Empiricism in the Debates about Satellite Data and Climate Models; Elisabeth A. Lloyd.- 5. Reconciling Climate Model/Data Discrepancies: The Case of the Trees That Didn’t Bark; Michael Mann.- 6. Downscaling of Climate Information; Linda O. Mearns et al..- Section 2: Uncertainties and Robustness.- 7. The Significance of Robust Model Projections; Wendy S. Parker.- 8. Building Trust, Removing Doubt? Robustness Analysis and Climate Modeling; Jay Odenbaugh.- Section 3: Climate Models as Guides to Policy.- 9. Climate Model Confirmation: From Philosophy to Predicting Climate in the Real World; Reto Knutti.- 10. Uncertainty in Climate Science and Climate Policy; Jonathan Rougier and Michel Crucifix.- 11. Communicating Uncertainty to Policy Makers: The Ineliminable Role of Values; Eric Winsberg.- 12. Modeling Climate Policies: A Critical Look at Integrated Assessment Models; Mathias Frisch.- 13. Modelling Mitigation and Adaptation Policies to Predict their Effectiveness: The Limits of Randomized Controlled Trials; Alexandre Marcellesi and Nancy D. Cartwright. (shrink)

Choice modellers are frequently criticized for failing to provide accurate representations of the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions. Several authors maintain that recent neuro-psychological findings enable choice modellers to overcome this alleged shortcoming. Some advocate a realistic interpretation of neuro-psychological models of choice, according to which these models posit sub-personal entities with specific neuro-psychological counterparts and characterize those entities accurately. In this article, I articulate and defend three complementary arguments to demonstrate that, contrary to emerging consensus, even the (...) best available neuro-psychological models of choice cannot be justifiably given this realistic interpretation. Moreover, I explicate what challenges will continue to hamper neuro-psychological modellers’ attempts to substantiate a realistic interpretation of their models. In doing so, I draw on the literature on scientific modelling to advance the ongoing philosophical discussion concerning the ontological status of the sub-personal entities posited in distinct decision sciences, the resemblance relations that supposedly connect choice models and the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions, and what conditions these models must satisfy to be regarded as realistic representations of their target systems. (shrink)

Informed consent is a central concept in the literature on the ethics of clinical care and human subjects research. There is a broad consensus that ethical practice in these domains requires the informed consent of patients and subjects. The requirements of informed consent in these domains, however, are matters of considerable controversy. Some argue that the requirements of informed consent have been inflated, others that they have not been taken seriously enough. This essay argues that both sides are partly (...) right. To advance this argument, the essay distinguishes a general doctrine of informed consent from what it characterizes as “models of informed consent.” A general doctrine articulates a set of requirements for informed consent and then adjusts these requirements to fit the context in which they are to be applied. In contrast, different models of informed consent impose different requirements in different contexts. The essay contends that different models of informed consent are needed for clinical care and clinical research. It outlines these two models, articulates the rationale for distinguishing them, and considers and rebuts the objection that clinical care and clinical research are too deeply intertwined in contemporary medicine for the models approach to apply to them. (shrink)

Scientists appeal to models when explaining phenomena. Such explanations are often dubbed model explanations or model-based explanations. But what are the precise conditions for ME? Are ME special explanations? In our paper, we first rebut two definitions of ME and specify a more promising one. Based on this analysis, we single out a related conception that is concerned with explanations that are induced from working with a model. We call them ‘model-induced explanations’. Second, we study three paradigmatic cases of (...) alleged ME. We argue that all of them are MIE, upon closer examination. Third, we argue that this undermines the building consensus that model explanations are special explanations that, e.g., challenge the factivity of explanation. Instead, it suggests that what is special about models in science is the epistemology behind how models induce explanations. (shrink)

