Zusammenfassung In dankbarer Erinnerung an Carsten Colpes Forschungen untersucht der Artikel Tradition und Translation an den als „heidnische Bibel“ oder „Weisheit Zoroasters“ sowie als kosmisch-mystisches Kritikpotential in Christentum und Islam bedeutsam gewordenen Chaldäischen Orakeln. Ich kann wechselseitige Anregungen zwischen den Chaldäischen Orakeln und der mittelplatonischen Religionsphilosophie des Numenios von Apameia um 180 n. Chr. zeigen: durch Möglichkeiten iranischen und griechischen Verständnisses von Dualismus sowie einerseits Orientalismus bei Numenios und andererseits Affinität zu Platon und Homer beim Theurgen Julian. Die Fragmente der (...) Chaldäischen Orakel sind keine Originalzeugnisse aus Chaldäa oder des Zoroastrismus – aber Abwandlungen. Es gab die mesopotamische Priesterwissenschaft mit Divination um Ištar, die von zoroastrischen Priestern mit der gleichfalls Himmel und Erde verbindenden Wassergöttin Anâhitâ und im Römerreich mit Hekate als Zaubergöttin und beseelendem Prinzip identifiziert wurde. (shrink)

The law in England allows that both parents and competent minors concurrently have the right to consent to medical treatment of the minor. This means that while competent minors may consent to treatment their refusal of consent does not act as an effective veto of treatment and treatment remains lawful if given with parental consent. This approach has been heavily criticized as inconsistent with the House of Lords decision in the Gillick case and damned as ‘palpable nonsense’. In this article, (...) I examine these criticisms and conclude that, far from being illogical, it is entirely consistent with the essential asymmetry between consent to treatment and refusal of treatment. I examine the two metaphors of keyholders and flak jackets used to explain this approach and I suggest that both have value but only when used in combination. I also explain why, contrary to the criticism, it is consistent with Gillick. (shrink)

Dr. theol. Ulrich H.J. Körtner ist Professor für Systematische Theologie an der Evangelisch-Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Wien.

Dr. theol. Dr. phil. Detlef Schwartz, Jahrgang 1954, Pfarrer i. R. und langjähriger nebenamtlicher Universitätsdozent, mit Stationen in Deutschland und den USA sowie Lateinamerika, zieht eine vorläufige Bilanz seiner bisherigen Arbeit im Auslandsdienst der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland. Er ordnet diese ein in Erfahrungen in einem Pfarramt der United Church of Christ, USA, und seinen Beobachtungen in der Millionenmetropole Los Angeles. Die Konsequenz eines verstärkten Dialogs der Religionen, besonders mit dem Islam, koppelt er zurück an die Frage nach der (...) Notwendigkeit eines Paradigmenwechsels im Religionsunterricht hin zu einem den Dialog fördernden Kulturunterrichts."-- Back cover. (shrink)

