Since Aristotle there are two main approaches in the explanation of begging the question (petitio): a dialectical mistake (an improper move in an argumentative dialogue) and an epistemic mistake. According to the latter begging the question is committed when the premises of an argument cannot be known independently of knowing the conclusion of the argument. Dialectical approaches use the notion of a commitment (acceptance, standpoint) and rules of dialogue as their basis. I propose a hybrid model, inspired by Jackson: the (...) rationale for introducing commitments and rules is epistemic. (shrink)

Nuestra tradición filosófica ha funcionando como un mito de la racionalidady no como un desarrollo de la racionalidad misma. Esta tradición muestratodas las características típicas de los sistemas mítico–mágicos. Sólo uncambio de condiciones sociales podría permitir el surgimiento de unaracionalidad genuina. De manera inversa, sólo el surgimiento de unaracionalidad genuina, podría producir el surgimiento de las condicionessociales apropiadas en las que la racionalidad pueda prosperar. No puedehaber un desarrollo filosófico genuino al margen de las condiciones socialesapropiadas. Se intenta aquí hacer (...) un bosquejo de esta situación. (shrink)

What is informal logic, is it ``logic" at all? Main contemporary approaches are briefly presented and critically commented. If the notion of consequence is at the heart of logic, does it make sense to speak about ``informal" consequence? A valid inference is truth preserving, if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. According to Prawitz two further conditions must also be satisfied in the case of classical logical consequence: (i) it is because of the logical form of the sentences (...) involved and not because of their specific content that the inference is truth preserving; (ii) it is necessary that if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. According to the prevalent criteria of informal logic an argument is cogent if and only if (i) its premises are rationally Acceptable, (ii) its premises are Relevant to its conclusion and (iii) its premises constitute Grounds adequate for accepting the conclusion (the ``ARG" conditions according to Govier). The ARG criteria characterize a certain broad kind of consequence relation. We do not (in general) have truth preservence in cogent arguments but if the premises are acceptable and other criteria are met, then so is the conclusion. We can speak about form in a loose sense and finally, there is rational necessity of the grounding or support relation. So a certain broad notion of logical consequence emerges from this comparison. The norms of ARG are norms of elementary scientific methodology in which argument is seen as embodying reasoning within a process of inquiry or of belief formation in subject areas accessible to every informed intellectual. (shrink)

Analyzing Apel's proposal for positive tolerance in multicultural society, the author develops critical observations concerning, first, the distinction between negative and positive tolerance, second, the ethical foundation of positive tolerance and, finally, the semantic content of the notion.

I raise some questions about differentiations between methods, checking methods, and appropriate methods in terms of their modal profiles. Melchior argues that there can be sensitive checking methods which are not safe. I try to show that such methods are epistemically deficient. I introduce restricted sensitivity (RS) and investigate its checking profile. RS with respect to a proposition _p_ requires that we consider more non-p worlds (not just the closest ones) but not those which are irrelevant (outside a sphere of (...) seriously possible worlds). Restrictedly sensitive methods (vacuously sensitive and strongly safe) based on the appropriate type of Bayesian reasoning might be sufficient for some kind of “modest” checking. Melchior defends a uniform account of checking based on insensitivity even in the case of necessary true propositions and he introduces the apparatus of impossible worlds. I argue that an unsatisfactory method for checking a necessary true proposition is a way of reaching a belief in the target proposition (different from the original one) which might easily not have delivered a true one. I also indicate some limitations of the idea that checking (and knowing) is essentially modal in character. (shrink)

This book casts new light on the process that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to a profound transformation in the study of nature with the emergence of mechanistic philosophy, the new mixed mathematics, and the establishment of the experimental approach. It is argued that modern European science originated from Hellenistic mathematics not so much because of rediscovery of the latter but rather because its “applied” components, namely mechanics, optics, harmonics, and astronomy, and their methodologies continued to be transmitted (...) throughout the Middle Ages without serious interruption. Furthermore, it is proposed that these “applied” components played a role in their entirety; thus, for example, “new” mechanics derived not only from “old” mechanics but also from harmonics, optics, and astronomy. Unlike other texts on the subject, the role of mathematicians is stressed over that of philosophers of nature and the focus is particularly on epistemological aspects. In exploring Galilean and post-Galilean epistemology, attention is paid to the contributions of Galileo’s disciples and also the impact of his enemies. The book will appeal to both historians of science and scientists. (shrink)

