This text examines the philosophy of Paul Weiss. Much of Dr Weiss's impact has come through his example, discussions, and such activities as founding and editing the Review of Metaphysics and founding and leading the Metaphysical Society of America.

A great variety of medical conditions are subject to the placebo effect. Although there is mounting evidence to suggest that the placebo effect is related to the expectation of clinical benefit, little is still known about the biochemical bases underlying placebo responses. Positron emission tomography studies have recently shown that the placebo effect in Parkinson’s disease, pain, and depression is related to the activation of the limbic circuitry. The observation that placebo administration induces the release of dopamine in the ventral (...) striatum of patients with Parkinson’s disease suggests a link between the placebo effect and reward mechanisms. In addition to Parkinson’s disease, the placebo-reward model may also apply to other disorders. However, the relative contribution of the different neurotransmitters and neuropeptides that are known to be involved in modulating the activity of the limbic system may be disease-specific. Thus, while the placebo-induced clinical benefit observed in Parkinson’s disease would mostly reflect the release of dopamine in the dorsal striatum, the activation of opioid and serotonin pathways could be particularly implicated in mediating placebo responses encountered in pain and depression, respectively. (shrink)

This paper deals with a major problem of the early days of the science of palaeontology, the nature and origin of fossils. In 1725, the German physician and academician, Dr Johann Beringer, was deceived into believing that fraudulent, carved stones were true fossils. Despite an extensive analysis, Beringer was not able to fit his ‘fossils’ to any contemporary concept of how fossils originate. The reason for Beringer's inability to classify his stones is explored here. It is argued that the carvings (...) embodied a sixteenth-century, Neoplatonic, concept of fossils, a concept that was outdated in Beringer's time. Beringer chose not to explain his stones rather than to accept the meaning they implied. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:108 Feminist Studies 46, no. 1. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Ellyn Weiss Anna U. Davis: An Introduction Anna U. Davis is a Swedish American mixed-media artist who was born in Lund, Sweden, and currently resides in Washington, DC. Her work draws frequently on the challenges she has faced living in the United States, particularly those related to her gender and racial position. Her husband, who spent (...) most of his childhood in the same Swedish town as Davis, was born to an African American man and a white Swedish woman. When Anna, who is also white, was pregnant with her own son, now in his early twenties, she began drawing what she terms “Frocasians,” people who are neither black nor white and who cannot claim automatic acceptance from either group. As her work explores, the outsider status of Frocasions both presents opportunity and exacerbates insecurity. Davis’s Swedish roots are central to her brand of feminism. She remembers growing up in an environment where notions of gender justice were firmly embedded in the legal framework and norms of the community. Her struggles with inadequate childcare and family leave as a young mother in the United States, then, form a strong undercurrent shaping her critical perspective. Davis also narrates growing up in a household that was emotionally unstable and sometimes difficult to navigate. As an outgrowth of these varied struggles, her art both values and aims to project strength. Davis’s graphic skills anchor her work; she always starts with detailed pieces in black and white. These pieces are then sometimes All images shown in this art essay courtesy of Anna U. Davis. Anna U. Davis, The Modern Plague, 2012. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 30 × 26 inches. CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT Anna U. Davis, Bull’s-eye, 2009. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 38 × 4 inches. Anna U. Davis, The Edge of Transit, 2008. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 12 × 10 inches. Anna U. Davis, Houseman, 2018. Acrylic and ink pen on cut-out birch plywood, 46 × 3 inches. Anna U. Davis, Black Velvet, 201. Inkjet print, 60 × 80 inches. Anna U. Davis, Black Velvet, 201. Inkjet print, 60 × 80 inches. CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT Anna U. Davis, Drop Dead Gorgeous, 2008. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 48 × 96 inches. Anna U. Davis, Delivered Agenda, 2009. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 20 × 20 inches. Anna U. Davis, Anonymous Was the Woman, 2014. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 12 × 10 inches. NEXT PAGE Anna U. Davis, Dr. Jekyll & Mrs. Hyde, 201. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 2 × 96 inches. LEFT TO RIGHT Anna U. Davis, Equilibrium, 201. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 40 × 40 inches. Anna U. Davis, Second Class, 201. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 2 × 96 inches. CLOCKWISE FROM LEFT Anna U. Davis, Shark-cuteri, 2016. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 2 × 96 inches. Anna U. Davis, Face-it (part ), 2009. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 18 × 24 inches. Anna U. Davis, Love, 201. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 2 × 96 inches. CENTER Anna U. Davis, Last Call, 2019. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 10 × 10 inches. NEXT PAGE Anna U. Davis, Tripping, 201. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on canvas, 2 × 96 inches. LEFT TO RIGHT Anna U. Davis, The Anonymous Celebrity, 2009. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 8 × 44 inches. Anna U. Davis, Tug of War, 2019. Acrylic, ink pen, and paper collage on raw linen, 41 × 31 inches. Anna U. Davis, Undertaker, 2009. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 4 × 2 inches. Anna U. Davis, Lena, 2009. Acrylic and paper collage on canvas, 32 × 32 inches. Ellyn Weiss 125 enlarged, either remaining in black and white, becoming the underpinning of a collage, or more recently, turning into a sculptural wall relief. The color in her pieces is typically derived from the brilliant tones of glossy illustrations in so-called “women’s magazines,” which she cuts up for collaging. The content is also influenced by the articles and advertisements in such magazines. Implicit in some of Davis’s... (shrink)

Dr. McGee presents a cogent argument for the patentability of the diagnosis of gene forms that are found to be associated with disease or other phenotypic manifestations. We're convinced he's wrong. An analogy will help explain why.

We reflect on Dr. Iserson’s article in this journal, in which he suggests that clinicians must “shove” patients towards appropriate care. While recognizing that overt clinical guidance is part of care, we suggest that its use should be tempered by the guidance’s responsiveness to the human and emotional experience of each patient.

The case of Dr. Nancy Olivieri, the Hospital for Sick Children, the University of Toronto, and Apotex Inc. vividly illustrates many of the issues central to contemporary health research and the safety of research participants. First, it exemplifies the financial and health stakes in such research. Second, it shows deficits in the ways in which research is governed. Finally, it was and remains relevant not only in Toronto but in communities across Canada and well beyond its borders because, absent appropriate (...) policies, what happened in Toronto could have happened (and could well still happen) elsewhere. In Part One of this paper, we review the facts of the Olivieri case relevant to the issues we wish to highlight: first, the right of participants in a clinical trial to be informed of a risk that an investigator had identified during the course of the trial and the obligation of the investigator to inform participants (both her own and those of other investigators); and second, the obligation of institutions to protect and promote the well-being of research participants as well as academic freedom and research integrity, the obligations of research sponsors to inform participants, research regulators, and others about unforeseen risks, and the obligations of research regulators to ensure that participants are informed of unforeseen risks and to otherwise protect and promote research integrity. In Part Two, we relate these facts and issues to New Zealand and Australia. We also make detailed recommendations for changes to the various instruments used for the governance of research involving humans in Australasia. (shrink)

