Floridi’s Theory of Strongly Semantic Information posits the Veridicality Thesis. One motivation is that it can serve as a foundation for information-based epistemology being an alternative to the tripartite theory of knowledge. However, the Veridicality thesis is false, if ‘information’ is to play an explanatory role in human cognition. Another motivation is avoiding the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap paradox. But this paradox only seems paradoxical, if ‘information’ and ‘informativeness’ are synonymous, logic is a theory of inference, or validity suffices for rational inference; (...) a, b, and c are false. (shrink)

This book is intended to serve as an advanced text and reference work on modal logic, a subject of growing importance which has applications to philosophy and linguistics. Although it is based mainly on research which I carried out during the years 1969-1973, it also includes some related results obtained by other workers in the field. Parts 0, 1 and 2, can be used as the basis of a one year graduate course in modal logic. The material which they contain (...) has been taught in such courses at Stanford since 1970. The remaining parts of the book contain more than enough material for a second course in modal logic. The exercises supplement the text and are usually difficult. I wish to thank Stanford University and Bar-Han University for making it possible for me to continue and finish this work, and A. Ungar for correcting the typescript. Bar-Ilan University, Israel Dov M. GABBA Y PART 0 AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL INTENSIONAL LOGICS CHAPTER 0 CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS Motivation We introduce the notions of a consequence relation and of a semantics. We show that every consequence relation is complete for a canonical semantics. We define the notion of one semantics being Dian in another and study the basic properties of this notion. The concepts of this chapter are generalizations of the various notions of logical system and possible world semantics found in the literature. (shrink)

A critical assessment of the second chapter of Samuel Fleischacker’s Being Me Being You, where Fleischacker makes use of Smith’s account of empathy to develop a distinctive Smithian conception of ‘humanity’.

This is the first English translation of the 12th-century philosophical and ethical classic that has been a key work in the development of medieval Jewish thought.

In this paper, we illustrate some serious difficulties involved in conveying information about uncertain risks and securing informed consent for risky interventions in a clinical setting. We argue that in order to secure informed consent for a medical intervention, physicians often need to do more than report a bare, numerical probability value. When probabilities are given, securing informed consent generally requires communicating how probability expressions are to be interpreted and communicating something about the quality and quantity of the evidence for (...) the probabilities reported. Patients may also require guidance on how probability claims may or may not be relevant to their decisions, and physicians should be ready to help patients understand these issues. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer ärztliche Umgang mit Opiaten und Sedativa bei Patienten am Lebensende kann ethische Fragen aufwerfen. Entsprechende Entscheidungen blieben bisher in aller Regel der ärztlichen Berufskunst und -pflicht überantwortet. Heute aber gerät dieser Bereich zunehmend auch in den Blickwinkel des Rechts. Ausdruck davon sind Bestrebungen, die indirekte Sterbehilfe, allenfalls auch die terminale Sedierung gesetzlich zu regeln. Ausgehend von einer Ist-Analyse der ärztlichen Praxis sowie von bereits bestehenden Regulierungen untersucht diese Arbeit die Konsequenzen derartiger Bestrebungen. Es zeigt sich, dass der Versuch, die (...) Thematik der indirekten Sterbehilfe für sich allein, also unter Vermeidung einer Regelung der direkt aktiven Sterbehilfe, zu behandeln, zu großen Schwierigkeiten führen würde. Ernüchternd sind aber auch die Erfahrungen aus den Niederlanden, derartige Fragen im Rahmen eines umfassenden Sterbehilfegesetzes anzugehen. Insgesamt ist somit zu befürchten, dass der Versuch einer detaillierten gesetzlichen Regelung dieses Bereiches mehr neue Grauzonen und Unsicherheiten schafft, als er zu beseitigen vermag. (shrink)

In many countries, the COVID‐19 pandemic varied starkly between different racial and ethnic groups. Before vaccines were approved, some considered assigning priority access to worse‐hit racial groups. That debate can inform rationing in future pandemics and in some of the many areas outside COVID‐19 that admit of racial health disparities. However, concerns were raised that “race‐responsive” prioritizations would be ruled unlawful for allegedly constituting wrongful discrimination. This legal argument relies on an understanding of discrimination law as demanding color‐blindness. We argue (...) that a, color‐blind understanding of discrimination would be hostile only to one of two rationales for prioritizing the relevant racial minorities in settings of racial health disparities. We also propose a method for incorporating appropriate race‐responsive concerns that is in many ways ethically and legally superior to ones suggested thus far. That method turns artificial intelligence, thanks precisely to its artificial and “black box” nature (features that underlie recent concerns about artificial intelligence's discriminatory potential), into an instrument of social justice. (shrink)

Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific theories, (...) by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)

Sadece tarihi ilgilendiriyor gibi görünen felsefenin başlangıcı problemi, şüphesiz tarihsel bir meseledir, ama aynı zamanda felsefenin kendisine de ait bir konudur, çünkü bu probleme ilişkin değerlendirmeler zorunlu olarak felsefenin doğasını açığa vurmaktadır. Felsefeyi Miletli Thales’in başlattığına ve ilk filozof olduğuna dair yerleşik bir gelenek söz konusudur; bununla birlikte, felsefe kendine özgü belirlenimler kazanıp kendini belirlemesini sağlayan belli bir gelişme sürecinin ürünüdür ve bu bakımdan birçok filozofun emeğine gerek duymuştur. Felsefe tarihinin ilk döneminde Grek filozoflar yeni başlangıçlar yapmışlar ve böylelikle felsefenin (...) yeni yönlerinin açığa çıkmasına hizmet etmişlerdir. Bu çalışmada, felsefenin sadece bir kurucusu değil kurucuları olduğunu vurgulamak üzere Thales’ten Aristoteles’e dek Grek filozofların felsefenin oluşumuna sağladıkları katkı irdelenecektir. (shrink)

The article aims at discerning and explaining the significance and role of emotive notions in understanding music, in performing it or listening to it with the appropriate understanding. The suggestion focuses on two notions: that of making sense of various musical features and their interconnections, and that of helping manage the enormous information one needs to process in keeping on the trail of the music in real time.

The thesis argued for in this work is that under certain conditions the use of violence is morally obligatory. The thesis is advanced as an alternative to both the pacifist and the liberal, right-oriented theses which are rooted in the idea that violence is evil. The defense consists of an exposition of the problems of the pacifist and liberal theses on the one hand and the development of a system that makes it possible to conceive of the use of violence (...) as morally obligatory on the other hand. ;The work begins with an examination of the socio-practical consequences of the idea that violent is evil--the blindness and insensitivity toward violence that most of us exhibit most of the time. Next comes an analysis of the pacifist and liberal moralities of violence that point out the two are grounded in similar utopian visions of a harmonious world and how they fail to be responsive to the demands of practice. The idea that violence is evil is examined next and a morally neutral conception of violence, an idea of non-abusive violence, is suggested as a preliminary to the consideration of an alternative morality of violence. ;The construction of an alternative begins with the outline of a schema for a moral system. The idea of human dignity is taken as its unifying notion and the ideals of justice, freedom and respect for persons as unfolding it. Moral rules understood as specifying moral obligation are taken as the mechanism of practical morality. The idea of moral policy is introduced as a middle ground between moral ideals and moral rules. The moral ideals are used to draw a distinction between savagery and a violent social world. The choice of a violent social world is understood as the choice of a world in which violence is morally regulated by rules that specify when we are morally obligated to use violence and when we are morally obligated to refrain from the use of violence. A discussion of such rules completes the construction of the alternative. (shrink)

Both left libertarians, who support the redistribution of income and wealth through taxation, and right libertarians, who oppose redistributive taxation, share an important view: that, looming catastrophes aside, the state must never redistribute any part of our body or our person without our consent. Cécile Fabre rejects that view. For her, just as the undeservedly poor have a just claim to money from their fellow citizens in order to lead a minimally flourishing life, the undeservedly ‘medically poor’ have a just (...) claim to help from fellow citizens in order to lead such a life. Such obligatory help may in principle involve even the supply of body parts for transplantation. The state ought to exact such resources from the medically rich whenever doing so would secure the prospect of a minimally flourishing life to the medically poor without denying that prospect to anyone else. Fabre criticizes Ronald Dworkin's belief in ‘a prophylactic line that comes close to making the body inviolate, that is, making body parts not parts of social resources at all’. For her, ‘Duties to help. . . do not stop at material resources: they involve the body. . . in invasive ways’. (shrink)

