Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.

An innovative theory of consciousness, drawing on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and supported by brain-imaging, presented in the form of a hardboiled ..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Dan Lloyd (bio)To think about grief is to think about many things. My one-year-old daughter was practicing opening and closing a cabinet door as I puzzled over a response to Wright, Sloman, and Beaudoin’s “Toward a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes.” She was completely absorbed in her project, and as I watched my elf at her task, I thought about the (...) voices of loss that speak briefly in section 3.1. How terrible it would be to lose a loved one. With that, I was overcome with a pang of love for my daughter, and further thought about the paper ceased.In the authors’ terms, my feelings about my daughter were “perturbances,” states that interfered with the internal management of my thought process, derailing it from the deliberate project of responding to the paper. Reading and thinking about loss activated the attachment structures involving those whose loss would be most devastating to me. The activation of the attachment structure was my episode of intense feeling, arising in me with an insistence level that temporarily exceeded my academic pursuits. The whole sequence of mental events arose through the interaction of major processes of perception, beliefs, “motivators,” plans, self-monitoring, and global control. The mind, according to the authors, is a collection of such processes.Is that all there is? The familiar objection to this brand of functionalist analysis is that it leaves out the most important part of mind, namely, conscious experience. Such an “architecture” for an “intelligent agent” is at best a simulation of some aspects of cognition, but the feelings, the moods, the subjective what-it-is-like of experience are missing. And without them, say the familiar critics, the mind is missing. The authors are naturally aware of this objection, and are careful to hedge their project: “In our discussion the ‘phenomenological problem’ is factored out and placed to one side.”I wonder, however, whether the authors are too quick to concede that their model omits the phenomenal. The symptoms of grief expressed by its sufferers would all be considered reports of the experience of grief, aspects of its phenomenology. The authors use these reports to guide their analysis of the functional processes of grief, and their analysis in turn explains why the grievers experience their losses as they do. Functionalist psychologists usually base their analyses on strictly observable responses obtained in cognitive psychology experiments. In using first-person reports as their guide, the authors inaugurate a promising union of phenomenology and functionalism. After their treatment of grief, the left over and left out phenomenology is noticeably slimmer.What remains of grief is its pain. In the spirit [End Page 127] of the paper, I will close with a brief speculative extension of the authors’ approach, using it to examine the core of the experience of grief. Like physical pain, emotional pain is curiously resistant to description, and not even easy to remember. (One remembers that one was in pain, and that it was hateful, but such reminiscences are faint shadows of the experience itself.) Though its phenomenology is elusive, pain has a clear function. It is aversive. As the authors note, pain involves “dispositions to terminate or reduce some state or process.” In their terms, pain is a motivator with a very high insistence level. Motivators motivate plans, and an aversive motivator would principally motivate a plan to remove the cause of the pain. However, grief and other chronic emotional pains are marked by irremediability. There can be no plan that replaces the loss, only fantasy plans or reversions to infant strategies of last resort (like crying). Within the cognitive architecture proposed by this paper, emotional pain is thus characterized by a collision of two processes, a highly insistent motive meeting a vacuum where a plan should be. The unanswered insistence would make the collision hateful, while the absent plan would leave a state partly without intentional content, and thus hard to describe or remember. This breakdown, arguably, is the pain—an emergent state or states arising in just this sort of wrenching bind.The traditional critic will insist that the painfulness... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Searle and the ‘Deep Unconscious’”Dan Lloyd (bio)Can another person know my thoughts with better authority than I know them myself? With his affirmative answer to this question, Freud invented the twentieth-century human, a being whose mind is accessible to scrutiny from outside, and whose attempts at conscious self-explanation are at best partial and in many cases wrong. Even as Freud’s scientific influence wanes, the shift of authority (...) he inaugurated is still gathering strength. Now the mind is open to many outsiders. Not only psychoanalysts, but behaviorists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists are all striving to read my mind, and yours. Against this historical sea change stands the solitary John Searle, whose work is consistently animated by fierce adherence to first person authority and surly attacks of any theory that could be exploited to undermine that authority. To most readers Searle’s positions seem stubbornly anti-scientific and covertly dualistic, despite his insistence to the contrary. And since science is good and dualism is bad, Searle’s arguments have become standing obstacles for theorists to discuss, debate, or dismiss.Buttressing his insistence on first person authority, Searle defends a Cartesian view of mental representation or intentionality, holding that an intentional entity is a conscious entity, either in actuality or potentiality. Deeply unconscious representations are therefore impossible. Eric Gillett has joined the debate just here with a pointed critique of Searle’s argument (also discussed in Lloyd 1990). Gillett performs a double service by challenging Searle’s premises and offering some positive grounds for the deep unconscious. I agree with Gillett that establishing the existence of deeply unconscious representations requires a theory of intentionality that is independent of conscious awareness. Ruth Millikan’s evolutionary teleology is an excellent candidate, in its pursuit of real function and real content (vs. “as-if” interpretation) for mental items.Some questions remain. First, if deeply unconscious entities are clinically important, then in addition to a defense-in-principle of their existence we will need some method of identifying specific deep representations in particular cases. Millikan’s functionalism links content to broad biological and environmental contexts, and thereby seems to be an unwieldy tool for content ascription. If deeply unconscious representations get their content in the way Millikan describes, how can the clinician make use of them?Second, and more important, Millikan’s theory shares with many others the ambition to explain all intentional entities, conscious and unconscious alike. This leads to a new dualism of mental contents, a split between intentional content and conscious content, since the comprehensive theory of intentionality will assign mental content both [End Page 201] shallow and deep, irrespective of consciousness. This is a perplexity that transcends particular theories of intentionality, since what my mental states represent seems at least partly dependent on my environment or context, but my current state of consciousness is exclusively dependent on my brain. How, in theory, can these two concepts of content be reconciled?In sum, deeply unconscious representations do not come cheap. One way to escape the new dualism of content is to deny that the deep entities are representations. Instead, they might be dispositions or the “mechanisms, instinctual drives, structures, and energies which can never become conscious under any conditions,” as Gillett suggests. (In Lloyd 1994 I explore the possibility of a dispositional unconscious understood via connectionism.) On this view, mental content could remain within our first person authority, while the causal processes that manage that content remain out of sight. I wouldn’t have to guess what I’m thinking, but I would depend on the sciences of the mind to tell me how I come to think it.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"Commentary: Commentary by LloydDan Lloyd Dan Lloyd, Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 06106, U.S.A.ReferencesLloyd, D. 1990. Loose connections: Four problems with Searle’s argument for the ‘Connection Principle.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 615–16. Google ScholarLloyd, D. 1994. Connectionist hysteria: Reducing a Freudian case study to a network model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 1, no. 2: 69–88. Google ScholarCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Managing ethical behavior is a one of the most pervasive and complex problems facing business organizations today. Employees' decisions to behave ethically or unethically are influenced by a myriad of individual and situational factors. Background, personality, decision history, managerial philosophy, and reinforcement are but a few of the factors which have been identified by researchers as determinants of employees' behavior when faced with ethical dilemmas. The literature related to ethical behavior is reviewed in this article, and a model for understanding (...) ethical behavior in business organizations is proposed. It is concluded that managing ethics in business organizations requires that managers engage in a concentrated effort which involves espousing ethics, behaving ethically, developing screening mechanisms, providing ethical training, creating ethics units and reinforcing ethical behavior. (shrink)

