_Purpose__._ This article aims to analyse the ways of free communicative solution of civil society problems as a basis for the development of deliberative democracy on the example of the activities of volunteer organisations. _Theoretical basis._ The conceptual basis of the study is Immanuel Kant’s philosophical understanding of individual obligations as the basis for the institutionalisation of social communication. This concept is developed by Jürgen Habermas in the direction of deliberative democracy. Max Weber, Quentin Skinner, and other theorists (...) give a special status to language communication in the functioning of social institutions. Contemporary Ukrainian researchers analyse the volunteer movement as the basis for the communicative implementation of human freedom. _Originality__._ Practices of political performance in society contribute to the specific and contextual solution of the tasks of communication theory and provide answers to questions about sustainable human needs, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, contribute to solving the political problems of everyday life. Grassroots socio-political movements, and especially volunteer movements, practice free discussion of various social problems, which is the basis of the deliberative democracy. _Conclusions._ Overcoming value differences between members of society is more effective in deliberative practices as the core of social communication in a democratic society. The substantive way to find new forms of communication is to use deliberative practices of implementing freedom to improve the functioning of social institutions. The formal way is aimed at attracting the experience of volunteer organisations in using the minimum necessary forms of bureaucratisation of social institutions in a democratic society. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a model for understanding the relation between substance and procedure in discourse ethics and deliberative democracy capable of answering the common charge that they involve an ‘empty formalism’. The expressive-elaboration model introduced here answers this concern by arguing that the deliberative practical rationality presupposed by discourse ethics and deliberative democracy involves the creation of a practical medium in which certain general basic ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom are expressed (...) and elaborated in the context of widespread moral disagreement. In the course of this paper I propose an elucidation of these ideas and argue for the thesis that they are internally related to the endorsement of deliberative practical rationality. The three basic substantive ideas contribute to the determination of the existence, the form, the topics and intended outcomes, and the effects of the practice of public deliberation. This amounts to an elucidatory defense of deliberative practical rationality by explicating its substantive significance or point. Key Words: critical theory • deliberative democracy • discourse ethics • equality • freedom • Jürgen Habermas • practical reason • John Rawls • solidarity • substance and procedure. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es identificar las consideraciones de quiénes deben guiar la sanción o reforma de la ley penal. Este objetivo cobra relevancia si consideramos que las diferentes respuestas pueden impactar en las tasas de cumplimiento del derecho penal y en los niveles de coacción estatal arbitraria. Para ello, se analizarán algunas propuestas teóricas que se ubican en una recta cuyos extremos están ocupados, respectivamente, por el populismo y el elitismo penal. Estos argumentos son reconstruidos en el debate (...) sobre la reforma del Código Penal Argentino. En este debate, la disminución de la interferencia proveniente del delito y la disminución de la interferencia estatal arbitraria se presentan como objetivos incompatibles. En parte, ello se debe a que las propuestas teóricas que alimentan los argumentos del debate presentan algunas limitaciones para satisfacer ambas demandas. El republicanismo, a través de la defensa de una democracia deliberativa fuerte, tiene capacidad para satisfacer ambas demandas, aparentemente antagónicas. Sin embargo, esa capacidad se ve disminuida en sociedades desiguales. Por ello defenderé que una reforma guiada por aquella propuesta republicana tiene una capacidad que se limita a disminuir la interferencia estatal y mantener iguales los índices del delito. (shrink)

This essay utilizes Plato's insights into the role of shame in dialogical interactions to illuminate the aesthetic dimensions of deliberative democracy. Through a close analysis of the refutation of Polus in Plato's dialogue, the "Gorgias", I show how the emotion of shame is central to the unsettling, dynamic, and transformative character of democratic engagement and political judgment identified by recent aesthetic critics of Habermas' model of communicative action and democratic deliberation. Plato's analysis of shame offers a friendly amendment to (...) these aesthetic critiques by showing how the psychological forces at the heart of shame make the outcome of our political engagements with others uncertain and unsettling, even while they make possible the kind of self-reflexivity necessary to foster the deliberative virtue of sincerity or truthfulness. (shrink)

Classroom discussion practices that can lead to reasoned participation by all students are presented and described by the authors. Their research emphasizes the careful orchestration of talk and tasks in academic learning. Parallels are drawn to the philosophical work on deliberative discourse and the fundamental goal of equipping all students to participate in academically productive talk. These practices, termed Accountable TalkSM, emphasize the forms and norms of discourse that support and promote equity and access to rigorous academic learning. They (...) have been shown to result in academic achievement for diverse populations of students. The authors outline Accountable Talk as encompassing three broad dimensions: one, accountability to the learning community, in which participants listen to and build their contributions in response to those of others; two, accountability to accepted standards of reasoning, talk that emphasizes logical connections and the drawing of reasonable conclusions; and, three, accountability to knowledge, talk that is based explicitly on facts, written texts, or other public information. With more than fifteen years research into Accountable Talk applications across a wide range of classrooms and grade levels, the authors detail the challenges and limitations of contexts in which discourse norms are not shared by all members of the classroom community. (shrink)

