Sadness is generally seen as a negative emotion, a response to distressing and adverse situations. In an aesthetic context, however, sadness is often associated with some degree of pleasure, as suggested by the ubiquity and popularity, throughout history, of music, plays, films and paintings with a sad content. Here, we focus on the fact that music regarded as sad is often experienced as pleasurable. Compared to other art forms, music has an exceptional ability to evoke a wide-range of feelings and (...) is especially beguiling when it deals with grief and sorrow. Why is it, then, that while human survival depends on preventing painful experiences, mental pain often turns out to be explicitly sought through music? In this article we consider why and how sad music can become pleasurable. We offer a framework to account for how listening to sad music can lead to positive feelings, contending that this effect hinges on correcting an ongoing homeostatic imbalance. Sadness evoked by music is found pleasurable (1) when it is perceived as non-threatening; (2) when it is aesthetically pleasing; and (3) when it produces psychological benefits such as mood regulation, and empathic feelings, caused, for example, by recollection of and reflection on past events. We also review neuroimaging studies related to music and emotion and focus on those that deal with sadness. Further exploration of the neural mechanisms through which stimuli that usually produce sadness can induce a positive affective state could help the development of effective therapies for disorders such as depression, in which the ability to experience pleasure is attenuated. (shrink)

Scientists are rapidly mapping the chemical and physical pathways that constitute biological systems, making the complexity of processes such as inheritance, development, evolution, and even the origin of life increasingly tractable. Through genetics and neuroscience, biological understanding is now being extended deeply into the human sciences and has begun to transform our understanding of behavior, mind, culture, and values. The idea of a science-driven unity of knowledge has reemerged in several forms in both reductionist and nonreductionist frameworks. This volume examines (...) some of the extraordinary empirical discoveries that have caused a revival of this idea and presents theories from thinkers in a variety of disciplines, including E. O. Wilson, Eric Kandel, and Elaine Scarry. (shrink)

Resumo: É inegável que os atomistas se interessaram pela complexidade dos sentidos (αἰσθήσεις) e buscaram elucidar o funcionamento da percepção visual (ὁρατικὸς), o que inclui explicar tanto a natureza dos “corpos sensíveis” (αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων) como a anatomia do órgão da visão, o olho (ὀφθαλμός). O presente trabalho, portanto, abordará a teoria da “percepção visual” (ὁρατικός) elaborada por Demócrito, a qual tem como fundamento teórico sua teoria atômica, pois como testemunha Aristóteles: “todas as coisas tem origem na combinação e no entrelaçamento (...) [das grandezas primeiras]” (ἀλλὰ τῆι τούτων συμπλοκῆι καὶ περιπαλάξει πάντα γεννᾶσθαι [τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθη], ARISTOT. De cael., III 4, 303a 4 [DK 67 A15]), que engloba, desde a natureza das “sucessivas emanações” (συνεχῶς ἀπορρέοντα) dos compostos (σύνθετον), a seu modo de afecção nos “órgãos dos sentidos” (ὑποκειμένας αἰσθήσεις). Tratar-se-á, portanto, de como se dá a percepção visual e como Demócrito compreende e descreve as funções do órgão da visão dentro deste processo de percepção. (shrink)

Esboça-se, a partir da compreensão dos parágrafos 32 e 51 do Livro X de Diógenes Laércio: Vida e doutrinas dos filósofos ilustres, uma teoria da percepção sensível e da imagem no pensamento de Epicuro. Contudo, buscando demonstrar o processo epistêmico das sensações (αἰσθήσεις), iniciado nas “projeções imagéticas” (φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς), ou seja, no desprendimento das superfícies dos corpos compostos mediante o movimento (κίνεσις) constante dos átomos, Epicuro, despretensiosamente, fundamenta a natureza do “sonho” (ὄναρ) como uma derivação das imagens (εἴδωλα) dos entes (...) corpóreos que afetam a alma “durante o sono” (καθ’ ὕπνους) e, por isso, são os sonhos verdadeiros: pois “move [a mente], e, o que não é [μὴ ὄν] não a move”. Neste sentido, rompe-se com uma larga tradição em que os sonhos são manifestações divinas, como expressa a Sentença Vaticana 24, logo, não carecem de interpretações, mas são explicados como “representações” (φαντάσματα) dos sensíveis advindas durante o sono que se formam na alma através das antecipações guardadas no entendimento, ou seja, são imagens representativas do mundo fenomênico, logo, só há sonho daquilo que se percebe. (shrink)

