Die Geisteswissenschaften zu verstehen, was sie sind und was sie erreichen konnen, ist heute, hundert Jahre nach Diltheys Tod, eine genauso wichtige Aufgabe wie zu dessen Lebzeiten. Diltheys Argumente und seine Position einer umfassenden philosophischen Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften sind auch heute noch von Bedeutung. Seine Verteidigung der Autonomie der geistigen Welt angesichts der positivistischen Herrschaftsanspruche liefert wichtige Gesichtspunkte fur die Evaluierung geisteswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Zum 100. Todestag Diltheys zeigen zehn renommierte Forscher anhand zweier Themengebiete - 'Dilthey and Kant' sowie 'Dilthey and (...) Hermeneutics' - auf, wie Dilthey fur heutige Fragestellungen fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Die deutsch- und englischsprachigen Beitrage sollen insbesondere jenen Wissenschaftlern dienen, die sich der methodischen Erneuerung der intellectual history, der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte sowie der Begriffsgeschichte verpflichtet haben. - Mit Beitragen von Benjamin D. Crowe, Annette Hilt, Theodore Kisiel, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Massimo Mezzanzanica, Jared A. Millson, Eric Sean Nelson, Frithjof Rodi, Maja Soboleva und Denis Thouard. (shrink)

Review Article on Mirowski's More Heat Than Light (1989).

Initially, models of chemical systems displaying oscillatory behavior were judged successful if they could show how such behavior was even possible. Recently, however, reaction mechanisms for chemical oscillators have been subjected to more stringent experimental tests. I examine strategies for model testing that flow from theoretical considerations, in particular, the types of feedback relations between chemical species required to produce oscillatory behavior in mechanistic models. These theoretical considerations allow chemists to work around important practical considerations such as an inability to (...) measure certain species in the experimental system. These sorts of testing strategies illuminate chemists' desiderata for a "good model.". (shrink)

Devenu une figure emblématique de l'opposition à l'ascension du nazisme, Theodor Lessing (1872-1933) - philosophe allemand d'origine juive - fut l'objet à partir de 1925 d'une virulente campagne de diffamation qui aboutit à son assassinat le 31 août 1933. Cet essai se propose non seulement d'éclairer les circonstances de sa vie et de sa mort, mais surtout de mieux faire connaître l'évolution de sa pensée et de son action à travers un choix de textes rédigés entre 1906 et 1933, (...) et toujours inédits en français. (shrink)

Résumé — Il s’agit de faire apparaître dans Lessing la continuité d’une question : celle de la prédication chrétienne, qui permet une nouvelle approche de ce qu’on appelle d’ordinaire sa « critique de la théologie » Dans la perspective d’une histoire sociale du savoir à l’époque de la confessionnalisation, l’œuvre est interrogée et recontextualisée à partir de la polémique que Lessing ne cessa d’entretenir avec le corps pastoral, en particulier avec ses usages et normes linguistiques. Instrument de légitimation (...) qui permet l’intervention de l’écrivain indépendant dans le champ de la théologie, la critique du prêche permet de construire une théologie laïque qui, contre le discours établi des Églises, entend déployer la forme véritable de la scientificité théologique. Ce faisant, elle sert aussi toutefois de révélateur des difficultés théoriques qui grèvent la pensée finale de l’auteur sur la Révélation.Zusammenfassung — Am Beispiel der Predigt wird hier ein neues Bild von Lessings sog. Theologiekritik dargestellt. Lessings theologische Schriften werden wissenssoziologisch im Zusammenhang mit seiner Polemik gegen die Sprachnormen der damaligen Geistlichkeit analysiert. Als Legitimierungsinstrument für den Eintritt des « freien Schriftstellers » ins theologische Feld ermöglicht auch die Kritik an die Predigt die Konstruktion einer Laientheologie, die gegen allen kirchlich etablierten Diskurs die « wahre » Gestalt der theologischen Wissenschaftlichkeit aufzudecken beansprucht, enthüllt aber zugleich als Chiffre des theologischen Spätwerks Lessings dessen theoretische Schwierigkeiten. (shrink)

