By applying diverse approaches to study the Aztec gods, light can be shed on different aspects of their personalities. In this article the cognitive theory of conceptual blending, developed by Fauconnier and Turner, is applied. In this perspective the functioning of the human mind is viewed as being grounded on the constant blending of mental spaces, a process that, in turn, makes new mental spaces emerge. After briefly reviewing the attempts to apply this theory to the ritual domain in general, (...) I consider two types of Aztec rituals, one dedicated to the rain god Tlaloc, and the other to Xochiquetzal, the goddess of seduction. I show the importance of the compression of time in the blending process that condenses three moments: mythical time, ritual time and the immediate future. The capability of the gods to subvert the lineal passage of time and to compress past, present and future stands out as a one of the chief characteristics highlighting the advantages found by applying Blending-Theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, (...) as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion. (shrink)

Among the various experiments in ‘new governance’, the model of Responsible Research and Innovation is emerging in the European landscape as quite promising. Up to now, there have been two versions of RRI: a socio-empirical version which tends to underline the role of democratic processes aimed at identifying values on which governance needs to be anchored and a normative version which stresses the role of EU goals as ‘normative anchor points’ of both governance strategies and policy making. Both versions are (...) unsatisfactory. The first since it suggests movable anchorage which could clash with prefixed values, such as individual rights. The second since it does not safeguard fundamental rights in the process of balancing ‘anchor points’. This result is counterintuitive because it exposes governance to the risk of facing adverse court decisions in the defense of individual rights, thus losing its anticipative attitude. In order to avoid this outcome, the paper argues that it is only through better integration between the system of human rights and that of EU fundamental rights that the anticipative feature of RRI can be preserved. (shrink)

Among the different interpretations of the philosophy of Schelling, there is no doubt that the ones developed by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers played a prominent role within the most recent Schelling scholarship. Both Heidegger and Jaspers focused on Schelling’s discourse on freedom, pointing out the fundamental incompatibility of its key elements, i.e. ‘ground’ and ‘existence’, as well as the fallacious conception of Seynsfuge that emerges from it. Moreover, Heidegger argues that Schelling’s ontology ultimately falls back into traditional metaphysical subjectivism, (...) ignoring the question of Being as such and in fact paving the way to nihilism. Similarly, Jaspers criticizes Schelling’s arbitrary account of the relation between freedom and existential being and his misleading conception of transcendence. However, I argue against Jaspers that Schelling’s discourse on freedom must be read as a philosophy of immanence, which aims at maintaining the concreteness of the concepts and at avoiding any form of transcendence. Consequently, I also argue against Heidegger that not only does Schelling’s discourse successfully show the compatibility of ground and existence, but that Schelling’s understanding of the ‘subject’ does not comply with Heidegger’s notion of ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ and is immune to Heidegger’s criticism. (shrink)

This paper presents a new interpretation of Michel Foucault’s critical project. It is well known that Foucault’s genealogical critique does not focus on issues of justification, but instead tackles “aspectival captivity,” that is, apparently inevitable limits of thought that constrain the agent’s freedom but that, in fact, can be transformed. However, it has not been recognized that, according to Foucault, critique can proceed along two distinct paths. In a key passage of “What Is Critique?,” Foucault states that critique is tasked (...) with questioning truth about its effects of power and with questioning power about its discourses of truth. We show that this “double movement” organizes Foucault’s critical project as a whole, giving it a significantly wider scope and a more complex structure than has been previously acknowledged. At the heart of the above-mentioned bifurcation lies an apparent tension between two contrastive roles Foucault assigns to truth-telling in the context of critique: on the one hand, truth-telling (as avowal) is a target of critique; on the other, truth-telling (as parrhesia) is one of critique’s methods. We argue that combining these two dimensions in a unified account is crucial for understanding and re-evaluating Foucault’s critical project as a whole. By showing that truth-telling remains an essential element of Foucauldian critique, this paper also rectifies some influential misinterpretations according to which Foucault’s critical project seeks to eliminate truth from the picture. (shrink)

In a recent blog post, Joshua Clover rightly notices the swift emergence of a new panoply of “genres of the quarantine.”1 It should not come as a surprise that one of them centers on Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, asking whether or not it is still appropriate to describe the situation that we are currently experiencing. Neither should it come as a surprise that, in virtually all of the contributions that make use of the concept of biopolitics to address the (...) current coronavirus pandemic, the same bunch of rather vague ideas are mentioned over and over again, while other—no doubt more interesting—Foucauldian insights tend to be ignored. In what follows, I discuss two of these insights, and I conclude with some methodological remarks on the issue of what it may mean to “respond” to the current “crisis.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on the concept of intuition in Schelling’s philosophy. More specifically, I show how Schelling attributes to intuition an ontological value by essentially relating it to freedom and primal Being. Indeed, for Schelling intuition is both the main instrument of philosophy and the highest product of freedom, by which we attain the so-called “God’s-eye point of view” and concretely grasp things in their immediate existence. That is, through intuition it is possible to grasp the absolute and (...) original unity of the principles, namely of being and thought, subject and object and freedom and necessity. Accordingly, I argue that Schelling’s conception of intuition, rather being a merely theoretical speculation, is aimed at demonstrating the immanent nature of Being, which is one of the key points in Schelling’s philosophy. (shrink)

Cosmopolitics, the concept of a world politics based on shared democratic values, is in an increasingly fragile state.