Statistical Default Logic (SDL) is an expansion of classical (i.e., Reiter) default logic that allows us to model common inference patterns found in standard inferential statistics, e.g., hypothesis testing and the estimation of a population‘s mean, variance and proportions. This paper presents an embedding of an important subset of SDL theories, called literal statistical default theories, into stable model semantics. The embedding is designed to compute the signature set of literals that uniquely distinguishes each extension on a statistical default theory (...) at a pre-assigned error-bound probability. (shrink)

O presente livro é um projeto corajoso e desafiador, mas um projeto já bem sucedido, pois não é sempre que em nosso país um livro acadêmico deste tipo chegue a uma segunda edição. É corajoso por convidar o leitor para dialogar com os autores e com duas escolas importantes da filosofia e da psicologia que são em geral mal compreendidas. É desafiador tanto para os autores quanto para seus leitores, pois o behaviorismo radical de Skinner (ou seu comportamentalismo, como os (...) autores preferem) e o pragmatismo americano têm sido alvos de críticas que desconhecem seus fundamentos. Aproximar as ideias de Skinner, atualizando-as, daquelas dos pragmatistas, principalmente Dewey, Mead e, mais recentemente, Rorty, presta um inestimável serviço para a filosofia e para a psicologia. O diálogo que este livro propõe aborda temas que parecem extrapolar o domínio do tipo de psicologia experimental cujos fundamentos Skinner lançou e explorou em sua longa carreira. Mas esses temas são também objeto das reflexões de Skinner, sendo que seu texto em que isso é mais flagrante é o livro Beyond Freedom and Dignity (traduzido no Brasil com o título de O mito da liberdade). Os temas relativos à organização da sociedade, da convivência humana em larga escala, os temas éticos e políticos, não estão fora do escopo das considerações de Skinner e dos pragmatistas sobre o comportamento e a ação humana em geral. E este livro nos convida a explorar também este rico universo de conceitos e questões. Ao aceitar o convite dos autores para este diálogo, o leitor vai lidar com ideias das quais a filosofia tem se ocupado desde sempre (e Aristoteles é lembrado pelos autores mais de uma vez), mas que têm sido tratados com muita timidez pela psicologia, temas como a identidade pessoal e a liberdade. Mas para entendermos bem o behaviorismo radical, devemos refletir também sobre esses assuntos. -/- Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra UFSC/UnB/CNPq. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce the debate on some relevant philosophical problems raised by Damasio‟s works. I will start with some critiques against Damasio‟s approach, such as his falling back into cartesianism or into some form of mentalism, his failing to consider the results of psychiatry and neurodynamics, the «mereological fallacy» of his representationalism. I will discuss other issues such as the interpretation of emotional processes, the problem of separation between feelings and emotions, the marginal (...) role of the sensory-motor system in his „sensory-centric‟ theory of emotions. Then I will focus on the problem of consciousness, the different forms of emergency of the self and the role played by emotions in the constitution of mental representations. I will finally analyze some philosophical aspects of the critical debate on Damasio‟s approach and I will briefly hint at the ethical implications raised by the debate. (shrink)

A concepção espinosista das relações entre o corpo e a mente é frequentemente apresentada como um modelo e uma referência na biologia e na neurobiologia contemporâneas, como testemunham as obras de Jean-Pierre Changeux, de Antonio Damasio ou de Henri Atlan. Apesar de suas profundas diferenças, esses pesquisadores expõem de maneira análoga três teses que fazem de Espinosa um precursor: o monismo psicofísico, a dualidade de expressão da unidade corpo/mente e a ausência de interação e de causalidade recíproca. Esse artigo (...) se interroga sobre as razões pelas quais Espinosa é convocado por esses pesquisadores para dar apoio às suas teorias e para abordar os diferentes usos da sua concepção das relações corpo/mente. Trata-se, portanto, de examinar a maneira pela qual eles apreendem sucessivamente essas três teses e de mensurar a pertinência de suas abordagens. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar, à luz da teoria das emoções de António Damásio, em que sentido “o erro de Descartes” traduz um equívoco do racionalismo ético na medida em que despreza o papel do corpo, da matéria e das paixões para a aquisição e o florescer de uma vida virtuosa no campo da filosofia moral ou mesmo para um conhecimento indubitável no campo epistemológico.

