According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject (...) to the illusion of phenomenal consciousness consists in having this disposition. I explain our ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness —that our sensory states bear phenomenal properties that are qualitatively like something with which we are directly acquainted that is ineffable, atomic, intrinsic, private, and non-physical. I also address the illusion meta-problem, which is to explain why illusionism seems especially counterintuitive. (shrink)

People can be disgusted by the concrete and by the abstract -- by an object they find physically repellent or by an ideology or value system they find morally abhorrent. Different things will disgust different people, depending on individual sensibilities or cultural backgrounds. In _Yuck!_, Daniel Kelly investigates the character and evolution of disgust, with an emphasis on understanding the role this emotion has come to play in our social and moral lives. Disgust has recently been riding a swell (...) of scholarly attention, especially from those in the cognitive sciences and those in the humanities in the midst of the "affective turn." Kelly proposes a cognitive model that can accommodate what we now know about disgust. He offers a new account of the evolution of disgust that builds on the model and argues that expressions of disgust are part of a sophisticated but largely automatic signaling system that humans use to transmit information about what to avoid in the local environment. He shows that many of the puzzling features of moral repugnance tinged with disgust are by-products of the imperfect fit between a cognitive system that evolved to protect against poisons and parasites and the social and moral issues on which it has been brought to bear. Kelly's account of this emotion provides a powerful argument against invoking disgust in the service of moral justification. (shrink)

A number of formal models, including a highly influential model from Hong and Page, purport to show that functionally diverse groups often beat groups of individually high-performing agents in solving problems. Thompson argues that in Hong and Page’s model, that the diverse groups are created by a random process explains their success, not the diversity. Here, I defend the diversity interpretation of the Hong and Page result. The failure of Thompson’s argument shows that to understand the value of functional diversity, (...) we should be clearer about how we conceive of and measure that diversity. (shrink)

In slapstick comedy, the worst thing that could happen usually does: The person with a sore toe manages to stub it, sometimes twice. Such errors also arise in daily life, and research traces the tendency to do precisely the worst thing to ironic processes of mental control. These monitoring processes keep us watchful for errors of thought, speech, and action and enable us to avoid the worst thing in most situations, but they also increase the likelihood of such errors when (...) we attempt to exert control under mental load (stress, time pressure, or distraction). Ironic errors in attention and memory occur with identifiable brain activity and prompt recurrent unwanted thoughts; attraction to forbidden desires; expression of objectionable social prejudices; production of movement errors; and rebounds of negative experiences such as anxiety, pain, and depression. Such ironies can be overcome when effective control strategies are deployed and mental load is minimized. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of humour standardly account for humour in terms of what happens within a person. On these internalist accounts, humour is to be understood in terms of cognition, perception, and sensation. These accounts, while valuable, are poorly-situated to engage the social functions of humour. They have difficulty engaging why we value humour, why we use it define ourselves and our friendships, and why it may be essential to our self-esteem. In opposition to these internal accounts, I offer a social (...) account of humour. This account approaches humour as a social practice. It foregrounds laughter and participation, and thereby gives an account of humour that helps to understand why we value humour, why we use it as we do, and why we use it to define our relationship to the world. (shrink)

The accessibility of suppressed thoughts was compared with the accessibility of thoughts on which Ss were consciously trying to concentrate. In Experiment I, Ss made associations to word prompts as they tried to suppress thinking about a target word (e.g., house) or tried to concentrate on that word. Under the cognitive load imposed by time pressure, they gave the target word in response to target-related prompts (e.g., home) more often during suppression than during concentration. In Experiment 2, reaction times for (...) naming colors of words were found to be greater under conditions of cognitive load when Ss were asked to suppress thinking of the word than under conditions of no cognitive load or when Ss were asked to concentrate on the word. The results support the idea that an automatic search for the suppression target increases the accessibility of the target during.. (shrink)

