The Encyclopedia of Diderot and D’Alembert is not only one of the most important monuments of philosophical thought of the Enlightenment, but also a significant socio-political event of that time. The study of the filiation of ideas in the 18th century shows that the work of the French Enlighteners is not the first work to generalize and structure the accumulated knowledge of mankind, but the totality of socio-philosophical reasons gives it the greatest importance. Comparative historical analysis also shows (...) that the collective work of the encyclopedists pursued not only educational goals, but also partly served as a platform for the promotion of new ideas, and the achievement of the task – the radical reform of the socio-political world order. It is worth noting that at the same time, contradictions often arose between a purely scientific approach and the popularization of the views of the French Enlighteners, which led to a distortion of the picture of the world created by encyclopedists, and gave grounds for a critical understanding of their concept. (shrink)

Against the current background of renewed publisher interests in encyclopedias, the article examines the modern genealogy of the Encyclopedia project. The article focuses particularly on three moments: Bacon’s ‘Great Instauration’ and attempted fashioning of a ‘New Organon’ (as against the old one of Aristotle), the Encylopedia of 1751 and its revolutionary-era successors, and Comte’s ‘system’ of positive philosophy. D’Alembert and Diderot’s classificatory tree, with its secularized capture of moral and political philosophy, was an attempt to improve on Bacon. (...) Comte’s grand systematizing was an attempt to cap their efforts by being entirely ‘positive’. For this, a science of society and a social standpoint were essential. His effort to fulfill Bacon’s totalizing dream of fully scientific (re-)systematization of knowledge, was a heroic and perhaps absurd failure. But, the article argues, Comte’s critique of Diderot and d’Alembert, with respect to what he took to be the radical incoherence of their classificatory ‘tree’ of knowledge, and his more general critique of both Bacon and 18th-century ‘encyclopedism’ for holding out the possibility of an objective (as opposed to subjective, and human-centered) synthesis of knowledge, touch on ‘metaphysical’ features of the epistemic landscape that, in new forms, are still with us. Comte’s forthright (and sociologically reflexive) articulation of the technocratic and religious dimensions of the Baconian project also illuminates elements of the (French) Enlightenment and derivatives from it that have not received sufficient attention, particularly in relation to one another. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the circumstances of Hryhoriy Skovoroda’s use of the pseudonym «Daniil Meingard» and the role played by Mykhailo Kovalynskyi in Skovoroda’s adoption of this pseudonym. The article reconstructs the biography of Pastor Daniel Mingard, whose name was adopted by Skovoroda, including refuted false information about him, widespread in Ukrainian-language literature; a brief description of the intellectual biography of his son, Pastor Gabriel Mingard, who, unlike his father, was a notable figure in the intel- lectual life of (...) the country of Vaud in the second half of the 18th century, in particular, one of the most original authors of the «Encyclopedia of Yverdon» — a liberal Protestant response to the «Encyclopedia» of Diderot and d’Alembert. The article states that the description of Daniel Mingard, which Kovalynskyi gives in «The Life of Grigory Skovoroda» in order to explain the origin of the pseudonym Skovo- roda, corresponds more to Gabriel than to Daniel Mingard. The explanation of this ambiguity is based on the hypothesis that Kovalynskyi, choosing Gabriel Mingard as an example to follow, projects the Mingard son-father relationship onto his relationship with Skovoroda. This hypothesis gives reason to reconsider the role of Kovalynskyi in the life of Skovoroda and in the formation of the image of the philosopher in «The Life of Grigory Skovoroda». The article reconstructs Kovalynskyi’s circle of reading and demonstrates that his literary preferences correspond to the leading trends of reception by Russian Freemasonry in the last third of the 18th century. Western, primarily liberal Protestant literature. This recon- struction gives reason to draw a parallel between Skovoroda’s opinion and Kovalynskyi’s reading circle, in the context of which the latter evaluates Skovoroda’s life and philosophy; they are related by devotion to religious and intellectual freedom, eclecticism, as well as numerous subjects that we consider purely Skovoroda’s subjects: self-knowledge, the inner man, the goodness of God, happiness, friendship, etc. (shrink)

For some time now, certain theorists have been urging us to move beyond text-based understandings of culture to consider the impact of new media on the structure and organization of knowledge. This article, however, reconsiders the usual priority given to digital media by comparing Wikipedia, the free, user-led online Encyclopedia, with Diderot and D'Alembert's eighteenth-century Encyclopédie. It begins by suggesting that the dichotomy between information system and text is not sufficient for describing the differences between the two. (...) It then considers more closely the type of critical thinking presupposed by the Encyclopédie. It concludes by raising the question of the role of judgement in making sense of any encyclopedia in a modern world in which knowledge systems only coexist on the condition of being partially blind to one another. (shrink)