Jeder weiss, dass er sterben muss. Er weiss nur nicht wann. Wüsste er es, er könnte den Tod nicht mehr aus seinem Leben verdrängen. Dieses Buch geht von einer utopischen Situation aus: Durch eine gentechnische Analyse wird bei jedem Menschen gleich nach seiner Geburt festgestellt, wann sein "Endtag", also sein Todestag, sein wird. Frühere Todesfälle gibt es nur bei Unfall oder Mord, spätere nie. Das Wissen um den Endtag verändert das Leben jedes Einzelnen, die Familien, die Gesellschaft, Ausbildung, (...) Beziehungen und Lebensplanung, Laufbahnen im Beruf, das Rentensystem u.v.m. Was für die einen ein "Horrorszenario" sein kann, entpuppt sich für die anderen als ein Segen: Alle können ihren Lebensabend planen und zur rechten Zeit bewusst Abschied nehmen. Und an diesem Punkt wird das Szenario von Ivo W. Greiter zum Plädoyer: Versucht euch täglich bewusst zu sein und zu akzeptieren, dass Ihr nicht ewig leben werdet. Rechnet mit dem Tod, redet über das Sterben, räumt eure Sachen auf. Und: Der Tod kann seinen Schrecken verlieren, wenn er am Leben teilhaben darf. "Und immer wieder stellte ich mir die Frage: Wenn ich weiss, was ich ändern würde, wenn ich in vier Monaten sterben würde, warum ändere ich es dann nicht gleich?" DR. GREITER, geb. 1940, ist Rechtsanwalt in Innsbruck; er ist vielfach in Berufsverbänden und ehrenamtlich engagiert, so als österreichischer Vorsitzender der internationalen Juristenorganisation World Jurist Association, Washington, als Vizepräsident des Österreichischen Juristentages und des österreichischen Anwaltsvereins u. a.; von 1983 bis 1989 war Dr. Greiter Mitglied des Gemeinderates von Innsbruck und von 1993 bis 2010 französischer Honorarkonsul in Innsbruck. Er befasst sich unter anderem mit Rechtsfragen für Menschen über 66; zahlreiche sonstige fachbezogene Veröffentlichungen. (shrink)

The representation of Neg-Raising in the grammar is a matter of controversy. I provide evidence for representing Neg-Raising as a kind of presupposition associated with certain predicates by providing a detailed analysis of NPI-licensing in Neg-Raising contexts. Specific features of presupposition projection are used to explain the licensing of strict NPIs under Neg-Raising predicates. Discussion centers around the analysis of a licensing asymmetry noted in Horn (1971, Negative transportation: Unsafe at any speed? In CLS 7 (pp. 120–133)).Having provided this analysis, (...) I go on to discuss its implications for the theory of NPI-licensing more generally. In particular, I discuss how the present proposal reflects on von Fintel’s (1999, Journal of Semantics, 16, 97–148) proposal to use Strawson downward entailment in the statement of NPI-licensing principles. (shrink)

Grounding is bicollective if it is possible for some truths δ,δ,... to be grounded in the some truths γ,γ,... without its being the case that each δi is grounded in some subcollection of γ,γ,.... In this paper I show how to do develop a hypergraph-theoretic account of bicollective ground, taking the notion of immediate ground as basic. I also indicate how bicollective ground helps with formulating mathematical structuralism.

Despite the skepticism of many mathematicians and logicians as to the possibility of any test which will show conclusively the consistency or independence of the members of a postulate set, several methods have nevertheless been devised and employed, e.g., the empirical methods of Russell and Huntington, the internal method of Hilbert, and the reflective method of Royce. However, with the possible exception of Hilbert's method, these techniques require us to forsake the purely formal or abstract mode of analysis, and instead (...) to rely in some sense on “concrete representations” or “interpretations” or “modes of action” which are said to “satisfy” the postulates in question. In short, they are all interpretational methods—and here is the crux of the problem. “Is it possible,” queries Weiss, “that the only way we can determine whether a set is consistent is by seeing all the postulates actually exemplified in some object? If so, we must arbitrarily assume that the object is self-consistent, so that the proof of consistency must ultimately rest on a dogma. As independence rests on consistency there are therefore no satisfactory proofs as yet of either independence or consistency.” The question “is thus answered,” according to Young, “only by reference to a concrete representation of the abstract ideas involved, and it is such concrete representations that we wished especially to avoid. At the present time, however, no absolute test for consistency is known.” Moreover, “suppose,” says the late Dr. Eaton, “that the system has no interpretation: how can the consistency independence … of the postulates be shown? There should be some analytic way—purely in the realm of the abstract, without interpretation—of establishing these properties of a set of postulates. This is an important problem that awaits solution.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EugenicsMary Carrington Coutts (bio) and Pat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)The word eugenics (from the Greek eugenes or well-born) was coined in 1883 by Francis Galton, an Englishman and cousin of Charles Darwin, who applied Darwinian science to develop theories about heredity and good or noble birth (I, Kevles 1985, p. x).The entry under "eugenics" in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics notes that the term has had different meanings in different eras: (...) "a science that investigates methods to ameliorate the genetic composition of the human race; a program to foster such betterment; a social movement; and in its perverted form, a pseudo-scientific retreat for bigots and racists" (V, Ludmerer 1978, p. 457). Kevles, who places a stronger emphasis than Ludmerer on the degeneration of eugenics, says that by 1935 it "had become 'hopelessly perverted' into a pseudoscientific facade for 'advocates of race and class prejudice, defenders of vested interests of church and state, Fascists, Hitlerites, and reactionaries generally'" (I, Kevles 1985, p. 164).Phrases such as "survival of the fittest" and "struggle for existence" came into use at the end of the nineteenth century when eugenics societies were created throughout the world to popularize genetic science. "Negative eugenics" utilized marriage restriction, sterilization, or custodial commitment of those thought to have unwanted characteristics. "Positive eugenics" tried to encourage the population perceived as "superior" to have more offspring (V, Ludmerer 1978, p. 459).In the United States, after World War I, new information, such as the importance of environmental influences and the more complex concept of multi-gene effects in inheritance, diminished the scientific justification for eugenics, but this knowledge did not decrease the pressure for legislation, judicial action, or immigration controls. The U.S. Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 favored immigration from northern Europe and greatly restricted the entry of persons from other areas referred to as "biologically inferior." Between 1907 and 1937, 32 [End Page 163] states required sterilization of various citizens viewed as undesirable: the mentally ill or handicapped; those convicted of sexual, drug, or alcohol crimes; and others viewed as "degenerate" (V, Larson 1991).In Germany, interest in eugenics flourished after the turn of the century when Dr. Alfred Ploetz founded the Archives of Race-Theory and Social Biology in 1904 and the German Society of Racial Hygiene in 1905. The German term Rassenhygiene or race hygiene encompassed more than the word "eugenics;" it included all attempts to improve hereditary qualities as well as measures directed at population increase (III, Weiss 1987). By the 1920s, various German textbooks incorporated ideas of heredity and racial hygiene, and German professors were participating in the international eugenics movement. The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics was founded in 1927; by 1933 a sterilization law, the Law for the Prevention of Congenitally Ill Progeny, which originally was entitled "Eugenics in the Service of Public Welfare," indicated compulsory sterilization "for the prevention of progeny with hereditary defects" in cases of "congenital mental defects, schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, hereditary epilepsy... and severe alcoholism." (III, Müller-Hill 1988, p. 10).The co-mingling of science, politics, and Weltanschauung (ideological or religious world view) caused the darkest period for eugenics when Nazi Germans embarked on their "final solution" to the Jewish "problem", or the Holocaust. The Nazi racial-hygiene program began with involuntary sterilizations and ended with genocide. Beginning with the 1933 Law for the Prevention of Congenitally Ill Progeny, 350,000 schizophrenic and other mentally ill persons were involuntarily sterilized, and marriage or sexual contact between Jews and other Germans was banned. Several hundred black children and 30,000 German Gypsies were sterilized. By 1945, when the allies liberated those remaining in Nazi concentration camps, six million Jews, 750,000 Gypsies, and 70,000 German psychiatric patients had been killed by the Nazis (III, Müller-Hill 1992, p. 47). As a result of the German experience, eugenic thought dropped to its nadir, and to the present day, the term "eugenics" invokes a sense of horror in some people.Great Britain, the United States, and Germany were the countries most involved with eugenic science in the first half of this century, but interest was present in Europe and other... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PEIRGE'S MARGINALIA IN W. T. HARRIS' Hegel's Logic Among the most eminent philosophers of nineteenth-century America were William Torrey Harris (1835-1909) and Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914 ). The former, by his establishment in 1867 of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, furnished a starting point for American philosophical maturity. The latter, who contributed to that iournal, has been considered America's greatest logician. It may therefore be (...) of interest to examine Peirce's marginalia in the first edition of Harris' chief work, Hegel's Logic: A Book on the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1890). Discovered by the present writer on a New York book-stall, in a cheaply priced, coverless, and water-stained copy, and now in his possession, it bears imprinted on the reverse of the title page: "Harvard University: Philos. Dept. Library. Gift of Mrs. Charles S. Peirce. June 28, 1915." Shortly after Peirce, in depressed circumstances, died on April 19, 1914, the Harvard Philosophy Department acquired from his wife the manuscripts that were published in the Collected Papers.1 Harris' Hegel's Logic, which presumably accompanied that transaction, contains several marginal annotations, mostly in faded ink, in a neat, small hand, similar to that reproduced in the frontispiece to Volume IV of Peirce's Collected Papers. Recalling a notable philosophical conjunction, the markings also reveal aspects of Peirce's character and confirm his complex attitude toward Hegel, crucial to the development of his philosophy. Peirce's shifting view and persistent concern regarding Hegel may be traced in some other remarks. For example, in a letter to Harris dated January 1, 1868, he says, "I admit there is music in the logic of Hegel, but that is all I discover there. ''2 In another letter to Harris, dated May 13, 1868, he indicates his ambivalence: "But as I should draw the line... I should come on the same side as Hegel, because I am idealistic. I do not 1eel very much opposed to Hegel, though I think his main point.s tin his own estimate of importance) are wrong. ''s About 1890, Peirce declared, "I reiect his philosophy in toto, ''~ and about 1896, he accused Hegel of reaching "each category from the last preceding by virtually calling 'next!'-5 Yet, in 1903, he acclaimed Hegel "in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived. ''6 And, in the very same year, reviewing another treatment of Hegel's logic, and including a reference to Harris' t Eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss,and Arthur Burks (Vols.I-VIII; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). 2,.C.S. Peirce to W. T. Harris." ed. WallaceNethery, The Personalist,XLIII (19fi2),37. I am indebted to Dr. Nethery for his kindness in letting me see these letters in advanceof publication. sIbid.,40. 4Collected Papers,I, 193. 5 Ibid., I, 246. eIbid., I, 277. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 83 treatise, Peirce flatly remarks: "But all these Hegelians--Harris, XVallace, Hibben, Everett, etc.--who dog the steps of their master in almost textual comments, are profoundly unfaithful to the spirit of his philosophy... the Logik now condemns itself. ''7 A constant feature in Peirce's negative attitude toward Hegel concerns the latter's failure to equip himself scientifically to deal with a subject the American considered basically scientific. For instance, about 1899, Peirce writes: Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following out for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent in itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had been chiefly laid up. It was a misfortune for Hegelism~ a misfortune for "philosophy," and a misfortune (in lesser degree) for science: Although Peirce adds, "My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume, ''9 and his dialectic parallels Hegel's, he attempts to escape the Hegelian subjectivism by an "objective logic" and by avoiding Hegel's supposed mathematical ignorance. "Most of what is true in... (shrink)