Dalam tradisi Kristiani gambaran tentang surga dan, terutama, neraka berlimpah. Dengan melukiskan keindahan surga dan, lebih lagi, kengerian api penyucian dan neraka para pengkhotbah pernah berusaha untuk mengarahkan umat ke hidup yang baik. Tetapi sekarang “hal-hal akhir” jarang dibicarakan dalam khotbah. Seakan-akan kurang njamani mengajukan pertanyaan tentang apa yang terjadi sesudah kematian. Padahal justru berhadapan dengan sikap acuh tak-acuh sebagian masyarakat tersekularisasi dengan ejekan dari sudut ateisme baru, baik orang beriman maupun mereka yang mencari justru mengajukan pertanyaan seperti: Apakah ada (...) hidup sesudah kematian? Apakah hakikat surga? Apakah betul Allah akan menyiksa para pendosa dalam neraka? Apakah barangkali neraka kosong? Dan apakah maksud serta dasar ajaran tentang api penyucian yang tidak dipercayai oleh Gereja-gereja Ortodoks dan Protestan? Kalau kita mencari informasi mendalam yang memungkinkan menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan itu, apabila kita tahu latar belakang religius dan budaya ajaran tentang “hal-hal akhir” itu serta apa yang dipikirkan oleh para teolog Kristiani paling mutakhir, kita akan merasa sangat terbantu oleh buku yang ditulis oleh Dr. Theol. Johanna Rahner, guru besar pada Fakultas Teologi Katolik Universitas Kassel, ini. Sayang, buku ini hanya tersedia dalam bahasa Jerman................................ Buku ini penting pada zaman di mana bagian hakiki setiap agama—apa yang akan terjadi dalam dan sesudah kematian—jarang diangkat. Kekuatan Johanna Rahner adalah bahwa ia membahas tema itu dari pelbagai sudut: dari sudut mitos-mitos dan agama-agama kuno, dari sudut Perjanjian Lama dan Perjanjian Baru, dari sudut teologi serta pelbagai “ajaran” yang muncul selama 2000 tahun Gereja dan Kristianitas, sampai dengan teologi paling muthakhir yang membuka perspektif yang sangat baru dibandingkan dengan pengertian tradisional. Johanna Rahner sendiri merangkum maskud bukunya: “Tantangan menentukan eskatologi adalah sandungan kematian yang berkaitan dengan pertanyaan yang tak terbungkamkan tentang keadilan serta harapan tak terpuaskan agar kerinduan yang mengharapkan agar pada akhirnya semuanya menjadi baik jadi terpenuhi.” Yang tidak dibicarakan dalam buku ini adalah pertanyaan-pertanyaan tentang universalitas atau keterbatasan penyelamatan Ilahi. Juga tidak dibicarakan adalah pertanyaan yang kelihatannya merupakan dobrakan baru, yang beberapa tahun lalu muncul dalam suatu konferensi teologis di Vatikan, yaitu apakah anak kecil, anak yang mati sebelum dilahirkan, bisa masuk surga atau harus dianggap masuk ke dalam suatu limbus. Buku ini cocok bagi para teolog serta bagi setiap warga Kristianitas yang ingin memahami secara mendalam ajaran tradisional dan muthakir Gereja Katolik tentang ke mana kita akan pergi dalam kematian. (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Program Pascasarjana, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

Herausgegeben von Walter Senner OP (Federf hrender Herausgeber), Kaspar Elm, Thomas Eggensperger OP, Isnard W. Frank OP, Ulrich Horst OP Mit neuen Methoden und Fragestellungen ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten die Erforschung der Geschichte der Bettelorden vorangetrieben und ihre ber die engere Ordens- und Kirchengeschichte hinausgehende Bedeutung f r Politik-, Wirtschafts- und Sozial-, f r Bildungs- und Geistesgeschichte herausgearbeitet worden. Zur Intensivierung und Koordinierung der sie ber hrenden Forschungen gibt die deutsche Dominikanerprovinz Teutonia die Reihe "Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte (...) des Dominikanerordens. Neue Folge" heraus. Auch in der Neuen Folge wird die Geschichte der Dominikaner im deutschen Sprachraum den Schwerpunkt bilden. Es werden auch wichtige Untersuchungen zur Ordensverfassung und Fr mmigkeit, zur Philosophie und Theologie aufgenommen, die f r den Dominikanerorden im Untersuchungsraum Verbindlichkeit oder Bedeutsamkeit hatten, selbst wenn die untersuchte Thematik ihrer Entstehung nach nicht speziell mit den deutschen Dominikanern und Dominikanerinnen zu tun hatte. Der Begriff Dominikanerorden wird in einem weiten Sinn verstanden. Alle Gemeinschaften, die nach rechtlicher Verfassung oder geistlicher Ausrichtung mit den Dominikanern zu tun hatten, werden ihm subsumiert: der Predigerorden, die dominikanischen Frauenkl ster und -gemeinschaften, die losen Verb nde der Dritten Orden sowie die verschiedenen Bruderschaften. Dem Zeitraum nach ist Forschungsgegenstand die Geschichte des Dominikanerordens von den Anf ngen bis in die unmittelbare Vergangenheit. Dabei ist auch gedacht an die Aufarbeitung von Entstehen und Geschichte der verschiedenen dominikanischen Frauengemeinschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts, die mit ihren religi sen und sozialen Aktivit ten in der sich rasch wandelnden Gesellschaft eine bedeutende, bisher meist untersch tzte Rolle spielten. Zum Lehrstuhl von P. Prof. Walter Senner OP: http: //philo.pust.op.org/prof/senner/index.html Zur Seite von Dr. theol. Thomas Eggensperger OP, M.A. http: //www.institut-chenu.eu. (shrink)

Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. The notion of othering spread from feminist theory and post-colonial studies to other areas of the humanities and social sciences, but is originally rooted in Hegel’s dialectic of identification and distantiation in the encounter of the self with some other in his “Master-Slave dialectic”. In this paper, after reviewing the philosophical (...) and psychological background of othering, I distinguish two kinds of othering, “crude” and “sophisticated”, that differ in the logical form of their underlying arguments. The essential difference is that the former is merely self-other distantiating, while the latter – as in Hegel’s dialectic – partially depends on self-other identification. While crude othering is closer to the paradigmatic notion of othering, sophisticated othering is closer to Hegel’s, but so is quasi-othering, which is nearly identical in form to sophisticated othering, but which misses the defining feature of othering – attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness. Because Hegel’s dialectic applies to any encounter of an interpreting self with some other, sophisticated or quasi-othering is at least potentially a very common occurrence in the interpretation of others, especially of those who do not belong to the in-group. However, although othering is usually undesirable, the Hegelian varieties can provide a “mirror”, which can be used as a tool to improve understanding of both the other and the interpreting self, and the malignant aspects of othering can be avoided through charity. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism asks (...) whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it. The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.” Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world. (shrink)

Rājadhamma is a list of ten royal virtues or duties that occurs in the jātaka tales and that has been influential in Southeast Asian Buddhist political thought. Like pre-modern political thought in Europe—that is, thought before the Sattelzeit—Buddhist political thought lacks a concept of the “state” and is concerned with kings and similar rulers. Here I propose a modernized interpretation of rājadhamma as virtues/duties of the state.

Davidson was right when he said that the idea of truth as a goal or norm makes no sense — truth is not something we can aim for, and whenever we say that we aim for truth, what we are really aiming for is some kind of epistemic justification. Nevertheless, the notion of a concern for or with truth can be understood in (at least) three ways that do make sense: (1) it can refer to a philosophical concern with the (...) nature of truth, theories of truth, and related philosophical problems; (2) it can refer to a concern (or aim) for ‘strong’ justification; and (3) it can refer to an attitude or ideal of truth(fulness). Concern for epistemic justification can be found in the Chinese and Indian philosophical traditions as well, and is probably universal among philosophical and scientific traditions. Assessing the third sense of concern for truth is more complicated, but considering that a lack of desire for the truth of one’s theories and ideas seems anathema to science and philosophy, it seems likely that something like this concern is universal among philosophical and scientific traditions as well. Concern with truth in the most literal sense — that is, a philosophical concern with truth in its basic sense as captured in Tarski’s schema — appears to be rare, however, and may even be unique to the Western tradition. (shrink)

Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a (...) cornerstone of both Davidson’s and Putnam’s later (but not earlier) coherentism. However, this thesis introduces a form of weak foundationalism into their theories, and consequently, those are strictly speaking not pure coherence theories, but hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism. (shrink)

In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can (...) be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of “deviant” implications. (shrink)