Résumé — L’intérêt des philosophes pour Lessing n’est peut-être jamais aussi intense et légitime que lorsqu’il se porte à considérer sa conception même de la philosophie. Du théorique au pratique ou, plus exactement, de la scission du théorique et du pratique dans le métaphysique à leur harmonie dans le modèle philosophique de la sagesse, la légitimité philosophique conçue par Lessing semble d’abord nous emmener vers une déconsidération principielle de toute philosophie comme simple métaphysique, au profit d’une philosophie dont (...) le seul sens serait alors de devenir philosophie pratique. Cependant, on peut alors se poser la question de savoir si la façon dont Lessing fait de la philosophie correspond à ce qu’il en dit : n’est-il pas alors surprenant de constater chez Lessing l’absence d’une telle philosophie pratique comme théorie des mœurs – et, au contraire, la troublante persistance d’échos métaphysiques ?Zusammenfassung — Das Interesse, das die Philosophen Lessing entgegenbringen, scheint um so stärker und berechtigter zu sein, als es seiner Auffassung der Philosophie selbst gilt. Vom Theorischen zum Praktischen, oder vielmehr von der Spaltung des Theorischen und des Praktischen im Metaphysichen, zur Harmonie, die dazwischen im philosophischen Weisheitsmuster herrscht, scheint zuerst die von Lessing begründete philosophische Legitimität jede Philosophie als einfache Metaphysik grundsätzlich zu entwerten, und zwar zugunsten einer Philosophie, deren einzige Bestimmung darin bestehen würde, eine praktiche Philosophie zu werden. Besteht jedoch nicht ein Widerspruch zwischen diesen beiden Pünkten : die Philosophie, wie sie bei Lessing tatsächlich anwesend ist, und was er sagt davon ? Es kann nämlich sonderbar erscheinen, da eine solche Philosophie bei Lessing keineswegs die Form einer Sittenlehre annimmt, sich vielmehr weiterhin durch das verwirrend Vorhandensein metaphysicher Echoen auszeichnet. (shrink)

This comment responds to Maul’s (2012) article evaluating the validity evidence and argument for the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) as a measure of emotional intelligence (EI). We suggest that Maul’s standards for establishing validity evidence are unrealistically high, and may not be met by other established psychometric tests. As an example, we show that evidence for the validity of Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) is of a similar standard to the MSCEIT.

In this article, Deleuze & Guattari (D+G)’s conception of democracy will be approached with regard to art’s envisagement of “becoming-democratic” as a mode of thinking through percepts and affects. For D+G, democracy is, by no means, a desirable political goal or the name of a type of governance appropriate for the world. On the contrary, as long as it is a representation mechanism, democracy has negative connotations since it promotes the dominance of majority. For this reason, the only way of (...) affirming democracy is to cleanse and subtract the governmental layers which fix it as a system of social measurement, and re-associate it with “multiplicity” & “becoming”. In this respect, democracy can only be affirmed if it is paired with the notions of becoming-democratic, becoming-revolutionary and becoming-minor. Nevertheless, it is not the case that mainstream political philosophy or professional politics are the only methods for formulating opinions on democracy. “Politics of art” would provide means of thinking upon becoming democratic since art—being a mode of thinking by itself—may place many issues about which one could talk only theoretically (or which would hardly become a part of daily life) on a living plane, even though that plane would solely exist in the world of the work of art. In brief, on the condition that it is not an apparatus of representation, art may turn into a medium of thinking upon becoming-democratic, in addition to all the other becomings that it is related to. (shrink)

Pour des raisons pratiques autant qu’idéologiques, les États socialistes ont souhaité la pleine participation des femmes au travail, qui supposait leur libération des tâches ménagères dévoreuses de temps. Ils ont, pour la plupart, passé un contrat social implicite avec leurs populations féminines : les femmes à l’usine et au champ, en échange d’une réduction des tâches domestiques, soit à travers leur socialisation, soit par la fourniture de produits finis allégeant le travail. L’article entend montrer que la Chine rurale fut une (...) exception à ce modèle. Alors que la participation des femmes rurales au travail augmentait fortement, le rationnement de marchandises peu abondantes et une politique empêchant les paysans de disposer d’argent liquide faisaient que les textiles et autres produits industriels sont restés hors de portée de la majorité des ruraux. En conséquence, des millions de femmes rurales ont continué, au prix d’un travail manuel laborieux, à vêtir et nourrir leurs familles, à un moment où triplait leur participation aux travaux des champs. Cette double charge particulièrement intense a permis à l’État chinois une rapide accumulation. (shrink)

Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...) on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism. * Both of us gratefully acknowledge support from the Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and NSF grant DIR-8822278 (M.F.) and NSF grant SBE-9212294 (E.S.). Special thanks go to A. W. F. Edwards.William Harper. Martin Leckey. Brian Skyrms, and especially Peter Turney for helpful comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)