Eine Seereise von 10 Tagen von Bremen nach New York hat mir nun endlich die erwünschte Gelegenheit gegeben, mich mit Ihrer Broschüre „Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantentheorie“ zu beschäftigen. Es läge nahe, mit der Antwort das Erscheinen Ihrer Veröffentlichung in den „Naturwissenschaften“ abzuwarten, von der mir Dr. Berliner, der hier an Bord ist, erzählt. Aber wer weiss, ob ich drüben in U.S.A. sobald zum Schreiben komme.

Writing, the exigency of writing: no longer the writing that has always (through a necessity in no way avoidable) been in the service of the speech or thought that is called idealist (that is to say, moralizing), but rather the writing that through its own slowly liberated force (the aleatory force of absence) seems to devote itself solely to itself as something that remains without identity, and little by little brings forth possibilities that are entirely other: an anonymous, distracted, deferred, (...) and dispersed way of being in relation, by which everything is brought into question – and first of all the idea of God, of the Self, of the Subject, then of Truth and the One, then finally the idea of the Book and the Work so that this writing (understood in its enigmatic rigor), far from having the Book as its goal rather signals its end: a writing that could be said to be outside discourse, outside language. – Maurice Blanchot ( The Infinite Conversation , xi) The Compendium * Beginning with the idea and practice of writing, and moving to the subject or self, then to truth and the One, and arriving at the Book and the Work, Blanchot’s words reflect the trajectory of the following work of writing. True to the embeddedness of the subject in the work of writing, the term “Compendium” has been a metonym for me over the past few years as I have thought about the concept of totality alongside its expression in figures such as the One, the Whole, or the All. In the following I aim to share some of the content of this metonym, and to enrich it by making some distinctions. 1 Here the term “Compendium” will refer to a concept of totality that is ontological (pertaining to being, and the copula) and also textual (pertaining to the symbolic, and the signifier-signified relationship). The Compendium is a figure for thinking the world as a Book, in the broadest sense—an approach to reality that is by no means new, but one that is due for renewal. 2 In partial answer to the question of the Compendium we will say that the word ‘Compendium’ stands in for expressions which seek to totalize, or concepts which seek to approach the concept of ‘everything,’ particularly when these expressions are bound up in the question of the Book (both the book as a physical object and the Book as a metaphysical figure: a way of thinking about the work in and of writing). The question of the Compendium is strongly associated with the physical and metaphysical form of the Book, like the mysterious and symbolic books which are opened in the Biblical book of Revelation, the book of life and the book of death, which together constitute an important couplet. 3 Parataxis & Hypotaxis There are two helpful distinctions that will bring us closer to an answer to the question “What is a Compendium?” The first distinction is between two figures in and for writing: parataxis and hypotaxis . Typically paired in contrast to one another as literary techniques, with parataxis indicating a side-by-side placement of textual elements and hypotaxis referring to subordinate arrangements of textual elements, the two figures can be understood as having a philosophical significance in addition to their practical function as devices for writers. For us these two terms will remain between philosophical theory and writing practice, and serve as a perspective for our writing and creation of texts. Here I take texts to refer to anything from the concrete written words in a book, to the ontological text of the world that we experience. Parataxis , as a figural way of thinking about the ontological structure of texts, refers to texts which are tightly woven and interdependent – texts within which each sentence bears the weight of the entire work. Parataxis often involves repetition, great density, and fragility. One of the best examples of this sort of text is Theodor Adorno’s posthumous magnum opus , Aesthetic Theory . In addition to the text itself, the translation history of the book may also help us to better understand parataxis and its relation to hypotaxis . The final published version of Aesthetic Theory , in German, was a text that Adorno intended to revise and rewrite, but this intention was never realized because of his untimely death. Where the German text of Aesthetic Theory certainly exemplifies the concept of parataxis , the first English edition took this densely woven text and carved Adorno’s lengthy paragraphs and lengthy sentences into manageable ‘bite-sized’ pieces of English text. The first translator took further liberty and inserted headings and new paragraph breaks where there were none in the original. Aesthetic Theory was eventually retranslated by Robert Hullot-Kentor and is now available in a form that is much more faithful to the original work. 4 The pertinent idea that this translation history points to is the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis . Where parataxis describes texts which are repetitive, densely woven, and often fragile, hypotaxis describes texts which are hierarchical and in which the primary relation is linear – the latter of which is very similar to the first English translation of Aesthetic Theory . On the other hand, the original German text that Adorno wrote was very dense, often repetitive, and contained long sections of text unbroken by paragraphs or headings. This example of parataxis was then turned towards hypotaxis through the initial translation which took a text that was, in many ways, nonhierarchical and nonlinear, and artificially subjected it to a hierarchy that was not its own (and here I take the word of Fredric Jameson who comments on the two translations in a note at the beginning of his book Late Marxism ). 5 The point here is not about translation, but rather the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis precisely as they are figures for discourse, written or otherwise. The concept of parataxis looks far more postmodern and rhizomic than the concept of hypotaxis which remains very modern and arborescent. This is a more figural way of talking about the distinction. However, if we wanted to take a more precise and analytical approach we could say that on the level of form parataxis involves a relationship between sentences and paragraphs in which each part bears an equally crushing responsibility to present the whole content of the text. As well, on the level of content, parataxis requires that each concept in a work take on the full conceptual weight of the total work. Continuing the analysis, we could say that parataxis describes texts in which there is no (or very little) linear or causal move from antecedent to consequent, whether in content or form. Instead, parataxis describes texts which weave together concepts via conjugations or associations. The concept of hypotaxis , on the other hand, requires that texts submit themselves to hierarchy, one example of which is logical argumentation. The contingency of the conclusion upon premises in hypotaxis is certainly distinct from the repetition, re-presentation, and conjugation of concepts in parataxis , and I think that this is evident in the difference between the writing styles prevalent in contemporary Analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy. It is not the case that the distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis absolutely corresponds with the writing styles of Continental and Analytic philosophy (respectively). There are thinkers who take exception to this pattern, such as Badiou’s more formal approach in the discourse of Continental philosophy to give one example. However, when Analytic philosophy takes its writing lessons from the sciences, and seeks to do philosophy via the clean linear move from antecedent to consequent, then I think that Analytic philosophy writes with hypotaxis in mind. On the other hand, when Continental (particularly German and French) philosophy takes its writing lessons from narrative or poetry then Continental philosophy writes with parataxis in mind. It is not fair to say that all those writing Continental philosophy are looking to narrative and poetry for stylistic direction, just as it is not the case that all those writing Analytic philosophy have mathematics and science as their writing format, however there are some striking ways in which the differing epistemologies of Continental and Analytic philosophy encourage writing with parataxis and hypotaxis in mind (respectively). For some, writing with parataxis or hypotaxis in mind is a conscious decision and a product of stylistic self-consciousness, and for others it is an unconscious discursive and epistemic requirement that must be met in order to be involved in a particular discourse. Before moving on to our second distinction, and then an examination of the question of the Book, it is important to point out that both totality and figurations like the One, the Whole, and the All, come out of very human desires to totalize or to actualize our being-towards-totality. The relationship between identity and totality then can be construed, with Heidegger in mind, as striving toward wholeness, completion, or fulfillment, each of which is a quality of compendia. 