When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...) me, did not motivate me. Though we can have normative reasons without being motivated, and vice versa, such reasons are closely related to our motivation. There are, however, very different views about what this relation is. This disagreement raises wider questions about what normative reasons are, and about which reasons there are. After sketching some of these views, I shall discuss some arguments by Williams, and then say where, in my opinion, the truth lies. [...] I [will] suggest why, as I believe, we should be non-reductive normative realists, and should regard all reasons as external. (shrink)

DEREK PARFIT is senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He regularly teaches there and is also afŠliated with New York University and Harvard. He was educated at Oxford and was a Harkness Fellow at Columbia and Harvard. He has been a visiting professor at Princeton, Temple, Rice, and the University of Colorado at Boulder, and is a fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has made major contributions to our (...) understanding of personal identity, philosophy of the mind, and ethics, and he is thought to be one of the most important moral philosophers of the past century. His many academic articles include “Personal Identity” (1971), “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life” (1986), “The Unimportance of Identity” (1995), and “Equality and Priority” (1997). Rationality and Morality and Rediscovering Reasons are forthcoming from Oxford University Press. His book Reasons and Persons (1984) has been described by Alan Ryan of The Sunday Times as “something close to a work of genius.”. (shrink)

This paper identifies the phenomenon of conceptual competence injustice, a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when a marginalized epistemic agent makes a conceptual claim and is illegitimately regarded as having failed to grasp one or more of the concepts expressed in her testimony. The notion of a conceptual claim is given a deflationary account that is coextensive with the class of a priori knowable claims. This study reveals a form of oppression that severely hinders marginalized epistemic agents who seek (...) to create or communicate conceptual knowledge. Conceptual competence injustice is compared and contrasted with three other forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, and contributory injustice. The final section investigates a number of damaging effects that conceptual competence injustice has on marginalized persons pursuing a career in academic philosophy. (shrink)

Torin Alter (2013) attempts to rescue phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument from the critique of Ball 2009 by appealing to conceptual mastery. I show that Alter’s appeal fails, and describe general features of conceptual mastery that suggest that no such appeal could succeed.

We propose a Bayesian framework for the attribution of knowledge, and apply this framework to generate novel predictions about knowledge attribution for different types of “Gettier cases”, in which an agent is led to a justified true belief yet has made erroneous assumptions. We tested these predictions using a paradigm based on semantic integration. We coded the frequencies with which participants falsely recalled the word “thought” as “knew” (or a near synonym), yielding an implicit measure of conceptual activation. Our experiments (...) confirmed the predictions of our Bayesian account of knowledge attribution across three experiments. We found that Gettier cases due to counterfeit objects were not treated as knowledge (Experiment 1), but those due to intentionally-replaced evidence were (Experiment 2). Our findings are not well explained by an alternative account focused only on luck, because accidentally-replaced evidence activated the knowledge concept more strongly than did similar false belief cases (Experiment 3). We observed a consistent pattern of results across a number of different vignettes that varied the quality and type of evidence available to agents, the relative stakes involved, and surface details of content. Accordingly, the present findings establish basic phenomena surrounding people’s knowledge attributions in Gettier cases, and provide explanations of these phenomena within a Bayesian framework. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss a puzzle involving accommodation. The puzzle is based on three assumptions. The first assumption is that accommodation takes place after an utterance. The second assumption is that accommodation can make a difference to the truth-value of an utterance even if the utterance is not about the future. The third assumption is that something that takes place after an utterance cannot make a difference to the truth-value of the utterance unless the (...) utterance is about the future. Since these assumptions are jointly inconsistent, one of them must be false. The question is which one we ought to reject. The majority of the discussion is devoted to discussing each of the options, and the tentative conclusion is that the most plausible strategy is to reject the third thesis. That amounts to saying that something that takes place after an utterance can make a difference to the truth-value of the utterance even if the utterance is not about the future. (shrink)

Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self-knowledge of the reason-responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first-personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating Pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First-person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and (...) finding it intelligible from one’s point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self-understanding. (shrink)

It is not unusual for the adjective ‘vulnerable’ to be applied to those in receipt of nursing practice without making clear what it is that persons thus described are actually vulnerable to. In this paper I argue that the way nursing has adopted the idea of vulnerability tends to imply that some people are in some way invulnerable. This is conceptually unsustainable and renders the idea of the vulnerable patient meaningless. The paper explores the meaning of vulnerability both in general (...) terms and in the context of nursing practice. It is argued that to be in receipt of nursing is to become, to a greater or lesser extent, more‐than‐ordinary vulnerable. Thus all patients are more‐than‐ordinarily vulnerable and this restricts their potential to flourish. Nurses are well placed to contribute to the flourishing of more‐than‐ordinarily vulnerable persons and my substantive claim is that this ‘protective’ function is indeed a legitimate and fundamental part of the role of nurses. (shrink)

This paper explores the specific contribution of a strand of contemporary French social theory founded by Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort to the understanding of human power. It formulates a conception of power that transcends its definitions in terms of physical coercion or institutionalised violence to reveal the way power is creative and institutes the social. Its reflection on the cultural nature of political power and it role in society is shown to extend the pioneering reflection of Durkheim's sociology, especially (...) as regards the homology that exists between religion and politics. The social role performed by the state explored by Durkheim prefigures Gauchet's theory of the state, which builds on Lefort's work. Gauchet's theory can be said to elaborate a critical synthesis of the two stands of Durkheim's work: the sociology of religion and the sociology of the modern state. This synthesis raises questions on the role played by the European state in the development of individualism, in both its political and economic manifestations. (shrink)

Tomasello et al. provide a new account of cultural uniqueness, one that hinges on a uniquely human motivation to share intentionality with others. We favor an alternative to this motivational account – one that relies on a modular explanation of the primate intention-reading system. We discuss this view in light of recent comparative experiments using competitive intention-reading tasks.