Democratic theorists often place deliberative innovations such as citizen's panels, consensus conferences, planning cells, and deliberative polls at the center of their hopes for deliberative democratization. In light of experience to date, the authors chart the ways in which such mini-publics may have an impact in the “macro” world of politics. Impact may come in the form of actually making policy, being taken up in the policy process, informing public debates, market-testing of proposals, legitimation of public policies, (...) building confidence and constituencies for policies, popular oversight, and resisting co-option. Exposing problems and failures is all too easy. The authors highlight cases of success on each of these dimensions. (shrink)

One of the main reasons that liberal democratic societies are not ill-prepared to confront the present challenge presented by disaffection with democratic institutions, is that the type of political theory currently in vogue is dominated by an individualistic, universalistic, and rationalistic framework. This erases the dimension of the political and impedes envisaging in an adequate manner the nature of a pluralistic democratic public sphere. This paper examines the most recent paradigm of liberal democracy: 'deliberative democracy', in order to (...) bring to the fore its shortcomings. Then, the authos puts forward some element for the elaboration of an alternative model that she proposes to call 'agonistic pluralism'. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy has assumed a central role in the debate about deepening democratic practices in complex contemporary societies. By acknowledging the citizens as the main actors in the political process, political deliberation entails a strong ideal of participation that has not, however, been properly clarified. The main purpose of this article is to discuss, through Jürgen Habermas’ analysis of modernity, reason and democracy, whether and to what extent deliberative democracy and participatory democracy are compatible and how they can, (...) either separately or together, enhance democratic practices. Further exploration of this relationship will permit a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of institutionalizing both discourses, as well as of developing democracy in a more substantive dimension. (shrink)

Gert Biesta criticises deliberative models of democracy and education for being based on an understanding of democracy as a ‘normal’ order, which involves certain ‘entry conditions’ for democratic participation. As an alternative, Biesta introduces the idea of democracy as ‘disruption’ and the associated subjectification conception of education both of which he draws from the work of Jacques Rancière. This paper challenges Biesta’s critique of deliberative democracy by demonstrating that the ‘entry conditions’ for deliberation serve an important normative function. (...) It is also suggested that Biesta’s critique dismisses some important dimensions of the deliberative model. The paper further contests Biesta’s conceptions of democracy and education by arguing, first, that his position involves certain contradictions that are problematic especially from a normative perspective. Second, the paper argues that Biesta’s conceptions of democracy and education might result in dismissing crucially important questions concerning the long-term evaluation and improvement of democratic and educational institutions. (shrink)

Participation in deliberation in stable democracies produces effects which are beneficial for democracy, while the results of deliberative innovations in non-democracies are more ambiguous. This article contributes to the debate about the effects of participatory democratic innovations on attitudes, related to democratic commitments, political capacities and political participation, in the increasingly ubiquitous hybrid regimes. We present the evidence collected from the participants before and after deliberative mini publics (DMPs), held in Serbia in 2020. Serbia is an exemplary case (...) of a recent wave of autocratization, which had led to it becoming a hybrid regime, and it had no track record of deliberative innovations. When conducting the mini publics, we introduced an innovation in the standard design, by including active citizens - representatives of local initiatives or social movements particularly interested in the issue of DMPs. We could not find evidence that the democratic innovation affected attitudes of participants regarding democratic commitments, political capacities and political participation. However, we did find that participants of the DMPs became less satisfied with the functioning of the democracy on the local level. We argue that the anti-democratic wider context of hybrid regimes can produce adverse effects when introducing participatory democratic innovations, at least when it comes to this specific dimension of political participation. We conclude with the suggestions for further research, and a call for consideration of the wider political context when designing democratic interventions in hybrid regimes. (shrink)