Cette étude examine cinq principaux changements de méthodologie qui se trouvent dans cinq documents-clé de Vatican II, afin de discerner à quel point ces documents sont cohérents avec ou différents des principales caractéristiques de méthodologie de la période du concile. L'article commence par une introduction à trois approches théologiques en voque dans les écrits catholiques romains au temps du concile: néo-scolastique, transcendantalisme et correlationisme. La conscience historique est aussi examinée comme une note importante de méthode théologique. L'article examine ensuite Sacrosanctum (...) Concilium, Lumen Gentium, Dei Verbum, Dignitatis Huamnae et Gaudium et Spes en vue de ces données. L'étude identifie six changements méthodologiques notoires dans les documents: la mise en sourdine de la néo-scolastique du 19e siècle, la transformation de la néo-scolastique grâce aux ressources bibliques, la montée de questions centrales à la méthode transcendentale, des essais tardifs mais importants de raisonnement transcendental, une corrélation toujours croissante de mode confessionel, une conscience historique en développement. En conclusion, les A. affirment une évolution méthodologique dans Vatican II qui pourrait valider une évolution continue de la méthode théologique aujourd'hui. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions AGOSTINO NIFO'S EARLY VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY Various historians of Renaissance philosophy have taken some notice of the prolific author and important philosopher of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Agostino Nifo (1470-1538), x but no one has yet studied his writings in a methodical and exhaustive fashion. 2 He not only published philosophical works in logic, physics, psychology and metaphysics, but he also authored treatises (...) on humanist topics? Recent scholars have tended to concentrate their attention on his psychological doctrines, no doubt because he was one of the major opponents of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) during the immortality controversy.4 Nifo published his De Immortalitate Animae in 1518 as a reply to the De lmmortalitate Ardmae, On the year of Nifo)s birth, see Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo xav al xvl ('Florence, 1958), p. 284, n. 8. There is contemporary evidence that he died on January 18, 1538. See Bartolommeo Capasso, "Le cronache de li antiqui ri del regno di Napoli di D. Gaspare Fuscolill0," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, I (1876), p. 538. The standard bio-bibliography still remains Pasquale Tuozzi, "Agostino Nifo 9 le sue opere," Atti e memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova, Nuova scrie, XX (Padua, 1904), pp. 63-86. But see also Giuseppr Tommasino, Tra umanisti e filosoft (Maddaloni, 1921), Porte I, pp. 123-147; and Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Philological Quarterly (forthcoming). z See Franeeseo Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi; Studi storici su la scuola bolognese e padovana del secolo xvI (Florence, 1868); Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: 1 grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (Milan, 1944); Etienne Gilson, "L'affaire de l'immortalit6 de l'fime ~t Venise at* d6but du xvIe si~ele," in Umanesirno europeo e uraanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branea (Florence, 1963), pp. 31-61; Miehele Giorgiantonio, "Un nostro filosofo dimentieato dcl '400 (Luea Prassicio e Agostino Nifo)," Sophia, XVI (1948), pp. 212-214 and 303-312; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sulraristotelismo padovano dal secolo x]v al xvI (Florence, 1958); idem, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano (Rome, 1945); Giovanni di NapoH, L'immortalitd delranima nel Rinascimento ('Turin, 1963); John Herman Randall, Jr., The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, I (Stuttgart, 1964); Eugenio Garin, La cultura [ilosofica del Rinascimento Italiano (Florence, 1961); idem, Storia della filosofia italiana, II (Turin, 1966). See Nifo's De Armorum Literarumque Comparatione Commentariolus (Naples, 1526); De Pulchro et Amore (Rome, 1531); De Re Aulica (Naples, 1534); and Prima Pars Opusculorum (Venice, 1535). The second of these works has been studied by Jules Houdoy, La beaut~ des femmes dans la litt#rature et darts rart du xII" au xvIe si~cle; Analyse du livre de A. Niphus du Beau et de l'amour (Paris, 1876). 4 For recent discussion of the immortality controversy, see Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi, ProbMmatique de l'immortalit~ de l'~me en Italic au d~but du xvIe si~.cle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen dge, Ann6e 1961, pp. 163-179; Giovanni di Napoli, op. cit., especially pp. 227-338; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), pp. 72-90; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965); Martin Pine, "Pomponazzi and the Problem of 'Double Truth'," Journal ot the History of Ideas, XXIX (1968), pp. 163-176; Harold Shulsky, "Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind," lournal of the History of Philosophy, VI (1968), pp. 341-361. [451] 452 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1516) of Pomponazzi, who had argued that personal immortality cannot be philosophically demonstrated, s But while these scholars correctly point out that Nifo abandoned an Averroist interpretation of Aristotle concerning the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the soul for the position which they assume to be Thomistic, they are not precise as to just when Nile made the shift.6 They have not observed that in his first two printed works, namely, the commentary on Averroes' Destructio Destructionum (1497) and the early commentary on the De Anima (1503), Nifo explicitly accepts Averroes as the... (shrink)