All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models would describe maximum rationality, (...) which a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences for epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In this paper, I present an argument to this conclusion and discuss its consequences, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'. (shrink)

Analyzing different works and in particular Habermas' reflection on Kant, the author reconstructs, first, his approach to international law and his political and legal cosmopolitanism. Second, he presents some critical observations on Habermas' cosmopolitanism in the context of his more general discursive theory of law and state. In this perspective, he discusses the problems of peace and of the role of the United Nations, the strategy of protection of human rights, and the question of world citizenship. He argues that Habermas' (...) cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of Kantian tradition based on a centralization of international power and a cosmopolitan law. Finally, he develops realist arguments in favour of a non‐globalistic conception of international law. (shrink)

In the present essay I would like to explore the different meanings of the emotion named Schadenfreude from a perspective integrating Plato’s and Aristotle’s moral philosophy with the analyses of phenomenological anthropologists such as Scheler, Plessner and Blumenberg. In the first half of my essay I will focus on Aristotle’s distinction between, on the one hand, a pleasure at another’s misfortune which does not necessarily obstruct pity in the opposite position and provides relief from indignation, and a malicious pleasure at (...) another’s misfortune understood as the opposite of envy. In the second half of the essay I will examine the link between the joy involved in Schadenfreude and laughter by asking whether and to what extent this contemplative emotion contributes to the emergence of a theoretical attitude. (shrink)

Napoleon Bonaparte is a veritable “case” for Nietzsche: he does not reduce Napoleon to a single image, but he rather builds up an ambiguous image of Napoleon for years without trying to define a final result. This ongoing construction is due to Nietzsche’s deep admiration for Napoleon that, however great it may be, does not avoid a certain distancing. Defined as the synthesis of Unmensch and Übermensch, Nietzsche regards Napoleon as an extraordinary human being because of his immorality when he (...) exercised power. It is precisely this extraordinary nature that makes Napoleon a model for understanding the concept of the Übermensch. (shrink)

O objetivo deste texto é o de apresentar as questões filosóficas que giram em torno da acusação schopenhaueriana corriqueira de charlatanismo contra seus adversários. O estudo dessas questões-satélites mostra que o charlatanismo pode ser compreendido como um problema filosófico e não mero xingamento vazio de relevância teórica, como se entende comumente. Elas podem ser resumidas como questões estéticas ou retóricas, porque problematizam o estilo do texto filosófico, o seu uso e sua função comunicativa. Próximo do pedante e do sofista, o (...) charlatão é aquele que abusa da obscuridade por conta de seu afastamento da concretude por uma opção pela escrita abstrata. (shrink)

O gênio é a faculdade do espírito na obra de arte bela. Este princípio de vida vem da produção de objetos que só o gênio é capaz. Para isto, ele tem a imaginação como um importante responsável. Então analisaremos a faculdade de imaginação na obra kantiana e sua relação com outras faculdades, para aprofundarmos a definição de gênio na Critica do Juízo.

Passage 228a7-8 of Plato’s Sophist has been the object of a broad debate by reason of a number of subtle interpretative problems. The present work attempts to take stock of this passage and to put forward a satisfying solution from both a philological and an exegetic perspective. I seek to show that the reading cited by Galen and adopted in the editions of the Sophist (τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν) cannot be preferred to the variant found in (...) the manuscripts of the dialogue (τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν). As for the interpretation, both readings stand out as problematic. I propose to reconsider the interpretation of the syntagma τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς and to translate it as “the natural kinship” rather than as “what is naturally kindred”. The paper continues with an analysis of the role played by kinship in Plato’s philosophy, showing how its sundering can be identified with stasis. (shrink)