Résumé — S’il fallait résumer les thèses défendues par Lessing dans le Laocoon, on arriverait à un résultat finalement malingre. L’idée que la peinture représente au moyen de « signes naturels » des corps coexistant dans l’espace, tandis que la poésie représente au moyen de « signes arbitraires » des actions se succédant dans le temps a été en effet maintes fois développée par d’autres auteurs avant l’essai de 1766. Ce constat n’ôte pourtant rien à l’intérêt du Laocoon. Car (...) cet intérêt réside ailleurs. Il se situe non pas dans l’exposé définitif de la thèse, mais dans la méthode qui y mène, une méthode que Lessing veut d’abord inductive, c’est-à-dire fondée sur l’exemple. Le présent article entend analyser la conception de la critique qui se dégage de l’essai : refus de la méthode déductive, rôle central dévolu à l’imagination, intronisation du public comme instance légitime de jugement – le tout sur fond de polémique antiwinckelmannienne.Zusammenfassung — Wollte man die in Lessings Laokoon verteidigten Thesen zusammenfassen, so würde man zu einem eher spärlichen Ergebnis kommen. Da die Malerei anhand « natürlicher Zeichen » nur koexistierende Körper im Raum und die Poesie anhand « willkürlicher Zeichen » nur sukzessive Handlungen in der Zeit darstellt, wurde in der Tat schon vor der Erscheinung dieses Traktats von anderen Autoren dargelegt. Dies gereicht aber dem Essay keineswegs zum Nachteil, denn seine Bedeutung liegt anderswo. Sie liegt weniger in dem Inhalt der Thesen selbst, als in der Methode, die zur Aufstellung dieser Thesen führt. Lessing sucht nach einer induktiven Methode, die auf der präzisen Analyse von zahlreichen Beispielen beruht. Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es, den Lessingschen Kritik-Begriff zu untersuchen, der sich aus der Methodologie dieses Essays ergibt : Ablehnung der deduktiven Verfahrensweise, Erhebung der Einbildungskraft zum entscheidenden Vermögen sowohl für die Produktion als auch für die Rezeption der Kunstwerke, Inthronisation des Publikums als vollberechtigter Kunstrichter – lauter Aspekte, die vor dem Hintergrund einer scharfen Polemik gegen Winckelmann entwickelt werden. (shrink)

La doctrine picturale du classicisme instituait le parallèle de l’image et du verbe, elle adoptait pour maxime la formule extraite d’Horace « Ut pictura poesis » (« Il en est d’une poésie comme d’une peinture »). Gotthold Ephraïm Lessing réfute cette conception dans son Laocoon en opposant les propriétés du lisible à celles du visible, et en affirmant l’impossibilité d’établir une équivalence entre elles. Il met en crise la lisibilité de l’œuvre plastique en opérant une distinction fondamentale entre l’image (...) et le mot, avec pour conséquence de séparer nettement la finalité essentielle de la peinture et celle de la poésie. Lessing défend l’idée que les moyens de la peinture correspondent aux limites de la poésie, et que les moyens de la poésie correspondent aux limites de la peinture. Ce chiasme se résout dans le théâtre qui, unissant les pouvoirs du verbe et de l’image, surmonte les limites expressives de la poésie et de la peinture en conjuguant leurs pouvoirs respectifs. (shrink)

When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood (...) is developmentally prior to and logically more basic than joint action, but also because it might constitute a way of being together with others, which we need to study if we wish to better understand the nature of the we. In the present contribution, my primary aim will be to offer an answer to the following question: does the we-experience, the experience of being part of a we, presuppose, precede, preserve, or abolish the difference between self- and other-experience? In pursuing this task, I will take a closer look at emotional sharing and draw on resources that are too frequently ignored in current social ontology, namely insights found in classical phenomenology and in contemporary research on social cognition. (shrink)

Ordinarily, we take moral responsibility to come in degrees. Despite this commonplace, theories of moral responsibility have focused on the minimum threshold conditions under which agents are morally responsible. But this cannot account for our practices of holding agents to be more or less responsible. In this paper we remedy this omission. More specifically, we extend an account of reasons-responsiveness due to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza according to which an agent is morally responsible only if she is appropriately (...) receptive to and reactive to reasons for action. Building on this, we claim that the degree to which an agent is responsible will depend on the degree to which she is able to recognize and react to reasons. To analyze this, we appeal to relations of comparative similarity between possible worlds, arguing that the degree to which an agent is reasons-reactive depends on the nearest possible world in which given sufficient reason to do otherwise, she does so. Similarly, we argue that the degree to which an agent is reasons-receptive will depend on the intelligibility of her patterned recognition of reasons. By extending an account of reasons-responsiveness in these ways, we are able to rationalize our practice of judging people to be more or less responsible. (shrink)

