House of Lords authority in Tesco v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 has reinforced the well-established principle that judicial review will distinguish between relevant and irrelevant considerations pertaining to the exercise of a power, and leave the weighing of the relevant ones to the decision-maker. It has also problematized the principle by insisting that relevant factors may adequately be taken into account even where the decision-maker allows them no influence (subject to challenge for irrationality). It (...) is difficult to accept that a legislative identification of relevant factors need not influence the decision-maker, and the article begins by observing that this proposition would probably not have been accepted at the time of Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578. It is argued in the article, however, that the proper influence of the relevant can be accommodated within the decision-making process while upholding the Tesco principle. The article therefore charts the activities which are logically implicit in a decision-making process including the consideration and weighing of relevant factors, and locates opportunities for legal challenge. The influence of the expressly relevant must be felt when the decision-maker has to decide whether other factors are impliedly relevant. It will equally be registered when a basis for the assessment of weight is established (weight being impossible to gauge without the prior formulation of criteria of influence). The process of weighing itself is shown to require two separate assessments; the first particular to each factor, the second comparative. This distinction allows explanation of those explanation of those authorities which require substantial weight to be given to certain protected factors, and helps to define the nature of irrationality challenges to absurd weighing. In summary, the article takes a rigorous look at what weight is, how it is assessed, how it differs from relevance, and to what extent a flawed assessment of it can be challenged. (shrink)

Fichte’s Doctrine of Science of 1811 offers a sound model for explaining the conditions of semantics in its connection with the idea of freedom. Following Wolfram Hogrebe’s suggestion that the principle of contradiction works as an archaeological semantic postulate, i.e., is the implicit condition for any sentence to be meaningful, we argue that in Fichte’s definition of the phenomenon we find such a semantic postulate at a higher genetic level than the principle of contradiction indicated by Hogrebe. Moreover, the Doctrine (...) of Science of 1811 offers an analysis of the steps through which this phenomenon displays itself – i.e. Vermögen, als, Soll – which can be understood as the conditions for establishing a meaningful sentence. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre 1811 kann uns einen soliden Modell zur Erklärung der Entstheung von Semantik anbieten. Mein Beitrag fangt mit der Darstellung Wolfram Hogrebes Hypothese an, dass der Satz vom Widerspruch als archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat fungiert, d.h. als implizite Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeglicher bedeutenden Äußerung. Ausgehend dieser Idee Hogrebes, hier schlage ich vor, dass man im Fichtes Begriffe der Erscheinung ein genetisch höheres archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat als der Satz vom Widerspruch finden kann. Daraufhin bietet die Wissenschaftslehre 1811 einen Einsicht in alle Schritte, wodurch die Erscheinung sich entfaltet – Vermögen, Durch, Als, Soll – die wir als die entsprechende Bedingungen für die Herstellung eines bedeutungsvollen Satzes verstehen können. (shrink)

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true (...) self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity. (shrink)

There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we mustn't assume that realism about consciousness incorporates (...) them, or that denying them means denying that consciousness exists. And we must assess whether they're accurate independently of how they arise. (shrink)

Building on Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love this book takes up the "question of the Other" and argues that through the interpretive activities of the amorous imagination lovers come to experience one another as the Beloved.

The world is disenchanted. Rationalization, intellectualization, and scientism rule the day. We used to see the world as a magical place, but now it's just a material space. How did we get here? The shift comes in part from the rise of a certain kind of secularism, one that reduces human experiences to whatever is explainable through observation. Love? It's just a biological drive. Joy, a rush of adrenaline. Beauty, an influx of dopamine. If you can't test it, it isn't (...) true; or so the thinking goes. The Romantic Life draws upon eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism to provide five strategies to re-enchant the world, five ways to imbue the world with meaning, truth, and beauty. According to the Romantics, far from being useless, encounters with impractical things like the imagination, nature, symbolism, sincerity, and the sublime give our lives a richness and depth that cannot be attained on a purely material account of the world. By learning from their example, we can come to see into the life of things, as William Wordsworth called it. We can be re-enchanted" -- taken from back cover. (shrink)

