Of all the philosophical challenges to theism in general and Christianity in particular, the one that Christians take most seriously is the Problem of Evil. It is clearly not logically contradictory to hold that there exists a Loving Ultimate Creator; and nevertheless there is a very substantial amount of evil and suffering in the world. But it is certainly problematic. Deeper scientific understandings of physics and evolution shed some light on this. It is also useful to reflect more deeply on (...) the relationships between love, suffering and creativity. (shrink)

We address the issue of fairly rewarding contributors to a crowdfunded project. We develop a theoretical non-strategic model, and introduce a new reward rule: a contributor’s reward depends both on her financial contribution and on the timing of her contribution. Following the axiomatic method used in models of resource sharing, we characterize this new reward rule by a pair of natural axioms. The resulting rewards coincide with the Shapley value of a suitable cooperative game built from the crowdfunding project. This (...) allocation rule conveys a signaling effect: if two contributors make the same financial contribution, the earlier obtains a greater reward. (shrink)

A new class of values combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of values such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. We propose a strategic implementation of our class of values in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class (...) of values, and one of each of its extreme points. (shrink)

New and recent axioms for cooperative games with transferable utilities are introduced. The non-negative player axiom requires to assign a non-negative payoff to a player that belongs to coalitions with non-negative worth only. The axiom of addition invariance on bi-partitions requires that the payoff vector recommended by a value should not be affected by an identical change in worth of both a coalition and the complementary coalition. The nullified solidarity axiom requires that if a player who becomes null weakly loses (...) from such a change, then every other player should weakly lose too. We study the consequence of imposing some of these axioms in addition to some classical axioms. It turns out that the resulting values or set of values have all in common to split efficiently the worth achieved by the grand coalition according to an exogenously given weight vector. As a result, we also obtain new characterizations of the equal division value. (shrink)

We introduce three natural collective variants of the well-known axiom of desirability, which require that if the contributions of a first coalition are at least as large as the contributions of a second coalition, then the payoff in the first coalition should be as large as the payoff in the second coalition. These axioms are called coalitional desirability and average coalitional desirability. The third variant, called uniform coalitional desirability, applies only to coalitions with the same size. We show that coalitional (...) desirability is very strong: no value satisfies simultaneously this axiom and efficiency. To the contrary, the combination of either average coalitional desirability or uniform coalitional desirability with efficiency and additivity characterizes the equal division value. (shrink)

We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of (...) means. The main result establishes that a cooperation at almost all stages of the game is an equilibrium outcome if the complexity of the machines the players may use is limited enough and if the length T of the repeated game is sufficiently large. This result persists when more than T states are allowed in the player’s automaton. We further consider a variant of the model in which the two players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by perceptrons and prove that the players can cooperate at most of the stages provided that the complexity of their perceptrons is sufficiently reduced. (shrink)

Les théories de la démocratie délibérative ont profondément renouvelé notre conception de la citoyenneté. La délibération collective suppose que le citoyen se conforme à un ensemble de règles procédurales et soit capable d’exposer les raisons justifiant ce qui, à ses yeux, serait la meilleure décision à prendre. Une telle aptitude à délibérer s’acquiert et fait partie de la formation du citoyen. L’objectif de cette contribution est d’apporter quelques éléments de réflexion sur la manière dont on peut apprendre à délibérer, sur (...) ce que cela signifie et sur ce qu’on doit attendre d’un tel apprentissage. Nos démocraties ont plus que jamais besoin d’une culture de la délibération qui s’exerce dès l’école et qui ne saurait se réduire à la maîtrise du raisonnement et de l’argumentation. (shrink)

La doctrine classique de la Common Law est la cible de nombreuses critiques de la part de Hobbes et de Bentham. Tous deux remettent en cause les principes qui fondent et justifient cette composante fondamentale du droit anglais. Sont notamment visés le caractère coutumier qui lui est attribué, sa prétendue rationalité ainsi que l’interprétation qu’en font les juges. Moment décisif dans l’histoire des théories du droit, cette controverse tend à faire prévaloir l’idée d’un droit créé par un acte de volonté (...) sur un droit non écrit, tiré de la coutume, que les juges s’efforcent d’appliquer et de perpétuer. Mais, au-delà de leur portée critique, les textes de Hobbes et Bentham présentent des divergences qui font apparaître deux conceptions distinctes de la Common Law et de la décision judiciaire. (shrink)

The classic theory of Common Law is based on the idea of a law derived from immemorial customs that guide judges’ decisions and contribute to the continuity and stability of the legal order. Hobbes, in his criticism of Edward Coke, questions the legal principles that characterize the “spirit of Common Law”. In his view, it is authority and not use that makes the law. This Hobbesian criticism, which can be considered as one of the ­sources of positivist interpretation of customary (...) law, first raises the question of the legal validity of custom but also leads to an original analysis of the court decisions and precedents. Two forms of rationality of law are opposed: one based on custom and knowledge of which is an “artificial reason”, the other based on natural law and the prescriptions of the judges’ individual reason. (shrink)

Résumé On attribue souvent à John Stuart Mill une théorie de la liberté fondée sur un principe de non-nuisance qui conduirait à une critique radicale du paternalisme politique et juridique. Cependant, en analysant de plus près la portée de ce principe ainsi que son mode de justification, il est possible d’en donner une interprétation qui soit compatible avec certaines formes de paternalisme. On peut ainsi considérer De la liberté comme une des sources du paternalisme libéral et plus précisément d’un paternalisme (...) perfectionniste visant à préserver et à promouvoir l’autonomie des individus. (shrink)

Le droit naturel soutient l’hypothèse d’une connexion nécessaire entre le droit et la morale. Pour les positivistes, cette thèse impliquerait l’invalidité de toute loi injuste. Lex iniusta non est lex. Cette maxime a malheureusement été la source de nombreux malentendus. À travers cette formule, le positivisme attribue au droit naturel une thèse que personne ne défend réellement. Notre objectif est de comprendre la genèse de ce malentendu et d’exposer la manière dont les théories contemporaines du droit naturel tentent de démêler (...) les confusions véhiculées par cette maxime. Le droit naturel ne conteste pas nécessairement la validité des lois injustes mais il permet, à partir de la signification « focale » des concepts juridiques, de comprendre en quoi ces lois sont à la fois juridiquement et moralement défectueuses. (shrink)

This chapter outlines ways in which Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is manifest in his later conception of philosophy and the negative attitude he held toward his times. The chapter tries to make clear how these two areas of Wittgenstein’s thought are connected and reflect an anti-scientistic worldview he held, one intimated in Philosophical Investigations §122. -/- It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is (...) superior to all other means of learning or gaining knowledge. Second, the view that scientific knowledge is superior to all other kinds of knowledge and understanding. Wittgenstein’s opposition to these claims is brought out through examining a fundamental aim of his later philosophy, producing the ‘kind of understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI §122), and his attempts to expose certain philosophical confusions. It is argued that these reflect his antiscientistic worldview. -/- Through discussion of Oswald Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein, the chapter outlines how Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism underwrites his negative cultural outlook and how this is connected with the anti-scientistic elements of his later philosophy discussed. The work of Ray Monk (1999; 1990) and Hans-Johann Glock (1996) is instrumental in what follows. (shrink)