O estudo da natureza da mente ocupa um lugar de destaque na agenda das investigações da Filosofia da Mente, porque sua abordagem parece fornecer uma explicaçáo da forma pela qual os humanos têm acesso aos dados da realidade. Pretendemos problematizar a teoria cartesiana de natureza da mente a partir de sua concepçáo de idéias inatas produzida a partir de um instrumental matemático, que segundo Descartes, nasce com o sujeito. Para tanto, faremos uma breve explanaçáo do método cartesiano, assim como de (...) sua concepçáo de sujeito, para chegar, enfim, à análise do que Descartes entende como idéia. Após o que uma breve análise da noçáo de idéias inatas será por nós realizada. Indicaremos entáo, como o pensamento cartesiano dá margem para o questionamento de sua distinçáo mente/corpo, esta que o neurocientista Damásio náo aceita, assim como náo aceita a prioridade da razáo sobre o sentimento. A natureza da mente náo é metafísica como o disse Descartes, para Damásio ela é biológica. (shrink)

Por acreditarmos que a dupla constituição da espécie humana não pode mais ser negligenciada pela fetichização de um de seus aspectos, pretendemos realizar um esforço inicial de aproximação entre as ideias produzidas pela psicanálise e pelas neurociências. Como objeto de investigação teórica, selecionamos os conceitos de Eu em Freud e de Self em Damásio para um estudo comparativo, em função das ressonâncias que apresentam, particularmente no que se refere ao lugar do corpo na sua constituição. Estamos certas de que as (...) ressonâncias e as dissonâncias encontradas podem servir de inspiração para o enriquecimento teórico de ambos os campos de pesquisa, guardadas as suas especificidades epistemológicas. Because we believe that dual constitution of the human species can no longer be neglected by the fetishization of one of its aspects, we plan to achieve an initial effort for rapprochement between the ideas produced by psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. As object of theoretical research, we selected the concept of Ego in Freud's work and of Self in Damasio's theory for a comparative study, according to the resonances that they have, particularly with regard to the place of the body in its constitution. We are certain that the echoes and the discrepancies found may serve as inspiration for the enrichment of both theoretical research fields, saved their specificities epistemological. (shrink)

The feeling of being alive still constitutes a major blind spot of contemporary affective sciences research. The mainstream view accepts it as an ‘umbrella notion’ comprising different states, such as M. Ratcliffe’s «feelings of being», T. Fuchs’s «feeling of being alive», E.M. Engelen’s «Gefühl des Lebendigseins», etc. In contrast, I argue for an account of the feeling of being alive as a unique feeling that can be described in several ways. Empirical support for this view comes mainly from Carvalho and (...) Damasio’s hypothesis of the distinctiveness of the interoceptive system as the physiological underpinning of this feeling. This account is also in line with many other approaches recognizing the role of interoception proper in mind and subjectivity grounding, collected by Tsakiris and De Presteer. Over recent decades, Damasio’s organic descriptions have been widely acknowledged as neurophysiological counterparts of philosophical/psychological concepts. However, in my view they have been often misinterpreted, especially due to the mainstream Ratcliffian interpretation mediating his ideas amongst philosophers. Throughout the paper, a critical inquiry into Damasio’s conceptualization is provided, by means of conceptual analysis and an overall taxonomy of the several affective states he has proposed over the past few decades. Ultimately, a critical discussion of his own account of the feeling of being alive is offered from a philosophical viewpoint. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos discutir a noção de construção da mente consciente a partir da perspectiva de Antonio Damásio. Para isso, centraremos nossa análise em Self comes to Mind. Em um primeiro momento é necessário delimitarmos o conceito de consciência na visão de Damásio, visando, com isso, a evitarmos equivocidades, na medida em que há várias definições de consciência. Acreditamos que, para uma melhor compreensão acerca do surgimento da mente consciente, é necessário levarmos em consideração os processos evolutivos aos quais o (...) homem está sujeito. A consciência é, pois, fruto de um desenvolvimento evolutivo já bem estabelecido pela ciência. Compreender o desenvolvimento evolutivo do self se torna tarefa de suma importância, na medida em que Damásio estrutura sua compreensão de mente consciente a partir do papel desempenhado pelo self na tarefa de agregar conteúdos mentais. Para Damásio, a origem da mente está associada ao momento em que um processo do self é adicionado a um processo mental básico. Quando não ocorre um self na mente, esta mente não é propriamente consciente, o que significa dizer que é o self que garante consciência a uma mente. Isso quer dizer que precisaremos discutir de forma clara e distinta o conceito de self e seus estágios, para que finalmente possamos entender os passos delimitados por Damásio para discutir a construção da mente consciente. (shrink)