6 Compilation & Selection The first distinction between parataxis and hypotaxis pertains to both form and content, and to both the mechanics of writing and the ideas to which writing refers. The second distinction pertains to both as well. In the process of writing and in the process of perception as well, there is a tension between compilation and selection . To begin with, in the work of theory-writing there is compilation, and this is because writing theory requires a broad perspective and certain measure of totalization. On the other hand, writing theory requires that the writer select an idea or a combination of ideas to individuate out of a radical and infinite multiplicity of identities and combinations. The concern here is not primarily for the writing of a theory about a specific idea, like a secondary work or a reference text. But rather the concern is with the writing of grand theories: Marx and Marxism, Derrida and Deconstruction, Husserl and Phenomenology, Sartre and Existentialism, Saussure and Structuralism —each of which strives along a trajectory towards being all-encompassing, whether it intends to or not. Today, we could even say that Speculative Realism has embarked on this journey, and perhaps now we could say that the discourse of Speculative Realism has reached the inevitable point after which a grand theory leaves the hands of its writer or writers and becomes a possession of the collective consciousness of the academy, or (perhaps now) the mass consciousness of the blogosphere—and this is a true pharmakon , a poison and a cure, a blessing and a curse. 7 When we write theory, whether the scope is that of a grand theory or a particular theory, we write in the tension between compilation (making good on the desire to be all encompassing) and selection (being required to decide and discern and to judge what is included in the work and what is deleted or appended or abridged or given over to ellipses). Generally speaking, the work of theory-writing often comes out of a desire to totalize, that is, to develop a theory of everything that is able to apprehend new experiences and ideas while still remaining whole. I grant that this is not a universal desire, and that not everyone who sits down to write a work (or book) of theory does so because of their will-to-totality, but it remains that this drive to totalize does condition a great many writers of theory (especially those who seek to develop grand theories like those mentioned previously). At the beginning of his book of interviews, Between Existentialism and Marxism , Sartre is quoted as saying, after completing the first volume of his Critique of Dialectical Reason : “I no longer feel the need to make long digressions in my books, as if I were forever chasing after my own philosophy. It will now be deposited in little coffins, and I will feel completely emptied and at peace—as I felt after Being and Nothingness . A feeling of emptiness: a writer is fortunate if he can attain such a state. For when one has nothing to say, one can say everything .” 8 This is where our two initial distinctions come to bear on the being-towards-totality as it is expressed in the concrete practice of writing: the first being between parataxis and hypotaxis , and the second being between compilation and selection. Where this second distinction is concerned there is a certain paradox at play given that selection is inescapable, and compilation is unachievable. Selection is inescapable (with the figure of the Compendium in mind) because, even when the imperative to compile is followed to excruciating lengths, selection still has the last word. This is why the Compendium is a figure rather than some material thing that can actually be accomplished or actualized. No matter how far one goes along with the will-to-archive and the will-to-compile, it is only ever a question of minimizing selection and never eliminating it. This leads to the second point, which is that total compilation is unachievable. The closest thing to total compilation that we have before us is the ontological and textual fabric of the world. Even in the case of the world, compilation cannot be enacted in a total fashion because of the need to include both the sphere of the actual and the sphere of the possible or potential. This as another way in which compilation is always-already selection, and further evidence that total compilation is practically impossible. Discursive Figuration and Total Writing Rather than figuration referring to a figure of speech or an image, here the term points to a way in which to think about the work of writing, both the work put into writing, and the work that is the result of writing: the finished yet incomplete final piece. As figures or figurations, the Book and the Compendium are ways of thinking about the work of writing and the human desire for the wholeness, completion, and fulfillment that are made manifest in the completed form of the book (whether a published or printed or saved document put to rest by the author). These two figures bear more strongly upon works that seek to be all-encompassing, and works that strive towards expressions of totality such as the One, the Whole, or the All. Moving on to the topic of the subtitle, and on a more prescriptive note, I would say that there is more hope for theory-writing to be found in parataxis than hypotaxis . Part of the reason for this claim is the poststructuralist critique of hierarchies, and yet another part is the compelling line of thinking called “weak thought” (in theology by John D. Caputo, and in philosophy by Gianni Vattimo, among others). 9 The consequences of these two convictions are such that if one is to strongly assert the truth of a grand theory without leaving the realm of hierarchy-critique and weak thought, then one must write paradoxically with parataxis in mind, and in so doing write weakly and non-hierarchically. This does not mean avoiding a sort of topography or topology when writing theory, rather it means avoiding both subjugation and oppression in thought by pursuing a nonviolent sort of ontology. In order to do this, theory writing does not present itself as an exercise in logical analysis where one mechanically moves from a set of premises (via contingency) to the inevitable conclusion (via necessity). Instead, theory approaches the idea of a Compendium. Given that the figural Compendium places parataxis and compilation above hypotaxis and selection, then the question becomes: is placing one part of a binary term before another not just another way of selecting, or another expression of hypotaxis ? Counter to the urge to resign oneself to the reign of selection, with some qualification one can nonetheless write without deciding whether selection and hypotaxis should be subservient to compilation and parataxis (which is to say that writing-without-decision is somewhere between and beyond possibility and impossibility). This dilemma can be disarmed by stating that theory writing is not about primacy, and not about having-decided-beforehand, both stylistically and also where content is concerned. This is the paradox of writing: always striving along a trajectory ( telos ) towards totality via parataxis and compilation, but always being drawn back to finitude and making selections, and placing one idea before another with hypotaxis in mind. In light of this paradox, the question of the Compendium as a figure for discourse and a figural Book has resonance with Jacques Derrida’s essay on Edmund Jabès’ Book of Questions , found in his Writing and Difference . The Question of the Book “Little by little the book will finish me.” 10 Derrida quotes Jabès, and proceeds to outline the reflexive relationship between the author of the book and the book itself, each of which are subjected to the other through a sort of chiasmus, both ontological and textual (not that the two are entirely separable). The Book, for Derrida like Blanchot in the introductory quotation, “infinitely reflects itself” and “develops as a painful questioning of its own possibility”, and in light of this we can draw an association with the painful tension between the practical reality of selection and the ideal trajectory of compilation. 11 This tension in writing, between the will to total compilation and the necessity of abridgment, is an ontological tension between part and whole just as it is a textual tension between signifier and signified. The ontological tension in writing that Derrida expresses in his essay on Jabès is between everything and nothing – a contradiction which Derrida finds in Jabès’ Book of Questions and also in the divine, in God. When one writes between compilation and selection one writes towards totality, and here we can follow Derrida who states that the lapse in signification, presumably in the signifier-signified discrepancy, is a “ rupture with totality itself” and furthermore that this lapse cannot be rectified through deductive reason or even philosophical discourse. 12 This rupture with totality, found in the troubled relation between signifier and signified, can also tell us a lot about the Book and about writing. Given an understanding of writing as an ontological act that strives towards (but never accomplishes) totality, we can see the written book as the manifested and given body of that striving. Perhaps in other disciplines or even other schools of philosophy there is a cultural climate within which the article is prized above the book, but I am fairly confident, especially when referring to the grand theories of Continental thought, that there is a respect for the book as a uniquely meaningful object capable of apprehending totality. Derrida writes, Between the too warm flesh of the literal event and the cold skin of the concept runs meaning. This is how it enters into the book. Everything enters into, transpires in the book. This is why the book is never finite. It always remains suffering and vigilant. 