Von Walchs Philosophischem Lexicon bis Zedlers Universal-Lexicon, von Diderots und D’Alemberts Encyclopédie bis zur Encyclopaedia Britannica: alle bedeutenden frühmodernen Wörterbücher und Enzyklopädien haben sich ziemlich viele Definitionen angeeignet, die der hugenottische Gelehrte Étienne Chauvin (1640 – 1725) in den beiden Ausgaben seines Lexicon philosophicum (1692 und 1713) bereits formuliert hatte. Chauvin verglich als erster die scholastische Tradition mit den Theorien der neuen Denker wie Descartes, Gassendi und deren Anhänger. Sein Werk befasst sich ausführlich mit der Naturphilosophie und beschreibt naturwissenschaftliche Instrumente (...) und Experimente. Erstaunlicherweise sind der komplexe Aufbau, die Quellen und die Nachwirkung von Chauvins Wörterbuch noch nie gründlich untersucht worden. Die vorliegende umfassende Studie über die Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie und Ideen wirft ein helles Licht auf die „République des lettres“ zwischen dem Ende des 17. und dem Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts. Sie behandelt Metaphysik, Logik, Ethik und anthropologische Themen sowie den Widerstreit zwischen alten und neuen Ansichten über die Natur. ---STIMMEN ZUM BUCH--- „Das Buch selbst bietet aber einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Aufklärungs- und Philosophie- bzw. Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Frühaufklärung sowie der Bildungsgeschichte Preußens. […] [Das Buch] bietet als solches auch aufschlußreiche Bausteine für das Projekt eines Vokabulars der europäischen Philosophien, dem man sich eben auch durch das Studium einschlägiger Lemmata alter Lexika nähern kann.“ (Till Kinzel, Informationsmittel (IFB), März 2017) From Walch’s Philosophisches Lexicon to Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon, from Diderot’s and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, all major early modern dictionaries and encyclopedias incorporate some of the definitions given by the Huguenot savant Étienne Chauvin (1640 - 1725) in the two editions of his Lexicon philosophicum (1692 and 1713). For the first time, Chauvin placed the scholastic tradition side by side with the theories of new thinkers like Descartes, Gassendi and their followers. His work covers natural philosophy extensively, describing scientific instruments and experiments. Surprisingly enough, the complex architecture of Chauvin’s dictionary, its sources, and its fortune have never been thoroughly investigated before. The present, broad study in the history of philosophical terminology and ideas casts light on the culture of the “République des lettres” between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. It deals with metaphysics, logic, moral, and anthropological themes, and the clash between ancient and modern visions of nature. (shrink)

En esta nota crítica (i) se hace una breve descripción de cada uno de los artículos que componen Orayen: de la forma lógica al significado, (ii) se señalan algunas cuestiones que no están claras en ellos o en las réplicas de Orayen y, (iii) en la medida de lo posible, se indica si los autores desarrollan ulteriormente los problemas abordados en sus artículos. The aim of this critical note is threefold: (i) it briefly describes and comments on each of the (...) articles of Orayen: de la forma lógica al significado; (ii) identifies some issues that may not be clear enough or not fully developed whether in the articles or even in Orayen's replies; (iii) as far as possible, it refers to further studies made by the authors themselves on the same, or quite related, subjects addressed by them in their papers. (shrink)

This article appeared in a special issue of the Goethe Yearbook, on Goethe and German Idealism. In it, I consider Novalis' unparalleled admiration for Goethe's scientific writings in contrast to his rather lukewarm reception of Goethe's poetry. I argue that Novalis' ideal of a “romantic encyclopedia” in which all the arts and sciences are understood in their relations to one another (as opposed to in isolation, like Diderot and D'Alemberts' project) is inspired by Goethe's practice as a scientist. (...) I develop Novalis' idea of an “empiricism that is nothing but genuine idealism,” illustrate its parallels with Goethe's “gentle empiricism,” and argue that Novalis’ conception of romantic science and his understanding of idealism as empiricism is directly inspired by Goethe’s practices as a poet and scientist. I consider the implications of this for our understanding of the meaning of “romantic” science. (shrink)

A citizen is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership. This broad definition is discernible, with minor variations, in the works of contemporary authors as well as in the entry “citoyen” in Diderot's and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie..

The concept of self has preeminently been asserted (in its many versions) as a core component of anti-reductionist, antinaturalistic philosophical positions, from Descartes to Husserl and beyond, with the exception of some hybrid or intermediate positions which declare rather glibly that, since we are biological entities which fully belong to the natural world, and we are conscious of ourselves as 'selves', therefore the self belongs to the natural world (this is characteristic e.g. of embodied phenomenology and enactivism). Nevertheless, from Cudworth (...) and More’s attacks on materialism all the way through twentieth-century argument against naturalism, the gulf between selfhood and the world of Nature appears unbridgeable. In contrast, my goal in this paper is to show that early modern materialism could yield a theory of the self according to which (1) the self belongs to the world of external relations (Spinoza), such that no one fact, including supposedly private facts, is only accessible to a single person; (2) the self can be reconstructed as a sense of “organic unity” which could be a condition for biological individuality (a central text here is Diderot’s 1769 Rêve de D’Alembert); yet this should not lead us to espouse a Romantic concept of organism as foundational or even ineffable subjectivity (a dimension present in Leibniz and made explicit in German idealism); (3) what we call 'self' might simply be a dynamic process of interpretive activity undertaken by the brain. This materialist theory of the self should not neglect the nature of experience, but it should also not have to take at face value the recurring invocations of a better, deeper “first-person perspective” or “first-person science.”. (shrink)

This paper examines Jean le Rond d’Alembert’s views of metaphysical cosmology and argues that these constitute an important context for Kant’s critical-period response to rational cosmology. D’Alembert is commonly taken to have dismissed cosmology from the roster of the legitimate sciences, and there is indeed evidence of his scepticism towards Maupertuis’ cosmology no less than towards Wolff’s cosmologia generalis. I argue, however, that a broadly Leibnizian cosmological perspective underpins d’Alembert’s accounts of our knowledge and of the task of the philosopher. (...) D’Alembert’s work thus anticipates and helps bring into focus Kant’s own nuanced engagement with the cosmological tradition. (shrink)

D'Alembert's Preliminary Discourse, a once‐influential eighteenth‐century consideration of the utility of the humanities, is relevant to contemporary concerns about the declining importance of humanistic education. A sympathetic appraisal of d'Alembert's critique of humanistic erudition as largely useless can serve as a starting point for reconceiving of the humanities as studies that help train the professionals who administer the institutions of modern society to better understand their own commitments.