Jean-Luc Nancy and the Thinking of Otherness is the first book in English to provide a sustained account of the relationship between Nancy, Levinas and Heidegger.

This paper addresses Frege's discussion of illogical thought in the introduction to Basic Laws of Arithmetic. After a brief introduction, I discuss Frege's claims that logic is normative vis-à-vis thought, and not descriptive, and his opposition to the idea that logical laws express psychological necessities. I argue that these two strands of Frege's polemic against psychologism constitute two motivating factors behind his allowing for the possibility of illogical thought. I then explore a line of thought—originally advanced by Joan Weiner—according to (...) which Frege should have rejected illogical thought as not constituting a genuine possibility. I argue that, once developed, this line of thought constitutes an important correction (moreover, one that is consistent with his two aforementioned anti-psychologistic strands) to Frege's own response to the possibility of illogical thought. -/- . (shrink)

Les avancées rapides dans les technologies numériques ont considérablement changé et amélioré la façon dont les données, informations et outils peuvent être diffusés, gérés, utilisés et réutilisés dans la recherche, et ont créé de nouvelles opportunités pour accélérer le progrès dans la science et l’innovation. Ces développements sont principalement dus au large mouvement formel ou informel de la peer production et à la diffusion globale de l’information mobilisant la coopération de communautés distribuées œuvrant dans des environnements en réseaux. Les initiatives (...) comme celle de Science Commons s’appuient sur un modèle économique de la science évoluant dans un environnement numérique et plus précisément sur un socle de partage et d’échange entre communautés de pairs comme modalité de production. Beaucoup d’autres initiatives de ce type sont en cours . Nous avons choisi Science Commons, dont l’objectif, au-delà de la communication scientifique, vise à accélérer la traduction des données en découverte – en débloquant tous les verrous y compris juridiques qui empêchent que la société bénéficie plus rapidement des résultats scientifiques. La philosophie et les outils pratiques de Science Commons seront décrits comme constitutifs d’une approche résolument ouverte de la connaissance scientifique, dans la lignée de la déclaration de Berlin .Rapid advances in the digital technologies have profoundly changed and improved the way in which data, information and tools can be disseminated, managed, used and re-used in research, and have created new opportunities to speed up progress in science and innovation. These developments are mainly due to an emerging broader movement in support of formal and informal « peer production » and global dissemination of information drawing on the cooperation of distributed science and knowledge communities working in open networked environments. Initiatives like the Science Commons rely on an economic model where science evolves in a digital environment, and more specifically on sharing and exchanges between peer communities as a basis for production. Many other initiatives of this kind are under way . We have chosen the Science Commons, whose objective, over and above scientific communication, is to speed up the translation of data into discovery by removing all barriers, including legal obstacles, that prevent society from enjoying the benefits of scientific results as quickly as possible. The philosophy and practical tools of the Science Commons are described as making up a resolutely open approach to scientific knowledge, as recommended by the Berlin Declaration. (shrink)

Anticipation is one of the main goals of new governance models, such as Responsible Research and Innovation. However, there is not a single mode of anticipation in this model. Two approaches can be addressed within the RRI framework: a socio-empirical one, which tends to underline the role of the democratic processes, aimed at identifying values on which governance needs to be anchored ; and a normative one, which stresses the role of EU goals as ‘normative anchor points’ in governance. These (...) two approaches also address two different models of anticipation: one based on the construction of shared pathways for reflexivity on the purposes of innovation, the other based on the progressive implementation of constitutional goals in risk assessment and management tools. However, both can be deemed partially unsatisfactory from the standpoint of human rights since one puts individual rights in the middle of the ‘values lottery’ where any participatory process ultimately leads; the other can be inadequate since fundamental rights are balanced alongside other goals and thus can be sacrificed, exposing the system to possible adverse court decisions. The normative framework of human rights can help to counterbalance both models aimed at maximising inclusion and those aimed at pursuing constitutional normative principles at the basis of technologically advanced societies, strengthening their dimension of anticipation according to a rights-based perspective. (shrink)