In the literature there are two well-established but opposite readings of Arendt: as an agonistic theorist and as a deliberative one. In between these two positions a smaller number of scholars have argued that in Arendt these two dimensions can to a large extent be reconciled. This paper follows this third path but tries to bring it one step further. In particular, it defends the idea that those scholars who have proposed this third reading of Arendt have fallen short (...) of revealing the degree to which deliberation and agonism are, for her, interwoven. Through an original reading of Arendt’s views on judgment, persuasion, distinction and Eichmann’s banality, the paper clarifies why, for her, agonism and deliberation are not only compatible but actually mutually dependent. In other words, it clarifies why she believes that there can be no deliberation without agonism and no agonism without deliberation. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that we should reframe the presentation and defense of the program of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy (DEP) in such a way that we make clear its connection to the substantive moral ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom. This program basically says that we should, when we can, determine the validity of the norms regulating our social life through practices of public deliberation. If we want to understand why engaging in public deliberation makes moral (...) sense, or is obligatory, we need to make explicit the connection between the formal procedures of deliberation and our most basic substantive moral ideas of freedom, equality and solidarity. In order to unpack this claim, I construct what I call an expressive-elaboration model of the relation between substance and procedure in public deliberation. According to this model, we should see the two dimensions as working in tandem, in such a way that deliberative procedures are understood as the medium of expression and elaboration of our basic substantive ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom. The three ideas are expressed in the fact and form of deliberation, and elaborated in their changing and specific interpretations as topics and consequences of deliberative practices. To develop this model, I start with a consideration of certain insights of Kant's moral theory, and proceed to bridge the gap between Habermas's more formalistic and Rawls's more substantive neo-Kantian accounts of practical reason. The result is a straightforwardly substantive articulation and defense of the dialogic procedures of DEP based on the recognition of the fact of widespread moral disagreement and a fundamental project of justice demanding that we deal with that condition of disagreement by constructing social arrangements in which we include each other, solidaristically, as free and equal members. This morally substantive defense of DEP referring to the fact of widespread moral disagreement and the fundamental project of justice is different from, and more compelling than, other common, formalistic and prudential defenses of DEP. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is often celebrated and endorsed because of its promise to include, empower, and emancipate otherwise oppressed and excluded social groups through securing their voice and granting them impact in reasoned public deliberation. This article explores the ability of Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy to accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups in democratic plural societies. It argues that the inclusive, transformative, and empowering potential of Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy falters when confronted with particular (...) types of historical injustices. It falters because it pays little attention to the historical dimension of injustices and the demands to which it gives rise. The historical dimension of longstanding injustices, it is argued, gives rise to a set of distinctive demands, such as collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, taking responsibility, and offering apology and reparations for causing these injustices, which go beyond the type of democratic inclusion that is often offered by deliberative democracy. Yet, the solution is not to abandon the model of deliberative democracy. Quite the contrary, it remains a valuable basis for forward-looking political decision making. The article concludes that in order to achieve inclusive, empowering and transformative deliberation in consolidated democracies that have experienced historical injustices, the politics of reconciliation is indispensable. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between popular sovereignty, populism, and deliberative democracy. My main thesis is that populisms resurrect the polemical dimension of popular sovereignty by turning “the people” against the “powerbloc” or the “elite”, and that it is crucial thatthis terrain not be ceded to authoritarian distortions of this basic contestatory grammar. Furthermore, I contend that populist forms of politics are compatible with a procedural and deliberative conception of democracy. Ifirst engage with the assumption that populism (...) and a procedural model of democracy are incompatible, demonstrating that this assumption relies on a conservative bias which tiesthe exercising of communicative power to a “duty of civility”. I then engage with radical-democratic reconstructions of the procedural notion of popular sovereignty which emphasize the unleashing and diversification of peoplehood in communication circuits and the mutual permeability of constitutional politics, parliamentary legislation, and the public sphere. Thirdly, I conclude that populisms are an essential part of communicative power in modern democracies and part of its dialectical structure. (shrink)

This paper takes stock of a recent but growing movement within the field of deliberative democracy, which normatively argues for the epistemic dimension of democratic authority and positively defends the truth-tracking properties of democratic procedures. Authors within that movement call themselves epistemic democrats, hence the recognition by many of an ‘epistemic turn’ in democratic theory. The paper argues that this turn is a desirable direction in which the field ought to evolve, taking it beyond the ‘fact of disagreement’ (...) that had previously blocked the conceptual road to acknowledging more than intrinsic properties to democratic decision procedures. The paper shows how two authors in particular – Joshua Cohen and David Estlund – have successfully lifted the Rawlsian requirement of epistemic abstinence and defends epistemic democrats and the implications of the epistemic turn in democratic theory against various misconceptions. (shrink)

Sophia Moreau contends that an important dimension of the wrong of discrimination lies in burdens on deliberative freedom.1 Discrimination may burden deliberative freedom by limiting or otherwise b...

Can recognition theories distinguish legitimate from illegitimate claims to recognition put forward by social movements? This paper identifies an under-theorised problem of recognition theories: in viewing struggles for recognition as a force for social progress in the mould of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, existing accounts have trouble identifying and ruling out illegitimate claims to recognition as formulated by contemporary counter-movements like white supremacists or men’s rights activists. I refer to this issue as the symmetry problem (...) of recognition since it amounts to difficulties in identifying grounds for excluding illegitimate claims to recognition that do not also symmetrically justify the exclusion of legitimate ones (and vice versa). I argue that criteria for telling apart legitimate from illegitimate claims to recognition need to include interpretation issues as a dimension of analysis, which consequently requires incorporating democratic deliberation as a necessary component of recognition theory. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é examinar como Habermas, orientado pela intuição normativa do uso público da razão, reconstrói uma concepção procedimental de democracia deliberativa, que, sem desconsiderar da dimensão estratégica e instrumental da esfera pública e da política, reformula a dimensão epistêmica da democracia: a aceitabilidade racional dos acordos políticos. Inicialmente, apresento brevemente a análise sociológica e histórica do conceito de esfera pública crítica, realizada em Mudança Estrutural da Esfera Pública (1962), para, em seguida, expor duas linhas de argumentação sobre (...) o conceito de esfera pública e de política deliberativa, em Direito e Democracia (1992): a que se refere ao princípio de legitimação baseado na razão pública como uma reconstrução intersubjetiva e política do conceito kantiano de autonomia; e a que concerne aos aspectos essenciais da teoria crítica da sociedade fundada na distinção entre mundo da vida e sistema e a "tradução" sociológica e institucional do uso público da razão, nos conceitos de sociedade civil e esfera pública. The objective of this article is to examine how Habermas, guided by a normative intuition of the public use of reason, reconstructs a procedural conception of deliberative democracy which, without disregarding the strategic and instrumental dimensions of the public sphere and of politics, reconstructs the epistemic dimension of democracy: the rational acceptability of political agreements. First, I briefly present a historical and sociological analysis of the concept of the public sphere in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). I then present two lines of argumentation regarding the concept of the public sphere and deliberative democracy in Between Facts and Norms (1992): one refers to the principle of justification based on public reason as an intersubjective and political reconstruction of the Kantian concept of autonomy; the other refers to the essential aspects of the critical theory of society based on the distinction between lifeworld and system, and on the sociological and institutional "translation" of the public use of reason in the concepts of civil society and public sphere. (shrink)