Cet article met en question une tendance postmoderne assez répandue: celle de reconstruire abusivement la signification d’un texte du passé, de telle façon que ce texte puisse jouer le rôle d’allié ou d’ennemi dans nos guerres idéologiques. L’exemple choisi c’est un article d’Umberto Eco - «Anti-Porfirio» ainsi qu’un chapitre parallèle de son livre Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Selon Eco, le fameux «Arbre de Porphyre» serait une illustration graphique de ce qu’il appelle «pensée forte». Or, cette pensée aurait été (...) minée depuis longtemps - affirme Eco - par la «pensée faible» qu’il retrouve dans la soi-disant «pensée encyclopédique», et ce sont déjà certains textes d’Aristote ou de Thomas d’Aquin, qui en attestent la présence. De plus, Eco pense avoir trouvé dans le Discours préliminaire d’Alembert, oeuvre qui préface l’Encyclopédie française, un devancier de la «pensée faible» postmoderne. Il s’apparente, selon lui, au «rhizome» décrit par G. Deleuze. Aussi cette «pensée encyclopédique» est-elle l’opposé même de la logique incarnée par l’antique «Arbre de Porphyre». L’article tâche de montrer qu’Umberto Eco a beaucoup déformé certaines idées des philosophes mentionnés là-dessus. En effet, il a tendance à discuter les textes pertinents hors de leur contexte métaphysique originaire, tout en en omettant certains aspects décisifs. D’après Eco, Thomas d’Aquin et surtout d’Alembert auraient anticipé le postmodernisme, ce qui, selon moi, n’est pas du tout le cas. Je crois que, en effet, Eco a donné moins une description tant soit peu fidèle d’un passé philosophique qu’une reconstruction relativement abusive de ce passé, légitimant ainsi ses propres vues philosophiques. (shrink)

RESUMO:A réplica rousseauniana a d’Alembert, autor do verbete Genebra da Enciclopédia, foi batizada como Carta sobre os espetáculos, em respeito ao tema nela tratado após os dez primeiros parágrafos, os quais abordam explicitamente o tema da intolerância religiosa. Contudo, o presente artigo apresenta, sob a perspectiva de uma moral da tolerância que não se resume às questões religiosas, a defesa de que a Carta a d’Alembert é uma integral e avançada Carta sobre a Tolerância, por contemplar, além do discurso iluminista (...) de recusa à inquirição ou inspeção da fé alheia em matéria de religião, uma atualizada recusa multiculturalista ao etnocentrismo. ABSTRACT:Rousseau’s letter to d’Alembert, author of the Encyclopedia entry on Geneva, is known as the Letter on Spectacles. The title subject is dealt with after the letter’s first ten paragraphs, which explicitly address the issue of religious intolerance. The present article presents, from a perspective of a moral tolerance that is not limited to religious affairs, the argument that the letter to d’Alembert is a comprehensive and advanced Letter on Tolerance. In addition to its Enlightenment discourse of refusal of inquiry or inspection of the faith of others on religious matters, the letter contains an up-to-date multiculturalist rejection of ethnocentrism. (shrink)

These two thinkers confront the issues surrounding public support for the arts through d'Alembert's original proposal, Rousseau's attack, and the first English translation of d'Alembert's response as well as correspondence relating to the exchange.".

SummaryThis paper analyses the revival of Pliny's Naturalis historia within the scientific culture of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, focusing on a French effort to produce an edition with annotations by scientists and scholars. Between the Renaissance and the early eighteenth century, the Naturalis historia had declined in scientific importance. Increasingly, it was relegated to the humanities, as we demonstrate with a review of editions. For a variety of reasons, however, scientific interest in the Naturalis historia grew in (...) the second half of the eighteenth century. Epitomizing this interest was a plan for a scientifically annotated, Latin-French edition of the Naturalis historia. Initially coordinated by the French governmental minister Malesherbes in the 1750s, the edition was imperfectly realized by Poinsinet a few decades later. It was intended to rival two of the period's other distinguished multi-volume books of knowledge, Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie and Buffon's Histoire naturelle, to which we compare it. Besides narrating the scientific revival of the Historia naturalis during this period, we examine its causes and the factors contributing to its end in the first half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Summary New information technology can be an invaluable aid to research in the history of ideas provided it is built on scientific foundations. This article discusses the case of Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie and analyses its use of earlier dictionaries (the Dictionnaire de Trévoux, Chambers's Cyclopaedia and Moréri's dictionary). It also shows how neglect of existing research in the history of ideas and ignorance of how these eighteenth-century European publications were elaborated, combined with inappropriate use of software for (...) detecting plagiarism, have led to totally mistaken findings. These findings, widely publicised thanks to the Internet, constitute a real danger for future research. The article concludes that the intellectual community urgently needs to invest seriously in the digital humanities in order to safeguard future research. (shrink)