In this article I reconstruct the philosophical conditions for the emergence of the notion of counter-conduct within the framework of Michel Foucault’s study of governmentality, and I explore the reasons for its disappearance after 1978. In particular, I argue that the concept of conduct becomes crucial for Foucault in order to redefine governmental power relations as specific ways to conduct the conduct of individuals: it is initially within this context that, in Security, Territory, Population, he rethinks the problem of resistance (...) in terms of counter-conduct. However, a few months later, in What is Critique?, Foucault replaces the notion of counter-conduct with that of critical attitude, defined as the particular form that counter-conduct takes in modern times. This notion allows him to highlight the role played by the will in resistance to governmental strategies. But since the notion of counter-conduct is conceptually wider than that of critical attitude, I suggest in conclusion that it could be worth reactivating it as a “historical category which, in various forms and with diverse objectives, runs through the whole of Western history.”. (shrink)

This paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wider norm demanding respect to those whom one (...) has invited to something, and finally, as a new suggestion, a Normative Interest View. This view holds that promising is a normative power that serves our interest in facilitating or enabling the relationship of trust between promisor and promisee. I argue that only those embracing the third view can fully account for the distinctive obligation that results from the giving of a valid promise in all cases. (shrink)

Il saggio analizza l'impatto che l'energia nucleare puň avere sulla relazione fra riscaldamento terrestre e generazioni future, sulla base delle prese di posizione degli organismi internazionali di regolazione del settore nucleare. Da un lato, l'energia nucleare viene vista da alcuni come contributo alla lotta al cambiamento climatico, dall'altro avrebbe impatti problematici sulle generazioni future: l'articolo illustra questo dilemma, puntando l'attenzione soprattutto sulla questione delle scorie e sulla tutela giuridica delle generazioni future. Si considera inoltre la questione dell'energia nucleare dal punto (...) di vista della sua valutazione complessiva, sottolineando la necessitÀ di una discussione ampia - che č mancata nel nostro paese. (shrink)

This paper surveys the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein's elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its (...) leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and, therefore, that so-called implicit memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty. (shrink)

For the first time in print, this article reports passages from John Rawls’s graduate papers and annotations on books and manuscripts from his personal library. The analysis of this material shows the historical inaccuracy of the widespread assumption that Rawls’s philosophy owes very little to American pragmatism. Peirce’s notion of truth, as well as the holistic critique of pragmatism thatMortonWhite began in the late 1940s, prove significant at the very beginning of Rawls’s philosophical enterprise. In the light of this material, (...) it might be argued that Rawls’s elaboration of ‘reflective equilibrium’ started at least in part as an attempt to overcome the pending problems of pragmatism. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to the criticisms of my ideas made by Christopher Groves in his piece “Logic of Choice or Logic of Care? Uncertainty, Technological Mediation and Responsible Innovation”, which was published in this journal. In my refutation of his objections, I firstly argue that, thanks to the work of the European Court of Human Rights, human rights are continuously evolving in Europe and therefore constitute a framework that is open to the future. Secondly, I argue that, through (...) codes of conduct, guidelines, etc., human rights give rise to moral practices, for example in the business sphere, and that they are not abstract and universal like natural rights, but contextual and actuated at the world-regional level, in particular. Finally, I show that a human rights framework is more effective than an ethics of care when it comes to dealing with certain aspects of intergenerational relationships, such as genetic enhancement in humans. (shrink)

A groundbreaking examination of Michel Foucault's history of truth. Many blame Michel Foucault for our post-truth and conspiracy-laden society. In this provocative work, Daniele Lorenzini argues that such criticism fundamentally misunderstands the philosopher’s project. Foucault did not question truth itself but what Lorenzini calls “the force of truth,” or how some truth claims are given the power to govern our conduct while others are not. This interest, Lorenzini shows, drove Foucault to articulate a new ethics and politics of truth-telling precisely (...) in order to evade the threat of relativism. The Force of Truth explores this neglected dimension of Foucault’s project by putting his writings on regimes of truth and parrhesia in conversation with early analytic philosophy and by drawing out the “possibilizing” elements of Foucault’s genealogies that remain vital for practicing critique today. (shrink)

Despite considerable differences, Stanley Cavell and Jean-Luc Nancy share the demand for a renewal of thinking produced through and with the concept of the world. Their articulation of the legacy bequeathed by Heidegger and Wittgenstein begins with an understanding of the world in excess of knowledge and insists on this impossible mastery as the most productive incentive for thinking. Inasmuch as philosophy has understood itself as producer of worldviews, systems and principle, philosophy has constantly suppressed the thinking of the world, (...) for any worldview absorbs and dissolves the world in its vision. For both Cavell and Nancy an insistence on this suppression leads to an emphasis on film. Two gestures can be said to intertwine in their thinking of film: to recapture our relation to the world as one that is not based on knowing as certainty, but on the reception of the singular; to recapture thinking as that which is attracted and called for by the insurgence of the singular, by the seam in experience. Nancy and Cavell reverse the idea of cinema as completing the regime of representation stressing how cinema produces a step away from thinking as representation in view of what the article names thinking as patience. The article concludes by asking: what does it mean for philosophy to understand itself as patience? (shrink)