PurposeAlthough an increasing body of literature suggests a relationship between brain irradiation and deterioration of neurocognitive function, it remains as the standard therapeutic and prophylactic modality in patients with brain tumors. This review was aimed to abstract and evaluate the prediction models for radiation-induced neurocognitive decline in patients with primary or secondary brain tumors.MethodsMEDLINE was searched on October 31, 2021 for publications containing relevant truncation and MeSH terms related to “radiotherapy,” “brain,” “prediction model,” and “neurocognitive impairments.” Risk of bias (...) was assessed using the Prediction model Risk Of Bias ASsessment Tool.ResultsOf 3,580 studies reviewed, 23 prediction models were identified. Age, tumor location, education level, baseline neurocognitive score, and radiation dose to the hippocampus were the most common predictors in the models. The Hopkins verbal learning and the trail making tests were the most frequent outcome assessment tools. All studies used regression as machine learning method. All models were judged to have a high risk of bias mainly due to issues in the analysis.ConclusionExisting models have limited quality and are at high risk of bias. Following recommendations are outlined in this review to improve future models: developing cognitive assessment instruments taking into account the peculiar traits of the different brain tumors and radiation modalities; adherence to model development and validation guidelines; careful choice of candidate predictors according to the literature and domain expert consensus; and considering radiation dose to brain substructures as they can provide important information on specific neurocognitive impairments. (shrink)

Ethics commissions are government advisory commissions mandated to give expert advice on contentious moral issues. As this requires making explicit value judgments, members with expert knowledge of ethics have a natural place as members of such commissions. Apart from these commissions being widespread, their recommendations assume a special normative authority within the legislative process. This raises many fundamental questions concerning the nature of moral expertise and how such commissions should deal with the political contexts in which they operate. Through a (...) reading of the relevant discussions in the literature in which the underlying normative ideals are located, this article reconstructs four normative models of the proper role of ethics commissions. This reconstruction seeks to contribute to analytical clarity and to elucidate the underlying disagreements concerning our expectations of ethics commissions. The four models, labeled ‘commission consensus model’, ‘society-proxy model’, ‘correctness model’, and ‘deep pluralism model’, differ from one another in terms of two main dimensions: the expertise and the public/political dimensions. After describing the models, giving examples from the literature on how they can be explicated, and describing an empirical example of a commission that has approximated the ideals, the strengths and weaknesses of the four models are discussed before the article concludes by asking whether there is one correct model of ethics commissions. (shrink)

When a group of agents attempts to reach an agreement on certain issues, it is usually desirable that the resulting consensus be as close as possible to the original judgments of the individuals. However, when these judgments are logically connected to further beliefs, the notion of closeness should also take into account to what extent the individuals would have to revise their entire belief set to reach an agreement. In this work, we present a model for generation of agreement (...) with respect to a given agenda which allows individual epistemic entrenchment to influence the value of the consensus. While the postulates for the transformation function and their construction resemble those of AGM belief revision, the notion of an agenda is adapted from the theory of judgment aggregation. This allows our model to connect both frameworks. (shrink)

I present a case study of scientific discovery, where building two functional and behavioral approximations of neurons, one physical and the other computational, led to conceptual and implementation breakthroughs in a neural engineering laboratory. Such building of external systems that mimic target phenomena, and the use of these external systems to generate novel concepts and control structures, is a standard strategy in the new engineering sciences. I develop a model of the cognitive mechanism that connects such built external systems with (...) internal models, and I examine how new discoveries, and consensus on discoveries, could arise from this external‐internal coupling and the building process. The model is based on the emerging framework of common coding, which proposes a shared representation in the brain between the execution, perception, and imagination of movement. (shrink)

Compared to standard liberal approaches to public reason and justification, the asymmetric convergence model of public justification allows for the public justification of laws and policies based on a convergence of quite different and even publicly inaccessible reasons. The model is asymmetrical in the sense of identifying a broader range of reasons that may function as decisive defeaters of proposed laws and policies. This paper raises several critical questions about the asymmetric convergence model and its central but ambiguous presumption against (...) coercion. By drawing on the theory of structural coercion, a main conclusion of the paper is that the asymmetric convergence model ultimately encounters the very incompleteness problems that its proponents often associate with more familiar consensus models of public justification. The paper also develops an alternative, Rawlsian-inspired account of public justification that includes elements of both convergence and consensus but not asymmetry. The Rawlsian model enables us to understand how democratic decisions may possess a degree of procedural, but still morally significant, liberal legitimacy under conditions of pluralism even when citizens fail to agree fully about either the premises of or conclusions to their political arguments. (shrink)

