Si l’on s’accorde à voir dans l’ouvrage du clergyman mélancolique Robert Burton paru en 1621 une sorte d’aboutissement et de consécration de la mode mélancolique, l’on a toutefois tendance à négliger le fait que l’anatomiste utilise le discours médical et la tradition mélancolique pour attirer l’attention de ses contemporains sur l’existence d’un désordre qui se manifeste, au niveau de la collectivité, par une crise religieuse, politique, sociale et économique. C’est sous le patronage de l’un des premiers représentants du courant (...) mercantiliste que Burton se place pour justifier l’emploi de la notion de « mélancolie politique » : celui de Giovanni Botero. La lecture de la « Préface » de L’Anatomie de la Mélancolie permet de constater l’existence d’une forte convergence entre les méthodes et les analyses des premiers mercantilistes anglais et le diagnostic de Robert Burton sur la crise économique que traverse l’Angleterre de Jacques Ier. Comment expliquer alors la coexistence dans le même texte de ce discours économique qui propose des réformes concrètes pour remédier à une situation de crise et d’un discours utopique qui préconise une forme autoritaire et disciplinaire de pouvoir comme remède à la mélancolie politique tout en affirmant le caractère chimérique et irréalisable de tout changement radical? (shrink)

Au moment où paraît l’Anatomie de la Mélancolie de Robert Burton (1e édition en 1621), l’humorisme se trouve sérieusement remis en cause par les découvertes du contemporain de Burton, William Harvey, concernant la circulation du sang. Comment expliquer alors la parution de cet ouvrage qui se présente comme une somme de toutes les connaissances médicales, philosophiques ou historiques accumulées au sujet de la mélancolie depuis l’Antiquité jusqu’à la fin de la Renaissance ? L’article se donne pour objectif de (...) comprendre quel peut être l’intérêt stratégique d’un recours au discours mélancolique et à la théorie des humeurs, lesquels deviennent sous la plume de Burton des instruments idéals permettant d’attirer l’attention sur la crise politique, sociale, économique et religieuse que traverse la monarchie anglaise de Jacques Ier. (shrink)

Parmi les nombreuses publications qui ont accompagné l’exposition Mélancolie, génie et folie, soulignons la parution d’un large choix de textes extraits de l’Anatomie de la mélancolie de Robert Burton (1577-1640), sous la direction de Gisèle Venet. L’œuvre de ce « théologien de profession et médecin par inclination » n’a pas d’emblée trouvé son chemin dans la « langue de Molière » (Préface, p. 7-8). Cette méconnaissance a partiellement pris fin en l’an 2000 grâce au gigantesque travail de tra..

Cet ouvrage regroupe vingt et un articles de dix à vingt pages sur le thème du genre dans différents contextes coloniaux. Divisé en trois parties, l’ouvrage possède aussi une préface et une postface, qui analysent les apports de ces travaux pour le champ d’étude de la World History. Cette discipline, qui se consacre à l’étude de grands phénomènes transversaux comme l’esclavage, la colonisation ou la migration, cherche à mettre en avant les relations historiques qu’entretiennent différentes pa...

La publication de The Anatomy of Melancoly de Robert Burton en 1621 marque un tournant dans l’histoire de cette célèbre maladie, déjà analysée dans le Problème XXX du corpus aristotélicien. Burton, en effet, ne se contentait pas de construire une sorte d’encyclopédie du savoir philosophique et médical sur la mélancolie, qu’il considérait comme la quintessence de toutes les maladies ; il en proposait aussi de nouvelles interprétations, notamment en abordant la mélancolie sous l’angle de ses co..

Climate change is already a major global threat, but many of its worst impacts are still decades away. Many people who will eventually be affected by it still have opportunities to mitigate harm. When considering the avoidable burdens of climate change, it seems plausible victims will often share some responsibility for putting themselves into harm’s way. This fact should be incorporated into our thinking about the ethical significance of climate-induced harms, particularly to emphasize the importance of differential abilities to get (...) and stay out of harm’s way. Currently, many people face serious obstacles to reducing their vulnerability to climate change, such as poverty, lack of education, and political or legal obstacles to mobility. Climate policy discussions should do more to emphasize the alleviation of these sources of difficulties, thereby empowering people to choose what risks they will bear in a warming world. (shrink)

In this entry, I tackle the phenomenon known as "faultless disagreement", considered by many authors to pose a challenge to the main views on the semantics of subjective expressions. I first present the phenomenon and the challenge, then review the main answers given by contextualist, absolutist and relativist approaches to the expressions in question. I end with signaling two issues that might shape future discussions about the role played by faultless disagreement in semantics.

Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to one of the important philosophical movements of the twentieth century and to a subject that continues to grow and diversify. Yet it is also a challenging subject, the elements of which can be hard to grasp. This lucid book provides an introduction to the core ideas of phenomenology and to the arguments of its principal thinkers, including Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi (...) examines and explains key questions such as: What is a phenomenological analysis? What are the methodological foundations of phenomenology? What does phenomenology have to say about intentionality, embodiment, intersubjectivity and the lifeworld? How do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in the cognitive sciences and qualitative research? This second edition has been thoroughly revised and expanded. It contains a new chapter on critical phenomenology and updated discussions of the application of phenomenology in psychiatry, psychology, and qualitative research. Including a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, Phenomenology: The Basics is a superb starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible introduction to this rich and fascinating subject. (shrink)

The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. Rather, it involves a dedicated comprehension module, (...) with its own special principles and mechanisms. We show how such a metacommunicative module might have evolved, and what principles and mechanisms it might contain. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt first argued the continuities between the age of European imperialism and the age of fascism in Europe in 'The Origins of Totalitarianism'. This text uses Arwndt's insights as a starting point for further investigations into the ways in which race, imperialism, slavery and genocide are linked.

Rationing is the allocation of a good under conditions of scarcity, which necessarily implies that some who want and could be benefitted by that good will not receive it. One reflection of our ambivalence towards health care rationing is reflected in our resistance to having it distributed in a market like most other goods—most Americans reject ability to pay as the basis for distributing health care. They do not view health care as just another commodity to be distributed by markets. (...) Despite this widespread view, we are the only developed country without some form of universal health insurance, and so for the 46 million Americans without health insurance their access to health care often does depend on their ability to pay for it. Rationing largely remains a topic that the public, their elected leaders, and many health care professionals prefer to avoid. Ever-growing costs of health care will increasingly force the practice and issue of health care resource prioritization and rationing into the open for public, professional, and political attention. This paper explores some of the features of those practices and issues that make them especially ethically and politically difficult. Those issues will not be easily resolved, but avoiding them will not avoid the need or reality of rationing, it will only mean that it will go on covertly and unexamined. That will lead neither to better or more legitimate prioritization and rationing decisions. (shrink)

Encyclopedia entry on the life and work of Karl Leonhard Reinhold.

Some medical services have long generated deep moral controversy within the medical profession as well as in broader society and have led to conscientious refusals by some physicians to provide those services to their patients. More recently, pharmacists in a number of states have refused on grounds of conscience to fill legal prescriptions for their customers. This paper assesses these controversies. First, I offer a brief account of the basis and limits of the claim to be free to act on (...) one’s conscience. Second, I sketch an account of the basis of the medical and pharmacy professions’ responsibilities and the process by which they are specified and change over time. Third, I then set out and defend what I call the “conventional compromise” as a reasonable accommodation to conflicts between these professions’ responsibilities and the moral integrity of their individual members. Finally, I take up and reject the complicity objection to the conventional compromise. Put together, this provides my answer to the question posed in the title of my paper: “Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?”. (shrink)

If one comes to Phénoménologie de la perception after having read Sein und Zeit (or Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) one will be in for a surprise. Both works contain a number of both implicit and explicit references to Husserl, but the presentation they give is so utterly different, that one might occasionally wonder whether they are referring to the same author. Thus nobody can overlook that Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl differs significantly from Heidegger’s. It is far more charitable. In (...) fact, when evaluating the merits of respectively Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty often goes very much against the standard view. This is not only the case in his notorious remark on the very first page of Phénoménologie de la Perception where he declares that the whole of Sein und Zeit is nothing but an explication of Husserl’s notion of Lifeworld, but also - to give just one further example - in one of his Sorbonne-lectures, where Merleau-Ponty writes that Husserl took the issue of historicity far more seriously than Heidegger. (shrink)

How should we appraise Bergson’s relation to phenomenology? There are different ways to tackle this question. In the following my focus will be quite narrow. I will restrict myself to a close reading of Bergson’s doctoral dissertation Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. The question I wish to ask is basically whether the analysis of consciousness that Bergson provides in the second chapter of the dissertation is phenomenologically convincing.