O Sentimento de Si, de António Damásio, tem como objectivo esclarecer não só o problema da construção da consciência mas também, e sobretudo, o problema da consciência da consciência, ou seja, da autoconsciência, do si. Para alcançar este desiderato Damásio constrói uma maioria de argumentos de base empírica e uns poucos de base lógico-filosófica, os quais o autor do artigo crê serem decisivos para a argumentação aí desenvolvida. O artigo pretende estabelecer, por um lado, o percurso dos principais argumentos lógico (...) filosóficos de Damásio relativamente à emergência do si e, por outro, apresentar aquilo que julga serem as dificuldades desse percurso. Essas dificuldades prendem-se, sobretudo, com o erro do mentalismo, na medida em que se ignora tudo o que foi dito sobre o mentalismo pelo segundo Witt-genstein. Em alternativa ao mentalismo (quase) cartesiano de Damásio, o autor do artigo defende que a compreensão do si poderá ser melhor apreendida através do paradigma autopoiético de Humberto Maturana e Francisco Varela. /// The Feeling of What Happens (O Sentimento de Si) of António Damásio aims at illuminating not only the making of consciousness but also, and above all, the problem of the consciousness of consciousness, i. e., of self-consciousness or the self. In order to achieve this goal, Damásio builds up a majority of arguments with an empirical base and a few more with a logico-philosophical basis, that the author of the article believes to be decisive for the argument presented. The article aims at establishing, on the one hand, the way followed by the main logico-philosophical arguments of Damásio related to the emerging of the self and, on the other, at presenting what the author believes to be the main difficulty inherent to this way of proceeding. These difficulties have mainly to do with the error of mentalism as much as it seems to ignore what has been said on mentalism by the second Wittgenstein. In alternative to the (almost) cartesian mentalism of Damásio, the author of the article defends that the understanding of the self can better be captured by means of the autopoietic paradigm of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind is intimately connected with the philosophy of action. Therefore, concepts like free will, motivation, emotions (especially positive emotions), and also the ethical issues related to these concepts are of abiding interest. However, the concepts of consciousness and free will are usually discussed solely in linguistic, ideational and cognitive (i.e. "left brain") terms. Admittedly, consciousness requires language and the left-brain, but the aphasic right brain is equally conscious; however, what it "hears" are more likely to be music (...) and emotions. Joy can be as conscious as the conscious motivation produced by the left-brain reading a sign that says, "Danger mines!!" However, look in the index of a Western textbook of psychology, psychiatry or philosophy for positive emotions located in the limbic system. Notice how discussion of positive spiritual/emotional issues in consciousness and motivation are scrupulously ignored. For example, the popular notions of "love" being either Eros (raw, amoral instinct) or agape (noble, non-specific valuing of all other people) miss the motivational forest for the trees. Neither Eros (hypothalamic) nor agape (cortical) has a fraction of the power to relieve stress as attachment (limbic love), yet until the 1950s attachment was neither appreciated nor discussed by academic minds. This paper will point out that the prosocial, "spiritual" positive emotions like hope, faith, forgiveness, joy, compassion and gratitude are extremely important in the relief of stress and in regulation of the neuroendocrine system, protecting us against stress. The experimental work reviewed by Antonio Damasio and Barbara Fredrickson, and the clinical example of Alcoholics Anonymous, will be used to illustrate these points. (shrink)

This chapter presents emotion as a function of brain‐body interaction, as a vital part of a multi‐tiered phylogenetic set of neural mechanisms, evoked by both instinctive processes and learned appraisal systems, and argues to establish the primacy of emotion in relation to cognition. Primarily based on Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis, but also incorporating elements of Lazarus' appraisal theory, this paper presents a neuropedagogical model of emotion, the somatic appraisal model of affect. SAMA identifies quintessential components, facets, and functions of (...) affect necessary to provide a new domain, namely educational neuroscience, with a basis on which to build a dynamic model of affect serving to critique traditional cognitivist‐oriented curricula and instruction, and to inform an alternative: neuropedagogy. (shrink)

This chapter presents emotion as a function of brain-body interaction, as a vital part of a multi-tiered phylogenetic set of neural mechanisms, evoked by both instinctive processes and learned appraisal systems, and argues to establish the primacy of emotion in relation to cognition. Primarily based on Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis, but also incorporating elements of Lazarus' appraisal theory, this paper presents a neuropedagogical model of emotion, the somatic appraisal model of affect (SAMA). SAMA identifies quintessential components, facets, and functions (...) of affect necessary to provide a new domain, namely educational neuroscience, with a basis on which to build a dynamic model of affect serving to critique traditional cognitivist-oriented curricula and instruction, and to inform an alternative: neuropedagogy. (shrink)