Les recueils des « lois sacrées » effectué par Sokolowski et Lupu sont incontestablement un instrument de travail de premier rang pour l’étude de la religion grecque. Pourtant, les documents dans ces recueils ne sont pas classés sur des critères juridiques. La présente étude vise à proposer une classification de documents en question conformément aux autorités qui les ont émis : conseils fédéraux en charge de sanctuaires panhelléniques, cités, subdivisions du corps civique (dèmes, tribus), associations privées (phratries, génè, orgéônes) et (...) donations à des autorités publiques ou à des associations privées. Il s’intéresse également aux différents moyens de faire respecter les normes concernant les pratiques religieuses, et analyse la signification de l’expression ta patria et sa relation avec les différents niveaux d’autorité religieuse. (shrink)

I write here about how the visible and the invisible intertwine in painting: in theory and in praxis – primarily the praxis of my own painting. Philosophers are rarely asked to discuss, much less to show in public, what they do avocationally rather than professionally. I was drawn to the invitation of the Merleau-Ponty Circle to exhibit my painting and to talk about what I do when I am not writing or teaching philosophy. It has offered a rare chance to (...) catch up with myself – with the painter in me. I started in art long before I turned to philosophy. It was my first love and is still my intermittent passion. I have not hidden it from others altogether – I have shown my work in various group shows– but it would be more accurate to say that I have hidden it from myself. Talking about my art work in the context of this Circle comes at a very welcome moment in which I am in the process of determining where I shall go with the rest of my life as it shortens down: ars longa, vita brevis.J’écris ici à propos de la manière dont le visible et l’invisible s’entrelacent dans la peinture : en théorie et en pratique, prioritairement dans ma propre pratique de la peinture. On demande rarement aux philosophes de discuter, et encore moins de montrer en public, ce qu’ils font en amateurs plutôt que professionnellement. J’ai été entraîné par l’invitation du Merleau-Ponty Circle à exposer ma peinture et à parler de ce que je fais lorsque je n’écrit pas et n’enseigne pas la philosophie. Cela m’a offert une chance rare de me retrouver moi-même, le peintre en moi. J’ai commencé dans l’art bien avant de me tourner vers la philosophie. C’était mon premier amour c’est encore ma passion intermittente. Je ne l’ai pas caché, puisque j’ai montré mon travail dans plusieurs expositions collectives. Ce serait plus juste de dire que je l’ai caché de moi-même. Parler de mes oeuvres d’art dans le contexte du Merleau-Ponty Circle arrive à un moment tout à fait bienvenu, où je suis en train de réfléchir à la suite de ma vie, puisqu’elle raccourcit : ars longa, vita brevis.In questo articolo tratto di come il visibile e l’invisibile si intreccino in pittura, nella teoria come nella pratica, e in particolare nella mia pratica di pittura. Raramente ai filosofi viene chiesto di discutere, e ancor più raramente di mostrare pubblicamente, ciò che essi fanno in ambito amatoriale e non professionale. Sono rimasto molto colpito dall’invito del Merleau-Ponty Circle a esporre i miei dipinti e a parlare dell’attività che svolgo quando non scrivo o non insegno filosofia. Questo invito mi ha fornito un’opportunità rara per riprendere contatto con me stesso – con il pittore che è in me. Mi sono avvicinato all’arte molto prima di rivolgermi alla filosofia. L’arte è stato il mio primo amore ed è ancora la mia passione intermittente. Non l’ho mai tenuta nascosta agli altri – ho presentato il mio lavoro in numerose mostre collettive; forse sarebbe più corretto dire che l’ho nascosta a me stesso.La possibilità di parlare della mia arte in occasione del Merleau-Ponty Circle si è presentata in un momento molto propizio, in cui mi trovo a domandarmi quale strada percorrere in quello che resta della mia vita che a mano a mano si accorcia: ars longa, vita brevis. (shrink)

Ce papier présente le corpus des discours du Premier ministre anglais (Tony Blair) prononcés de 1997 à 2004. Avant d'être intégrés dans le corpus, les textes sont corrigés, les graphies sont standardisées. On montre que ce corpus ouvre de nombreuses pistes de recherches. Deux exemples sont donnés : les principales ruptures thématiques et stylistiques permettent de repérer deux grandes périodes dans ces huit années ; on caractérise la richesse du vocabulaire de T. Blair à l'aide des notions de spécialisation et (...) de diversité. (shrink)

This article is the product of a critical engagement that I have orchestrated between Husserl’s phenomenology and Stoic epistemology. I argue that the Stoic theory of knowledge, which is based upon the idea that the individual human being is a logos spermatikos, or “rational seed” of God, precludes any authentic doctrine of freedom, insofar as it enslaves the individual to a constant reference back toward God, as the source of “fundanlent” of all knowledge. However, the similarities between the Stoic theory (...) and the phenomenology of Husserl call us toward a deeper reading, and an asking of the important question: what constitutes freedom? This question can only be answered by thinking beyond both Stoic epistemological schemas and Husserlian intentionality, toward a doctrine of freedom that is best described as demiurgic.Cet article est le produit d’une enterprise critique organisée autour de la phénoménologie husserlienne et de I’épistémologie stoïcienne. Je soutiens que la théorie stoïcienne de la connaissance, fondée sur I’idée qui veut que I’être humain individuel soit un logos spermatikos, un “germe rationnel” de Dieu, exclut toute doctrine authentique de la liberté, dans la mesure où elle contrait I’individu à référer constamment à Dieu en tant que source ou “fondement” de toute connaissance. Toutefois, les similarités entre la théorie stoïcienne et la phénoménologie husserlienne nous poussent à une interprétation plus profonde et à poser I’importante question: qu’est la liberté? Cette question ne peut être répondue qu’en dépassant et les schémes épistémologiques stoïciens, et I’intentionalité husserlienne, vers une doctrine de la liberté qui pourrait être qualtfiée de démiurgique. (shrink)

L’étude entend montrer que, si le temps est finalement unique, l’espace, lui, est originellement (et non du fait de la constitution de l’être-au-monde) multiple. Une analyse d’un passage du Timée où la Chôra est dite tithênê (nourrice) permet d’asseoir une interprétation de la différence foncière entre espace et lieu. Le lieu a progressivement disparu pour s’absorber dans l’espace neutre qui traduit homologiquement l’infinité divine ou pour s’atténuer dans le site. Il est difficile de trouver une analyse adéquate du lieu depuis (...) la mort de Leibniz (1916) jusqu’à la thèse de Bergson en latin sur la notion aristotélicienne de lieu. (shrink)