Prescription opioid abuse (POA) is an escalating clinical and public health problem. Physician worries about iatrogenic addiction and whether patients are ‘drug seeking’, ‘abusing’ and ‘diverting’ prescription opioids exist against a backdrop of professional and legal consequences of prescribing that have created a climate of distrust in chronic pain management. One attempt to circumvent these worries is the use of opioid contracts that outline conditions patients must agree to in order to receive opioids. Opioid contracts have received some scholarly attention, (...) with trust and trustworthiness identified as key values and virtues. However, few articles have provided a critical account of trust and trustworthiness in this context, particularly when there exists disagreement about their role in terms of enhancing or detracting from the patient–physician relationship. This paper argues that opioid contracts represent a misleading appeal to patient–physician trust. Assuming the patient is untrustworthy may wrongfully undermine the credibility of the patient's testimony, which may exacerbate certain vulnerabilities of the person in pain. However, misplaced trust in certain patients may render the physician vulnerable to the potential harms of POA. If patients distrust their physician, or feel distrusted by them, this may destabilise the therapeutic relationship and compromise care. A process of epistemic humility may help cultivate mutual patient–physician trust. Epistemic humility is a collaborative effort between physicians and patients that recognises the role of patients’ subjective knowledge in enhancing physicians’ self-understanding of their theoretical and practice frameworks, values and assumptions about the motivations of certain patients who report chronic pain. (shrink)

Recent medical and bioethics literature shows a growing concern for practitioners’ emotional experience and the ethical environment in the workplace. Moral distress, in particular, is often said to result from the difficult decisions made and the troubling situations regularly encountered in health care contexts. It has been identified as a leading cause of professional dissatisfaction and burnout, which, in turn, contribute to inadequate attention and increased pain for patients. Given the natural desire to avoid these negative effects, it seems to (...) most authors that systematic efforts should be made to drastically reduce moral distress, if not altogether eliminate it from the lives of vulnerable practitioners. Such efforts, however, may be problematic, as moral distress is not adequately understood, nor is there agreement among the leading accounts regarding how to conceptualize the experience. With this article I make clear what a robust account of moral distress should be able to explain and how the most common notions in the existing literature leave significant explanatory gaps. I present several cases of interest and, with careful reflection upon their distinguishing features, I establish important desiderata for an explanatorily satisfying account. With these fundamental demands left unsatisfied by the leading accounts, we see the persisting need for a conception of moral distress that can capture and delimit the range of cases of interest. (shrink)

abstract Assume that some group, A, is under a serious threat from some other group, B. The only way group A can defend itself is by using lethal force against group B, but the standard conditions for using force in self‐defence are not met. Ought group A to avoid the use of force even if this means yielding to an aggressive, evil power? Most people would resist this conclusion, yet given the violation of essential conditions for self‐defence, this resistance is (...) hard to justify. The aim of this paper is to point to an interesting yet unnoticed move made by some philosophers to find a way out of this problem, a move which relies on construing the situation at hand as a tragic dilemma. I show the attractiveness of this solution and argue that in the end it fails. (shrink)

The experience of authorship arises when we feel that observed effects (e.g., the onset of a light) are caused by our own actions (e.g., pushing a switch). This study tested whether dysphoric persons’ authorship ascription can be modulated implicitly in a situation in which the exclusivity of the cause of effects is ambiguous. In line with the idea that depressed individuals’ self-schemata include general views of uncontrollability, in a subliminal priming task we observed that dysphoric (compared with nondysphoric) participants experienced (...) lower authorship of action effects when the self-concept was primed. Priming the potential effects of an action just prior to their occurrence, however, increased experiences of authorship in all participants and eliminated the effect of self-concept priming on dysphoric participants’ authorship experiences. These findings suggest that the human mental system seizes on a match between primed and actual action effect to establish a sense of authorship, even in a state of depression when persons have weak self-views of causing behavioral outcomes. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

For years, tour guide Daniel Lum has brought visitors as well as his children out to the remote corners of Barrow, Alaska, one of the northernmost cities in the world, to witness polar bears and walrus on the dark, sandy beaches. Over time, snapping pictures for tourists and shooting photographs of his own, he has been a first-hand witness to the profound environmental changes taking place as his homeland shifts and disappears before his eyes. As arguments over climate change (...) rage in more temperate locales, Nuvuk, the Northernmost is a poignant snapshot of life in a town where these changes are impossible to overlook. Lum's vivid photographs of wildlife, such as whales, polar bears, and birds, offer rare close-ups of animals few ever see. In addition, Lum provides vivid descriptions and pictures of daily life in and around Barrow, offering a compelling insider's introduction to living on the tip of the world. With Lum as a capable guide, Nuvuk, the Northernmost is a chance to see a rare world before it changes forever. (shrink)