The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of /truth/, the concept of TRUTH, and the word *truth*. The property of /truth/ is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of /truth/; and *truth*· is the word we (...) use to express that understanding. Almost all human beings over the age of 2 have the concept of TRUTH, and therefore, the question whether some tradition has the concept of TRUTH is moot, but that doesn't imply that every language has a (single) word for *truth*. Furthermore, recognizing *truth* is complicated by the conceptual neighbors of TRUTH. What distinguishes *truth* from its neighbors is disquotationality. Theories of /truth/ similarly need to be distinguished from theories about adjacent notions. If a theory is more plausibly interpreted as a theory of /justification/, then it is not a theory of /truth/. (shrink)

Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a (...) composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the definitional problems of altered states of consciousness and their potential relevance in phenomenological investigation. We suggest that visionary states or visionary phantasy working induced by psychedelics, as extraordinary types of altered states, are appropriate subjects for phenomenological analysis. Naturally, visionary states are not quite ordinary workings of the human mind, however certain cognitive psychological and evolutionary epistemological investigations show that they can give new insights into the nature of consciousness. Furthermore, we suggest that contemporary (...) inquiries concerning altered states in consciousness studies give an opportunity to complete the contemporary phenomenological investigations of phantasy with the notion of visionary phantasy. Here we propose that the similarities and differences between Dieter Lohmar’s weak phantasy and Benny Shanon’s concept of vision are precisely discernible, and, consequently, it may be possible that weak phantasy and visionary phantasy are situated on the two outermost poles of the colorful spectrum of phantasy activity. (shrink)

This is my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015) paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong 王充 as an alethic pluralist.

The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either (...) a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion. (shrink)

(First paragraphs.) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, including that of past, present, and future, and that of the passing of time. This experience and awareness of time raises a number of puzzling questions. How do we experience time? What exactly do we experience when we experience time? Do we actually experience time? Or do we infer time from something in, or some aspect of our experience? And so forth. These and many (...) related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open—that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers. (shrink)

Any social and political arrangement depends on acceptance. If a substantial part of a people does not accept the authority of its rulers, then those can only remain in power by means of force, and even that use of force needs to be accepted to be effective. Gramsci called this acceptance of the socio-political status quo “hegemony.” Every stable state relies primarily on hegemony as a source of control. Hegemony works through the dissemination of values and beliefs that create acceptance (...) and that serve the interests of the state and/or the ruling elite (the “hegemones”). Hegemony is most efficient if it remains invisible. A key hegemonic belief is the idea that there is no alternative to the current socio-political status quo or that the way things are is “natural.” The current hegemony – that is, the set of values and beliefs that bolster the current socio-political status quo – is a hegemony of psychopathy: it promotes “cultural psychopathy” and destroys empathy and compassion, thus threatening everything that makes us human. The hegemony of psychopathy is responsible for massive human suffering. It must be fought and replaced with a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs that promote compassion and care. Fighting hegemony requires fighting the “pillars” that support it. Most important among these are the mass media and culture industry, and mainstream economics. The former is responsible for a continuous stream of hegemonic propaganda; the latter – among others – for providing a pseudo-scientific justification for the false belief that there is no alternative. The book concludes with some considerations on tactics and strategy in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy, but does not – and cannot – offer any concrete advice. (shrink)

As a child we all admired the sparkling desert crystal sand grains of the sandglass, and while they slowly, silently rolled down, occasionally, we started dreaming, after having turned it very carefully, watching the grains taking different directions, as the sand was suddenly starting to dance! While the sunlight reflected on the even flow of crystal grains, imagination soared far, into the actual deserts, desert ships, camels, into the fantasy worlds… It was good to dream, freely, realistically, or with a (...) free imagination. As in the sandglass time moments are overlapping, never simply a passing of time as bidirectional succession of points. The duration of the present suggests a radical experience of the hic et Nunc. The sandglass gives us also about five minutes to figure out the right order of our experience. It is both short as an aphorism, both long enough to captures some real perfection and harmony in the world. In our dialogue we tried to crystallize a few central ethical notions, such as an ethical evolution in time, captured by the allegory of the sandglass, which opens not only the imagination but also challenges the decision-maker: “Now quick, take the right decision, I give you five minutes!”. (shrink)