Denis Diderot’s natural philosophy is deeply and centrally ‘biologistic’: as it emerges between the 1740s and 1780s, thus right before the appearance of the term ‘biology’ as a way of designating a unified science of life (McLaughlin), his project is motivated by the desire both to understand the laws governing organic beings and to emphasize, more ‘philosophically’, the uniqueness of organic beings within the physical world as a whole. This is apparent both in the metaphysics of vital matter he (...) puts forth in works such as D’Alembert’s Dream (1769) and the more empirical concern with the mechanics of life in his manuscript Elements of Physiology, on which he worked during the last twenty years of his life. This ‘biologism’ obviously presents the interpreter of Diderot with some difficulties, notably as regards his materialism, given that contemporary forms of materialism have on the contrary strongly rejected notions of emergence, vitalism, teleology and any concepts appealing to unique, irreducible features of organisms. In response, some have described him as a ‘holist’ (Kaitaro) while others have emphasized his materialist, naturalist project (Bourdin, Wolfe). In what follows I examine a little-known aspect of Diderot’s articulation of his biological project: his statement in favour of epigenesis within the short but suggestive Encyclopédie article “Spinosiste.” Diderot was, of course, a partisan of epigenesis (the developmental-biological theory opposed to preformation, according to which beings develop by successive adjunction of layers of matter), but why include a statement in favour of a particular biological (or developmental) theory within an entry dealing with a philosopher, Spinoza, who does not seem to have been concerned at all with the specific properties of living beings, how they grow from embryonic to developed states, and so on? By trying to answer this question I also try and locate Diderot’s biological project in relation to what will become, in the years after his death, the project for a science called ‘biology’, with figures such as Treviranus and Lamarck. For it is not clear that the two can be easily correlated or causally linked: Diderot’s ‘epigenetic Spinozism’ is a different conceptual entity from what we find in histories of biology. (shrink)

The development of science and technology in the Age of Enlightenment came to the idea of a language for describing technical and technological achievements that could facilitate mutual understanding between scientists, artisans, inventors, as well as production organizers and government agencies. This task seemed easily achievable, and the French Academy of Sciences undertook a special edition of the encyclopedic type “Description of Sciences and Crafts” to create such a language. However, the edition was not completed and was partly continued in (...) the “Encyclopedia” of Diderot and D’Alembert, which for the first time in the practice of encyclopedic publications began not only to study crafts and technical achievements, but also to visualize them in special engravings. In Russia, the analysis of technical and technological discourse occurred later, in the late 18th – early 19th centuries. Russian authors had the opportunity to take into account the experience of encyclopedic publications in France and Britain and to see that the project of creating a universal language uniting artisans, scientists and those in power could not be fully realized. However, the problem of mutual understanding between different social groups involved in the process of production and exploitation of new technologies remained unresolved, so work in this direction was being carried out, although sometimes it remained beyond the interest of intellectual historians and historians of science. The article compares European and Russian sources of the 18th century devoted to this issue, as well as a number of Russian sources of the early 19th century related to the analysis and understanding of scientific and technological achievements, new vocabulary and new relationships generated by technical and technological development. It is concluded that the introduction of these sources into scientific circulation will be promising for the study of technical discourses and trends in their development. (shrink)

This volume of selections provides a fresh translation of some of the major philosophical and literary achievements of the beleaguered editor of the Encyclopedie. For the most part, the selections follow a chronological sequence with each selection given a brief explanation in which the reader is referred to the 1875 Assezat and Tourneux edition of Diderot's works. The main thrust of Diderot's philosophical materialism is embodied in D'Alembert's Dream, in which the author argues that the mechanized-physical view (...) gives coherent unity to cosmological, biological, and moral speculation. Yet, if Diderot is to be a materialist, he is to be a humanistic one, for in his Refutation of Helvetius he rails against the latter's view of man as a mere sensory-bound animal devoid of real moral feelings. Thus there is in Diderot a vacillation between a heartfelt desire for moral values which beg to be grounded on reason, and a reason that cannot accept the basis for the values of his day since experience seems to contradict such a basis. Diderot expresses this dichotomy well in Rameau's Nephew. In the mastery of his dialogue form, Diderot plays the man of moral stability while the nephew represents the moral nihilist. It is interesting to note that Hegel saw in the nephew a cultural alienation or self-estrangement which gradually produced the characteristic cleavage between faith and reason in the age of the French Enlightenment. Since he bore this inner tension within himself, and since it is men who make up "ages," one can say that Diderot was the French Enlightenment.—J. J. R. (shrink)

Although maybe not the most fashionable area of study today, French science has a secure place in the classical canon of the history of science. Like the Scientific Revolution and Italian science at the beginning of the seventeenth century, French science, particularly eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century French science, remains a safe, albeit conservative, bet in terms of history-of-science teaching and research. The classic trope of the passage of the flame of European science from Italy to Britain and France in the (...) seventeenth and then eighteenth centuries is well established in overviews of the field. Specializing in research in this area is not, therefore, unreasonable as a career choice if you are aiming for a history-of-science position in Europe or even in the US. The Académie des sciences, with its state-sponsored model of collective research, provides a striking counterpoint to the amateur, more individualistic functioning of London's Royal Society – a foretaste of modernity in the institutionalization of science. Clearly naive, such a representation of French science serves as a good initial framework on which to hang half a century of critical historical research. If proof of the continued interest for eighteenth-century French science is needed, we can cite the Web-based project around Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie currently in progress under the auspices of the French Academy of Sciences. The large number of publications in the history of French science make it unreasonable to pick out one or two for special attention here. But what about history of science in France and the academic community that practises this discipline today? Here, I offer a very personal view and analysis of this community, trying to underline contrasts with the history of science in the UK and the US. (shrink)