Though the very task of modeling God implies that the reality of God is to some degree unknowable, there are a variety of positions one may take concerning the degree to which one has epistemic access to God. If our models of God are too influenced by subjectivity, it makes no sense to test them against each other in rational competition. In this essay, I define four possible positions that may underlie the task of God-modeling: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, (...) and fallibilism. Of these four, I propose that fallibilism is the most appropriate method for constructing models of God. Fallibilism simultaneously assumes that our models are able to refer to a divine reality, and yet always with a tentative stance, as absolute confirmation or universal consensus concerning them will almost certainly never be obtained. Models of God can engage in rational competition, but a final decision will probably be delayed indefinitely. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

In “Consensus, Clinical Decision Making, and Unsettled Cases,” David M. Adams and William J. Winslade make multiple references to both editions of the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation in their discussion of two assumptions that are supposed to be at the heart of the facilitated consensus model’s inability to handle unsettled cases; that is, that:1. Consultants “should maintain a kind of moral impartiality or neutrality throughout the process,” “explicitly condemn[ing] anything (...) resembling a substantive ‘ethics’ recommendation,” and2. “What counts as the proper set of allowable options among which the parties are to deliberate will itself always be clearly discernible.”Herein, I argue that neither of these assumptions is required by ASBH’s ethics facilitation approach. I then conclude by suggesting that, despite their fundamentally mistaken interpretation of the ASBH approach—perhaps even because of it—Adams and Winslade have made two important contributions to the ethics consultation literature. (shrink)

Carl F. H. Henry has widely been acknowledged for his contributions to evangelical social concern. What has not been fully appreciated though is theological foundations that undergirded Henry’s priority model as it relates to the relationship between the church social and evangelistic mandates. For Henry, the key to both was the doctrine of revelation, and this foundation enabled Henry to uniquely argue for both integration and prioritization. As such, Henry presents a challenge to many contemporary models of evangelism and (...) social concern that set the two on an even plane by locating them within a kingdom rubric. Despite accusations that his theological method fosters information over transformation, Henry hold forth a revelation centered approach with Augustinian roots capable of guiding the contemporary church on the elusive issue of finding a biblical approach to its mission. (shrink)

Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. (...) Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined. (shrink)

L'assimilation des images à une attitude chrétienne correcte fut le résultat d'un long débat sur la nature du culte chrétien. Les icones n'excluaient pas d'autres approches comme la vertu chrétienne , mais elles faisaient désormais partie inextricablement d'une éthique chrétienne complète. Les hagiographies de Théodore Stoudite, de Photios, de Nicéphore ont contribué à la diffusion du culte des images comme une pratique chrétienne acceptable. L'exemple miraculeux de Michel au sanctuaire d'Eusèbe intervient également dans la mise en place d'un consensus.

While Specific Informed Consent has been the established standard for obtaining consent for medical research for many years, it does not appear suitable for large-scale biobank and health data research. Thus, alternative forms of consent have been suggested, based on a variety of ethical background assumptions. This article identifies five main ethical perspectives at stake. Even though Tiered Consent, Dynamic Consent and Meta Consent are designed to the demands of the self-determination perspective as well as the perspective of research as (...) a public good, they are still also criticized from both perspectives. In addition, criticisms based on concerns of justice, participation and democratic deliberation, and relational concerns have been levelled at each of the models. As all of these perspectives have valid points to make, the task at hand lies in balancing these ethical perspectives. What constitutes an adequate balancing depends on contextual factors. These factors include digital infrastructure and digital literacy, data safety regulation, good scientific and clinical practice, transparent debates on ethically relevant features of research, social inequalities, anti-discrimination laws and practices, trust in health care institutions and recognition of patient preferences, and consensus on unethical research. We argue that the role of context in determining acceptable models of consent puts the ethical importance of models of consent into perspective. Since altering contextual factors can help to live up to the ethical concerns at stake in debates about models of consent, opting for such a shift of focus comes without ethical loss. (shrink)

This contribution provides an assessment of the epistemological role of scientific models. The prevalent view that all scientific models are representations of the world is rejected. This view points to a unified way of resolving epistemic issues for scientific models. The emerging consensus in philosophy of science that models have many different epistemic roles in science is presented and defended.