RésuméL'authenticité et la diversité font aujourd'hui figure de slogans dans les sociétés contemporaines de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique nord. En revanche, on a peu exploré les liens entre ces deux idées. À cette fin, cet article aborde les écrits tantôt convergents, tantôt divergents de Charles Taylor et Martin Heidegger pour prolonger leurs réflexions respectives sur l'authenticité et montrer en quoi elles peuvent servir defondement à une nouvelle forme de diversité culturelle. Pour tous deux, l'être-au-monde authentique nous permet d'accider au (...) tréfonds du matériel culturel dont nous devons disposer pour que se nouent des rapports fructueux avec les autres cultures. (shrink)

Qiyās, or “correlational inference” (often glossed as “analogy”), comprises a primary set of methodological tools recognized by a majority of premodern Sunnī jurists. Its elements, valid modes, and proper applications were the focus of continual argument and refinement. A particular area of debate was the methodology of determining or justifying the ʿilla: the legal cause (or occasioning factor, or ratio legis) giving rise to a ruling in God’s Law. This was most often discussed (and disputed) under the rubric of “the (...) modes of causal justification” (masālik al-taʿlīl). Among these modes was the much debated test of dawarān (concomitance of presumed cause and effect). In brief, proponents of dawarān employed it to justify claims that a property (waṣf) occasioned the ruling (ḥukm) in an authoritative source-case (aṣl). In concert with other considerations, the demonstrated co-presence (ṭard) and co-absence (ʿaks) of property and ruling—that is, their concomitance “in existence” (wujūdan) and “in nonexistence” (ʿadaman)— was taken as an indication that the property was the ruling’s ʿilla. Delving further into dawarān and causation (ʿilliyya), the current study interprets “in existence” and “in nonexistence” not as a kind of metaphor for true and false (within the framework of a classical truth-functional formal semantics), but as an accurate terminology vis-à-vis the meaning of causality statements, fully compatible with dominant Islamicate views on causal agency. In brief, a deeper logical and linguistic analysis of the different existential modes of dawarān strongly suggests that we should distinguish property (or phenomenon) and ruling (or effect) as types (concepts or propositions linguistically expressed by a sentence) as opposed to tokens (instantiations of the type; the real, ontological events that verify the proposition). Our reading of dawarān as shaped by a finer-grained structure not only allows us to identify the efficient occasioning process as a function which takes some particular token of the ʿilla (arguably, the property or properties which provide the ruling’s material cause) and renders a token of the general ruling type, but it allows us to elucidate the role of taʿlīl (causal justification) in shaping an epistemological theory of argument to the best explanation: a sophisticated, premodern manifestation of abductive reasoning. (shrink)

Pour un Américain vivant en France, spécialisé dans l’histoire du socialisme français au XIXe siècle, et, plus particulièrement dans la pensée de Pierre-Joseph Proudhon comme moi, je ne pouvais que trouver absurde la campagne lancée six mois après l’investiture du président Barack Obama par les militants les plus extrémistes du Parti Républicain,..

Disabled people frequently find themselves in situations where their quality of life and wellbeing is being measured or judged by others, whether in decisions about health care provision or assessments for social supports. Recent debates about wellbeing and how it might be assessed (through subjective and/or objective measures) have prompted a renewed focus on disabled people’s wellbeing because of its seemingly ‘anomalous’ nature; that is, whilst to external (objective) observers the wellbeing of disabled people appears poor, based on subjective assessments, (...) people with disabilities report a good quality of life. In this paper, I examine an article by the philosopher Dan Moller in which he seeks to explain this ‘disability paradox’. Despite agreeing with his analysis that there is more to what people value than happiness, his explanation reflects some of the difficulties presented in philosophical accounts which seek to understand the lives of disabled people: this includes an analysis which fails to problematise definitions of wellbeing and who has the ‘voice’ to do the defining; which negates the multiple identities and subject positions that disabled people occupy; and which lacks recognition of the social contexts which mediate disabled people’s lives. I suggest that there is a need to incorporate disabled people’s voices into research which deepens our empirical knowledge about the relationship between impairment and wellbeing, including the social circumstances that shape disabled people’s agency. (shrink)

I respond to Dan Lowe’s charge that libertarianism, or the most defensible version, involves an unacceptable “asymmetry of value.” I argue that there is an inconsistency between Lowe’s approach to counterexamples and his eventual objection.

Cet article s’intéresse aux similarités entre deux tableaux : la Jeune Fille à la perle de Johannes Vermeer, et le Portrait de Béatrice Cenci par Guido Reni, dit le Guide (selon l’attribution du XIX e siècle). L’expression du visage semble indéterminée, et c’est à ce titre que ces œuvres peintes ont provoqué l’imagination littéraire ; Russell Hoban et Tracy Chevalier se sont penchés sur le premier tableau et le mystère de son expression, P.B. Shelley et Hawthorne sur le deuxième. Dans (...) Le Faune de marbre, Hawthorne évoque le tableau du Guide pour écrire une théorie de l’art où la « suggestion » tient une part essentielle. Dans Les Cenci, Shelley met en scène Béatrice, et son visage devient l’objet de projections de la part de ses ennemis. Quel discours s’élabore lorsque le visage d’une femme devient signe ambivalent, écran où sont projetées l’innocence et la culpabilité, s’inscrivant contre la personne même et sa capacité à s’exprimer? (shrink)

(1) Je suis en ce moment, comme tout le monde peut le voir, dans une salle et non pas dehors. Je suis debout et non assis ou couché. Je porte des vêtements et ne suis pas tout nu. Je parle à voix haute et ne suis pas en train de chanter ou de chuchoter ou de me taire. J'ai dans la main quelques feuilles de papier sur lesquelles quelque chose est écrit. Il y a beaucoup d'autres personnes dans la salle (...) où je me trouve. Il y a des fenêtres d'un côté et une porte de l'autre. (2) Eh bien, ces dive... (shrink)

This is a collection of fifty essays featured in Edward R. Murrow's 1950s This I Believe radio series. It includes such celebrities of the twentieth century as Pearl Buck, Norman Cousins, Margaret Mead, James Michener, Jackie Robinson, and Harry Truman. With an introduction by Edward R. Murrow and a foreword by Dan Gediman, executive producer of the contemporary This I Believe radio broadcasts, heard weekly on public radio.