13 Here the vitality of the literal event is compromised by the deadening weight of the concept, and the figure of the Book assists in this lapse of meaning. The Book is a totalizing object, much like the figure of the Compendium, and yet this totalization lacks its final object of completed totality both because the figural Book is necessarily incomplete, and because the physical book is always-already a product of selection. Instead of achieving its end of being a place where everything takes place, it suffers from the lapse of writing, the discrepancy between event and concept. Derrida continues his exposition on Jabès by bringing to light yet another reflexive relation, a reversal of the relationship between the Book and the world. Derrida writes that, for Jabès, “the book is not in the world, but the world is in the book.” 14 In addition to what was stated before, I take figuration to mean that the concepts employed, such as the Book or the Compendium, are not subject to the supposed rigor of analysis that is so prized by Enlightenment or Capitalist realisms. The figure of the Book and the figure of the Compendium cannot be held accountable to standards imported from scientific method, given an understanding that these standards require a concept to be replicable, consistent, falsifiable, measurable, and so on… This is an important point to make, especially in the present atmosphere within which theory must justify itself under conditions that are not its own. Instead of being held to these standards, figuration serves as a way in which to think about writing that leaves thought open to idealistic speculation, imperfect analogies, and most importantly the ever-present gain and loss that occur in the relationship between thought and being. By extension the figural way of addressing writing indulges in enough generalization to accommodate the excess/lack relationship between the ideal form of the Book or the Compendium, and the manifested and given body of a text (as it is practically completed and closed). Here we speak against the hostile atmosphere which would have theory submit itself to hierarchical rigor, rather than Blanchot’s “enigmatic rigor”, by being explicit about the discursive conditions and epistemic conditions under which theory operates. To write with parataxis in mind is, to a certain degree, to write with weakness as one’s methodology (with weak thought being in opposition to hypotaxis and hierarchy as much as weak thought can be in opposition to anything). Rather than asserting the strength of hierarchical theory, and rather than employing antagonistic argumentation with the goal of refutation different discursive and epistemic conditions for theory writing must be cultivated (and these are by no means new). First the critical and theoretical spirit reveals itself as being concerned with the task of complication—especially the complication and critique of binaries, dichotomies, dualities, polarities, paradoxes, parallaxes, hybridities, and especially antinomies. Second, theory positions itself as a sort of showing or revealing, rather than being ultimately focused on coming to full agreement or disagreement. This is where figuration can help theory-writing, both by placing emphasis on teleologies and trajectories (like parataxis and compilation), and by shifting focus away from pure primacy, power, or absolute origin. Figuration then, assists theory writing by placing the concern of theory outside of the concerns of the hard or soft sciences, and into the realm of thought or the idea. To speak of ‘the’ Compendium or ‘the’ Book, here, is to generalize not regarding the perfect form of the Compendium or Book, but to engage speculatively with an abstract idea which remains singular and yet complicated by multiplicity. The question of the Book that Derrida asks through Jabès is a question of everything and nothing, totality and nonbeing, and this question is a concern for writing and a concern for the figure of the Compendium so defined by the tension between compilation and selection, and parataxis and hypotaxis . On the note of nonbeing, we can look to the final page of Derrida’s first essay on Jabès in Writing and Difference and notice the introduction of his neologism, différance (with an ‘a’). Derrida writes: Life negates itself in literature only so that it may survive better. So that it may be better. It does not negate itself any more than it affirms itself: it differs from itself, defers itself, and writes itself as différance . Books are always books of life (the archetype would be the Book of Life kept by the God of the Jews) or of afterlife (the archetype would be the Books of the Dead kept by the Egyptians). 15 This introduction of différance into the equation of the Book, alongside ontological affirmation and negation, hearkens back to the discussion of the symbolic lapse earlier in his essay. Differing and deferring, the Book is always a Book of Life and a figure for the intersection of the vital (life) and the total in writing. In a way, the writer of the Book may be someone who lives life, and in another way the writer of the book-as-object may be someone who engages in the act of writing, both practically (by inscribing words on paper, or typing script on a computer) and ontologically or symbolically (by investing their existence and inexistence into a work worthy of the figural Book). In addition to the writer as writer, the writer also serves as an editor, and the editorial role alongside the idea of the Compendium shows the editor to be one who collects and compiles, while being restrained by eventual selection and decision. Beyond this the editor of works and texts, in both the Book and the world, is engaged in a process of inscribing notation—of annotating (on) the Compendium. Eternal commentary is a feature of the textual Compendium, just as open-ended totality describes the ontological Compendium. The writer as writer does not simply write texts, but rather engages in a profoundly ontological act of inscribing their existence into the world, and the writer as editor does not merely annotate or alter texts as they are, but rather comments upon the text of the world. In/Conclusion So as we create texts, and as we write and create theory, let us be and remain attentive to the figure of the Compendium and the figure of the Book. These two concurrent metonymies are essential for total writing (grand theories, etc.), and may be forgettable for those concerned with fragmentary or hierarchical writing (which are valid in their own right). From the ontological and symbolic text of the world and phenomenological experience, to concrete texts such as books or mixed media, the figure of the Compendium and the figure of the Book are important for the actualization of the human will to be all-encompassing. The figure of the Compendium teaches writers of theory that the repetition, density, and fragility of parataxis offers a strong sort of weakness which does not become yet another variety of oppressive and hegemonic thought. Rather than write with hypotaxis in mind, subjugating one thought to another via cause and effect or antecedent and consequent, I would hope that theory-writing could guiltlessly indulge in the dialectical and contradictory conjugation of ideas, and take this as a legitimate methodology. Rather than being ashamed of showing resonances or giving way to abridgment or ellipses, it is my own authorial (but not authoritative) conviction that one need not give up on totalizing and constructing grand theories because of the fact that complete totalization is impossible, and one need not give up on totalizing and constructing grand theories because of the worry of violence, for the Book and the Compendium lack their completed object and are ever incomplete trajectories. NOTES * UPDATED 7/19/13: we've updated the HTML version to reflect the (correct) PDF version. Our apologies to the author—eds. 1. I would like extend thanks to Dr. Peter Schwenger of the University of Western Ontario for his comments on this paper and his hospitality as it was presented as a Theory Session at the Centre for Theory and Criticism on October 26th 2012. I would also like to thank Andrew Weiss for conversation and critique. 2. I should clarify my use of the term ‘figure’ at the outset. Given the use of the term by Jean-Francois Lyotard in Discourse, Figure (and also Gilles Deleuze in Francis Bacon ), I should state clearly that my use of the term will not correspond to the term ‘figure’ understood as the representation of an object. Instead, my use of the term ‘figure’ and its variations (‘figural’, ‘figurative’, ‘figuration’) will refer to the illustrative or metaphorical use of the Compendium or the Book as models or ways of thinking about writing and discourse. 3. Cf. Revelations 20:12-15. 4. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory , Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London & New York: Continuum Press, 1997). 5. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic (London & New York: Verso, 1990), ix-x. 6. I have written about this concept of being-towards-totality elsewhere in two pieces of writing: the first is called Notes on the Compendium (an unfinished draft) which addresses some very wide theoretical concerns, being structured as a sort of itinerary or archive, and the second is Dialectics Unbound (Punctum Books, 2013) which outlines a concept of totality without the violence of totalization. While these works are more concerned with ontological totality, here I would like to focus on the idea of the Compendium as a textual totality. 7. Cf. Louis Morelle, “Speculative Realism: After Finitude and Beyond, A vade mecum” in Speculations: Journal of Speculative Realism . Issue 3 (Brooklyn, New York: Punctum Books, 2012), 241-272. 8. Jean-Paul Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism . Trans. John Matthews (London & New York: Verso, 1974), 9. 9. Cf. John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006). 10. Jacques Derrida, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book” in Writing and Difference . Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 65. 11. Ibid, 65. 12. Ibid, 71. 13. Ibid, 75. 14. Ibid, 76. 15. Ibid, 78. (shrink)