Many factors complicate the education of urban students. Among them have been issues related to population density; racial, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity; poverty; racism ; and funding levels. Although urban educators have been addressing these issues for decades, placing them under the umbrella of "urban education" and treating them as a specific area of practice and inquiry is relatively recent. Despite the wide adoption of the term a consensus about its meaning exists at only the broadest of levels. (...) In short, urban education remains an ill-defined concept. This comprehensive volume addresses this definitional challenge and provides a 3-part conceptual model in which the achievement of equity for all -- regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity – is an ideal that is central to urban education. The model also posits that effective urban education requires attention to the three central issues that confronts all education systems _accountability_ of individuals and the institutions in which they work, _leadership_, which occurs in multiple ways and at multiple levels, and _learning_, which is the raison d'être of education. Just as a three-legged stool would fall if any one leg were weak or missing, each of these areas is essential to effective urban education and affects the others. (shrink)

The model of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) defended in the ASBH Core Competencies report has gained significant traction among scholars and healthcare providers. On this model, the aim of CEC is to facilitate deliberative reflection and thereby resolve conflicts and clarify value uncertainty by invoking and pursuing a process of consensus building. It is central to the model that the facilitated consensus falls within a range of allowable options, defined by societal values: prevailing legal requirements, widely endorsed organizational (...) policies, and professional standards of practice and codes of conduct. Moreover, the model stipulates that ethics consultants must refrain from giving substantive recommendations regarding how parties to a moral disagreement in the clinic should evaluate their options. We argue that this model of CEC is incomplete, because it wrongly assumes that what counts as the proper set of allowable options among which the parties are to deliberate will itself always be clearly discernible. We illustrate this problem with a recent case on which one of us consulted—a neonate born with trisomy 18 (T18). We try to show that law, policy, and standards of practice reveal no clear answer to the question posed by the case: namely, whether forgoing gastrostomy tube feedings for a baby with T18 is allowable. We suggest there may be other kinds of cases in which it may simply be unsettled whether a given choice falls within the set of allowable options within which consensus is to be facilitated. What should an ethicist do when confronting such unsettled cases? We agree with the facilitation model that an ethicist should remain neutral among the allowable options, when it is clear what the allowable options are. But, in unsettled cases, the role of a consultant should be expanded to include a process of moral inquiry into what the allowable options should be. We end by raising the issue of whether this means an ethicist should share his or her own conclusions or views about the allowability of a given clinical option. (shrink)

By now a consensus has emerged that people, when subjected to high-stakes decisions through automated decision systems, have a moral right to have these decisions explained to them. However, furnishing such explanations can be costly. So the right to an explanation creates what we call the cost problem: providing subjects of automated decisions with appropriate explanations of the grounds of these decisions can be costly for the companies and organisations that use these automated decision systems. In this paper, we (...) explore whether large language models could prove significant in overcoming the cost problem. We provide an initial case for believing that they can but only with serious ethical costs. (shrink)

Biomedical science has been remarkably successful in explaining illness by categorizing diseases and then by identifying localizable lesions such as a virus and neoplasm in the body that cause those diseases. Not surprisingly, researchers have aspired to apply this powerful paradigm to addiction. So, for example, in a review of the neuroscience of addiction literature, Hyman and Malenka (2001, p. 695) acknowledge a general consensus among addiction researchers that “[a]ddiction can appropriately be considered as a chronic medical illness.” Like (...) other diseases, “Once addiction has taken hold, it tends to follow a chronic course.” (Koob and La Moal 2006, p. ?). Working from this perspective, much effort has gone into characterizing the symptomology of addiction and the brain changes that underlie them. Evidence for involvement of dopamine transmission changes in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and nucleus accumbens (NAc) have received the greatest attention. Kauer and Malenka (2007, p. 844) put it well: “drugs of abuse can co-opt synaptic plasticity mechanisms in brain circuits involved in reinforcement and reward processing”. Our goal in this chapter to provide an explicit description of the assumptions of medical models, the different forms they may take, and the challenges they face in providing explanations with solid evidence of addiction. <br>. (shrink)