La explosiva fecundidad de Luhmann no puede explicarse sin referencia a un extraordinario método de trabajo, selectivo y combinatorio a la vez, basado en el automatismo interactivo de un elaboradísimo fichero por materias. ¿Será precisamente la estructura laberíntica del fichero y de la obra de Luhmann la clave interpretativa de la consideración excepcional, persistente y creciente que ha merecido en el círculo de la cultura italiana de los setenta-ochenta? La primera recepción de Luhmann en Italia es realizada por (y coincide (...) con el clima de fragmentación de) las tradicionales subculturas italianas del marxismo y el catolicismo, que se sienten "irresistiblemente provocadas', especialmente por la concepción luhmanniana del Estado de Derecho. La recepción de los años ochenta, sin embargo, está caracterizada por un incontenible splitting, que amenaza la propia identidad del autor, y por el auténtico "agujero negro" de la teoría de la autopoiesis en su doble cualidad de teoría biológica y teoría epistemológica. Difícil que, con estos dos obstáculos, el nuevo programa de investigación de Luhmann produzca resultados apreciables. (shrink)

The death penalty is so deeply rooted in the history of humanity that it will not be possible to abolish it any time soon, together with its ancestral models, such as lynching, stoning and torture. There is little use in appealing to absolute ethical values or to juridical principles held to be universal. A realistic approach suggests a careful consideration of the function the death penalty performed – and still performs – in the structures of political power and in the (...) hierarchical and repressive logic of religions, be they transcendent or nontranscendent. The struggle against the death penalty cannot but coincide with a wide-ranging political and cultural battle against the philosophies and ideologies that venerate “temporal idols” and demand an absolute faith tirelessly decreeing absolute punishments. The supreme punishment has always been a “religious penalty.” The supreme and definitive punishment is founded on a supreme and definitive certainty. The dogmatic certainty of the supreme judge knows no compassion – knows not the feeling of humanity’s common suffering and unhappiness; such certainty makes no provision for the misery, fragility and vulnerability of the human condition. Capital judgment upsets the only indisputable human solidarity – our solidarity against death. (shrink)

L’article est un examen critique de l’œuvre de Cornelius Castoriadis. Tout au long de sa vie, aussi bien par l’histoire des idées que par l’étude des situations socio-historiques, sa préoccupation centrale a toujours été d’établir le caractère créateur de l’action humaine. Mais dans sa réhabilitation intellectuelle de la création, Castoriadis donne en dernière instance le primat aux dimensions psychiques sur les dimensions sociales. C’est ce parcours et les principales conséquences sociologiques qu’il induit qui retiendront notre attention. Son œuvre permet à (...) la fois de souligner les limites d’une vision déterministe de l’action, et les insuffisances d’une perspective prométhéenne d’analyse de la vie sociale.The article is a critical study of Cornelius Castoriadis’s work. All his life, due to the history of ideas as well as the study of sociohistorical situations, his main concern has always been to establish the creative nature of human action. Yet in his intellectual rehabilitation of creation, Castoriadis finally favours psychic dimensions over social dimensions. This article focuses on this evolution and on its main sociological consequences. His work allows us to underline the limits of a determinist vision of action and the shortcomings of a promethean analysis of social life. (shrink)

Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the general (...) problem—the context of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance theory. (shrink)

O presente ensaio tem por objetivo mostrar o papel desempenhado pelas hipóteses ad hoc em dois importantes episódios da cosmologia científica: a adoção da constante cosmológica por Einstein e a descoberta da matéria escura por Zwicky. Há importantes semelhanças entre ambos, uma vez que foram hipóteses adotadas com base em possíveis interações cosmológicas gravitacionais. Comumente encontramos juízos distintos em relação aos dois casos, apenas por um ter sido lembrado como um “sucesso preditivo” e o outro como um “fracasso” de Einstein. (...) Procuramos mostrar ao longo do texto como, não apenas essa avaliação não é justa, como também que a adoção de hipóteses ad hoc é um recurso largamente utilizado na ciência e necessário ao seu desenvolvimento. Até mesmo nos principais referenciais em filosofia da ciência, como Lakatos, Kuhn, Popper e Laudan, encontramos avaliações sobre a utilização destas hipóteses muito mais positivas do que popularmente se dissemina, classificando-as como “estratagemas convencionalistas” utilizadas apenas para mascarar dificuldades teóricas e conceituais. Todos estes referenciais citados se mostram unanimes sobre a importância das hipóteses ad hoc para o progresso da ciência, apesar de suas divergências sobre concepções de ciência e de progresso. (shrink)