B. F. Skinner's claim that "operant behavior is essentially the field of purpose" is systematically explored. It is argued that Charles Taylor's illuminating analysis of the explanatory significance of common-sense goal-ascriptions (1) lends some (fairly restricted) support to Skinner's claim, (2) considerably clarifies the conceptual significance of differences between operant and respondent behavior and conditioning, and (3) undercuts influential assertions (e.g., Taylor's) that research programs for behavioristic psychology share a "mechanistic" orientation. A strategy is suggested for assessing the plausibility of (...) Skinner's broader claims about the adequacy of the operant behaviorist program for the analysis of purposive behavior. (shrink)

The essays presented here by Olkowski and Weiss attempt to situate Merleau-Ponty in the larger context of feminist theory, while impartially evaluating his contributions, both positive and negative, to that theory.

Przedmowa Problematyka związana z zależnościami przyczynowymi, ich modelowaniem i odkrywa¬niem, po długiej nieobecności w filozofii i metodologii nauk, budzi współcześnie duże zainteresowanie. Wiąże się to przede wszystkim z dynamicznym rozwojem, zwłaszcza od lat 1990., technik obli¬czeniowych. Wypracowane w tym czasie sieci bayesowskie uznaje się za matematyczny język przyczynowości. Pozwalają one na daleko idącą auto¬matyzację wnioskowań, co jest także zachętą do podjęcia prób algorytmiza¬cji odkrywania przyczyn. Na potrzeby badań naukowych, które pozwalają na przeprowadzenie eksperymentu z randomizacją, standardowe metody ustalania zależności przyczynowych (...) opracowano na początku XX wieku. Zupełnie inaczej sprawa przedstawia się w przypadku badań nieeksperymentalnych, gdzie podobne rozwiązania pozostają kwestią przyszłości. Zadaniem tej książki jest podanie warunków, które powinny być spełnione przez te rozwiązania, oraz sformułowanie proceduralnego kryterium zależności przy¬czynowych jako szczegółowej realizacji tych warunków. Pociąga ono waż¬kie konsekwencje dla filozofii i metodologii nauk, które ujawnia – podany w Części II – zarys me-todolo¬gii proceduralnej. W literaturze przedmiotu brakuje w miarę wszechstronnego i systema¬tycznego omówie¬nia najnowszych filozoficznych i metodologicznych dys¬kusji na temat przy¬czynowości, co niech będzie wytłumaczeniem, dlaczego w niektórych punktach obecnej książki szczegółowo referuję trudno dos¬tępne teksty źró¬dłowe. Przymiotnik „proceduralny” używam tu w znaczeniu węższym niż Huw Price (w którego pracach właściwszy byłby termin „kryterialny”) dla podkre¬ślenia – zgodnie z łacińskim źródłosłowem procedo – że dla ustalenia przy¬czyny niezbędne jest podjęcie przez uczonych określonych interakcji z ba¬daną rzeczywistością. Zalążki zamysłu prezentowanego w tej książce przedstawiłem podczas warsztatów filozoficznych „Philosophy and Probability” w roku 2002, zor¬ganizowanych przez Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu w Konstancji. Wdzięczny jestem uczestnikom tych warsztatów za uwagi, a przede wszyst¬kim następującym osobom: Luc Bovens, Brandon Fitelson, Alan Hájek, Stephan Hartmann oraz Jon Williamson. Podczas międzynarodowej konferencji „Analytical Pragmatism”, zorgani¬zowanej w Lublinie w roku 2003 przez Wydział Filo¬zofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, odniosłem swoją koncepcję do prac Nancy Cartwright. Szczególnie inspirujący okazał się komentarz Huw Price’a do mojego referatu i przeprowadzona z nim dysku¬sja. Ujęcie koncepcji metodologii proceduralnej na szerszym tle współ-czes¬nego nurtu empirystycznego w filozofii nauki przedstawiłem w roku 2004 podczas konferencji „5th Quadrennial Fellows Conference”, zorgani¬zowanej przez Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz Centrum Filozofii Nauki w Pittsburghu. Szczególnie pomocne w dalszych moich pra¬cach były uwagi Jamesa Bogena, Janet Kourany, Jamesa Lennoxa, Johna Nortona, Thomasa Bonka, Jana Woleńskiego i Johna Worralla, za które wyra¬żam swoją wdzięczność. Korpus książki powstał podczas mojego stażu w Centrum Filozofii Nauki w Pittsburghu, który odbyłem jako stypendysta Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej w roku akademickim 2004-2005. Uczestniczyłem w tym czasie w życiu naukowym Centrum i w pracach badawczych zespołu z Instytutu Filozofii Uniwersytetu Carnegie-Mellon w Pittsburghu kierowanego przez Clarka Glymoura. Na jego ręce składam podziękowanie za wiele po¬mocnych uwag do moich wy¬stąpień oraz tekstów i za dyskusje przede wszystkim z nim samym i z jego najbliższymi współpracownikami: Peterem Spirtesem oraz Richardem Scheinesem, a także pozostałymi członkami tego zes¬połu, doktorantami i uczestnikami seminarium badawczego „Causality in the Social Sciences”. Za wieloletnie wsparcie, wielopłaszczyznowe inspiracje towarzyszące pi¬saniu tej książki, a także liczne pomocne uwagi do jej wcześniejszych wersji dziękuję przede wszystkim Księdzu Profesorowi Andrzejowi Bronkowi oraz Księdzu Profesorowi Józefowi Herbutowi, współprowadzącemu seminarium doktorskie w Katedrze Metodologii Nauk Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubel¬skiego im. Jana Pawła II, jak również pozostałym uczestnikom tego semina¬rium. Dziękuję mojej Żonie, dr Annie Kawalec za wiele wysiłku włożonego w ulepszenie redakcji – językowej i merytorycznej – obecnej książki. Książkę tę można czytać na kilka sposobów. Czytelnikom zainteresowa¬nym przede wszystkim prowadzeniem badań empirycznych polecałbym rozpoczęcie od Rozdziału 2. i kontynuację pozostałych rozdziałów Części I, a następnie Dodatków. Czytelnikom zainteresowanym problemami filozo¬fii i metodologii nauk polecałbym rozpoczęcie lektury książki od Części II i uzupełniającą lekturę Rozdziału 2., a następnie Wprowadzenia i Zakończenia. Czytelnikom mniej zainteresowanym zagadnieniami teoretycznymi pole¬całbym zapoznanie się z fascynującymi dziejami odkrycia przyczyn cholery przez Johna Snowa, które rekonstruuję w Rozdziale 1. W dalszej części nato¬miast polecałbym przejście do Wprowadzenia i Zakończenia, które w mniej specjalistyczny sposób przybliżają proponowane tu rozstrzygnięcia. Tekst książki nie był dotąd publikowany. Wyjątkiem są pewne fragmenty Rozdziału 8. oraz 9., które w zmienionej postaci ukazały się w Rocznikach Filozoficznych (Kawalec 2004). -/- Lublin, luty 2006 r. (shrink)

This theoretical paper elucidates the nature of educational technology and, in the process, sheds light on a number of phenomena in educational systems, from the no-significant-difference phenomenon to the singular lack of replication in studies of educational technologies. Its central thesis is that we are not just users of technologies but coparticipants in them. Our participant roles may range from pressing power switches to designing digital learning systems to performing calculations in our heads. Some technologies may demand our participation only (...) to enact fixed, predesigned orchestrations correctly. Other technologies leave gaps that we can or must fill with novel orchestrations, which we may perform more or less well. Most are a mix of the two, and the mix varies according to context, participant, and use. This participative orchestration is highly distributed: in educational systems, coparticipants include the learner, the teacher, and many others, from textbook authors to LMS programmers, as well as the tools and methods they use and create. From this perspective, all learners and teachers are educational technologists. The technologies of education are seen to be deeply, fundamentally, and irreducibly human, complex, situated and social in their constitution, their form, and their purpose, and as ungeneralizable in their effects as the choice of paintbrush is to the production of great art. (shrink)

In a recent article Mark Ian Thomas Robson argues that there is a clear contradiction between the view that possible worlds are a part of God's nature and the theologically pivotal, but philosophically neglected, claim that God is perfectly beautiful. In this article I show that Robson's argument depends on several key assumptions that he fails to justify and as such that there is reason to doubt the soundness of his argument. I also demonstrate that if Robson's argument were sound (...) then this would be a problem for all classical theists and not just those who hold the possible worlds view. (shrink)

Asserting that humanitarian intervention is a highly ambiguous principle, Pasic and Weiss warn of the dangers of politically driven rescues that often force trade-offs between the pursuit of rescue and political order.

Traditional approaches to character education have been viewed by many educators as an attempt to establish self control within students to habituate them to prescribed behaviour and as nothing more than a ‘bits‐and‐pieces’ approach to moral education. While this is accurate for many character education programmes, integrated multi‐dimensional character education embraces both moral education and character formation. Students learn to identify and process social conventions within the core values of the school and community and have opportunities to learn practical reasoning (...) skills in schools where character education is integrated into all aspects of the schooling process. Reported in this article are several studies, including two large‐scale experimental investigations, that show integrated character education results in an improved school environment, student pro‐social and moral behaviour, and reading and maths test scores. Schools become more caring communities; student discipline referrals drop significantly, particularly in areas related to bullying behaviour; and test scores in moderately achieving schools increase nearly 50%. (shrink)

Of course private-public terminology has a certain first-hand obviousness for us. No one does my experiencing for me; there are features of myself evident to me simply by virtue of the fact that I live through them. These features are not available in quite the same way to others. And your situation is the same. Meanwhile we all have the same sort of access to what we can see and touch and explore scientifically, i.e., the public common world. These remarks (...) must not be taken to imply that a human's privacy is identical with awareness or with immediate feelings; privacy is not exhausted in consciousness. Nevertheless the importance of the private-public distinction à propos actualities is its promise for clearing up or at least clarifying many puzzles involving consciousness: problems about perception, mind-brain connections, and even perhaps immortality. At least the distinction is promising if you begin by taking us to be indeed individual centers of an awareness which discloses some private content but also discloses real other bodily beings. That is, something like Weiss's conception of private and public or inside and outside seems to be essential if one holds that mentality has a firm non-dubious place in the natural world. (shrink)

In this interview with the Austrian journalist Alexia Weiss, I outline how Austrians missed several chances to confront their political guilt. I then clarify how individual and collective guilt are interconnected, and I explain how the argument that our grandfathers and mothers only "did their duty" echoes the defense mechanisms Austrian perpetrators used in the postwar trials. I also show that attempts in Austria to derail the staging of Thomas Bernhard's Heldenplatz play in the eighties parallel today's attempts to (...) dissuade the building of a House of History. In both instances, Austrians aimed to fend off unconscious guilt feelings. In addition, not dealing with guilt led to the survival of Anti-Semitic elements in Austrian society, which today's Far Right in Austria has manipulated for its purposes. Finally, I explain that my living in the United States allowed me to remain a "subject-in-outline." This subjectivity implies that I am identified with Austria, which was necessary to feel political guilt. However, I am not wholly identified with my country of origin, which was essential to confront the complex subject of Austria's failed dealing with guilt. (shrink)