Although maybe not the most fashionable area of study today, French science has a secure place in the classical canon of the history of science. Like the Scientific Revolution and Italian science at the beginning of the seventeenth century, French science, particularly eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century French science, remains a safe, albeit conservative, bet in terms of history-of-science teaching and research. The classic trope of the passage of the flame of European science from Italy to Britain and France in the (...) seventeenth and then eighteenth centuries is well established in overviews of the field. Specializing in research in this area is not, therefore, unreasonable as a career choice if you are aiming for a history-of-science position in Europe or even in the US. The Académie des sciences, with its state-sponsored model of collective research, provides a striking counterpoint to the amateur, more individualistic functioning of London's Royal Society – a foretaste of modernity in the institutionalization of science. Clearly naive, such a representation of French science serves as a good initial framework on which to hang half a century of critical historical research. If proof of the continued interest for eighteenth-century French science is needed, we can cite the Web-based project around Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie currently in progress under the auspices of the French Academy of Sciences. The large number of publications in the history of French science make it unreasonable to pick out one or two for special attention here. But what about history of science in France and the academic community that practises this discipline today? Here, I offer a very personal view and analysis of this community, trying to underline contrasts with the history of science in the UK and the US. (shrink)

Le projet de l'Encyclopédic de Diderot et d'Alembert constitue un tournant dans l'histoire de la philosophic dans la mesure où d'Alembert a procédé à une pluralisation de la métaphysique. À la métaphysique traditionnelle et singulière se sont ajoutées des métaphysiques. Examinons plus particulièrement les trois métaphysiques que sont la métaphysique des corps, la métaphysique des propositions et la métaphysique des sciences exposées dans l'Encyclopédie : on s'aperçoit alors que la nouveauté est moins le progrès des sciences que le processus (...) philosophique comme herméneutique du génie de l'invention, dans les sciences comme dans les arts. Ce processus remplace désormais la méaphysique traditionnelle et ouvre la voie aux théories de la connaissance. The project of Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie constitutes a turning point in the history of philosophy to the extent that d'Alembert achieved a pluralization of metaphysics. To traditional metaphysics, he added various other metaphysics. This paper focuses more specifically on the three following metaphysics, that of bodies, that of propositions and that of the sciences, as they were developed in the Encyclope'die. It thus appears that novelty does not so much lie in the advancement of the sciences than in the philosophical process understood as a hermeneutics of the genius of invention, both in the sciences and the arts. This process supersedes traditional metaphysics and paves the way for theories of knowledge. (shrink)

Around the middle of the eighteenth century, the leading figures of the French Enlightenment engaged in a philosophical debate about the nature of music. The principal participants-Rousseau, Diderot, and d'Alembert-were responding to the views of the composer-theorist Jean-Philippe Rameau, who was both a participant and increasingly a subject of controversy. The discussion centered upon three different events occurring roughly simultaneously. The first was Rameau's formulation of the principle of the fundamental bass, which explained the structure of chords and their (...) progression. The second was the writing of the Encyclopédie, edited by Diderot and d'Alembert, with articles on music by Rousseau. The third was the "Querelle des Bouffons," over the relative merits of Italian comic opera and French tragic opera. The philosophes, in the typical manner of Enlightenment thinkers, were able to move freely from the broad issues of philosophy and criticism, to the more technical questions of music theory, considering music as both art and science. Their dialogue was one of extraordinary depth and richness and dealt with some of the most fundamental issues of the French Enlightenment. In the newly revised edition of Music and the French Enlightenment, Cynthia Verba updates this fascinating story with the prolific scholarship that has emerged since the book was first published. Stressing the importance of seeing the philosophes' writings in context of a dynamic dialogue, Verba carefully reconstructs the chain of arguments and rebuttals across which Rousseau, D'Alembert, and Diderot formulated their own evolving positions. A section of key passages in translation presents several texts in English for the first time, recapturing the tenor and tone of the dialogue at hand. In a new epilogue, Verba discusses important trends in new scholarship, tracing how scholars continue to grapple with many of the same fundamental oppositions and competing ideas that were debated by the philosophes in the French Enlightenment. (shrink)

The author of this study aims to provide a synthetic survey of Diderot’s philosophy, as distinguished from the numerous analytic studies that have been made of particular aspects of the Frenchman’s thought. The central thread uniting Diderot’s various works, Crocker contends, is a view of the universe as comprising simultaneously both order and disorder in an ineluctable tension. In the initial chapter, Crocker outlines this rather loose theme by examining Diderot’s "dynamic" conception of the physical universe and (...) man’s ambiguous relation to it. The theme is elucidated in succeeding chapters devoted, respectively, to Diderot’s aesthetic theories, his view of morality, and his political thought. Crocker stresses the evolution of Diderot’s thought on these subjects as a consequence of the very intractability of the central problem that concerned him. Although Diderot often contradicted himself, the author concludes, his self-contradictions were a reflection of the contradictory nature of reality as perceived by both Diderot and the author. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article provides a reappraisal of the history of proyectismo. Scholars have employed the concept to categorise early eighteenth-century Spanish authors and reforms, and have thereby severed them from their historical context. This article explores the imperial origins of this political culture by shedding light on the generation of knowledge in early eighteenth-century diplomatic and imperial spaces. The article focuses on the overlooked thinker Álvaro José Navia-Osorio y Vigil, Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado – long considered to be a (...) proyectista – and his appeal to the Spanish Republic of Letters to assist him in his project for a universal dictionary; an enterprise that predated Chamber’s Cyclopedia and Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. Marcenado’s contributions to the establishment of Spanish intellectual connections with foreign thinkers were, moreover, symptomatic of the political approach of early eighteenth-century ilustrados – transterritorial, transnational, and transversal thinkers who drew on the peninsula’s ties with the Flanders and Italy to revitalise the intellectual life of Spain. These thinkers recovered the study of Muslim Spain, and envisioned the establishment of councils and academies in Mexico and Peru. The Spanish Enlightenment, then, originated in the early eighteenth-century from their rediscovery of the Spanish Republic of Letters. (shrink)