In the world today, human beings are confronted with a number of problems due ultimately to the apparent conflicts among the different religions (religious faiths). Religious attitudes, ideas, and practices differ and even seem to be incompatible with one another. I argue, however, that these faiths do not contradict. To see this, we need to engage in the comparative study of religion. This will show that the ultimate aim of all the world's religions is to establish unity among people, and (...) will thereby provide a basis for tolerance and understanding on the part of the followers of every religion towards other religions. (shrink)

In the present article the author studies and reviews the essential scientific opinions and discourse on the understanding of the term and phenomena of Cybernetics. The article is the author's vision of the concept of cybernetic epistemology based on its progressive methodological features. The main idea of the understanding of the information warfare category as a complex social system in the context of cybernetic epistemology is also developed in the present research. The concept of complexity theory has not yet been (...) applied in the study of ontological characteristics of the "information warfare" phenomenon so far. This kind of analyzing method allows us to highlight the true essential characteristics of "information warfare". There are recursiveness and spontaneous nature among them. This kind of epistemology methods and their possible and proper application in Cybernetics were analyzed and reviewed in the present paper. Such an analyzing confirmed the relevance of this research for the formalization of the world’s complex phenomena. It also determined the possibility of constructive generalization of knowledge and research data. However, this knowledge should be gained in the process of complex formalization of the studied phenomena characteristics and the maximum permissible changes and transformation in their conditions and forms. (shrink)

L'A. étudie le récit d'Eunapius concernant le règne d'Arcadius à partir de la mort de Théodose en 395 jusqu'en 404. Eunapius de Sarde est un sophiste, un philosophe et un historien grec païen qui a vécu de 347 à environ 414 ; il est un exemple de la rédaction helléniste et son travail peut être classé dans la fiction historique. Il s'oppose aux changements politiques, sociaux, économiques et religieux du 4e siècle ainsi qu'aux régimes de Constantin et Théodose. Son héros (...) est Julien l'Apostat. (shrink)

Writing On the Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke tells us the ideas most capable of making an impression are those related to self-preservation and society. Such ideas are bound to our passions. Passions belonging to self-preservation turn on pain or danger.1 Those belonging to society do as well, although in this work, Burke dwells exclusively on pain. Because he tells us the king of terrors is death, we might infer pain is inferior to danger, the latter more formidable. We experience (...) delight in both when they are remote and do not affect us. But this delight, or indeed pleasure of any kind, is less powerful in terms of passion. Possibly for this reason Burke declines to qualify delight or pleasure as a source... (shrink)

Study on the philosophy of Cārvāka, classical Indian materialist.

This chapter contains section titled: Organizing the Notes for On Certainty Groundlessness and Language‐games Searching for Primary Links Between Language and Reality Seeing Logic and Practice Pictures, Propositions and Reality Forms of Life Practices and Parallels Is the Title on Certainty a Happy One? Is on Certainty a Polemic against Moore? Is Wittgenstein's Main Interest in Moore's Propositions the Nature of Nonsense? Does Wittgenstein Say that the Propositions he is Interested in Form a Class, and Does he Say the Same (...) of all of Them? Are Wittgenstein's Propositions Context‐free? What is the Connection between Wittgenstein's Propositions and Logic? Is Wittgenstein Appealing to Primitive, Pre‐linguistic Reactions as the Basis of our Language‐games? What is Meant by the Sureness in Our Language‐games? How are Our Conclusions Related to the Notions of a Form of Life or World‐picture? How do Wittgenstein's Conclusions Differ from Some Classical and Contemporary Views of Our Relation to the World? Rhees's Development of Wittgenstein's Concerns. (shrink)

Originally published in 1972, this book is a systematic analysis of the objectives and methods of history teaching. The book considers the criticisms of the 1960s and 70s of history as a subject and the pressures for its replacement in the school curriculum. It examines the complex psychological background of learning history and suggests that historical understanding makes an important contribution to cognitive growth. It also stresses the important part played by historical material in the emotional and imaginative life of (...) the child. Concluding with a discussion of practical classroom methods, the author proposes objectives and characteristic concepts of the subject which may be embodied in all levels of teaching. (shrink)