This study investigated the performance of boys with psychopathic tendencies and comparison boys, aged 9 to 17 years, on two tasks believed to be sensitive to amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex func- tioning. Fifty-one boys were divided into two groups according to the Psychopathy Screening Device (PSD, P. J. Frick & R. D. Hare, in press) and presented with two tasks. The tasks were the gambling task (A. Bechara, A. R. Damasio, H. Damasio, & S. W. Anderson, 1994) and (...) the Intradimensional/ Extradimensional (ID/ED) shift task (R. Dias, T. W. Robbins, & A. C. Roberts, 1996). The boys with psychopathic tendencies showed impaired performance on the gambling task. However, there were no group differences on the ID/ED task either for response reversal or extradimensional set shifting. The implications of these results for models of psychopathy are discussed. (shrink)

Although risky decision-making has been posited to contribute to the maladaptive behavior of individuals with psychopathic tendencies, the performance of psychopathic groups on a common task of risky decision-making, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), has been equivocal. Different aspects of psychopathy (personality traits, antisocial deviance) and/or moderating variables may help to explain these inconsistent findings. In a sample of college students (N = 129, age 18–27), we examined the relationship between primary and (...) secondary psychopathic features and IGT performance. A measure of impulsivity was included to investigate its potential as a moderator. In a joint model including main effects and interactions between primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy and impulsivity, only secondary psychopathy was significantly related to risky IGT performance, and this effect was not moderated by the other variables. This finding supports the growing literature suggesting that secondary psychopathy is a better predictor of decision-making problems than the primary psychopathic personality traits of lack of empathy and remorselessness. (shrink)

This article develops some of the many ways in which Leonardo and Descartes, throughout the prolific period of human valuation from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, seem to have approached and anchored their seminal contributions on the Cartesian body and metaphysical mind. While Leonardo masterfully developed an iterative thinking system of visual design applied to nature and artifacts, Descartes laid the groundwork for methodical critical thinking in dimensions that ironically ranged from dreams to the controlled narrative, from a deceptive (...) body to a rational man. In an interdisciplinary articulation of historical and neurobiological leanings, contemporary concepts of the cognitive emotional brain, led by Damasio as the basis for his conclusions about the "Descartes Error", as well as a torrent of growing evidence that supports high cognitive abilities in associative processes mediated by action/body lead us to a re-evaluation today of the legacies of Leonardo and Descartes, rescuing a scientific mind/brain/body process that underlies the human mastering of a universal technology of discourse that would revolutionize science. (shrink)