The culture-economy dialectic (CED) – the opposition of the concepts and phenomena of culture and economy – is one of the most important ideas in the modern history of ideas. Both disciplinary boundaries and much theoretical thought in social science are strongly influenced or even determined by the CED. For that reason, a thorough analysis and evaluation of the CED is needed to improve understanding of the history of ideas in social science and the currently fashionable research on the cultural (...) influences on economic differences between countries and regions. This thesis is an attempt to do just that. The concepts of “culture” and “economy” (and related concepts) and the (assumed) relations therebetween are compared and analyzed. Empirical results from earlier studies are summarized and some new test are presented. These new tests are partly based on a measurement of Dutch regional culture. However, most theories of the CED are (nearly) impossible to verify (empirically). There appears to be some influence of wealth on specific cultural phenomena (such as individualism and post-materialism), but the often assumed influence of culture on entrepreneurship and economic growth remains unconfirmed. Moreover, from an analysis of the theories themselves, it appears that most of these cannot be falsified and are, therefore, hardly 'scientific'. Many of the theories of the CED and, in fact, many theories of social science in general are of a conceptual rather than a causal nature. These theories cannot be falsified (or verified) by empirical means alone, but must be studied by means of conceptual analysis. In the final conclusions, this thesis, therefore, argues for conceptual analysis in – and a more anarchist approach to – social science. (shrink)

This essay describes the author's studies with bacteria in post‐war Hungary; the difficulties encountered, with funding, collaboration and publication; and how the Szeged Institute consolidated itseif as the one outstanding scientific Institute in Eastern Europe, with the author at the helm.

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 2 Seiten: 532-580.

The gravity-related model of spontaneous wave function collapse, a longtime hypothesis, damps the massive Schrödinger Cat states in quantum theory. We extend the hypothesis and assume that spontaneous wave function collapses are responsible for the emergence of Newton interaction. Superfluid helium would then show significant and testable gravitational anomalies.

Buddhist Ethics. The Path to Nirvana. Hammalawa Saddhatissa. Wisdom Books, London 1987. £6.95/$12.95.

This book extends the contemporary concept of the minimal self by introducing the affective core self. The overall aim is to integrate certain psychoanalytical ideas into the phenomenological investigation of passivity and reformulate the idea of the phenomenological unconscious. This volume contributes to the multidimensional analysis of the self by positioning the affective core self between the layers of the more minimal and the less minimal self. It underscores the importance of the unconscious in the constitution of the affective core (...) self by providing the comparative analysis of the phenomenological and the psychoanalytical unconscious. Furthermore, comparisons are drawn between Freud’s conception of the afterwardsness of trauma and the phenomenological notion of retroactive sense-constitution. The book concludes that retroactive sense-making is a double-sided phenomenon and differentiates between implicit-bodily and conscious-narrative retroactive sense-constitution. In order to bolster the idea of implicit-bodily sense-constitution the volume also examines and utilizes contemporary insights on the nature of body memory. The conclusion claims that the affective core self is constituted in time by means of the underlying processes of the two-sided retroactive sense-constitution. This text appeals to students and researchers working in phenomenology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer an overview of the main positions in ecological ethics as a special field of applied ethics. All approaches in this field endeavour to extend the area of ethics to the non-human world; they have built their systems using different theoretical constructions concerning the meaning of nature. One can enumerate the following main approaches of contemporary ethical views in human ecology: holistic, cosmocentric, biocentric, anthropocentric, pathocentric, and teleological ethics. The paper offers a consciously (...) eclectic approach between these special points of view. (shrink)