We present a model for generating a kind of neural synchrony in which the individual spike trains of one neuron or group of neurons closely match the spike trains of another. This kind of neural synchrony has been observed in animals performing auditory, visual and attentional information processing tasks. Our model is realized in a system of functionally identical, refractory spiking neurons. Larger systems with more sophisticated information processing capabilities can be constructed from aggregated instances of the basic network.

What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, developing our own account, offering two reasons for our account, and meeting two objections and solving one puzzle.

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might *prohibit* having certain inquiring attitudes (``norms of restriction''), while ignoring those that might *require* having them (``norms of expansion''). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields - some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might prohibit having certain inquiring attitudes (“norms of restriction”), while ignoring those that might require having them (“norms of expansion”). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields—some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

In the target article, Cramer et al. suggest that diagnostic classification is improved by modeling the relationship between manifest variables (i.e., symptoms) rather than modeling unobservable latent variables (i.e., diagnostic categories such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder). This commentary discusses whether symptoms represent manifest or latent variables and the implications of this distinction for diagnosis and treatment.

Just north of the Arctic Circle sits Kotzebue, a town of the Inupiat people that has endured for over a century. In this compelling visual essay, Dennis Witmer captures scenes on its Front Street, the main thoroughfare whose buildings have evolved from the sod huts of Native cultures to permanent wood and concrete edifices. From front yards with parked snow machines to townspeople peacefully strolling down sidewalks, the striking black-and-white images in Front Street, Kotzebue offer a thought-provoking view of (...) life in the Arctic and people’s methods of coexisting with the brutality of nature. (shrink)

I discuss the relationship between different versions of the equivalence principle in general relativity, among them Einstein's equivalence principle, the weak equivalence principle, and the strong equivalence principle. I show that Einstein's version of the equivalence principle is intimately linked to his idea that in GR gravity and inertia are unified to a single field, quite like the electric and magnetic field had been unified in special relativistic electrodynamics. At the same time, what is now often called the strong equivalence (...) principle, related to the local validity of special relativity, can also be found in Einstein's writings, albeit by a different name and clearly separated from what he calls the equivalence principle. I discuss both the development of Einstein's thoughts on the different versions of the equivalence principle, their relationship to the relativity principle, as well as later reflections and variants proposed. (shrink)

The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...) there is a question whether it is even possible for reasoning to begin in desire, a question arising from the nature of desire and its objects, which to my knowledge has not been articulated. If we can see how desire can provide the arche of action, then we can consider later, and from that vantage point, whether it is necessary that it should do so. It will, I think, be possible eventually to argue that if practical reasoning has the character it must have, if it can begin in desire, then its starting point can be nothing but desire. (shrink)

My article focuses on Le Théâtre existentialiste by Simone de Beauvoir, recently translated and published in the volume of the Beauvoir Series on her literary writings. The first part introduces the original sound recording of this text and the circumstances behind its possible production in New York City in 1947 and my discovery of it at Wellesley College in 1996. The second part analyzes the divisions of Beauvoir's remarks as she presents Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and their principal plays from (...) the period of the Occupation: The Flies, No Exit, and Caligula. The third part then evaluates certain of Beauvoir's key concepts in terms of how they were able to define adequately the substance of existentialist theater for a postwar American audience and whether they remain valid for a more contemporary theatrical public some six decades later. (shrink)

One of the most powerful arguments against socialism consists in the claim that it is incompatible with liberty. In the works of F.A. Hayek, this argument is developed in a sophisticated and systematic manner. Hayek’s attempt to prove the incompatibility of socialism and freedom relies on a concept of liberty that derives from the tradition of classical republicanism, and bears significant resemblance to the one used by current neo-republicans. To be free means not to be ruled in an arbitrary manner, (...) not to be ruled by people, but by laws. Socialism however, Hayek claims, implies the direct and discretionary rule of bureaucrats over the whole economy, and thereby violates liberty. The paper will examine this argument in detail, illuminate its connection to republicanism, and refute it. Such a refutation will not be directed against the concept of liberty employed by Hayek; instead, it will be shown that socialism properly implemented can conform to the demands of Hayek’s liberty. (shrink)

In this article, I reject the “principlism” of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and argue that respect for autonomy is, and ought to be, the fundamental value of bioethics. To do so, I offer a reconstruction of what I call the field's “founding myth,” a genealogy that affords primacy to the right to be respected as a human being with dignity. Next, I examine the relationship between this basic right and a derivative right of autonomy. I suggest that principlism has (...) promulgated an uncharitable understanding of respect for autonomy, one that ensures that the principle cannot occupy the central position I claim for it. Finally, I sketch a more plausible understanding of respect for autonomy and explore its implications. (shrink)

This paper extends several themes from recent work on norms of assertion. It does as much by applying those themes to the speech act of asking. In particular, it argues for the view that there is a species of asking which is governed by a certain norm, a norm to the effect that one should ask a question only if one doesn’t know its answer.