This article provides a narrative review on the concept of dialogue within STS and Deliberative Democracy academic literature. Through this review I find that dialogue has been used in unsystematic, conflicting and sometimes even misleading ways that conflate dialogue and deliberation. Dialogue is used flexibly as an epistemological standpoint, an interactional format, a tradition and format of public engagement, an interactional phenomenon and an idealised moment. I provide a characterisation and theorisation of dialogue that seeks to integrate critical and (...) historical accounts of dialogue, while introducing analytical dimensions that can be leveraged for further research. By bridging STS and Deliberative Democracy, I advance a definition of dialogue as a public technology. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to identify, given certain democratic normative standards regarding deliberation, some pros as well as cons of possible online deliberation designs due to variations in two key design dimensions: namely, asynchronicity and anonymity. In particular, we consider one crucial aspect of deliberative argumentation: namely, its reciprocity, which puts interaction centre stage to capture the back-and-forth of reasons. More precisely, we focus on two essential features of the deliberative interaction: namely, its listening widely and (...) listening carefully. We conclude that one sort of online deliberation that combines the two design features of anonymity and asynchronicity is likely to better promote the reciprocity required for democratic deliberation than both natural and designed offline deliberations and online simulations of them. (shrink)

As the distance between science and society is collapsed with the growth of contemporary knowledge societies, so a range of different approaches to the democratic governance of science superseding its Enlightenment government is emerging. In light of these different approaches, this article focuses on the figure of the scientific citizen and the variable dimensions of a new scientific citizenship. Three models of democracy - advanced consumer, deliberative and radical/pluralist - are put forward as both partly competing and partly complementary (...) frameworks within which the new rights and responsibilities of the scientific citizen can be articulated and discussed. In each case the theory and practice of scientific citizenship are viewed against the background of contemporary developments within the field of science communication; the rise of the public understanding of science movement; the new enthusiasm for advancing public engagements with science, and the legitimate place of different forms of public protest and dissent within new designs for democratic governance. (shrink)

In this paper I consider various shifts in my research and understanding stimulated by seeking how to combat social ecological crises connected to modern economies. The discussion and critical reflections are structured around five papers that were submitted to Environmental Values in an open call to address my work. A common aspect is the move away from neoclassical environmental economics, and its reductionist monetary valuation, to a more realist theory and multiple methods. This relates to my work on environmental ethics, (...) plural values, stated preference validity and deliberative monetary valuation. Expanding beyond the narrow confines of mainstream orthodoxy has involved exploring a range of other disciplines (e.g. applied philosophy, social psychology, human geography, political science, social anthropology, history of thought and philosophy of science) and learning from this literature to rethink economics and develop social ecological economics. A broad range of subjects are covered here, including: personal responsibility, social practice, psychology of the individual, participatory processes, value (intrinsic, instrumental and relational), Nature–society relationships and interdependencies, critical realism and the conduct of unifying interdisciplinary science. I end with a series of comments concerning the failings of orthodox economics and the conduct of scientific research for social ecological transformation. (shrink)

Deliberative and participatory approaches to democracy seek to directly include citizens in decision-making and agenda-setting processes. These methods date back to the very foundations of democracy in Athens, where regular citizens shared the burden of governance and deliberated every major issue. However, thinkers at the time rightly believed that these methods could not function beyond the scale of the city-state, or polis. Representative democracy as an innovation improved on the scalability of collective decision making, but in doing so, sacrificed (...) the extent to which regular citizens could participate in deliberation. Modern technology, including advances in computational power, machine learning algorithms, and data visualization techniques, presents a unique opportunity to scale out deliberative processes. Here we describe Polis, an open source web application capable of collecting and synthesizing feedback from people in a scalable and distributed fashion. Polis has shown itself capable of building shared understanding, disincentivizing counterproductive behavior, and cultivating points of consensus. It has done this in the context of journalistic and academic research, and directly as part of decision-making bodies at local and national levels, directly affecting legislation. These results demonstrate that deliberative processes can be scaled up beyond the constraints of in-person gatherings and small groups. (shrink)