When formulating a policy related to food in a heterogeneous context within a nation or between nations, oppositional positions are more or less explicit, but always have to be overcome. It is interesting to note, though, that such elements as culture and religion have seldom been the focus in discussions about methods of decision-making in food policy. To handle discrepancies between oppositional positions, one solution is to narrow differences between partners, another to accept one partner or position as dominant. In (...) a solid and lasting policy, any of these options has to be agreed upon by all the partners involved. In this article, I argue that context sensitivity and a shared picture of the situation are necessary bases for a solid food policy. Two methods for policy discussion are elaborated on and religious slaughter is given as an example of a heterogeneous setting with strongly diverging ideals. Several aspects have to be respected from the outset, such as culture, religion, and value systems. This condition is partly met in a model of informed consent and in a consensus model. The informed consent model is regarded as insufficient, because it lacks both methods of dealing with hierarchies and the goal of finding a shared and nuanced picture of the situation. A consensus model meets these tasks but might on the other hand, among other things, be too difficult to follow and to administer. For both models, some difficulties with justification of decisions arise. Five essential elements emanating from a combination of these models are suggested as a basis for a decision process regarding food policies: respect for each discussion partner, context sensitivity, respect for arguments including emotions, a shared picture of the situation, and finally relating theory and practice. (shrink)

There exists a widespread consensus amongst contemporary jurisprudents, positivists and non-positivists alike, that the meaning of ‘obligation’ should not radically shift from law to morality, or any of the other domains of practical reason. Yet there is limited effort in contemporary discussions of legal obligation to engage with the metaphysics of normativity with an eye to a well-founded account of those elements that deliver its non-conditional character. On a recent occasion I discussed the shortcomings of a prominent positivist account (...) of legal obligation, that of Jules Coleman. In this chapter I turn to a prominent non-positivist account, the model of principle, and argue that, even though it identifies key elements or conditions of normativity simpliciter, it stops short of delivering a conclusive account of unconditional legal obligation, an account that would place legal obligation in the same continuum with all other types of obligation. Taking up from where the model of principle halts, I propose a complementary—if more fundamental—account of normativity simpliciter, which I dub the model of norms. I make a case for it, by looking into universal conditions of normativity and, in conclusion, offer some more specific remarks about the advantages of the model of norms over other competing models. Part 2 looks into the account of legal obligation tendered by the model of principle. According to it, law is an instance of action-directing action or action that purports to get other agents to comply with the ends it sets out to attain. The idea here is that the very logic of action-direction draws moral reasons—principles—into the picture of legal obligation, as the one item that can explain how and whether the facts of a social practice, which purports to direct action, come to acquire the status of reasons for action for the subjects of law. Subsequently, this model is contrasted with an alternative model of obligation that takes facts of authority to constitute reasons of action in virtue solely of their structure. In conclusion it is argued that, in contrast to the second model, the model of principle manages to capture what is distinctive about action-directing action in the domain of law—that is, the special normative significance of the possibility to coerce others under a scheme of public institutions. Part 3 opens by pointing to a more widespread worry that needs to be addressed before the model of principle can be deemed fit for the role it is employed—the worry relates to the ability of principles to constitute genuine reasons for action. In particular, the enquiry investigates the nature of principles and their ability to avoid certain flaws that might pertain to reasons for action in general. In taking up this line of enquiry the paper looks into the more general debate on normativity with a view to specifying requirements that anything which purports to be a reason ought to meet. I employ a rationalist analysis of normativity, which brings the idea that intentional thought is normative to bear on the analysis of the meaning of normative terms, such as ‘ought’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’. In conclusion, I argue that the content of normativity consists in normative facts—ie norms—which purport to model the content of ideal—or counterfactual—states of the will. Such norms give exhaustively the content of normativity. In light of the above, part 4 advances a two-layered model of norms, with the higher level being populated by norms simpliciter, and the lower by norms in a domain. When considered jointly the two layers ground the possibility of non-conditional obligation without evoking moral realism and the concomitant suspicion of scepticism. On the face of it some key advantages of the model of norms are discussed over the two other models of legal obligation, that of principle and that of authority. On the one hand norms resist the ‘talking past each other objection’ which is commonly levelled against principles. On the other, norms are much better suited to account for the moral limits of action-directing action than either principles or facts of authority, for they illustrate cogently that the grounds of any reason for action already include a concern for others’ autonomy. (shrink)