Quine’s philosophy comprises a bewildering set of views whose integrating principle is his “confirmed extensionalism”. The paper offers a historical as well as an intellectual reconstruction of extensionalism. Traditional extensionalism (Boole) freed logic from Aristotelian essentialism that had inhibited the development of logic. Quine’s confirmed extensionalism is the acceptance, as a matter of course, of the validity of Frege’s criticism of [Boole’s] extensionalism. His confirmed extensionalism is a generalized version of the philosophy of science known as conventionalism. As such, it (...) places the advancement of science outside the province of science proper. It is, thus, at odds with Quine’s repeated expressions of alliance with the Popperian (hypothetico-deductive) model of science. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a comprehensive analysis and a normative assessment of rationing through inconvenience as a form of rationing. By “rationing through inconvenience” in the health sphere, we refer to a nonfinancial burden that is either intended to cause or has the effect of causing patients or clinicians to choose an option for health-related consumption that is preferred by the health system for its fairness, efficiency, or other distributive desiderata beyond assisting the immediate patient. We argue that under (...) certain conditions, rationing through inconvenience may turn out to serve as a legitimate and, compared to direct rationing, even a preferable tool for rationing; we propose a research agenda to identify more precisely when that might be the case and when, alternatively, rationing through inconvenience remains ethically undesirable. After defining and illustrating rationing through inconvenience, we turn to its moral advantages and disadvantages over other rationing methods. We take it as a starting assumption that rationing, understood as scarce-resource prioritization, is inevitable and, in a society that has goals beyond optimizing health care for individual patients—such as improving societal health care, education, or overall welfare—prudent and fair. (shrink)

This chapter investigates how a reading of Wittgenstein along the lines laid out by Cora Diamond makes room for a novel approach to ethical truth. Following Diamond, I develop the connection between the kinds of elucidatory propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain the shape of our theoretical thinking, such as “‘someone’ is not the name of someone” and “five plus seven equals twelve,” and the kind of propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain (...) the shape of ethical thinking, such as “slavery is unjust.” As Diamond points out in connection with the last example, this is a proposition that we take to be an undeniable truth; for anyone who would attempt to negate it would become unintelligible to us. In this sense this ethical truth spells out the limits of ethical thinking. And yet what counts as coherent thought about such matters tends to shift over time. Indeed the great difficulty of overcoming ethical disagreements has to do with the fact that what is at stake in them is not just the content, but the form and limits of thought. Nonetheless, Diamond proposes that ethical propositions may count as genuine truths. For this to make sense, a middle path between realism and relativism must be found. In order to show how this is possible, and in order to defend Diamond’s view, I propose to approach ethical truth by means of a disjunctivist strategy. On this approach, while we, just as much as our interlocutor, may at times be misled in our ethical thinking, and while we may at times fail to shape our ethical thought in ways that prevent us from gaining clarity on ethical matters, this does not detract from the fact that we may at times be right, and that we may then genuinely possess ethical truth. (shrink)

This article analyses and interprets the works of Friedensreich Hundertwasser (1928–2000) as a source of inspiration for environmental ethics and offers an extended model of the Ecological Self based on an interpretation of his works. Hundertwasser was a prominent Jewish-Austrian artist and environmental activist, yet despite his commitment to environmental issues, he has not received the attention he deserves from the environmental ethics community. His works and writings suggest a critique and reformulation of the well-known concept of the Ecological Self. (...) This concept implies that humans are essentially embedded in the natural world – that the Self is porous and open rather than disengaged and atomistic. This article suggests an alternative, holistic and extended version of this concept. It assesses and incorporates additional layers found between humans and nature – clothing, architecture, urban environments, and social and political environments. (shrink)

The present collection of essays honours John Woods on the occasion of his eightieth birthday from contributors who wish to pay homage to this remarkable researcher whom they see not only as a scholar of prodigious energy and insight, but as a friend, colleague, collaborator, or former teacher. All of the essays touch upon topics Woods has taken a direct or indirect interest in, ranging from technical problems of mathematical logic and applications of formal methods through philosophical logic, philosophy of (...) language, epistemology and history of ancient and modern logic. The sections themselves of the book cover relevance, paradoxes, inconsistency, fallacies, abduction, fictions, logic naturalized, law, argumentation and narratives, and many other topics: and represent the main research areas which have profited from Woods' reflections. (shrink)

Which inequalities in longevity and health among individuals, groups, and nations are unfair? And what priority should health policy attach to narrowing them? These essays by philosophers, economists, epidemiologists, and physicians attempt to determine how health inequalities should be conceptualized, measured, ranked, and evaluated.

ABSTRACT I examine five arguments against removing controversial monuments. I argue that none of these arguments provides good reasons for leaving controversial monuments in place. A close examination of these arguments also points to some of our misconceptions about the nature of monuments. The arguments include the claim that removing monuments rewrites history, that removal amounts to ex-post facto moralizing, that controversial monuments are needed to stir people to healthy debate, that the focus on monuments is a distraction preventing us (...) from making pragmatic progress, and that removing some monuments is the first step in a slippery slope that will lead to excessive censure of historical figures. (shrink)