Benefit-cost analysis is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay. This definition is incompatible with the exclusion of impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, for which individuals do have WTP. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only impacts for which consumer sovereignty should govern. This is because WTP implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only appropriate for ‘sovereignty-warranting’ impacts. I compare (...) the high cost of including non-sovereignty-warranting impacts to the relatively low cost of excluding sovereignty-warranting impacts. (shrink)

Business Ethics is designed to serve as a textbook for first year students of MBA and diploma students of management courses. The book provides a deep insight into the crucial role played by ethical choices in managerial decision making within an organization as well as the impact of such decisions on the world at large. Starting with a broad overview of the meaning and scope of ethics and the development of ethical thought, the book puts forward the applications of ethical (...) standards to business areas such as corporate governance, marketing and brand management, advertising, and finance. The discussion shifts to a more human level with the various issues of workplace ethics as well as consumer rights. Special focus is given to ethical choices related to the environment, cyber space and criminal intimidation. Contemporary issues like corporate code of ethics, political correctness and the role played by NPO and NGO in upholding moral values are discussed in detail. Finally, several open-ended issues like Intellectual Property. The book follows a debate-based approach where both for and against views are presented, followed by concept analysis and logical deductions. This approach is well aided with a number of caselets, case studies and end chapter review questions. This book will also serve as a useful reference for BBA faculty and professionals. (shrink)

A partir de courtes meditations nees d'une chronique a la radio, le philosophe Daniel Vigne s'interroge sur le sens de notre vie comme de ce que nous avons de plus precieux. Chercher la direction, la signification, les enjeux de cette existence dans laquelle, dirait Pascal, nous sommes embarques. Les sujets abordes sont regroupes en sept rubriques, qui evoquent successivement: l'etonnement comme accueil du sens, le monde comme eclat du sens, le temps comme elan du sens, le langage comme voix (...) du sens, le corps comme noeud du sens, quelques objets pleins de sens, et quelques conduites insensees... Sur ces divers themes, on ne trouvera ici ni discours savant, ni expose systematique. Le but est moins de donner des solutions que d'ouvrir des horizons, de proposer des reperes, des cles, des intuitions qui nous aident a vivre. Il est d'utiliser au mieux notre intelligence pour l'orienter vers la verite. Ces reflexions sur le sens sont donc, au fond, des questions de bon sens. Le fait qu'elles soient posees par un professeur de philosophie ne doit inquieter personne: il s'agit avant tout de favoriser l' etonnement d'exister. (shrink)

I argue that neutral free logic and existence hedging are incompatible. Primarily, I respond to proposals by James Pryor intended to reconcile the two. Consideration of those proposals will reveal that on any neutral free logic either some existence hedges will entail some undesired existence claims, or they will not entail some desired existence claims.

Dear Norm,Thank you for sharing such a personal and heartfelt essay. I have been asked by the editors to comment. Reading it inspires me to do so in a similarly heartfelt way. Although I don't know you well, I thought I'd write to you as if you were my patient.I share your sense that Alzheimer disease is a terrible scourge. I've seen much of this disease over a lifetime of practice, and I deeply understand its ravages and the debility and (...) suffering it causes. But what you propose is not a good solution for the problems that Alzheimer disease poses for patients, families, and society. It will ultimately do far more harm than good. Please let me try to explain. (shrink)