When a person commits a testimonial injustice, the unjust thing they do consists in their reaction to an assertion (theorists diverge on the details; paradigmatically the relevant unjust thing consists in prejudicially refraining from believing the assertion). Whatever reactions to questions are analogous to these reactions to assertions, those things are "interrogative injustices". I explore some models of those things and apply them to some non-ideal cases. One of the models appeals to mental states like curiosity and wonder, telling us (...) that interrogative injustice occurs when hearers prejudicially refrain from adopting those mental states. Other models appeal to common conversational goals – these goals including the answering of questions. On these models, interrogative injustice occurs when a person asks a question, and another person prejudicially blocks the answering of that question from joining the common goals. Or, if they don’t block said answering, perhaps they believe that it should be thus blocked. Or perhaps they merely resist the question, not fully blocking its answering from joining the common goals but instead pushing back against it in some other way. Or perhaps they merely believe that they should resist the question. I endorse a pluralism on which each of these things can be an interrogative injustice. (shrink)

According to the modal interpretation, the standard mathematical framework of quantum mechanics specifies the physical magnitudes of a system, which have definite values. Probabilities are assigned to the possible values that these magnitudes may adopt. The interpretation is thus concerned with physical properties rather than with measurement results: it is a realistic interpretation. One of the notable achievements of this interpretation is that it dissolves the notorious measurement problem. The papers collected here, together with the introduction and concluding critical appraisal, (...) explain the various forms of the modal interpretation, survey its achievements, and discuss those problems that have yet to be solved. Audience: Philosophers of science, theoretical physicists, and graduate students in these disciplines. (shrink)

Is it possible to measure psychological attributes like intelligence, personality and attitudes and if so, how does that work? What does the term 'measurement' mean in a psychological context? This fascinating and timely book discusses these questions and investigates the possible answers that can be given response. Denny Borsboom provides an in-depth treatment of the philosophical foundations of widely used measurement models in psychology. The theoretical status of classical test theory, latent variable theory and positioned in terms of the underlying (...) philosophy of science. Special attention is devoted to the central concept of test validity and future directions to improve the theory and practice of psychological measurement are outlined. (shrink)

(2008). 2007 AESA Presidential Address Conflict of the Faculties: Democratic Progressivism in the Age of “No Child Left Behind”. Educational Studies: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 94-113.

This paper argues that questions can be bullshit. First it explores some shallowly interrogative ways in which that can happen. Then it shows how questions can also be bullshit in a way that’s more deeply interrogative.

pt. 1: lecture 1. The Hindu vision of life ; lecture 2. Thucydides and the Peloponnesian war ; lecture 3. Law and rule in Sophocles' Antigone ; lecture 4. Socrates and socratic quest ; lecture 5. Plato, idealism and power : part 1 ; lecture 6. Plato, idealism and power : part 2 ; lecture 7. Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic ; lecture 8. Machiavelli's theory of power and politics -- pt. 2: lecture 9. Rousseau's theory of human nature and (...) society ; lecture 10. Marx's critique of capitalism and solution of communism ; lecture 11. Freud's theory of human nature and civilization ; lecture 12. Thoreau's theory of civil disobedience ; lecture 13. Dostoevsky's grand inquisitor ; lecture 14. The idea of anarchism and the example of Emma Goldman ; lecture 15. Hitler's use of power ; lecture 16. Gandhi's use of power. (shrink)