This second volume of Eric Voegelin’s miscellaneous papers contains unpublished writings from the time of his forced emigration from Austria in 1938 until his death in 1985. The volume’s focus is on dialogue and discussion, presenting Voegelin in the role of lecturer, discussant, and respondent. “The Drama of Humanity” presents the Walter Turner Candler Lectures delivered in four parts at Emory University in 1967. This text, a small book in itself, addresses the themes of “The Contemporary Situation,” “Man in the (...) Cosmos,” “The Epiphany of Man,” and “Man in Revolt,” providing the reader with a good introduction to Voegelin’s later work. Another extensive text included in this volume is “Conversations with Eric Voegelin at the Thomas More Institute” in Montreal. These exchanges include lectures and discussions given by Voegelin between 1967 and 1976. A number of other sections offer insight into Voegelin’s intellectual development over a period of forty years. These include the complete “Foreword” to the second edition of _The Political Religions, _which is published here for the first time; “Notes on T. S. Eliot’s _Four Quartets_;” the “Cycle Theory and Disintegrations;” “What Is Political Theory?;” “The Spiritual and Political Future of the Western World;” “Notes on ‘Civilization and Foreign Affairs;’” “Structures of Consciousness;” “The Beyond and Its Parousia;” and the 1983 “Responses at the Panel Discussion of ‘The Beginning of the Beginning.’” Several lengthy excerpts from conference dialogues with other scholars are also included: “The West and the Meaning of Industrial Society,” “Natural Law in Political Theory,” and “Man in Political Institutions.” Volume 33 concludes with Voegelin’s “Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two,” his last public utterance on the course of his life and his life’s work. By choosing dialogue as the focus of this volume, Petropulos and Weiss are able to show not only the extent to which Voegelin engaged in an exchange of ideas but also his abiding concern for the practical and theoretical conditions necessary in order for this exchange to take place. (shrink)

Scholarly correspondence can be as insightful as scholarly work itself, as it often documents the motivating forces of its writers’ intellectual ideas while illuminating their lives more clearly. The more complex the authors’ scholarly works and the more troubled the eras in which they lived, the more substantial, and potentially fascinating, their correspondence. This is especially true of the letters between Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin. The scholars lived in incredibly dramatic times and produced profound, complex works that continue to (...) confound academics. The communication between these two giants of the social sciences, as they sent their thoughts to one another, was crucial to the work of both men. _A Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime: The Correspondence between Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin _demonstrates that Schutz and Voegelin shared a remarkable friendship: they first met as students in Vienna in the 1920s and found themselves great partners in discussion; years later they were pushed out of Europe by Nazi pressure and went to work at separate American universities. For twenty years they wrote each other, developing their respective scientific works in that dialogue. The letters bear witness to their friendship during the years they spent in exile in the United States, and they document the men’s tentative attempts at formulating the theories of “lifeworld” and “gnosis” associated with Schutz and Voegelin today. The entire collection of 238 letters was printed in German in 2004, but this edited volume is the first to present their correspondence in English and offers a selection of the most important letters—those that contributed to the thinkers’ theoretical discussions and served as background to their most significant thoughts. Editors Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss do not analyze Schutz’s and Voegelin’s works in light of the correspondence—rather, they present the collection to create a framework for new interpretations. _A Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime_ takes a unique look at two major social scientists. This volume is a valuable resource in the study of Voegelin’s political philosophy and Alfred Schutz’s contribution to American sociology and marks an important addition to the literature on these remarkable men. Showing how scholarly discourse and the dialogue of everyday life can shed light on one another, the book finally presents this correspondence for an American audience and is not to be missed by scholars of philosophy and sociology. (shrink)

In his essay “The Integration of the Ethic of the Respectful Use of Animals into the Law”, David Favre begins to articulate a new framework for understanding the legal status of nonhuman animals. The present essay supports the broad contours of Favre’s framework, but raises challenges for some of the framework’s elements. The first half questions Favre’s claim that possession of DNA and the capacity for life underlie the need for a more robust conception of animal legal standing. The second (...) half questions Favre’s prior proposal that animals be deemed persons under law and questions his pragmatic suggestion that judges and scholars refrain from specific speculations about the moral status of animals. (shrink)

This is a study of John Dewey's philosophy based on three interrelated themes. I maintain, first, that the best understanding of Deweys work is achieved by a Peircean reading. On that reading Deweys philosophy is partly interpreted through the conceptual framework provided by C. S. Peirce. Second, I argue that a detailed grasp of Dewey's theory of inquiry is essential for a convincing assessment of his philosophical views. Third, I show that Dewey's theory of inquiry creates a common context for (...) different kinds of inquiry. ;Problem-solving is at the core of Dewey's philosophy. A general notion of inquiry does not presuppose that successful methods need to be copied. To understand inquiry as an activity sharing common features one needs to see how problem-solving in one field can be facilitated by problem-solving in other fields. ;I discuss recent debates on Dewey's philosophy based on Rorty's interpretation of his work and argue that because of a failure to emphasise Dewey's methodological approach, some Dewey-scholars who claim to be true to Dewey's word and spirit present implausible objections to the work of philosophers who, like Rorty, interpret Dewey liberally. Although I do not think that Rorty presents a very useful interpretation of Dewey, I do think that the attempt to incorporate Dewey's work into a forceful and spirited philosophical argument is more useful and interesting than a learned discussion about what Dewey's views were exactly at any given point in time. ;The second chapter of my study is devoted to an exploration of some central parts of Charles Peirce's philosophy, especially the role and place of the belief/doubt model in Peirce's thought. The belief/doubt model outlines a framework for inquiry that defines the basic tenets of pragmatism. ;The chapters that follow deal with Dewey's theory of inquiry. I discuss the central parts of this theory arguing that Dewey's presentation of reasoning at the early defining stages of inquiry makes it plausible to understand it as abductive reasoning. Such reasoning is concerned with selecting possible hypotheses. Thus for Dewey the stage in inquiry where hypotheses are selected is the crucial stage. ;Dewey's idea of natural science as a model for inquiry is derived from the view that scientific success in modern times secures natural science a special status. This, according to Dewey, is something the philosophical community has failed to appreciate. Dewey's examination of some concepts and procedures of natural science leads him to criticise many common philosophical assumptions, such as the idea that science must be based on a strict distinction between objective facts and subjective factors. Knowledge for Dewey should be characterised in terms of a certain relationship between an agent and his environment rather than in terms of true statements of objective facts. (shrink)

Hobbes’s contemporaries and some modern commentators draw attention to the distinctively paradoxical character of the philosopher’s writing. The chapter examines the role of paradox in Hobbes’s arguments and argues that the use of paradox constituted one of Hobbes’s most distinctive writing strategies. The chapter considers Hobbes’s discussion of paradox in its contemporaneous context, suggesting that Hobbes deliberately deployed paradox to exploit a connection between admiratio, or wonder, and curiosity. It is further suggested that Hobbes did so to motivate a particular (...) form of transformative readerly engagement characteristic of his general approach. (shrink)