It is shown that in every gauge the potential of the electromagnetic field in the presence of sources is resolved by an extension of the Helmholtz theorem into a solenoidal component and an irrotational component irrelevant for description of the field. Only irrotational components are affected by gauge transformations; in Coulomb gauge the irrotational component vanishes: the potential is solenoidal. The method of solution of the wave equation by use of positive- and negative-frequency parts is extended to solutions of (...) class='Hi'>D'Alembert's equation, and applied to equations satisfied by the potential in Coulomb gauge and the electric and magnetic vectors. Fourier transforms of potentials specifying destruction/creation operators become time dependent in the presence of sources. Our central equation states this time dependence. Frequency parts of Maxwell's equations are obtained. When the retarded potential in Coulomb gauge is resolved into kinetic and dissipative components, the latter is shown to be in radiation gauge. Correspondingly, the energy/stress tensor is resolved into three components; the power/force density, into two: a kinetic and a dissipative component. Work done by the latter component is negative: energy and momentum are dissipated from matter to radiation. Boson quantization conditions are satisfied by the kinetic component of the retarded potential, but commutators of the dissipative component are determined by the current sources. The energy/stress tensor and Hamiltonian of the field in the presence of sources are derived from the classical Lagrangian density. The relation between the Hamiltonian and the energy is shown to agree with the time dependence of the destruction/creation operators in Heisenberg picture. (shrink)

Review of: Stephen Gaukroger: The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1680-1760. Oxford: Clarendon, 2010, pp. ix+505. £47.00 (hb). ISBN 9780199594931. This volume is the second of a projected six-volume work on the shaping of modern cognitive values through the emergence of a scientific culture, a phenomenon that Gaukroger takes to be specific to the West. The volume ranges from Newton’s initial publications on optics to the French Enlightenment and the publication of (...) the <i>Encyclopédie</i> of Diderot and d’Alembert. During this period, the unity within natural philosophy, secured by the view that matter theory should underlie all natural philosophy, is challenged, as is the unity between natural philosophy and physico-theology, the latter unity being the primary source of the cultural legitimacy that had allowed natural philosophy to flourish. The first type of unity was sundered as Newtonian natural philosophy disavowed the requirement that mechanics be united with a microscopic corpuscularian basis. Further, during this period, scientific (or natural philosophical) values first came to dominate the cognitive values of an entire culture, largely through the <i>persona</i> of the <i>philosophe</i> as the embodiment of reason, albeit a sensibilized reason arising from the new non-mechanistic natural philosophy of the mid-eighteenth century and no longer tied to physico-theology. The book does a better job charting the trend toward disunity than it does charting the rise of sensibility. (shrink)

Starting from the first occurrences in French of ‘esprit de corps’ (Saint-Simon, Voltaire), this article investigates this phrase’s philosophical and metaphorical presuppositions of eighteenth-century uses. After analysing Voltaire’s attempt to define the concept of esprit de corps in the ‘ESPRIT’ article of the Encyclopédie, I will examine a passage from Diderot’s Rêve de D’Alembert, in which esprit de corps is traced back to its metaphorical origin: esprit de corps here appears as esprit du corps, which shows how the political (...) use of this category implies a certain preunderstanding of what the physiological body is and how it forms. As a background to his enquiry into the esprit de corps, Diderot puts forward a model of the organism marked by the rhythms and dynamics of epigenesis: the human body, like the political body, is permanently on the verge of completion, engaged in redefining its boundaries with the world and the relationships between its constituent organs at every moment, according to the principle of pleasure.From this perspective, between d’Holbach’s La morale universelle and Helvétius’s De l’esprit, esprit de corps becomes the expression of the eighteenth-century attempt to question the relationships between individuals, groups, and societies, outlining a stratified political reality crossed by non-univocal rhythms of functioning, recognising passions – particularly esteem – and interest as the constitutive and dissolutive forces of societies. (shrink)

This article attempts to tie two questions together: how to approach the process that constitutes multitudes into communities? And: what role can literary studies play in the age of Empire? To overcome the abstraction of these questions, the article closely follows the return of the word « consequence » in Diderot’s text, D’Alembert’s Dream. Through the wealth of echoes provided by a few quotes, the literary approach comes to be defined as a coring to light of the programs which (...) engineer the reproduction of our social life. Depending on its effects , the encounter between a text and a brain can play a significant regulating role in the permanent process of constitution of multitudes into communities. The disarray in which literary critics and teachers alike find themselves today should lead to a redefinition of their activity which would put the multitudes in position to be the producers, rather than the receivers, of tomorrow ’s literarity. (shrink)

The article tackles the relationship between genius and analogy in Descartes’s early writings and the programmatic writings of the Encyclopédie. For Descartes, ingenious analogies between phenomena that are not obviously related belong more properly to poetic truth discourse, whereas philosophy must be content with the more easily observable and methodical mechanistic comparisons. In the encyclopedic ordering of Diderot and d’Alembert, on the other hand, ingenious analogies are not specific to any particular field of knowledge, since genius consists precisely in (...) connecting even the most remote branches of the whole tree of knowledge. I argue that the theoretical core of both approaches can be traced back to Aristotle’s theory of metaphor insofar as it relies on the analogy of genera rather than species. (shrink)