Resumo: Discuto a abordagem de Darwin sobre meios e finalidades de expressões emocionais, com destaque para o choro e sorriso dos bebês; e apresento algumas contribuições, que se depreendem desse conteúdo, para a reflexão das práticas educativas direcionadas à estas crianças que se encontram na primeira etapa da vida. Para tanto, utilizo de descrições e análises apresentadas por Darwin em “A expressão das emoções nos homens e animais”, publicado em 1872 (2009); apresento perspectivas de estudiosos contemporâneos, que tratam das expressões (...) emocionais, tais como: Tomasello (2003) e Damásio (2011). Com base nessas considerações, abordo sobre a importância das expressões emocionais no desenvolvimento de práticas educativas dirigida aos bebês, adicionando ao debate comentários de estudiosos que tratam da primeira infância. Enfatizo o choro e o sorriso como meios naturais de expressão das emoções, que são acionados por estímulos e se dirigem à manifestação de necessidades básicas e estados emocionais, quer sejam excitantes ou deprimentes. Nos bebês, estes meios se apresentam, inicialmente, como ações reflexões; progressivamente, tais meios se mostram cada vez mais complexos. As contribuições que se depreendem dessa discussão podem ser refletidas por cuidadores, no desempenho de suas práticas educativas junto aos bebês, em sintonia com a relação corpo-mente. Palavras-chave: Darwin; Emoções; Bebês; Prática Educativa. Darwin's perspective on babies' emotional expressions: contributions to the development of educational practices Abstract: I discuss Darwin's approach to the means and ends of emotional expressions, with emphasis on babies' crying and smiling; and I present some contributions, which are deduced from this content, for the reflection of educational practices aimed at these children who are in the first stage of life. For that, I use descriptions and analyzes presented by Darwin in “The expression of emotions in men and animals”, published in 1872 (2009); I present perspectives of contemporary scholars who deal with emotional expressions, such as: Tomasello (2003) and Damásio (2011). Based on these considerations, I address the importance of emotional expressions in the development of educational practices aimed at babies, adding comments from scholars who deal with early childhood to the debate. I emphasize crying and smiling as natural means of expressing emotions, which are triggered by stimuli and are directed towards the manifestation of basic needs and emotional states, whether they are exciting or depressing. In babies, these means appear, initially, as reflective actions; progressively, such means are becoming more and more complex. The contributions that emerge from this discussion can be reflected by caregivers, in the performance of their educational practices with babies, in tune with the body-mind relationship. Keywords: Darwin; Emotions; Babies; Educational practice. La perspectiva de Darwin sobre las expresiones emocionales de los bebés: aportes al desarrollo de las prácticas educativas Abstracto: Analizo el enfoque de Darwin sobre los medios y fines de las expresiones emocionales, con énfasis en el llanto y la sonrisa de los bebés; y presento algunos aportes, que se deducen de este contenido, para la reflexión de las prácticas educativas dirigidas a estos niños que se encuentran en la primera etapa de la vida. Para ello, utilizo descripciones y análisis presentados por Darwin en “La expresión de las emociones en hombres y animales”, publicado en 1872 (2009); Presento perspectivas de estudiosos contemporáneos que se ocupan de las expresiones emocionales, tales como: Tomasello (2003) y Damásio (2011). Con base en estas consideraciones, abordo la importancia de las expresiones emocionales en el desarrollo de prácticas educativas dirigidas a los bebés, agregando al debate comentarios de estudiosos que se ocupan de la primera infancia. Destaco el llanto y la sonrisa como medios naturales de expresión de emociones, que son desencadenados por estímulos y se dirigen a la manifestación de necesidades básicas y estados emocionales, ya sean estos excitantes o deprimentes. En los bebés, estos medios aparecen, inicialmente, como acciones reflexivas; progresivamente, tales medios son cada vez más complejos. Los aportes que emergen de esta discusión pueden ser reflejados por los cuidadores, en el desempeño de sus prácticas educativas con los bebés, en sintonía con la relación cuerpo-mente. Palabras clave: Darwin; Emociones; bebés; Práctica educativa. Data de registro: 18/02/2022 Data de aceite: 17/08/2022. (shrink)

A partire dalle ricerche storico-filosofiche di Emanuela Scribano, studiose e studiosi di fama internazionale si confrontano con i grandi temi metafisici, teologici, epistemologici, etico-politici ed estetici delpensiero moderno e contemporaneo: la teoria del soggetto, il problema mente-corpo, il punto di vista delle neuroscienze, la follia, la memoria, l'amore, il desiderio, l'inquietudine, il controllo delle passioni, il fatalismo, l'inganno divino, la creazione delle verità eterne, la profezia, gli angeli, l'ateismo virtuoso, la tolleranza, la verità rivelata, la critica dell'irrazionalismo, la musica, l'impegno (...) civile e lumanesimo cosmopolitico. Tra gli autori discussi: Leone Ebreo, Montaigne, Charron, Descartes, Clerselier, La Forge, Pascal, Spinoza, Bayle, Sturm, Locke, Penn, Smith, Mandeville, La Mettrie, Kant, Swedenborg, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Luporini e Damasio. (shrink)

William Connolly has made important interventions in political theory over a period of four decades, and the past few years have seen a surge in recognition of his contribution. Those who are familiar with Connolly’s ideas will know the role that continental theorists—especially Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze—have played in the development of his thought, and more recently the uses he has made of advances in the natural sciences, for example in complexity theory, in the work of the (...) neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, and the Nobel Prize–winning chemist Ilya Prigogine. With reference to these innovations, a consensus has emerged in recent discussions, that there is a basic discontinuity between Connolly’s “postmodern” theory of pluralism and the “old” pluralism of the generation of post-war political scientists. By way of contrast, in this essay I outline the congruity between Connolly’s ideas and earlier iterations of pluralism. I trace the essential continuities between Connolly and the leading post-war writers, especially Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, David Truman, and David Easton, and also his proximity to a tradition of pluralism that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century and was exemplified in the work of Arthur Bentley. Indeed, I make the case that Connolly’s work is best understood as the resumption and enhancement of a distinct canon of pluralism in American political thought. (shrink)