The Scandinavian working-life tradition is founded on ideas and values similar to the model of conductivity. However, although the Scandinavian working-life tradition is pragmatic and consensus seeking the model of conductivity is stringent following its principles. The pragmatic approach, here represented by the Danish program of “the developmental work,” has made it difficult to follow the vision of the program (to improve working conditions and at the same time meet social and environmental needs). Instead, the program has mainly targeted (...) organizational development in established companies, accepting the existing principles of wealth creation. The model of conductivity can strength the visions behind the pragmatic approach by its conceptualization of an alternative creation of wealth related to opportunities in current working life: a creation of wealth based on skill, creativity and networking among employees across the borders of the organizations and released from the language of management. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show that democratic consensus – one of the more prominent ideals in recent political thought – is an essential byproduct of epistemically warranted beliefs about political action and organization, at least in those cases where the issues under dispute are epistemic in nature. An essential byproduct (to borrow Jon Elster’s term) is a goal that can only be intentionally achieved by aiming at some other objective. In my usage, a political issue is epistemic (...) when there is some right (or at least best) answer concerning how it ought to be resolved that is independent of people’s beliefs or desires about how it ought to be resolved. An important secondary claim, then, is that it is difficult to explain the presumptive value of political deliberation unless we understand a very large share of political issues as epistemic in nature. This view implies a considerably more contentious model of political deliberation but is not incompatible with familiar forms of conciliatory behavior in our public disputes. (shrink)

In the early days of natural language semantics, Donald Davidson issued a challenge to those, like Richard Montague, who would do semantics in a model-theoretic framework that gives a central role to a model-relative notion of truth. Davidson argued that no theory of this kind can claim to be an account of real truth conditions unless it first makes clear how the relativized notion relates to our ordinary non-relativized notion of truth. In the 1990s, Davidson’s challenge was developed by Etchemendy (...) into an argument against the model-theoretic account of logical consequence, one that also threatens the attempt to capture natural language entailment relations in modeltheoretic terms—one of the central desiderata of semantics. Nevertheless, the modeltheoretic framework has flourished within natural language semantics. But it has flourished without any consensus among semanticists as to how to answer Davidson’s challenge. The aim of this essay is to develop an answer. I argue that model-theoretic semantics is best understood as model-based science: a semantics for a natural language is a scientific model of truth conditions. This makes good sense of the way model-theoretic tools are used in natural language semantics. And it allows us to answer Davidson’s challenge by showing how a theory that employs a relativized notion of truth manages to tell us about ordinary truth conditions. Moreover, I argue that it helps us see how semantics can provide genuine explanations for natural language entailment and other truth-conditional phenomena. (shrink)

Public bioethics bodies are used internationally as institutions with the declared aims of facilitating societal debate and providing policy advice in certain areas of scientific inquiry raising questions of values and legitimate science. In the United States, bioethical experts in these institutions use the language of consensus building to justify and define the outcome of the enterprise. However, the implications of public bioethics at science-policy boundaries are underexamined. Political interest in such bodies continues while their influence on societal (...) class='Hi'>consensus, public debate, and science policy remains ambiguous. This article presents a theoretical discussion of public bioethics bodies as boundary organizations and examines them in terms of relationship to the moral and cognitive authority of science and other forms of expertise, mechanisms for public participation in controversial science policy, and the deployment of consensus models. The theoretical discussion is examined in the case of the U.S. Human Embryo Research Panel. (shrink)

This paper argues that the choice of backing to certify the authority of a warrant requires a legitimation inference. When brought into question, such an inference becomes a claim defended by showing sound reasons for the selection of backing pertinent to a shared context. Legitimation controversies ensue when an attributed consensus meets objection. It is argued that attention to legitimation controversies renders the Toulmin model a more useful critical paradigm for investigating the development and risks of communicative reasoning in (...) a public forum. The nomination of John Tower as Secretary of Defense is employed to illustrate how critical analysis of legitimation controversies reflexively expands the domain of inquiry for informal reasoning. (shrink)