SummaryScholars have pointed to Montesquieu's influence on Rousseau's work generally. Other scholars, who focus more intently on the Letter to d'Alembert, discern a crucial but limited influence of Montesquieu in two of Rousseau's teachings there: first, that some practices, including the theatre, can be appropriate and even wholesome for some societies, while noxious for others; and second, that mores are important in determining what types of laws and institutions a given people can tolerate and maintain. Careful consideration of Rousseau's Letter (...) in light of Montesquieu's Persian Letters and Spirit of the Laws reveals a much more pervasive influence, however. Rousseau's depictions of the theatre as well as his discussions of the role of women in both French and English society reveal that the Letter bears a striking resemblance to, and, in fact, appears to be a response to, aspects of Montesquieu's thought. Montesquieu's captivating depictions of the sociability that the French theatre can engender was surely an obstacle for Rousseau's opposition to its influence in Geneva. In resisting such influence, Rousseau counters many of Montesquieu's specific arguments and judgements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.3 (2000) 3-11 [Access article in PDF] Preface The State of Death Jonathan Strauss In reality, there is perhaps a greater distance between old age and youth than there is between decrepitude and death, for here one must not consider death to be something absolute.... Death is not armed with a blade, nothing violent accompanies it, life ends by imperceptible nuances.... (D. J.)We dare... to assert, on the (...) basis of a knowledge of the structure and properties of the human body and a large number of observations, that death can be cured. (m.) —Diderot and d'Alembert, Encyclopédie1But if Man is Action, and if Action is Negativity "appearing" as Death, Man, in his human or speaking existence, is only a more or less deferred death, and one that is conscious of itself.Therefore: to recognize Discourse philosophically, or to recognize Man as one who speaks, is to accept unambiguously the fact of death and to describe... its significance and reach. Now, this is precisely what philosophers before Hegel omitted to do. —Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de HegelDeath changed in the nineteenth century. The shift probably began during the Enlightenment, when, as Philippe Ariès has argued, people learned for the first time to fear their mortality—not just the terrors and uncertainties of their demise or the anguish over an eventual punishment for their sins, but extinction itself [1: 112-14, 125]. Within the space of a few decades, death became a sheer and unredeemable absence, an unconsolable loss, and a confrontation with pure negativity. During those years, death was transformed from a nuance between different states to an absolute. It became, in itself, infinite and sublime, a nothingness whose discovery, like that of the zero, unleashed unknown and limitless powers. These now had to be grappled with, to be grasped theoretically as well as practically, in both the intimacy of private fears and the communality of public legislation. And once death was recognized as an absolute it could be put to use as one, for both the individual and the social collective.Hegel, as Kojève taught, was the first to harness the new forces of mortality within an intellectual mechanism worthy of their scope. "Death," he wrote in the preface to the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, "... is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength" [19]. This power to grasp one's demise, to confront it and "tarry" with it, was what he called the Subject—at once the isolated unit of humanity confronted by the limits of its mortality and the key to the social orders that [End Page 3] depend on it, in a pragmatic sense. As justice and enfranchisement increasingly rely on the responsibility of single subjects, so does death rise in importance as the final determiner of socially answerable individuality. In this setting, where mortality is the limit of the subject, society becomes a state of death, a collective grounded in the transcendental absolute of a nothingness that intervenes regularly and practically within the events of life.In such a state, executions are not merely exercises of authority or purgings of unassimilable elements from the social body; they are also, and most significantly, spectacles of the transcendental grounds of the social itself. Here, death is democratic not merely because it is the universal leveler, not simply because it imposes a one hundred percent experience tax on all brackets of the population, but because it produces the uniform units of untransferable humanity, individuals, who at once suffer the obligation to conform to the state and enjoy the, at least theoretical, enfranchisement to transform it. Throughout our days, in the most insignificant details, we feel this mortal isolation organizing our legal relation to our social context, and in each case my death to come draws a line around me, saying: this is you. My metro pass and airline tickets will be valid, my response to the jury duty summons required, and my vote counted, unless I die. It does not matter that I have changed lovers, or... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 535 the consequent thinness and incompleteness which invest the author's discussion in this area. In fact, the omission leads Trinkaus to some misinterpretation regarding the nature and development of poetic theology and the relationships between the studia humanitatis and studia divinitatis. Thus he claims that Petrarch made the classic statement of the theologia poetica ("Poetic is not at all opposed to theology"), thereby inferring that he revived (...) this insight for the Renaissance. But this interrelationship had already been fully and substantively developed by Dante (as Colish convincingly shows in her concluding chapter). Dante's own poetic epistemology grew out of medieval poetics and was explicitly linked to Augustine's (by Dante in the Convivio). In his letter on the Divine Comedy, furthermore, Dante shows that he has appropriated for himself as poet all the tasks, methods, and powers of theology. The Divine Comedy is to be read like Scripture; its purpose is to remove men from misery and bring them to beatitude. That it can do so, moreover, derives from the fact that, as he wrote in the Convivio, "words... are like the seeds of action." Speech, e.g., prayers, poems, confessions of faith, etc., can transform the behavior of the hearer. That is why Dante called himself a poet of rectitude, and why his epitaph described him as a theologian (Theologus Dantes). Yet Trinkaus asserts that Petrarch and especially Boccaccio revived this Augustinian theory of the relationship between the prisci poetae and the prisci theologi. If Boccaccio contributed to this process (and he did), it was less because of his interest in poetic legends about the gods, than because of his admiration for Dante, the subject of his public lectures and his biography. As he declared in his Li[e o[ Dante, it is perfectly clear "that not only is poetry theology but also that theology is poetry." And were it permitted, he allowed, "I should say he [Dante] would have become a god on earth." One misses the presence of Dante in Trinkaus' book; for he belongs--as Boccaccio and Bruni, and (much later) Burcldaardt made plain--at the heart of all Renaissance discussions of poetry and theology, of epistemology, of the employment of learning to civic, public, and moral purposes, and of human and humanistic attempts to reintegrate the soul and reconcile logic to life. He, too, possessed Fanstian dimensions, and like Petrarch, he inspired the humanistic enterprise that came after. Jo~ H. GEEatmN Scripps College and Claremont Graduate School Rhetoric and Truth in France. Descartes to Diderot. By Peter France. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. viii + 282. $16.25) Can a writer express the truth without relying upon rhetorical devices? A negative answer to this question provides the recurrent theme in a "series of linked essays" in which Peter France examines classical French rhetoric as represented in the writings of Descartes, Montesquieu, d'Alembert, Bossuet, Boileau, Racine, Diderot, and Rousseau. He begins with Descartes, who is symbolic of the traditional philosophical revulsion against rhetoric, and then examines the remaining authors who fall on a spectrum between Rousseau, who engages in the "desperate quest for the mirage of genuine, unmediated communication," and Boileau, who was the self-conscious designer of a new style of rhetoric. While the focus is philosophical, the background of this book is largely historical in its illustration of the intellectual tools of a major part of French society over an extended period of time. Professor France is successful in having focus and background reinforce one another. In Part I, he begins with a description of rhetoric in the ancien r~gime. He reviews the classical and medieval roots of rhetoric; the influential Renaissance view of rhetoric as mere ornament, a view perpetuated by the work of Peter Ramus; and the role of rhetoric 536 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in the ancien rJgime as it was taught in the schools and as a mark of social ascension. The conclusion of this review is that "all systems of verbal communication appear to contain an element of distortion." In interpreting Descartes, France relies heavily and admittedly upon the work of Goubier. One surprising comment is the assertion that Descartes refrained from publishing Le... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The order assumed in the construction of the Encyclopédie, edited by Diderot and D’Alembert, supposes an epistemic and normative model that not only conditions the formation of the canon as a referential horizon, but simultaneously produces a template for the political administration of life, with significant consequences for the relationship between canonical discourse and biopolitics within Enlightenment. The article proposes an analysis of this double normative device, with its impasses and complex strategies of enunciation, through the investigation of (...) the nexuses of continuity between the epistemology of mathematics developed by D’Alembert and his controversial position regarding inoculation, the preventive treatment against smallpox available in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