In April, 1976, The Monist published an article by Paul Edwards entitled “Heidegger and Death: A Deflationary Critique.” It demonstrates that even after fifty years of thoughtful consideration, important sections of Heidegger’s Being and Time still suffer serious misinterpretation. As discussion of topics relating to mortality have become an intellectual fad, a serious student of Being and Time would like to examine its analysis of death and to assess critically the contributions which this investigation could make to the current (...) interdisciplinary dialogues on the subject. Before one undertakes this task, however, one must clear the ground by showing that, contrary to Edwards’ position, Heidegger’s insights into human mortality amount to more than a “platitude” disguised by “pretentious and fantastically misleading language,” language which is grounded, in turn, in “a slurring of certain elementary distinctions and a set of perverse redefinitions.” This paper, therefore, critically examines Edwards’ account of Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death and exhibits the grounds of Edwards’ serious misinterpretation. On the basis of a more accurate interpretation of this death analysis, it then sets forth the philosophically interesting theses about death which the work contains. This paper does not argue that a correct interpretation of the notion of being-towards-death automatically defuses all criticism directed against it; it argues only that one appreciates the genuine philosophical difficulties of the notion only after one grasps as precisely as possible the author’s meaning. The paper closes by enumerating these difficulties. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.1 (2005) 1-19 [Access article in PDF] God's Immutability and the Necessity of Descartes's Eternal Truths Dan Kaufman Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths (henceforth "the Creation Doctrine") has been thought to be a particularly problematic doctrine, both internally inconsistent and detrimental to Descartes's system as a whole. According to the Creation Doctrine, the eternal truths, such as the truths (...) of mathematics and those concerning true and immutable natures, are freely created by God.1 The Creation Doctrine has led several scholars to think that Descartes held (or was committed to) the view that the eternal truths are not necessary truths; in fact, there are no necessary truths if Descartes is correct.2 [End Page 1]In fact, however, Descartes held both of the following.The eternal truths are freely created by God.The eternal truths are necessarily true.That Descartes held (1) is uncontroversial; in fact, it is the characteristic thesis of his Creation Doctrine. However, his commitment to (2) is more controversial. I believe the controversy surrounding (2) arises precisely because Descartes' acceptance of (1) is so uncontroversial. That is, some have thought that his acceptance of (1) eliminates any possibility of accepting (2). This view is mistaken. In several texts, it is clear that Descartes believes that the eternal truths are necessarily true; this is especially noticeable in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland (AT IV 118; CSMK 235). The task, then, is to account for the necessity of the eternal truths within the confines of the Creation Doctrine; that is, to explain the fact that (2) is true, given that (1) is true.3 Unfortunately, Descartes says precious little about this issue. To make matters worse, there is a scarcity of treatments of this issue in the literature; and the literature that does address this issue tends to treat it quickly and vaguely, perhaps recognizing the difficulty of addressing it in any detail. In this paper, I attempt to remedy this unfortunate situation.I begin by examining the most prominent interpretation of Descartes's explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths: the Immutability Interpretation.4 This interpretation is given by Margaret Osler and most prominently by Edwin Curley.5 According to this interpretation, the eternal truths are necessarily true because they are created by God, and God's will is immutable. I will show that this interpretation is incorrect: It is either too weak to explain the necessity of the eternal truths or it is too strong in that it would commit Descartes to necessitarianism, [End Page 2] a view he does not hold.6 I also show that some suggestions for salvaging the Immutability Interpretation fall short. In the final section I present an alternative interpretation. My interpretation has a firm basis in Descartes's texts, does not have the shortcomings of the Immutability Interpretation, and has several virtues of its own. 1. Immutability Before examining the role, if any, that God's immutability actually plays in Descartes's explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths, it may be helpful to have a working account of God's immutability. To be immutable is not merely to be unchanging, but rather to be unable to change. That is: I1: x is immutable iff x is essentially unchanging.7We must recognize, however, that there are extrinsic and relational properties that a thing may acquire or lose without any real change in the thing; that is, there are so-called Cambridge changes that something may undergo without thereby being mutable. For example if x is five feet tall at t and x is five foot five at some later time t´, then x has really changed; but if x is not an uncle at t and x is an uncle at some later time t´, then x has not really changed in virtue of acquiring this property. The idea is that there are some properties which are, to use Edward Wierenga's and Nicholas Wolterstorff's term, "change... (shrink)

Inspiring life wisdom from people of all ages—based on the This I Believe radio program The popular This I Believe series, which has aired on NPR and on Bob Edwards' shows on Sirius XM Satellite and public radio, explores the personal beliefs and guiding principles by which Americans live today. This book brings together treasured life lessons of people from all walks of life. Whether it's learning the power of saying hello or how courage comes with practice, their intimate (...) reflections will inspire, move, and encourage you. Filled with the valuable insights distilled from a wide range of personal experiences, This I Believe: Life Lessons is a perfect gift—for others or for yourself. Includes extraordinary essays written by "ordinary" people who share the story of an important lesson they have learned about life Shares a wide range of beliefs and experiences from a diverse group of contributors, including a physician, a roller derby queen, a corporate executive, and a homeless person Based on the popular This I Believe radio series and thisibelieve.org website No matter what your age or circumstances, this book will give you valuable food for thought and important new insights on how others have learned from life's challenges. (shrink)