No presente artigo, analisamos as abordagens de António Damásio e Gerald Edelman sobre a consciência e fazemos um paralelo com as teses apresentadas pelo filósofo John Searle. Recorremos também às críticas dos filósofos Bennett e Hacker como pedras de toque da viabilidade de algumas teses. Desse modo, apresentamos uma revisão sistemática da obra de Damásio, Edelman e Searle, a fim de promover um diálogo produtivo entre as ideias defendidas por estes autores, os quais, segundo nossa interpretação, assumem uma teoria do (...) campo unificado da consciência. (shrink)

Este estudo busca investigar o movimento constitutivo das articulações entre razão e emoção e a sua influência na educação contemporânea. Para tanto, busca situar novas contribuições a partir das pesquisas de Antonio Damásio para quem as emoções e os sentimentos, são considerados indispensáveis para a vida racional nos diferenciando uns dos outros, nos tornando únicos e nos capacitando a um repertório de respostas emocionais criadas a partir da interação entre o corpo e a mente. Também são utilizadas as reflexões do (...) filósofo seiscentista Baruch Espinosa, cuja contribuição para este estudo reside nos seus conceitos de afeto, liberdade e servidão. Assim, propõe-se uma movimentação no sentido de contextualizar o entendimento dos conceitos de emoção e sentimentos, culminando no desvelamento das suas reais influências no agir humano e na transcendência da visão construída a partir do paradigma epistemológico moderno. Para tanto, pontua-se, as perspectivas filosóficas entre a razão e a emoção que foram sendo produzidas ao longo do tempo e, no segundo momento, procura-se compreender as articulações entre emoções, sentimentos e consciência. Esses apontamentos resultarão nos elementos em favor da dignidade, da reverência pela vida e da liberdade de pensamento como valores a serem assegurados e defendidos na educação. E, dessa forma, provocam os seus atores a rediscutir o papel das emoções e sentimentos, reavaliando a pauta das suas ações. (shrink)

Neste artigo, buscamos descrever o papel crucial da hipótese dos marcadores somáticos (HMS) na interação entre o que denominamos de ‘imperativo emocional’ e a ingerência da razão durante o processo de tomada de decisão na obra Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, de António Damásio. Primeiramente, examinamos a interação entre raciocínio, emoções e ação humana, com ênfase nos processos cognitivos subjacentes à tomada de decisão. Em seguida, exploramos a influência dos fatores emocionais e biológicos na HMS, indo além (...) da análise de custo-benefício, destacando a relevância da memória e das representações mentais no processo decisório. Posteriormente, abordamos a influência da HMS, emoções e sentimentos em decisões, especialmente em cenários de risco e recompensa imediata, enfatizando a necessidade de considerar implicações imediatas e futuras. A seguir, investigamos os marcadores somáticos em termos neurais, discutindo se são inatos ou adquiridos e sua influência no comportamento social e em lesões cerebrais. Por fim, analisamos a relação entre processos cerebrais, como os córtices pré-frontais, e a interpretação de sensações corporais, respostas emocionais e tomada de decisões, acentuando a importância dessas regiões na assimilação dos marcadores somáticos e sua influência em pensamentos, percepções e comportamentos. Concluímos que a HMS é vista como um mecanismo biológico que integra informações emocionais e cognitivas, moldando avaliações e escolhas. (shrink)