The morally responsible practice of clinical medicine depends on many factors, the integrity of clinical judgment chief among them. Responsible clinical judgment requires that it be deliberative. The disciplines of the humanities, all of which contribute to clinical ethics—as the papers that follow illustrate—teach that deliberative reasoning includes critical self-awareness and self-scrutiny. Critical appraisal proves essential to achieving both. The papers in the 2013 Clinical Ethics number of the Journal provide distinctive critical appraisals of clinical judgment: concepts of (...) race; narrative; stewardship; and the Rule of Rescue. By becoming commonplace, such critical appraisals of clinical judgment become essential to clinical ethics. (shrink)

Plutôt que de prendre le parti d’une critique – par ailleurs légitime – des usages, notamment managériaux, de la compétence éthique, ce texte propose de prendre le concept au sérieux et de tenter de l’éclairer en s’appuyant notamment sur les approches pragmatistes des émotions développées par James, Dewey et Peirce. Plutôt que de privilégier une accentuation délibérative et argumentative des compétences éthiques favorisée par l’efflorescence et la multiplication des « comités d’éthique », il cherche principalement à penser les émotions comme (...) compétences éthiques, tout en en revendiquant une conception cognitiviste. Les « compétences éthiques » sont tout d’abord déployées sous les accentuations possibles de la responsabilité, distinguées selon la grammaire des pronoms personnels, comme autonomie, comme sollicitude, comme souci du collectif, comme accusation... L’éclairage pragmatiste des émotions comme compétences éthiques permet ensuite d’ouvrir à une approche renouvelée de l’« engagement » pensé comme compétence, couvrant un large spectre allant des engagements volontaires, obéissant à des décisions, jusqu’à des engagements à dominante émotionnelle caractéristiques par exemple des « communautés esthétiques », du ressentir, du vibrer ensemble. (shrink)

Recent conceptualizations of auditors’ professional skepticism suggest the interplay between analytical and intuitive information processing. We conduct an in-depth empirical investigation to explore this relationship, drawing on 49 interviews with auditors from the Big Four audit firms in the UK. It reveals that auditors’ skepticism often emerges intuitively in response to interpersonal contexts, manifesting as feelings of discomfort. These intuitive responses guide subsequent, more deliberative processes of collecting and analyzing audit evidence. The research demonstrates that such intuitive feelings are (...) integral to auditors’ recognition of potential issues, thereby enhancing their cognitive evaluations. Additionally, the study explores how auditors’ skeptical judgments are continuously shaped by their social environments and the intuitions of other members of their audit teams. Ultimately, the findings affirm that the fusion of intuition and reasoning plays a crucial role in auditors’ practice of PS, with past practice experiences and social interactions enriching their intuitive assessments and contributing to developing their professional expertise. (shrink)

This article aims to pay heed to the rational and deliberative dimensions of moral agency within the project of moral enhancement. In this sense, it is presented how the technique of neurofeedback might contribute to the enhancement of moral deliberations and autonomy. Furthermore, this brain-computer interface is thought as a possible element of a Socratic moral assistant interested in improving moral enhancement within a model of full interaction between moral agents and such a moral assistant. This proposal does not (...) embrace the project of moral bioenhancement, centred in the improvement of moral emotions through neuropharmacology. Moreover it rejects the delegation of moral decision-making to moral artificial agents because this would mean that there is continuity between moral human and artificial moral agents. (shrink)

The renewed engagement with Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom in management and organization studies is reflective of the wider turn towards practice sweeping across many disciplines. In this sense, it constitutes a welcome move away from the traditional rationalist, abstract, and mechanistic modes of approaching ethical decision-making. Within the current engagement, practical wisdom is generally conceptualized, interpreted or read as a form of deliberation or deliberative judgement that is also cognizant of context, situatedness, particularity, lived experience, and so on. (...) We argue that while this way of conceptualizing practical wisdom moves closer to practice in accounting for the concrete and particular reality within which individuals enact ethics, it does not adequately account for practice in the ontological and relational sense posited in practice theories. Practical wisdom conceptualized on the _deliberative_ dimension still retains a higher emphasis on distinct entities (individuals/institutions), reflexive agency, conscious mental states, goal-directed action, and intentionality. In other words, it puts a higher stress on individual _wisdom_, as opposed to _practice_ or the relational interaction of the individual and social inhering in practice. We offer an alternative conceptualization of practical wisdom based on the _dispositional_ mode of being in the world which is rarely deliberate, intentional, or reflective. Our conceptualization integrates Aristotle’s original ethical framework, which is already embedded in a practice-based ontology, with insights from practice theories to show how practical wisdom is intuitively channelled in the _dispositional_ mode in a given social configuration of virtues/ends. (shrink)