Adalah hal yang lumrah bila dalam tiga dasa warsa terakhir ini muncul minat yang semakin tinggi terhadap kajian dan seluk-beluk korupsi mengingat berbagai kerusakan yang ditimbulkannya. Bahkan, topik korupsi menjadi agenda internasional para ahli politik dan pembuat kebijakan. Kendati demikian, literatur kajian mengenai korupsi dalam tradisi filsafat masih dapat dikatakan minim. Oleh karena itu, kajian filsafat terapan mengenai korupsi yang dilakukan oleh Seumas Miller, Peter Roberts, dan Edward Spence layak diapresiasi. Dalam buku ini, para penulis (selanjutnya akan disingkat menjadi Miller, (...) dkk.) menegaskan bahwa korupsi merupakan suatu spesies imoralitas (hlm. xvi). Melalui titik pijak tersebut, Miler dkk. memperlihatkan perbedaan kerangka konseptual yang halus antara korupsi dan tindakan imoralitas lainnya. Dengan kata lain, tindakan korupsi sudah pasti merupakan perbuatan imoral, tetapi tidak semua perbuatan imoral adalah tindakan korupsi. Dengan menempatkan persoalan korupsi pada ranah moralitas, Miler dkk. seakan menegaskan bahwa korupsi adalah suatu gejala khas manusiawi dan dilakukan secara sadar. Hal ini diungkapkan secara eksplisit oleh Miller dkk. Mereka mengstakan bahwa tindakan korupsi adalah laku kebiasaan yang salah secara moral, dan karenanya tidak didorong oleh keyakinan sejati yang benar secara moral (hlm. 13)................... Berdasarkan uraian-uraian yang cermat dan halus mengenai korupsi, Miller dkk. juga memaparkan lokus tanggung jawab moral untuk memerangi korupsi. Secara detail, paparan tersebut diuraikan dalam bab ke-6 hingga ke-10 yang memuat berbagai alternatif untuk menghadapi korupsi, seperti pengembangan sistem-sistem antikorupsi, peran “peniup peluit” (whistleblower), pranata yuridis, serta mekanisme hukuman yang sesuai dengan teori keadilan yang bersifat memulihkan (restorative theory of justice). Bagi Miller dkk., berbagai pertimbangan tindakan antikorupsi yang ditawarkannya harus dilandaskan pada tanggung jawab moral. Pendasaran ini konsisten dengan kerangka konseptual yang diajukan pada bagian awal buku ini: bahwa korupsi merupakan persoalan moral. Mereka juga menegaskan bahwa tanggung jawab moral tersebut bersifat kolektif (hlm. 211). Tidak hanya itu, sistem antikorupsi yang digagas juga perlu bersifat menyeluruh: berupa pengembangan unsur-unsur reaktif maupun preventif sekaligus (hlm. 156). Miller dkk. juga berharap bahwa pranata yuridis dan mekanisme hukuman seharusnya dapat menentukan inti dari sistem keadilan dengan mengambil inspirasi pemikiran politik yang dikembangkan dari tradisi filosofis Aristoteles, John Locke, David Hume, Imanuel Kant, dan John Stuart Mill. Selain itu, baik pranata yuridis mapun mekanisme hukuman diharapkan dapat berperan untuk memulihkan (mengintegrasikan) kembali hal-hal yang korup (rusak) pada masyarakat dan sekaligus menghalau korupsi dari masyarakat. Melalui rangkaian paparan buku tersebut, kajian Miller dkk. mengenai korupsi dan antikorupsi merupakan masukan yang berharga dari tradisi filsafat, khususnya filsafat moral. Hal ini sangat berguna untuk mengembangkan kajian korupsi serta antikorupsi secara mendalam dan serius dalam konteks kekinian. (Yulius Tandyanto, Mahasiswa Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

Un texte n’existe que dans la mesure où il est lu et ses différentes lectures contribuent à en montrer la richesse et l’intérêt. En France on a longtemps lu et on continue encore à lire Fanon, en particulier Les damnés de la terre , à la lumière de la préface que Sartre avait rédigée, à la demande de Fanon lui-même, après une rencontre et d’intenses discussions entre les deux hommes au printemps 1961 à Rome. Le premier chapitre des Damnés de (...) la terre , intitulé “De la violence” avait été publié séparément dans les Temps Modernes , la revue dirigée par Jean-Paul Sartre, comme s’il s’agissait là de l’essentiel de ce livre. Il y a eu depuis beaucoup d’autres lectures de l’œuvre de Fanon, et en particulier de ce livre difficile et complexe. Je voudrais m’attacher, dans les pages qui vont suivre, à la lecture faite par Edward Said des textes de Fanon tout au long de sa carrière, à partir du moment, où, à la suite de la guerre de 1967 entre Israël et les pays arabes, et l’occupation de la Cisjordanie et de Gaza, ainsi que l’annexion de la partie Est de Jérusalem, Said va mêler intimement élaboration théorique et agir politique. Il est d’autant plus intéressant, d’un point de vue français, de porter attention à cette lecture, que Fanon aussi bien que Said, sont largement marginalisés dans le champ intellectuel et universitaire. Ils sont l’un et l’autre le symptôme d’une tache aveugle dans la pensée française dominante, peu encline à analyser le phénomène colonial. Il ne s’agit pas seulement des lacunes de l’histoire coloniale, qui commence tout juste à se développer. Le regard porté par Frantz Fanon sur la colonisation française en Algérie est difficilement supportable dans un pays qui se veut la “patrie des droits de l’Homme” et des valeurs universelles, tout comme la mise en évidence du racisme dans la France des années 1950. Ce qui semble encore davantage difficile à admettre, c’est que la domination coloniale puisse concerner aussi les catégories intellectuelles, les productions de l’imaginaire, et la construction des subjectivités. Lors de la parution, en 1980, de la traduction française d’ Orientalism , la levée de boucliers contre l’ouvrage fut telle qu’il fallut attendre vingt-cinq ans pour une nouvelle édition du livre qui était devenu introuvable. Entre temps Edward Said était mort, et sa notoriété internationale telle qu’il était impossible de continuer à faire comme si cet ouvrage avait cessé d’exister. On peut naïvement s’étonner d’une telle réaction, en face d’un livre dans lequel il est largement question d’écrivains et de savants français, et qui surtout a été écrit en partie dans le sillage intellectuel de Michel Foucault. Said avait cependant déjà pris, à cette époque, des distances avec la théorie foucaldienne, en s’appuyant sur d’autres théoriciens, au premier rang desquels Fanon. L’importance qu’il accordait à Fanon était antérieure. En effet, dans Beginnings , son premier ouvrage important de théorie littéraire, qui précédait Orientalism , Said avait déjà situé Fanon parmi ceux qui, avec Freud, Orwell, Lévi-Strauss et Foucault, avaient contribué à la production d’un “langage mental commun.&rdquo. (shrink)