Nurses working in a newborn intensive care unit report that treatment decision disagreements for infants in their care may lead to ethical dilemmas involving all health-care providers. Applying Rest’s Four-Component Model of Moral Action as the theoretical framework, this study examined the responses of 224 newborn intensive care unit nurses to the Nurses Ethical Involvement Survey. The three most frequent actions selected were as follows: talking with other nurses, talking with doctors, and requesting a team meeting. The multiple regression analysis (...) indicates that newborn intensive care unit nurses with greater concern for the ethical aspects of clinical practice (p =.001) and an increased perception of their ability to influence ethical decision making (p =.018) were more likely to display Nurse Activism. Future research is necessary to identify other factors leading to and inhibiting Nurse Activism as these findings explained just 8.5% of the variance. (shrink)

The notion of specification plays a key role in the developing science of computing. It is typically considered to be the keystone in the software development process. However, there is no single, generally agreed meaning of specification that bears close scrutiny. Instead there is a variety of different, although partially interlocking and overlapping interpretations of the term.We catalogue this varietal profusion and attempt to lay bare both the sources and consequences of each major alternative. We attempt to present the full (...) range of possibilities, and the biases inherent in each style of interpretation. (shrink)

Ongoing developments in evolutionary and systems biology highlight the deficiencies of reductionistic and mechanistic explanations of the "organic" world. Whitehead's ontology provides the basis for a unified theory of social organization that connects the emergence of primitive life to the development and diversification of human societies along a continuum of creative ontogeneration. The metaphysical characteristic of "creativity" is precisely the manifestation of the ontogenerative relationship between possibility and actuality. Actualization is change. While all actualization necessarily exhibits some degree of continuity (...) with the past, it is driven by the inertiac availability of specific relevant forms of possibility, through which it has access to an array of "novel" forms for actualization. This relation to novelty explains everything from the emergence ofprokaryotes on earth 3.6 billion years ago to the possibility of ideological resistance in human societies today. (shrink)

Cultural relativism was the subject of a panel presentation at the 2005 meetings of the American Anthropological Association. In 2007, three of the four presentations were published in Anthropological Quarterly. The present article comprises what was presented in the fourth panel presentation, my own, plus a critical realist critique of the other three papers and the discussant’s introduction of them. The critical realist method of immanent critique, applied here, reveals the gaps, contradictions and non-sequiturs of cultural relativism, and suggests that (...) the critical realist meta-philosophy of philosopher Roy Bhaskar, sociologist Margaret Archer, and others offers anthropologists a stronger theoretical paradigm from which to operate. (shrink)

The completion of the chimpanzee genome will greatly help us determine which genetic changes are unique to humanity. Chimpanzees are our closest living relative, and a recent study has made considerable progress towards decoding the genome of our sister taxon.1 Over 75,000 common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) bacterial artificial chromosome end sequences were aligned and mapped to the human genome. This study shows the remarkable genetic similarity (98.77%) between humans and chimpanzees, while highlighting intriguing areas of potential difference. If we wish (...) to understand the genetic basis of humankind, the completion of the chimpanzee genome deserves high priority. BioEssays 24:490–493, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Abstract:It has become increasingly common to either dismiss Nietzsche's will to power thesis as a thesis about the nature of reality or else to interpret it as promoting antiessentialism. The latter tendency is evident in the recent ontic structural realist interpretation of Nietzsche. According to the latter view, Nietzsche proposes a constitutively relational ontology that he takes to be supported by natural science and which, it is argued, is now supported by contemporary quantum physics. The author argues, against the antiessentialist (...) trend generally and the ontic structuralist realist interpretation in particular, that Nietzsche's will to power is a causal essentialist thesis that offers a metaphysics of causal powers that, although relational by virtue of being directed to produce effects, are also intrinsically constituted. The author argues that Nietzsche's causal essentialism, contrary to the ontic structural realist interpretation, emerges from his criticism of, rather than support for, the capacity of natural science to capture real causal power. Nonetheless, in contrast to both Nietzsche's view that science lacks the resources to support an appeal to intrinsic natures to secure real causal power and the ontic structural realist's claim that contemporary physics rules it out, the author argues that a particular wave function realist interpretation of quantum mechanics gives Nietzsche precisely what he wants by highlighting the causal significance of intrinsic natures of the wave function in configuration space. The article concludes that, contrary to his own expectations, Nietzsche's causal essentialism is scientifically vindicated. (shrink)

Since its initial release in 2004, Ethics for the Practice of Psychology in Canada has filled a vital need for a single source on professional ethics and law relevant to Canadian psychologists. This important new edition reflects the fourth edition of the Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists and highlights discussions in the areas of diversity and social justice. An essential resource, it focusses on the most pertinent ethical and legal issues for Canadian psychologists, including decision making, consent, confidentiality, helping (...) without harming, professional boundaries, diversity, social responsibility, and conducting research. An appendix includes discussion questions and reflective journal exercises to facilitate awareness of personal motives and biases relevant to making ethical choices. (shrink)

This paper examines Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge in the context of both his rejectionof the Kantian thing-in-itself and his perspectivism. It is argued that Nietzsche’s principalcontention with the thing-in-itself centers round the dissociation of truth and justification. Thepaper argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism, understood as an epistemic thesis, sows the seeds forthe overcoming of this sceptical dissociation.