The conceptual promise of relational values, theorized as the principles and virtues of human relationships (with other humans and nature), to motivate sustainability may be observed in its rapid uptake in theoretical and policy domains. Both relying on and impacting nature, agriculture has garnered attention among efforts to apply relational values. However, quantitative measures have received little focus in efforts to operationalize relational values. Guided by the assertion that sustainable agriculture is embedded with both relational and instrumental values (i.e., self-interested (...) ends), this study considers theoretical and methodological challenges and offers a pathway to quantitatively measuring relational values within agriculture, focusing specifically on seeds—an agricultural input embedded with plural values. Drawing on 151 survey responses from seed growers in Vermont, this study assesses how relational and instrumental values are reflected among commercial and non-commercial seed growers and are associated with the presence of crop diversity in their farms and gardens. The findings show that those who sell seeds for income have significantly higher relational values, instrumental values, and crop diversity than those who do not sell seeds. Should these findings be confirmed in future studies, potential exists for policy initiatives encouraging market behavior and its governance to express a range of values beyond instrumental ones exclusively. This paper concludes by arguing that all economic exchange is likely embedded with both relational and instrumental values, meaning that policies and programs that activate a range of values will most likely maximize the impacts of the myriad initiatives pursuing sustainable agriculture. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with landmarks in the history of the idea of cancerous contagiousness from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. The origins of the idea of cancerous contagiousness is considered on the basis of Galen’s distinction between scabiesleprosy, cancer and elephantiasis. Paul of Aegina (seventh century) established the association between these latter diseases. In the fourteenth century, a ‘new line of inquiry’ developed concerning the transmission of diseases like plague, and G. Fracastoro (1546) applied this approach by stating (...) that putrefaction and inflammation notably produce elephantiasis, which is obviously contagious, as inflammation and heat, without putrefaction, produce cancer. J. Fernel (1548) applied the process of syphilitic contamination to ulcerated cancer, whose vapour ‘is widely dispersed’ and which ‘quickly kills by its malignancy’. G. Cardano (1564) reacted against these views, and declared that cancer was could not be transmitted by contact. But A. Zacuth (1629–1634) and N. Tulp (1652) provided instances of such transmission. D. Sennert, who is often said to have accepted Zacuth’s testimony, was doubtful and suggested, rather than contagion, transmission by heredity. This type of explanation was privileged during Classical Age, until experiments on animals or human beings infected by cancerous liquid took place during the Enlightenment in France and England. Pichler (1786) finally recommended forbidding marriage between people suffering from cancer. (shrink)

The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.

Scientific psychology and neuroscience are taking increasingly precise and comprehensive pictures of the human mind, both in its physi- cal architecture and its functional processes. Meanwhile, each human mind has an abbreviated view of itself, a self-portrait that captures how it thinks it operates, and that therefore has been remarkably influential. The mind’s self-portrait has as a central feature the idea that thoughts cause actions, and that the self is thus an origin of the body’s actions. This self- portrait is (...) reached through a process of inference of apparent mental cau- sation, and it gives rise to the experience that we are consciously willing what we do. Evidence from several sources suggests that this self-portrait may often be a humble and misleading caricature of the mind’s opera- tion—but one that underlies the feeling of authorship and the acceptance of responsibility for action. (shrink)

Classic serotonergic psychedelics are experiencing a clinical revival, which has also revived ethical debates about psychedelic-assisted therapy. A particular issue here is how to prepare and protect patients from the vulnerability that the psychedelic state creates. This article first examines how this vulnerability manifests itself, revealing that it results from an impairment of autonomy: psychedelics diminish decision-making capacity, reduce controllability, and limit resistance to external influences. It then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five safety measures proposed in the literature, (...) what aspect of the patient’s vulnerability they seek to reduce, and how they can be optimized. The analysis shows that while preparatory sessions, advance directives, and specific training and oversight are useful, starting with a lower dosage and no therapy is less so. Finally, the article presents a safety measure that has been overlooked in the literature but could be highly effective and feasible: bringing a close person to the psychedelic session. (shrink)

This paper examines Rorty´s theory of truth in reference to concepts such as “falibilism” and “progress”. First, it claims that Rorty mixes inconsistently the pragmatist conception of truth, the Davidsonian thesis that “true” is a primitive and the deflacionist conception of truth. Secondly, it analyses the Rortyan attempt to “reduce” “true”” to “warranted assertibility” in order to show that this move is imcompatible with falibilism. It is argued that the distinction between truth and justification is essential to conceiving falibilism. Finally, (...) it is held that Rorty´s pragmatism is unable to explain scientific and philosophical progress. Three points in the Rortyan philosophy can be pointed out for that thesis: 1) incommensurability of vocabularies, 2) the idea that there is no reason to think that the beliefs best justified are those which are most likely to be true, 3) the “reduction” of “true” to “warranted assertibility”. (shrink)