Graham Priest proposed an argument for the conclusion that ‘nothing’ occurs as a singular term and not as a quantifier in a sentence like (1) ‘The cosmos came into existence out of nothing’. Priest's point is that, intuitively, (1) entails (C) ‘The cosmos came into existence at some time’, but this entailment relation is left unexplained if ‘nothing’ is treated as a quantifier. If Priest is right, the paradoxical notion of an object that is nothing plays a role in our (...) very understanding of reality. In this note, we argue that Priest's argument is unsound: the intuitive entailment relation between (1) and (C) does not offer convincing evidence that ‘nothing’ occurs as a term in (1). Moreover, we provide an explanation of why (1) is naturally taken to entail (C), which is both plausible and consistent with the standard, quantificational treatment of ‘nothing’. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on Gianni Vattimo’s and Paolo Diego Bubbio’s notion of kenosis showing that (1) they both understand kenotic sacrifice in a strongly hermeneutical sense, and connect it with a perspectival account of truth and knowledge; (2) they both emphasize that kenotic sacrifice has a fundamentally ethical aspect; and (3) they both maintain that kenotic sacrifice is an “un-natural” act that is implied in the withdrawal of one’s self. However, I intend to show that nature can be (...) understood positively through the notion of kenosis, and that it is possible to envisage an ethical theory that concretely tackles the self-proclaimed centrality of human agency within nature, therefore, implementing an effective and non-anthropocentric form of kenotic sacrifice. In this sense, I conclude by arguing that kenotic sacrifice can primarily be seen as an act of making room for other ways of being. (shrink)

Not only the vertical direction of images – perceptually subject to the law of gravity and its consequences – plays an important role in their interpretation; the horizontal direction left-right too seems to foster different interpretations from its converse. For this reason there are subjects and genres of painting, such as the Annunciation or the portrait, revealing some constants from this point of view, in their representation conventions. And for this same reason there are languages​​, like comics, where the left-right (...) direction is critical not only for the succession of panels – clearly bound to the direction of verbal writing – but also for the panel’s internal organization. These reflections suggest a cultural explanation of the differences in horizontal organization in pictures, linking it to the habits of writing, while ruling out the explanations making reference to the physiology of brain. (shrink)

Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and what Peirce took to (...) be ‘perfect knowledge’ lose their appeal in epistemology of science. From the points of view of the logic for pragmatics and the modal translations given in this article, conjecturability and pragmaticism provide an enriched epistemology for scientific practices that can accommodate both epistemic and non-epistemic values. (shrink)

"Actes du IIe Colloque international (1990) du Centre de recherche en philosophie politique et sociale de l'Universite d'Ottawa"--Cover p. 4.

RESUMO As elites simbólicas perpetuam as formas mais importantes de racismo, o que aponta a importância de nos dedicarmos à análise de como discursos racistas são construídos, com foco específico no discurso da elite branca e, neste trabalho, da branquitude soteropolitana conforme plasmada por estudantes da Universidade Federal da Bahia. Para tanto, reunimos dados, gerados na UFBA, oriundos de questionários abertos e grupo focal com estudantes de graduação. Nesta análise discursiva crítica, utilizamos recorte de uma pesquisa mais ampla, na qual (...) se investigou a percepção da branquitude por discentes autodeclarados/as brancos/as da UFBA. Nossa análise sugere que a percepção do privilégio branco, mesmo quando afirmada, é permeada de ideias que podem fundamentar práticas e/ou discursos racistas, e que a representação de mulheres negras ainda é calcada em estereótipos socialmente construídos numa sociedade fortemente racista como a nossa. ABSTRACT Symbolic elites perpetuate the most critical forms of racism, which points to the importance of the analysis of how racist discourses are constructed, with a specific focus on the white elite. In this paper, the focus is Bahia's capital whiteness as shaped by students at the Federal University of Bahia. For this, we gathered data, generated at UFBA, from open questionnaires and a focus group with undergraduate students. For this critical discursive analysis, we used a section of a broader research, in which the perception of whiteness by self-declared white students from UFBA was investigated. Our analysis suggests that the understanding of white privilege is permeated with ideas that can support racist practices and discourses, and that the representation of black women is still based on socially constructed stereotypes in an actively racist society such as ours. (shrink)