Several authors believe that there are certain facts that are striking and cry out for explanation—for instance, a coin that is tossed many times and lands in the alternating sequence HTHTHTHTHTHT…. According to this view, we have prima facie reason to believe that such facts are not the result of chance. I call this view the striking principle. Based on this principle, some have argued for far-reaching conclusions, such as that our universe was created by intelligent design, that there are (...) many universes other than the one we inhabit, and that there are no mathematical or normative facts. Appealing as the view may initially seem, I argue that we lack sufficient reason to accept it. (shrink)

The question that is front and center at the outset of William James's great work The Varieties of Religious Experience is What is religion?1 He opens his discussion of this question in the second lecture, "Circumscription of the Topic," with the observation that the field of religion is so "wide" and the definitions of it so varied that it would be "foolish" to try to find a single definition that formulates its essence. Even if, instead, we look for a defining (...) characteristic of religion within the self or mind, we find the same disagreement among authors "in the psychologies and in the philosophies of religion": "One man allies it to the feeling of dependence; one makes it a derivative from fear; others connect... (shrink)

Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 396-407.

Background Randomized controlled trials are central to generating knowledge about effectiveness of interventions as well as risk, protective and prognostic factors related to diseases in emergency newborn care. Whether prospective participants understand the purpose of research, and what they perceive as the influence of the context on their understanding of the informed consent process for RCTs in emergency obstetric and newborn care are not well documented. Methods Conceptual review. Discussion Research is necessary to identify how the illnesses may be prevented, (...) to explore the causes, and to investigate what medications could be used to manage such illness. Voluntary informed consent requires that prospective participants understand the disclose information about the research, and use this to make autonomous informed decision about participation, in line with their preferences and values. Yet the emergency context affects how information may be disclosed to prospective research participants, how much participants may comprehend, and how participants may express their voluntary decision to participate, all of which pose a threat to the validity of the informed consent. I challenge the claim that the ‘understanding’ of research is always necessary for ethical informed consent for research during emergency care. I argue for reconceptualization of the value of understanding, through recognition of other values that may be equally important. I then present a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection about autonomy, beneficence and justice in research in emergency research. Conclusion While participant ‘understanding’ of research is important, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a valid informed consent, and may compete with other values with which it needs to be considered. (shrink)

My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.

When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a model (...) for justification, I show how ordinary perceivers would appeal to external factors to support their perceptual beliefs, and normally suppose that their beliefs are reliably connected to the objects their beliefs are about. I find in this feature of our common justificatory practice a sufficient basis for positing an externalist condition on justification—namely that subjects are only justified if their beliefs are reliably connected to their objects. (shrink)

What kind of futures does agro-food imaginaries enable and who can get involved in the making of agro-food futures? In this respect, what can the increasingly influential idea of circular economy potentially offer in terms of enabling more sustainable agrofood futures? We approach this task by first outlining the interconnected challenges that the agro-food system is facing related to environmental degradation, economic crises and social problems. Then we consider the way these challenges are being addressed in agro-food studies. We argue (...) that agro-food research in recent years has seen important contributions in relation to studies of alternative food networks and the “quality” turn. These research agendas have challenged the current logic of the food system in terms of offering alternative visions of future development. We highlight two examples from the literature—the eco-economy and the integrated territorial agri-food paradigm—that develop broader frameworks for rethinking the future of the agro-food system and which have distinguished themselves in contrast to the industrialized and globalized conventional food system. We find that with respect to reorienting and reconfiguring economic structures and relations all three approaches share a common goal, but circular economy stands out in relation to the actors that are included by, for example, emphasizing collaborations and partnerships with extant agro-food businesses. Also with regards to scalar politics, it would be prudent to consider the potentials offered by the increasingly influential ideas around circular economy. (shrink)

In his book Ethics J. L. Mackie says that moral facts would have to be queer facts. I argue that an act’s hurting somebody is necessarily a reason, though not necessarily a conclusive reason, not to do that act; and that such hurting is a natural fact, not a queer fact. I try to defend this externalist position about this particular reason against internalists such as Mackie, and in particular against the position of Stephen Darwall in Impartial Reason.

Externalist theories of representation (including most naturalistic psychosemantic theories) typically require some relation to obtain between a representation and what it represents. As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories. I offer a naturalistic and externalist account of empty concepts that shows how they can be shared across individuals. On this account, the brain is a general-purpose model-building machine, where items in the world serve as templates for model construction. Shareable empty concepts arise when there is a common (...) template for different individuals' concepts, but where this template is not what the concept denotes. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two philosophical issues that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that ‘happiness’, as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that (...) are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods. (shrink)