This article focuses on the relationship between ecological citizenship and the green state and asks whether it is a productive one. First, I examine the political system of an ideal ecological state to assess how it could encourage ecological citizenship. Then, I turn my attention to how eco-states might emerge and be sustained, and the obstacles they may encounter. I show that the green state has a strong potential to develop ecological citizenship, albeit with a rather narrow focus on its (...) deliberative dimension. However, my main point is that this potential may not be fully realised because the green state is grounded on a postliberal ecological democracy and an ecologically modernised economy. Since the green state cannot avoid the problems arising from the nexus between liberal democracy and capitalism, I claim that it is not the most appropriate locus for the cultivation of ecological citizenship. (shrink)

In this article we will suggest that the traditional account of the freedom of expression needs revision. The emergence of Internet media has shown that the traditional ideal of a plurality of voices does not in itself lead to fruitful public spheres. Inspired by Foucault’s interpretation of the Greek concept parrhesia we suggest that the plurality of voices should be supplemented with an ideal of courageous truth-telling. We will furthermore argue that the notion of courage has two dimensions that should (...) be taken into account. On the one hand a Derridean reading of courage brings out a disruptive and aporetic feature of courage. On the other hand, courage also needs to be articulated through some kind of goal, which in a public setting calls for a deliberative dimension. We conclude by suggesting that public spheres with courageous truth-telling will facilitate societies in which strong voices and opinions are continuously challenged by less strong voices. (shrink)

Aristotelian equity has often been relegated to scholarly discussions of retributive justice. Recently, however, political theorists have recast equity as the virtue of a sympathetic democratic citizen. I build on this literature by offering a more precise explanation of equity’s internal structure and political significance. In particular, I reveal equity’s deliberative dimension. For Aristotle, equitable citizens, statesmen, and legislators correct or go beyond the law, as appropriate, not only when they render retrospective judgments about matters of punishment or (...) distribution, but also when they deliberate about future-oriented questions of legislation or political action. In addition, I show, more concretely, the role of equity in democratic citizenship. Drawing upon the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians, I argue that the Athenian demos exemplified equity when it brought about the reconciliation and the amnesty of 403 BC. Attention to this episode clarifies the conceptual linkages between equity, deliberation, sympathy, and democracy. (shrink)

While early optimists have seen online discussions as potential spaces for deliberation, the reality of many online spaces is characterized by incivility and irrationality. Increasingly, AI tools are considered as a solution to foster deliberative discourse. Against the backdrop of previous research, we show that AI tools for online discussions heavily focus on the deliberative norms of rationality and civility. In the operationalization of those norms for AI tools, the complex deliberative dimensions are simplified, and the focus (...) lies on the detection of argumentative structures in argument mining or verbal markers of supposedly uncivil comments. If the fairness of such tools is considered, the focus lies on data bias and an input–output frame of the problem. We argue that looking beyond bias and analyzing such applications through a sociotechnical frame reveals how they interact with social hierarchies and inequalities, reproducing patterns of exclusion. The current focus on verbal markers of incivility and argument mining risks excluding minority voices and privileges those who have more access to education. Finally, we present a normative argument why examining AI tools for online discourses through a sociotechnical frame is ethically preferable, as ignoring the predicable negative effects we describe would present a form of objectionable indifference. (shrink)

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of (...) epistemic democracy, however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy. Key Words: legitimacy • deliberative democracy • epistemic democracy • social epistemology. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss Bernard Williams’s theory of reasons for action. Following the introduction and analysis of its main concepts and the identification of the argument that it is offered in its favor and against alternative positions, I analyze the objection that the soundness of this argument depends on the acceptance of a procedural conception of correct deliberation that Williams would have assumed, without offering any argument, as true. I argue that this objection is false because (...) it is possible to identify in his writings a supplementary argument justifying his preference for a procedural conception. (shrink)

Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses (...) the importance of giving reasons for collective decisions, where such reasons should also be collectively decided. I compare these two accounts on the basis of a formal model developed in the growing literature on the ‘discursive dilemma’ and ‘judgment aggregation’ and address several questions: What is the trade-off between the (minimal liberal) demand for reaching agreement on outcomes and the (comprehensive deliberative) demand for reason-giving? How large should the ‘sphere of public reason’ be? When do the decision procedures suggested by the two accounts agree and when not? How good are these procedures at truthtracking on factual matters? What strategic incentives do they generate for decision-makers? My discussion identifies what is at stake in the choice between minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts of collective decisionmaking, and sheds light not only on these two ideal-typical accounts themselves, but also on many characteristics that intermediate accounts share with them. (shrink)