A partir dos aparatos conceituais que Judith Butler empresta de Melanie Klein, pensaremos sobre a relação entre o ressentimento, a reparação e a solidariedade no que se refere aos posicionamentos de Edward Saïd relativamente à questão palestina. Para tanto, levaremos em consideração as obras What world is this? e The Force of Nonviolence, de Butler, bem como o ensaio “Amor, Culpa e Reparação”, de Klein. Ademais, trabalharemos com o ensaio “Identity, Authority and Freedom”, de Saïd e com suas entrevistas reunidas (...) em Dans l’ombre de l’Occident, mas também com a que fora concedida a Charles Rose em 2001. Com base nisso, analisaremos a atitude do intelectual frente à dimensão trágica do mundo; em seguida, problematizaremos de que maneira a paranoia opera na dinâmica da violência social para, então, indicar o papel da culpa na negociação psíquica entre o ressentimento e a reparação como salvaguarda dos laços sociais. (shrink)

Early French Feminisms est un reader, type de publication encore peu développé en France, destiné principalement à un public étudiant. Y figurent des textes (par larges extraits ou dans leur intégralité) de Flora Tristan (1803-1844), Jeanne Deroin (1805-1852), Pauline Roland (1805-1892), Madeleine Pelletier (1874-1939) et Hélène Brion (1882-1962), assortis de longues introductions, de copieuses notes infrapaginales et d'une belle bibliographie. Cette anthologie a été conçue par deux hi...

L’article se veut l’esquisse d’une généalogie de l’authenticité esthétique et artistique à l’époque des Lumières. L’authenticité expressive qui va investir l’art et la poésie dans la seconde moitié du xviiie siècle résulte d’une transformation des valeurs, qui fait de l’individu lui-même, irréductible à la société où il vit et aux conventions qui le portent, la source et la motivation de l’autorité de l’œuvre artistique et littéraire. Les Conjectures on Original Composition d’Edward Young permettront d’illustrer cette transformation profonde de l’ethos de (...) l’artiste et de l’écrivain que représente l’émergence d’une valeur d’authenticité créatrice. (shrink)

Depuis Edward W. Said, les recherches sur le rapport entre discours et représentations idéologiques ont permis d’éclairer la situation postcoloniale en ouvrant un champ de recherche propre à revisiter la question de l’altérité. Depuis, dans cette même ligne, des études comme celles de Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak ont prolongé la réflexion en portant leur attention sur la condition des femmes dans les anciens pays colonisés. L’auteur de la présente contribution s’efforce, alors, en premier lieu, de montrer de quelle façon la philosophe (...) indienne utilise la déconstruction derridienne pour penser la question de la condition féminine indienne. Ensuite, il souligne comment sa lecture postcoloniale de la littérature contribue à revisiter l’histoire de l’indépendance et ses prolongements, en interrogeant la place des femmes, notamment les plus défavorisées. Enfin, après avoir rappelé les grandes lignes du texte «Can the subaltern speak?», largement commenté à travers le monde, Fred Poché propose quelques repères utiles pour la prise en compte de la parole des «subalternes». (shrink)

Dans son livre sur I' Histoire du scepticisme d'Érasme à Spinoza, Richard H. Popkin présente la théorie de la vérité proposée par Edward Herbert de Cherbury dans le De veritate comme une machine de guerre lourde et impuissante dirigée contre le scepticisme religieux de l'âge classique. L'article entend montrer que le lourd dispositif conceptuel du De veritate ne constitue pas le coeur de la réponse cherburienne au scepticisme mais seulement le fondement théorique d'un perspectivisme religieux immédiatement corrigé par la défense (...) d'un credo minimum stable et universel. Par là, Cherbury accomplit le programme du pragmatisme religieux de Sextus Empiricus, en recherchant non pas la religion la plus vraie mais la meilleure pour permettre aux hommes de vivre en paix dans le respect mutuel de leurs croyances. (shrink)

Jonathan Edwards est considéré comme le premier philosophe original de l’Amérique. Sa pensée est à comprendre dans le contexte de la théologie calviniste dont elle interprète en métaphysique les thèmes principaux. A travers la notion de l’idée spirituelle, elle énonce une épistémologie où la relecture de la connaissance intellectuelle à partir des catégories esthétiques et éthiques conduit vers l’ébauche d’une noétique de la compossibilité. Quant à sa théorie de la volonté, à travers le refus de considérer toute détermination extérieure (...) ou antérieure, elle présente une homogénéité du volontaire, anticipant l’enseignement de Kant.Edwards is the first original philosopher of America. His thought is to be understood in the context of Protestant theology : he endeavours to give a metaphysical interpretation of the major principles of Calvinistic theology. Through the notion of the « spiritual idea », he is working out an epistemology where the reformulation of intellectual knowledge thanks to ethical and esthetical considerations, leads towards a theory of the compossibility. As far as his doctrine of the will is concerned, he is bracketing the very question of all external determination. He is thus led to expound the homogeneity of the voluntary sphere in anticipation of Kantean teaching. (shrink)

Philosophers such as Dan Brock believe that surrogates who make health care decisions on behalf of previously competent patients, in the absence of an advance directive, should make these decisions based upon a substituted judgment principle. Brock favours substituted judgment over a best interests standard. However, Edward Wierenga claims that the substituted judgment principle ought to be abandoned in favour of a best interests standard, because of an inherent problem with the substituted judgment principle. Wierenga's version of the substituted judgment (...) principle and his counterexample to the principle's successful interpretation of valid surrogate consent is presented. A new version of what is meant by the substituted judgment principle is advanced. The new version is not beset with the problems Wierenga initially ascribed to the substituted judgment principle. (shrink)

Dans cette introduction, Edward Fullbrook et Kate Fullbrook se sont donné pour objet l'étude des éléments principaux de la philosophie de Simone de Beauvoir. Les auteurs entendent ainsi compléter les autres lectures qui ont été publiées sur cette œuvre, notamment sur sa composante littéraire. Cette approche peut surprendre quand on sait que récemment, on a insisté sur la relation d'osmose entre la fiction et les écrits théoriques chez de Beauvoir. Mais l'Introduction des Fullbrook ne fait pas autre chose, finalement, que (...) de montrer plus avant comment la philosophe ne va pas sans l'écrivaine. Le livre comporte aussi une autre dimension: les auteurs veulent lever les obstacles à la compréhension de Simone de Beauvoir, en élucidant notamment son association avec Jean-Paul Sartre, l'image que de Beauvoir donne d'elle-même et l'originalité de son approche. Or cette originalité tient principalement au fait, écrivent-ils, que fiction et théorie sont intimement liées. (shrink)

Dr Edwards' stimulating and provocative book advances the thesis that the appropriate axiomatic basis for inductive inference is not that of probability, with its addition axiom, but rather likelihood - the concept introduced by Fisher as a measure of relative support amongst different hypotheses. Starting from the simplest considerations and assuming no more than a modest acquaintance with probability theory, the author sets out to reconstruct nothing less than a consistent theory of statistical inference in science.