The current consensus is that most natural categories are not organized around strict definitions (a list of singly necessary and jointly sufficient features) but rather according to a family resemblance (FR) principle: Objects belong to the same category because they are similar to each other and dissimilar to objects in contrast categories. A number of computational models of category construction have been developed to provide an account of how and why people create FR categories (Anderson, 1990; Fisher, 1987). (...) Surprisingly, however, only a few experiments on category construction or free sorting have been run and they suggest that people do not sort examples by the FR principle. We report several new experiments and a two‐stage model for category construction. This model is contrasted with a variety of other models with respect to their ability to account for when FR sorting will and will not occur. The experiments serve to identify one basis for FR sorting and to support the two‐stage model. The distinctive property of the two‐stage model is that it assumes that people impose more structure than the examples support in the first stage and that the second stage adjusts for this difference between preferred and perceived structure. We speculate that people do not simply assimilate probabilistic structures but rather organize them in terms of discrete structures plus noise. (shrink)

Nietzsche offers us an account of how different drives interact with one another; it is rich but also appears to risk the homunculus fallacy. Competing attempts to deflect this charge on his behalf share an implicit consensus about the ‘epistemic ends’ of the account: they assume Nietzsche is trying to provide true explanations of psychological phenomena. I argue against this consensus. I claim that Nietzsche's characterisations of drive interaction are to be taken as fictive and are not intended (...) to have explanatory value. They nevertheless facilitate genuine epistemic achievement. Drawing on Catherine Elgin's account of the epistemic role of idealised models in science, I argue that Nietzsche's account of drive interaction is a ‘model of the mind’ that, despite relying on falsehoods, can exemplify features of our psychology that aid us in making novel predictions. We then see that Nietzsche neatly sidesteps the homunculus fallacy; we can further understand more fully what Nietzsche hopes his drive psychology will teach us. We can now resolve, for example, outstanding interpretative puzzles about the relationship between psychic integration and Nietzsche’s distinctive notion of spiritual health. (shrink)

The approach to teaching employed in the Dictionary of Medical Ethics (1) provides a model which might be adopted in other media. Most of the 150 authors were medical, but many represented other disciplines, and they wrote for similar professionals and for the general public. Medical ethics is derived from medical science and practice, moral philosophy, sociology, theology, the law and other disciplines, all of which make essential, distinctive and complementary contributions to knowledge and to teaching. Medical practitioners must play (...) the primary role, because they are responsible for clinical ethical decisions, but they need the co-operation and guidance of others. All who are concerned should work towards the development of a general moral consensus among the profession and public, which keeps abreast of scientific and technical advances and to which all are committed. (shrink)

Parameterization and parameter tuning are central aspects of climate modeling, and there is widespread consensus that these procedures involve certain subjective elements. Even if the use of these subjective elements is not necessarily epistemically problematic, there is an intuitive appeal for replacing them with more objective (automated) methods, such as machine learning. Relying on several case studies, we argue that, while machine learning techniques may help to improve climate model parameterization in several ways, they still require expert judgment that (...) involves subjective elements not so different from the ones arising in standard parameterization and tuning. The use of machine learning in parameterizations is an art as well as a science and requires careful supervision. (shrink)

The primary aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the deductive model of ethical applications, which is based on normative ethical theories like deontology and consequentialism, and to show why a number of models have failed to furnish appropriate resolutions to practical moral problems. Here, for the deductive model, I want to call it a “Linear Mechanical Model” because the basic assumption of this model is that if a normative theory is sacrosanct, then the case is as it (...) is. The conclusion derived from the case will also be correct, true and acceptable. However, traditional ethicists used to apply their ethical theories, but they did not know which moral theory was effective on the ground level of reality. The study will show readers how ethical theories are in conflict with each other in the case of euthanasia. In more precise words, “which ethical theories are said to be applied, meta-ethical or normative, or both for the resolution of ethical problems? If normative theories are said to be applied, how the application can take place when it is contrary to our experience, that (then) in a situation of moral crises, no one really applies a theory?” For that, my argument is the linear model has failed because it is rigid, often ignores the agents’ intrinsic values, and has no space to amend it, no matter how bizarre the consequence is. Its alternative is the Inductive model. For that, the paper will take three moral principles (autonomy, beneficence including maleficence, and justice) of Beauchamp & Childress. This suggests us for resolving value-laden moral problems, we should consider some steps such as a) recognising moral issues to start with; b) developing the moral imagination; c) sharpening analytical/critical skills; d) testing out disagreements; e) effecting decisions and behavior; and f) implementation, closure, and process are of vital importance, in other words, it starts with the free and informed consensus of all interested parties, but this model also has been failed because the model could not give a systematic organization to their way of resolution. Here, my argument is that the inductive model provides resolution of the practical problem but ignores what is ethically obligatory, permissible, or wrong in that situation, and there are no appropriate suggestions in the case of a moral crisis. (shrink)