In the present essay, I will compare Hegel’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the history of philosophy. I will show how Hegel and Husserl recast Kant’s idea of a philosophizing history of philosophy in two different ways. Both Hegel and Husserl share the conviction that reason unfolds itself in history. Nonetheless, whereas Hegel identifies the history of philosophy with the contingent manifestation of the self-actualization of the Idea, Husserl develops a critical history of ideas. On the one hand, Hegel conceives of (...) the history of philosophy as a complex whole and each determinate philosophy as interpreting a specific articulation of the logical deduction of thought-determinations. On the other hand, perhaps influenced by Windelband, Husserl appropriates the Kantian thesis according to which the objects of the history of reason represent specific constellations of problems. (shrink)

Existe uma tese que dá conta da compatibilidade entre externalismo sobre conteúdo mental e autoconhecimento (BURGE, 1988). Esta tese, que explora a proprie-dade de autoverificação de autoatribuições do tipo “penso que p”, porém, funciona ape-nas para autoatribuições de pensamentos cuja expressão é a primeira pessoa do tempo presente do modo indicativo em seu uso assertórico. Entre os casos problemáticos estão as autoatribuições no passados e as autoatribuições de atitudes proposicionais específicas. Tal falha do compatibilismo é apontada por Boghossian (1992) como (...) prova da in-compatibilidade entre externalismo e o autoconhecimento. Existe uma extensa biblio-grafia para dar conta das autoatribuições no passado. Em tais artigos (BURGE, 1995), defende-se a existência de uma função preservativa da memória que, salvo em situações adversas, garantiria a veracidade das autoatribuições no passado. Porém há pouca bibli-ografia sobre o outro problema da tese compatibilista, o das autoatribuições de atitudes proposicionais específicas. Este artigo propõe expandir o alcance da teoria da memória preservativa, para que ela dê conta do autoconhecimento de atitudes proposicionais pas-sadas. Para tanto, propomos critérios que definam quando uma autoatribuição de pen-samentos passados é verdadeira, mesmo nos casos em que atitude e conteúdo dos pen-samentos não sejam idênticos, mas apenas similares. O critério para similaridade de conteúdos (que garantiria a verdade de autoatribuições deste tipo) foi proposto por Ber-necker (2009), o critério para as atitudes é novo: a atitude que S pensa em t2 como tendo tido em t1 é similar à atitude em t1 sse a atitude atual for implicada pela anterior. (shrink)

Nietzsche est mort et c'est à nous à le faire vivre. Cet usage du texte n'est pas un retour à ce que Deleuze professait superbement : pour ce dernier, faire un enfant dans le dos (de Kant, de Bergson, voire de Nietzsche, même si Deleuze affirmait qu'avec ce dernier c'était l'inverse), c'était à la fois utiliser l'auteur pour lui faire dire ce qu'il n'avait explicitement pas dit, mais qui pouvait présenter un intérêt spéculatif, et, en même temps, dissimuler cet écart. (...) De fait, Deleuze disait "nous" ou "on", amalgamant ainsi sous le même pronom le commenté et le commentateur. Danilo Bilate, au contraire, revendique l'écart et le souligne tout au long de sa démonstration, rappelant ainsi sans cesse au lecteur que, s'il veut faire un enfant à Nietzsche, et si l'on nous permet de filer scabreusement la métaphore, c'est par-devant! Du même coup, là où Deleuze méprisait ouvertement toute philologie (jusqu'à ne pas même préciser les traductions utilisées), Danilo Bilate accorde à la terminologie nietzschéenne la plus grande attention. On interroge les textes pour ce qu'ils disent – car ils disent tout de même quelque chose par eux-mêmes si on veut bien les écouter. L'enfant qu'il s'agit de faire à Nietzsche en les écoutant est une éthique. Bertrand Binoche. (shrink)

This paper starts with an analysis of the maker’s knowledge principle as one of the main characteristics of Modern epistemology. We start by showing that maker’s knowledge can be understood in two ways: 1) a negative sense, as a way of establishing limits to human knowledge: we can only know what we create; and 2) a positive sense, as legitimizing human knowledge: we effectively know what we create. We proceed then to examine the roots of the maker’s knowledge principle in (...) the context of the transition from Greek philosophy to early Christian thought, seeing Philo of Alexandria as perhaps the first to formulate an early version of the principle. We conclude that it is the Christian conception of God as creator that makes possible a redefinition of the relation between knowing and creating, opening the way to the Modern formulation of the principle. (shrink)