Participatory approaches to environmental decision making and assessment continue to grow in academic and policy circles. Improving how we understand the structure of deliberative activities is especially important for addressing problems in natural resources, climate change, and food systems that have wicked dimensions, such as deep value disagreements, high degrees of uncertainty, catastrophic risks, and high costs associated with errors. Yet getting the structure right is not the only important task at hand. Indeed, participatory activities can break down and (...) fail to achieve their specific goals when some of the deliberators lack what we will call participatory virtues. We will argue for the importance of future research on how environmental education can incorporate participatory virtues to equip future citizens with the virtues they will need to deliberate about wicked, environmental problems. What is the role of education for deliberative skills and virtues relative to other aspects of environmental education, such as facts and values education? How important is it relative to careful design of the deliberative process? What virtues really matter? (shrink)

This paper has three dimensions, historical, theoretical and social. The historical dimension is to show how the Ciceronian system of dialectical argumentation served as a precursor to computational models of argumentation schemes such as Araucaria and Carneades. The theoretical dimension is to show concretely how these argumentation schemes reveal the interdependency of rhetoric and logic, and so the interdependency of the normative with the empirical. It does this by identifying points of disagreement in a dialectical format through using (...) argumentation schemes and critical questions. The social dimension is to show how the Ciceronian dialectical viewpoint integrates with the use of computational tools that can be used to support the principle of reason-based deliberation and facilitate deliberative democracy. (shrink)

The precautionary principle in public decision making concerns situations where following an assessment of the available scientific information, there are reasonable grounds for concern for the possibility of adverse effects on the environment or human health, but scientific uncertainty persists. In such cases provisional risk management measures may be adopted, without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those adverse effects become fully apparent. This is the definition of the precautionary principle as operationalized under EU law. The precautionary (...) principle is a deliberative principle. Its application involves deliberation on a range of normative dimensions which need to be taken into account while making the principle operational in the public policy context. Under EU law, any risk management measures to be adopted while implementing the precautionary principle, have to be proportionate to ensure the chosen high level of protection in the European Community. This articlewill illustrate the established practice concerning the release of genetically modified organisms into the environment and how the principle is implemented under hard law. The article also provides an outlook on what this may imply for the relative new case of nanotechnology and the use of precautionary principle within the context of soft law (use of codes of conduct). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine whether it is morally wrong to ban only male citizens from leaving a country in wartime, and if it is, why it is the case. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared martial law and ordered general mobilization, at the same time prohibiting male citizens aged 18 to 60 from crossing the border. The justifiability of the ban is in dispute, and opponents have made a case in both legal and (...) moral dimensions. In the moral dimension, there are arguments based on consequentialism, individual freedom, and fairness or non-discrimination. In this paper, I focus on the third argument and argue that the ban unfairly and morally wrongfully discriminates against male Ukraine citizens on the basis of their gender. First, I define discrimination and apply it to our case. Second, moving from the descriptive definition of discrimination to its moral wrongness, I argue that the male-only ban is unfair and morally unjustified. Third, I argue that the ban can also be deemed morally wrong from one of the prominent views in the field of the ethics of discrimination, namely the deliberative freedom view. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the deliberative democracy argument for freedom of expression in terms of its relationship to different dimensions of autonomy. It engages the objection that Enlightenment theories pose a threat to cultures that reject autonomy and argues that autonomy-based democracy is not only compatible with but necessary for respect for cultural diversity. On the basis of an intersubjective epistemology, it argues that people cannot know how to live on mutually respectful terms without engaging in public deliberation and (...) developing some degree of personal autonomy. While freedom of expression is indispensable for deliberation and autonomy, this does not mean that people have no obligations regarding how they speak to each other. The moral insights provided by deliberation depend on the participants in the process treating one another with respect. The argument is related to the Danish cartoon controversy. (shrink)

This article discusses the relationship between the ideal of autonomous preference formation and the danger of paternalism in deliberative democratic theory. It argues that the aim of autonomous preference formation can and should be decoupled from a justification of paternalistic state action aimed at reshaping citizens’ preferences. The problem of non autonomous preference formation is rooted in the communication structure in which each and every one forms her preferences and hence cannot be solved by some paternalistically judging on others’ (...) behalf. The argument is based on a new formulation of the deliberative democratic ideal, which emphasizes and clarifies the multiple dimensions of freedom it incorporates. (shrink)

Is it possible to look at schools as spaces for encounters? Could schools contribute to a deliberative mode of communication in a manner better suited to our own time and to areas where different cultures meet? Inspired primarily by classical (Dewey) and modern (Habermas) pragmatists, I turn to Seyla Benhabib, posing the question whether she supports the proposition that schools can be sites for deliberative communication. I argue that a school that engages in deliberative communication, with its (...) stress on mutual communication between different moral perspectives, gives universalism a procedurally oriented meaning, serving as an arena for encounters that represents a weak public sphere. An interactive universalism of this kind attaches importance to developing an ability and willingness to reason on the basis of the views of others and to change perspectives. In that respect, the institutional arrangements of schools are potential parts of the political dimension of cosmopolitanism, as well as its moral dimension, in terms of the obligations and responsibilities we develop through our institutions and in our actions as human beings towards one another. (shrink)