Capitalism has been an unprecedented engine of wealth creation for many centuries, leading to sustained productivity gains and long-term growth and lifting an increasing proportion of humanity out of poverty. But its effects, and hence its future, have come increasingly under question: Is capitalism still improving wealth and well-being for the many? Or, is long-term value creation being sacrificed to the pressures of short-termism, with potentially far-reaching consequences for society, the natural environment, prosperity, and global order? Building on a collaboration (...) between the Schulich School of Business and global management consultancy McKinsey & Company, this volume reflects both the urgency of the needed action and the tremendous opportunity to forge consensus and catalyze a lasting movement toward a more responsible, long-term, and sustainable model of capitalism. This unique volume brings together many of the leading proponents for a reformed, re-imagined capitalism from the Âfields of academia, business, and NGOs. Its contributors have been at the forefront of thought and action in regard to the future of capitalism. Both individually and collectively, they provide powerful suggestions of what such a long-term oriented model of capitalism should look like and how it can be achieved. Drawing on their research and professional experience, they write in an accessible style aiming to reach the broad audiences required to turn a re-imagined capitalism into a reality. (shrink)

Les « collectifs en ligne » proposent un modèle original qui cherche à rendre compatible d'une part la production de quasi-unanimités avec l'exigence de ne pas perdre de temps dans la production de consensus, d'autre part l'intérêt pour la discussion argumentée avec la mise en oeuvre de techniques de délibération et de vote. L'article explore le fonctionnement de ces communautés virtuelles, en faisant l'hypothèse qu'elles construisent un modèle souverainiste de délibération.The "online group" . Propose an original model that seeks (...) to make it compatible with a production share of almost unanimities with the requirement not to lose time in the production of consensus, On the other hand the interest in reasoned discussion with the technical implementation of deliberation and vote. The article explores how these virtual communities, assuming they construct a model of deliberation sovereignty. (shrink)

Criticism of Larry Laudan's views on disagreement and progress in science.

I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation of the (...) feeling of agency. However, within the literature there is a growing sense of unease with the model; a consensus seems to be building that the model is not up to the task of explaining all of the new discoveries made regarding the feeling of agency since its inception. Most problematically there are paradigms which deeply challenge the comparator model by suggesting that a weak feeling of agency can be elicited even when no motor prediction is formed. The new account offered here inherits the explanatory power of the comparator model whilst avoiding this problem. (shrink)

Economics is currently experiencing a climate of uncertainty regarding the soundness of its theoretical framework and even its status as a science. Much of the criticism is within the discipline, and emphasises the alleged failure of the neoclassical viewpoint. This article proposes the deployment of partial modelling, utilising Boolean networks (BNs), as an inductive discovery procedure for the development of economic theory. The method is presented in detail and then linked to the Semantic View of Theories (SVT), closely identified with (...) Bas van Fraassen and Patrick Suppes, in which models are construed as mediators creatively negotiating between theory and reality. It is suggested that this approach may be appropriate for economics and, by implication, for any science in which there is no consensus theory, and a wide range of viewpoints compete for acceptance. (shrink)

This paper is a rejoinder to Alan Irwin's constructive response "Agreeing to Differ?" to our (2017) paper. We zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises, namely (a) How to understand consensus? (b) Why are so many public participation activities consensus-driven? (c) Should we not value the art of closure, of finding ways to make agreements, particularly in view of the dire state of world politics today? We use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some of (...) our ideas. (shrink)