Aristotle bequeathed to us a powerful metaphysical picture, of substances in which properties inhere. The picture has turned out to be highly problematic in many ways; but it is nevertheless a picture not easy to dislodge. Less obvious are the normative tones implicit in the picture and the way these permeate our system of values, especially when thinking of ourselves and our ambitions, hopes and fears. These have proved, if anything, even harder to dislodge than the metaphysical picture which supports (...) them. This paper first draws out the ethics suggested by a conception of being as individual substances, and finds both inner tensions among these values—expressed in divergent characteristics in the history of philosophy—and a neglect of a significant set of values. Substance metaphysics prefers freedom, independence and autonomy over relational and reciprocal values, which can even be regarded as existentially threatening. A prominent attempt to accommodate both sorts of values without eschewing substantialist metaphysics is briefly considered, before turning to examine an alternative metaphysics and the values it implies. A metaphysics which takes being as becoming, it is argued, supports an ethics centred on relational values, and their associated virtues of care. (shrink)

In locating friendly fire in contemporary philosophy of religion, D.Z. Phillips shows that more harm can be done to religion by its philosophical defenders than by its philosophical despisers. Friendly fire is the result of an uncritical acceptance of empiricism, and Phillips argues that we need to examine critically the claims that individual consciousness is the necessary starting point from which we have to argue: for the existence of an external world and the reality of God; that God is a (...) person without a body, a pure consciousness; and that to assent to a religious belief is essentially to assign a truth value to a proposition independent of any confessional context. When these products of friendly fire are avoided, we arrive at a new understanding of belief, trust and the soul, and refuse to say more or less than we know about the realities of human life in the service of religious apologetics. (shrink)

Discrepancies between the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the adult and pediatric diagnostic guidelines for brain death (BD) (the “Guidelines”) have motivated proposals to revise the UDDA. A revision proposed by Lewis, Bonnie and Pope (the RUDDA), has received particular attention, the three novelties of which would be: (1) to specify the Guidelines as the legally recognized “medical standard,” (2) to exclude hypothalamic function from the category of “brain function,” and (3) to authorize physicians to conduct an apnea (...) test without consent and even over a proxy’s objection. One hundred seven experts in medicine, bioethics, philosophy, and law, spanning a wide variety of perspectives, have come together in agreement that while the UDDA needs revision, the RUDDA is not the way to do it. Specifically, (1) the Guidelines have a non-negligible risk of false-positive error, (2) hypothalamic function is more relevant to the organism as a whole than any brainstem reflex, and (3) the apnea test carries a risk of precipitating BD in a non-BD patient, provides no benefit to the patient, does not reliably accomplish its intended purpose, and is not even absolutely necessary for diagnosing BD according to the internal logic of the Guidelines; it should at the very least require informed consent, as do many procedures that are much more beneficial and less risky. Finally, objections to a neurologic criterion of death are not based only on religious belief or ignorance. People have a right to not have a concept of death that experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory criterion. (shrink)

This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls’ theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with (...) whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the article centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all. (shrink)

Much leading thought about consciousness in the inter-war period was associated with the British intellectual C. K. Ogden. His International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method included landmark textbooks by major psychologists including Adler, Jung, Koffka, and Piaget. His journal Psyche, included work about Behaviorism, brain chemistry, and essays such as ‘Are we becoming more conscious?’ by literary critic I. A. Richards. The chapter surveys the work from Ogden’s projects which demonstrates the greatest acuity and foresight about questions concerning (...) consciousness which preoccupy us now. It concentrates on Ogden’s other book series – especially To-Day and To-Morrow. Some of the more provocative new thinking about consciousness is to be found among its speculations on the future. In one of the pioneering transhumanist texts in this series, J. D. Bernal’s The World, the Flesh and the Devil invents the electronic cyborg. He imagines increasing longevity by transferring brains to machine hosts; hot-wiring them to instruments providing extra senses – X-ray, chemistry, but above all radio. This would enable them to be in direct wireless contact with everyone else – effectively the internet before the invention of the computer. Such interconnectivity makes imaginable a form of collective consciousness. Such ideas mesh with new thinking about language and criticism; fields in which Ogden and Richards were also pioneers. These writers poised before the threshold of computing thus raise questions which anticipate work in subsequent neuroscience, and also our moment at the dawn of Artificial Intelligence, and the questions that raises about whether consciousness can be extended, synthesized, or indeed detected. (shrink)

Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of human behavior have become increasingly widespread. At their best, they allow us to abstract from misleading particulars in order to better recognize and appreciate broad patterns in the phenomena of human social life. We discuss this explanatory strategy, contrasting it with the particularist methodology of contemporary evolutionary psychology. We introduce some guidelines for the assessment of evolutionary game theoretic explanations of human behavior: such explanations should be representative, robust, and flexible. Distinguishing these features (...) sharply can help to clarify the import and accuracy of game theorists' claims about the robustness and stability of their explanatory schemes. Our central example is the work of Brian Skyrms, who offers a game theoretic account of the evolution of our sense of justice. Modeling the same Nash game as Skyrms, we show that, while Skyrms' account is robust with respect to certain kinds of variation, it fares less well in other respects. (shrink)

In this paper I explore graded attributions of blameworthiness—that is, judgments of the general sort, "A is more blameworthy for x-ing than B is," or "A is less blameworthy for her character than B is." In so doing, I aim to provide a philosophical basis for the widespread, if not completely articulate, practice of altering the degree to which we hold others responsible on the basis of facts about them or facts about their environments. To vindicate this practice, I disambiguate (...) several related properties and identify the properties of being more blameworthy for an action with a complex set of relations between what an agent deserves for her action and how good it is from the point of view of desert that she receives that response. (shrink)

Prior studies provide consistent evidence of deficits for psychopaths in processing verbal emotional material but are inconsistent regarding nonverbal emotional material. To examine whether psychopaths exhibit general versus specific deficits in nonverbal emotional processing, 34 psychopaths and 33 nonpsychopaths identified with Hare's (R. D. Hare, 1991) Psychopathy Checklist-Revised were asked to complete a facial affect recognition test. Slides of prototypic facial expressions were presented. Three hypotheses regarding hemispheric lateralization anomalies in psychopaths were also tested (right-hemisphere dysfunction, reduced lateralization, and reversed (...) lateralization). Psychopaths were less accurate than nonpsychopaths at classifying facial affect under conditions promoting reliance on right-hemisphere resources and displayed a specific deficit in classifying disgust. These findings demonstrate that psychopaths exhibit specific deficits in nonverbal emotional processing. (shrink)

There has been a good deal of interest in recent years in what Franz Brentano had to say about the notion of ‘intentional objects’ and about intentionality as a criterion of the mental. There has been less interest in his classification of mental phenomena. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano asserts and argues for the thesis that mental phenomena can be classified in terms of three kinds of mental act or activity, all of which are directed towards an (...) immanent object. These are, respectively, presentation, judgment and what he calls the phenomena of love and hate. Once again, less interest has been shown in what he has to say about the last of these three than in what he says about the others. I wish to take Brentano's views as the point of departure for a discussion of love and hate, since these notions seem to me to have a good deal of philosophical interest, for at least two main reasons. First, I have recently had some concern with the part that personal relations play in our understanding of others and of ourselves, and love and hate seem to be very important elements in such relations. Second, love and hate have long seemed to me to provide important counter-examples to some prevalent philosophical theories about the emotions. I shall take this issue first. (shrink)

Engaging Polanyi’s embeddedness–disembeddedness framework, this study explored the work experiences of Bhil children employed in Indian Bt cottonseed GPNs. The innovative visual technique of drawings followed by interviews was used. Migrant children, working under debt bondage, underwent greater exploitation and perennial and severe depersonalized bullying, indicative of commodification of labour and disembeddedness. In contrast, children working in their home villages were not under debt bondage and underwent less exploitation and occasional and mild depersonalized bullying, indicative of how civil society organizations, (...) along with the state, attempt to re-embed economic activities in the social context. Polanyi’s double movement was evident. ‘Place’ emerged as the pivotal factor determining children’s experiences. A ‘protective alliance’ of community controls and social power, associated with in-group affiliations and cohesive ties, stemming from a common village and tribal identity, aided children working at home for Bhil farmers. ‘Asymmetric intergroup inequality’ due to pronounced social identity and class differences, coupled with locational constraints and developmental disadvantage, made migrant children vulnerable targets. Social embeddedness influences how child workers are treated because it forces employers to be ethical and not engage in bullying. However, by shifting production to children’s home villages, there is an attempt to obscure the difference between child labour and child work. Thus, the seeds of disembeddedness are sown through the very act of re-embeddeding, potentially hampering future interventions. (shrink)

This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.

Despite widespread agreement that ambivalence precludes agency “at its best,” in this paper I argue that ambivalence as such is no threat to one’s agency. In particular, against “unificationists” like Harry Frankfurt I argue that failing to be fully integrated as an agent, lacking purity of heart, or being less than wholehearted in one’s choices, tells us nothing about whether an agent’s will is properly functioning. Moreover, it will turn out that in many common circumstances, wholeheartedness with respect to some (...) motive or course of action is itself a defect in an agent’s will. (shrink)