This chapter reviews empirical evidence bearing on the design of online forums for deliberative civic engagement. Dimensions of design are defined for different aspects of the deliberation: its purpose, the target population, the spatiotemporal distance separating participants, the communication medium, and the deliberative process to be followed. After a brief overview of criteria for evaluating different design options, empirical findings are organized around design choices. Research has evolved away from treating technology for online deliberation dichotomously (either present or (...) not) toward nuanced findings that differentiate between technological features, ways of using them, and cultural settings. The effectiveness of online deliberation depends on how well the communicative environment is matched to the deliberative task. Tradeoffs, e.g. between rich and lean media and between anonymous and identifiable participation, suggest different designs depending on the purpose and participants. Findings are limited by existing technologies, and may change as technologies and users co-evolve. (shrink)

The development of the theory of deliberative democracy has culminated in a synthesis between Rawlsian political liberalism and Habermasian critical theory. Taking the perspective of conceptions of freedom, this article argues that this synthesis is unfortunate and obscures some important differences between the two traditions. In particular, the idea of internal autonomy, which was an important, implicit idea in the ideology critique of the earlier Habermas, falls out of view. There is no room for this dimension of freedom (...) in political liberalism and it has largely disappeared from the later Habermas. In so far as others have followed Rawls and Habermas, deliberative democratic theory has converged around a less critical and more accommodationist view of freedom. If we want to keep deliberative democracy as a critical theory of contemporary society, we should resist this convergence. Our starting point should not be `the fact of reasonable pluralism' but rather `the fact of unreflective acquiescence'. This article argues for incorporating internal autonomy in a complex theory of freedom to which deliberative democracy should be normatively committed. (shrink)

From the local level to international politics, deliberation helps to increase mutual understanding and trust, in order to arrive at political decisions of high epistemic value and legitimacy. This book gives deliberation a dynamic dimension, analysing how levels of deliberation rise and fall in group discussions, and introducing the concept of 'deliberative transformative moments' and how they can be applied to deeply divided societies, where deliberation is most needed but also most difficult to work. Discussions between ex-guerrillas and (...) ex-paramilitaries in Colombia, Serbs and Bosnjaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and police officers and locals in Brazilian favelas are used as case studies, with participants addressing how peace can be attained in their countries. Allowing access to the records and transcripts of the discussions opens an opportunity for practitioners of conflict resolution to apply this research to their work in trouble spots of the world, creating a link between the theory and practice of deliberation. (shrink)

This paper has three dimensions, historical, theoretical and social. The historical dimension is to show how the Ciceronian system of dialectical argumentation served as a precursor to computational models of argumentation schemes such as Araucaria and Carneades. The theoretical dimension is to show concretely how these argumentation schemes reveal the interdependency of rhetoric and logic, and so the interdependency of the normative with the empirical. It does this by identifying points of disagreement in a dialectical format through using (...) argumentation schemes and critical questions. The social dimension is to show how the Ciceronian dialectical viewpoint integrates with the use of computational tools that can be used to support the principle of reason-based deliberation and facilitate deliberative democracy. (shrink)

The acoustic dimension of political philosophy has rarely attracted serious attention, in part because scholars have tended to assume that political theories, ideas, and concepts, exist as abstract entities that are often noiselessly communicated in written texts. And yet, the noisy communication of political ideas whether in the form of Socratic dialogues, Churchillian orations, or in the hushed tones of focus group conversations treasured by deliberative democrats today, has a rich political history and a continuing relevance. This paper (...) will focus on five performative modes for the communication of political ideas: the monologue, the dialogue, the oration, the interjection, and the noisy crowd. While this list may not be exhaustive, it will be used here as a starting point for further exploration. I will contend that in each of these performative modes, the communication of political ideas is framed by the noise of actual, or textually imagined kinds of political speech designed to underscore the validity of the ideas conveyed. One of the most important reasons for traversing this variable performative and acoustic terrain today is to enable us to hear and to listen to political speech amid the potentially polluting hum of political white noise. (shrink)

Chantal Mouffe ha criticado con vehemencia la propuesta deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas por lo que interpreta como una negación del conflicto político. El objetivo de este trabajo es reconsiderar esta objeción. Para ello se reconstruye la crítica mouffeana a partir de cuatro diferentes planos analíticos en lo que refiere a las posibilidades de comprensión y aceptación del antagonismo. En contra de lo sostenido por Mouffe, afirmamos que a pesar de que el modelo deliberativo coloca un énfasis prioritario en la dimensión (...) consensual de la práctica comunicativa, el conflicto constituye un supuesto necesario e irreductible que está presente en la base del edificio teórico de la propuesta habermasiana. Chantal Mouffe has strongly criticized the Jürgen Habermas' deliberative proposal for what she asserts is the negation of political conflict. In this paper we reconsider this objection by rebuilding this critique through four different dimensions which consider the possibilities of comprehension and acceptation of antagonism. Thus, in opposition to what Mouffe supports, we assert that even though his deliberative model emphasizes the consensual dimension of the communicative practice, conflict lays on the basis of the Habermas' theoretical structure as a necessary and unavoidable concept. (shrink)