Gutoku Shinran 愚禿親鸞 maintains his status today as one of the most consequential religious thinkers in Japanese history. The tradition stemming from his thought and teaching activity, Shin Buddhism, has been a significant force in Japanese society since the fifteenth century and remains one of the largest Buddhist movements in the world at present, with over twenty thousand temples in Japan and a century-old institutional presence in North America. His writings have been studied in a commentarial tradition going back to (...) his early descendants in the fourteenth century, burgeoning during the Edo period, and continuing in recent times with prominent nonsectarian philosophers such as NISHIDA Kitarō西田幾多郎, SUZUKI Daisetsu 鈴木大拙, TANABE Hajime 田辺元, MIKI Kiyoshi 三木清, and NISHITANI Keiji 西谷啓治. Shinran’s concern in his writings is less to impart doctrinally validated teachings or methods of proper conduct than to articulate and enable a fundamental transformation of awareness. This is because it is precisely such an “overturning” of ordinary awareness and entry into a transformed mode of existence that signals the authentic encounter with enlightening activity that lies at the core of his Buddhist thought. His focal issues are, therefore, the nature of a person’s interaction with the Pure Land path and the distinction between provisional and genuine modes of engagement. He recognizes that it is usual for persons initially encountering Pure Land teachings to seek a coherent intellectual understanding of the doctrines from the perspective of the conventional self and to pursue means to assimilate the advantages of the path into their ongoing lives. Shinran, however, views such efforts as a continued assertion of the false discrimination and self-attachment that propel ordinary human life in anxious and painful existence. Thus, he seeks in his writings to precipitate a shift in apprehension that leads to authentic engagement with, and indeed itself arises from, the working of the Pure Land path. In other words, Shinran views the distinctive accessibility and effectiveness of Pure Land Buddhism as rooted in its transformative functioning within the realm of mundane, illusive thought and language. In this essay, I focus on aspects of reading Shinran, first taking up the overarching issues of Mahāyāna and Pure Land Buddhist thought that contextualize the basic problems in doctrinal understanding he feels compelled to address in his own writings. I then go on to consider the character of his methods of composition in formulating and communicating his own religious awareness. I close by highlighting several of the major philosophically relevant themes and issues in his thought. (shrink)

The lectures on American pragmatism given by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim in 1913 in Paris were first published in French in 1955 and finally translated into English and published in 1983 as Pragmatism and Sociology. For obvious reasons they have attracted considerable attention from philosophers and sociologists, especially the latter, in both continental Europe and the English speaking world. Durkheim's motives in giving the lectures have been scrutinized, his interpretations of the pragmatists widely discussed and his criticisms of William (...) James, John Dewey, and F. S. C. Schiller have met with mixed receptions. However, after years of scholarly discourse on his motives, interpretations and criticisms, there is no common agreement on the significance and meaning of Pragmatism and Sociology. We briefly address the disagreement over Durkheim's motives in the introductory section before turning to our interpretation in the body of the article. There we focus on his criticisms of the pragmatists’ views on the aims and nature of knowledge, which is a classic confrontation between French rationalism à la Durkheim and American pragmatism of the James/dewey variant. (shrink)

The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum particles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state—in clear conflict with what we know about (...) classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles emerge, as new entities that do not correspond to the “particle indices” defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles, as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether many discussions in the literature about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to demonstrate that Kiyozawa Manshi’s 1895 Draft for a Skeleton of a Philosophy of Other-Power and two of Nishida Kitarō’s early writings—namely the 1911 An Inquiry into the Good and the 1917 Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness—instantiate the mystical form of absolute dialetheism. Absolute dialetheism is the thesis that the absolute exists and can only be known as a true contradiction. Its mystical form holds that because every conceptual cognition of the absolute leads to contradiction, (...) the absolute transcends all conceptual knowing. By exploring their theoretical and practical differences, we show how Kiyozawa and Nishida represent two varieties of the mystical form of absolute dialetheism. Theoretically, this difference in variety is apparent in the way in which they attempt to prove the existence of the absolute. Kiyozawa employs the Cartesian version of the ontological argument to derive the existence of the absolute from the concept of a maximally perfect being. By contrast, Nishida relies on an experience that is purified of all reflection and in which the collapse of the subject-object distinction implies the omnipresence of the absolute—something we illustrate using the example of music. Practically, while Kiyozawa regards the contradictory absolute as grounding and motivating the transition from philosophy to religion, Nishida points the way to a philosophical practice in which we live into the pure experience of contradiction. We argue that both approaches to the mystical form of absolute dialetheism fail for reasons internal to them. Whereas Kiyozawa cannot employ the Cartesian version of the ontological argument while simultaneously rejecting the principle of non-contradiction, Nishida has trouble accounting for the possibility of difference, without which there can be neither reflection nor philosophical thought. Most of all we aim to demonstrate the productive nature of these failures, for they form the agenda and the problems that would motivate the absolute thinking so characteristic of key members of the Kyoto School. (shrink)

Bonaventure’s Sentence Commentary provides the most comprehensive set of trinitarian arguments to date. This article focuses on just one of them, the one from beatitude. Roughly, beatitude can be thought of as God’s enjoyment of his own, supreme goodness. After a brief rationale of Bonaventure’s speculative project, I assay the concept of beatitude and exposit his four-stage argument. Bonaventure reasons: (i) for a single supreme substance; (ii) for at least two divine persons; (iii) against the possibility for an infinite number (...) of divine persons; (iv) for at least three, and against the possibility of four (or more) divine persons. I show how this line of reasoning is significantly more complex than Bonaventure’s terse summaries initially indicate. My main goal is to explicate the four steps and unpack their main support. Along the way I attend to the argument’s sources, logical progression, and I respond to several concerns. (shrink)