Debate between Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota Morris) and Michael Huemer (Philosophy, Colorado), forthcoming in Problems in Applied Ethics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Steven Cowan, ed. (Bloomsbury). The main essays are 5000 words or fewer; replies are 1500 words or fewer. This penultimate version is published here with permission from the editor.

What is truth? What role does truth play in the connections between language and the world? What is the relationship between truth and being? Douglas Edwards tackles these questions and develops a distinctive metaphysical worldview. He argues that in some domains language responds to the world, whereas in others language generates the world.

PYRRHONIAN BUDDHISM: AN IMAGINATIVE RECONSTRUCTION -/- Author: -/- Adrian Kuzminski 279 Donlon Road Fly Creek, NY 13337 USA -/- Description of Pyrrhonian Buddhism: -/- The ancient Greek sceptic philosopher, Pyrrho of Elis, accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where he had contacts with Indian sages, so-called naked philosophers (gymnosophists), among whom were very probably Buddhist mendicants, or sramanas. My work, entitled Pyrrhonian Buddhism, takes seriously the hypothesis that Pyrrho’s contact with early Buddhists was the occasion of his rethinking, in a (...) Greek philosophical idiom, of what he experienced in those encounters. This has major implications for our understanding of both Buddhism and Pyrrhonism. -/- Pyrrho’s rethinking of Buddhism, I argue, enabled him to introduce into Greek philosophy and culture several key Buddhist notions. These include the primacy and interdependence of immediate phenomenal experience (which the Buddhists called dependent origination), the suspension of judgment about beliefs lacking phenomenal verification (reflecting the scepticism of the Buddha about ‘unanswered’ or ‘metaphysical’ questions), and the promise of personal enlightenment said to follow such suspension, which Pyrrho called ataraxia, and the Buddhists called bodhi. -/- Pyrrho, like Socrates, wrote nothing, but the movement he founded—Pyrrhonism--became an important tradition in Western philosophy. When the texts of later Pyrrhonian philosophers, particularly Sextus Empiricus, were redicovered during the Renaissance, they sparked a reexamination of the foundations of knowledge, thereby helping to prompt the modern scientific revolution. -/- The notion that early Buddhism played a pivotal role in the birth of ancient Greek Pyrrhonian philosophy remains provocative, but has found increasing support in recent years. An earlier work of mine, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism (Lexington Books, 2008), was, as far as I know, the first book-length comparison of the common features of the two traditions. My current work, Pyrrhonian Buddhism, seeks to broaden and deepen this comparison. It argues that ancient Greek Pyrrhonism is best understood as a fully developed but hitherto largely unrecognized Western version of Buddhism. -/- The Introduction reviews our current understanding of Pyrrhonism in light of recent scholarship on ancient Greek-Indian cultural exchanges, and outlines the methodology I employ. -/- Part I of the book offers re-readings of the classic Pyrrhonian texts, with parallels to Buddhism in mind, including Diogenes Laertius (Chapter One), Sextus Empiricus (Chapter Two) and Timon and Aulus Gellius (Chapter Three). -/- Part II enlists the rubric of the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma to illuminate the fundamental points of comparison between early Buddhism and ancient Pyrrhonism. -/- The First Turning (Chapter Four) centers on the Buddhist insistence on the dependent origination of the objects of immediate consciousness, which can also be found in the understanding of immediate experience expressed in the phenomenalistic atomism of the Pyrrhonists. The Second Turning (Chapter Five), as posed by the ‘unanswered questions’ of the Buddha and the ‘emptiness’ of the Madhyamaka, finds its Pyrrhonian correlation in the suspension of judgment over ‘indeterminate’ beliefs. And the Third Turning (Chapter Six), reported as bodhi in Buddhism and ataraxia in Pyrrhonism, is shown in both traditions to follow liberation from suffering and existential angst, caused by what the Buddhists call our attachments and the Pyrrhonists call our beliefs. -/- Other Writers/Commentators: -/- Aspects of the Pyrrhonian/Buddhism question have been addressed by Edward Conze, Everard Flintoff, Thomas McEvilley, Jay Garfield, Mathew Neale, Ethan Mills, Christopher Beckwith, and Robin Brons, among other recent writers. The book-length studies on the issue (since my earlier work) are by Beckwith (Greek Buddha) and Neal (Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism). Other writers/scholars with relevant expertise include C. W. Huntington, Jr., Charles Goodman, Stephen Batchelor, Dan Lusthaus, Rupert Gethin, and Mark Siderits. -/- . (shrink)

Bu makalede solipsizmin argümanlarının metafizik ve epistemolojik düzlemlerde geçerli olup olmadığı değerlendirilecektir. Bu çerçevede çalışmada ilk olarak solipsizmin şüphecilikle ilişkisi bağlamında tarihsel arka planı verilecek, Rene Descartes ve George Berkeley’in solipsizmin teorik açıdan derinleşmesini mümkün kılan savlarına da yer verilecektir. Ardından George Edward Moore ve Hilary Putnam’ın solipsizme karşı kullanılabilecek argümanları ele alınacak ve son olarak solipsizm eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulacaktır. Makalenin temel argümanı solipsizmin ne metafizik ne de epistemolojik açıdan gerekçelendirilebileceğidir.

Seule la démarche matérialiste en histoire permet de réfuter radicalement les essentialismes, tel que « l’orientalisme » en dépit de la critique infondée de Marx par Edward Said. L’attitude politique de Marx et Engels envers la religion reste d’actualité. Cependant, la tradition marxiste est déficitaire dans le domaine de la sociologie de la religion. Il faut intégrer d’autres apports, dont le concept durkheimien d’anomie, pour comprendre la résurgence du religieux contemporaine du tournant néolibéral. Tandis que le christianisme des origines se (...) prête facilement à une lecture de gauche, la théologie islamique, et notamment sa version ultraorthodoxe propagée par le royaume saoudien, favorise une lecture intégriste combattante. Il est périlleux pour les marxistes de se placer sur le terrain de l’exégèse en islam au lieu de s’en tenir à la séparation entre politique et religion. (shrink)