An Encyclopedia for the Empire. In the preface to the universal encyclopedia Die Kultur der Gegenwart (The Culture of the Present), the editor‐in‐chief Paul Hinneberg places his project – not openly but nevertheless unequivocally – in the tradition of the French Encyclopédie that Diderot and d'Alembert had organized from 1751 until 1765. The attempt to accomplish anew such a large‐scale project and, in this way, to win the German Empire the kind of intellectual leadership which the Encyclopédie, (...) in historical retrospect, had achieved for the epoch of Enlightenment, required to convince the leading scholars, scientists, and technicians of the nation to participate in the endeavor and to assemble their contributions under a common systematic agenda through which this universal encyclopedia would distinguish itself from all dictionaries and disciplinary encyclopedias. While the Encyclopédie followed to a large extent an empiricist philosophy, Hinneberg trusted in the integrative function of the concept of culture and the ability of his contributors to elucidate the history of their respective disciplines and to connect them with neighboring fields of culture. The present contributions argues that although, from a philosophical point of view, the historicist tack taken by Hinneberg makes the concept of culture quite blurry, it nevertheless provides enough cohesive structure such that the work, even though unfinished as a consequence of war and inflation, represents a faithful picture of its epoch that Hinneberg understands as an epoch of transition. (shrink)

L’Introduction à l’analyse des lignes courbes algébriques de Gabriel Cramer, paru en 1750, a tout de suite bénéficié du soutien de D’Alembert qui l’a inclus dans les références bibliographiques de ses articles de mathématiques de l’Encyclopédie portant sur les courbes. Ainsi choisi et légitimé par l’entreprise encyclopédique et ses reprises (Yverdon, Méthodique), l’ouvrage de Cramer devient objet patrimonial au tournant du xixe siècle pour les mathématiciens, amateurs, professionnels ou enseignants qui travaillent sur les courbes algébriques. Le suivi sur le temps (...) long des mentions de l’Introduction dans les encyclopédies, dictionnaires ou histoires des mathématiques en langue française, ainsi que dans quelques textes d’enseignement, nous permettra de comprendre que ce processus de patrimonialisation n’induit pas sa conservation, sa protection, sa valorisation à de seules fins mémorielles, en figeant l’ouvrage dans un passé immuable. Au contraire, il permet une historicisation critique de la part des acteurs qui les met en position d’interroger et de réactualiser les connaissances et les pratiques que l’œuvre contient, au gré des mouvements d’émergence, de réorganisation et des spécialisations des savoirs mathématiques, quitte à en oublier certains aspects pour en mettre de nouveaux en valeur. (shrink)