Selon Damásio, le moi conscient se crée à partir de la capacité du cerveau à raconter, c’est-à-dire à transformer en récit les signaux et messages produits par ses diverses couches. Les mythes donnent au monde une cohérence significative qui provient de l’organisation des éléments que ses récits produisent. Les rapports au monde de toutes les espèces vivantes sont contenus dans les limites de leurs possibilités phylogénétiques qui résultent déjà d’une relation continuée pendant des millions d’années. La capacité humaine de créer (...) des récits sur le réel doit intégrer ces éléments phylogénétiques qui se manifestent même dans les parties non conscientes du cerveau intégrées pourtant dans le récit qui construit un moi. Ce dépôt venu du fond des âges est une des causes de l’excès de sens que nous poursuivons toujours et qui est, au niveau de l’imaginaire « premier » la voix de ce fonds dans ces rapports avec le texte du monde. Un récit est ainsi une façon de donner à voir l’invisible, et cette invisibilité produit un excès de sens qui cherche toujours à se manifester. Il est marqué par les cohérences et consistances des images de cet imaginaire premier qui médiatise toujours nos relations au monde et aux autres, et auquel s’ajoute les cohérences des imaginaires « seconds » des individus et des cultures. According to Damásio, the self-conscious arises from the ability of the brain to tell, i.e. turn into a story the signals and messages produced by its various layers. Myths give the world a significant consistency that comes from the organization of the elements produced by its stories. The relationships of all living species with the world are contained within the limits of their phylogenetic opportunities resulting from a relationship continued for millions of years. The human ability to create stories about reality must incorporate these phylogenetic elements into the narrative that builds self-awareness. This unknown repository coming from the depths of time is one of the causes of the excess of meaning that we always pursue and is, at the level of the basic imaginary, one that Gilbert Durand considered the heritage of sapiens, the voice of these assets in their links with the text of the world. A narrative is thus a means of seeing the invisible, and this invisibility produces an excess of meaning which always seeks to manifest itself. It is marked by the coherence and consistency of the images of this basic imaginary which always mediates our relationship to the world and to others, and to which is added the coherences of the secondary imaginary coming from individuals and cultures. (shrink)

Damasio, an eminent neuroscientist explores the science of human emotion and what the great Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza can teach of how and why we feel. Damasio shows how joy and sorrow, those most defining of human feelings, are in fact the cornerstones of our survival and culture.

Linking the process of rational decision making to emotions, an award-winning scientist who has done extensive research with brain-damaged patients notes the dependence of thought processes on feelings and the body's survival-oriented regulators. 50,000 first printing.

The publication of this book is an event in the making. All over the world scientists, psychologists, and philosophers are waiting to read Antonio Damasio's new theory of the nature of consciousness and the construction of the self. A renowned and revered scientist and clinician, Damasio has spent decades following amnesiacs down hospital corridors, waiting for comatose patients to awaken, and devising ingenious research using PET scans to piece together the great puzzle of consciousness. In his bestselling Descartes' (...) Error, Damasio revealed the critical importance of emotion in the making of reason. Building on this foundation, he now shows how consciousness is created. Consciousness is the feeling of what happens-our mind noticing the body's reaction to the world and responding to that experience. Without our bodies there can be no consciousness, which is at heart a mechanism for survival that engages body, emotion, and mind in the glorious spiral of human life. A hymn to the possibilities of human existence, a magnificent work of ingenious science, a gorgeously written book, The Feeling of What Happens is already being hailed as a classic. (shrink)

No two individuals with the autism diagnosis are ever the same—yet many practitioners and parents can recognize signs of ASD very rapidly with the naked eye. What, then, is this phenotype of autism that shows itself across such distinct clinical presentations and heterogeneous developments? The “signs” seem notoriously slippery and resistant to the behavioral threshold categories that make up current assessment tools. Part of the problem is that cognitive and behavioral “abilities” typically are theorized as high-level disembodied and modular functions—that (...) are assessed discretely (impaired, normal, enhanced) to define a spectral syndrome. Even as biology reminds us that organic developing bodies are not made up of independent switches, we remain often seduced by the simplicity of mechanistic and cognitive models. Developmental disorders such as autism have accordingly been theorized as due to different modular dysfunctions—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), of the “mirror neuron system” (Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006), of “weak central coherence” (Happe and Frith, 2006) or of the balance of “empathizing” and “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009), just to list a few. -/- The broad array of autonomic (Ming et al., 2005; Cheshire, 2012) and sensorimotor (Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Maurer and Damasio, 1982; Donnellan and Leary, 1995; Leary and Hill, 1996; Donnellan and Leary, 2012; Donnellan et al., 2012) differences experienced and reported by people with autism have by such theories typically been sidelined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing genetic causes, but rendered as incidental and decisively behaviorally irrelevant symptoms—surely disconnected from cognition. But what if the development of cortically based mental processes and autonomous control relies on the complexities and proper function of the peripheral nervous systems? Through such an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous symptoms of autism invites new interpretations. We propose here that many behavioral-level findings can be re-defined as downstream effects of how developing nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt to the challenges of having various noisy, unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral inputs. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to offer a critical analysis of the political projections that Antonio Damasio has put forward of his specific conception of homeostasis. By starting from a complex conception of homeostasis, one that focuses not only on the maintenance of life but also on flourishing, Damasio argues that certain cultures are contrary to the homeostatic imperative. I will suggest that, even if we adopt the complex interpretation of homeostasis (rather than the deflated one that (...) is usual in most evolutionary approaches), resorting to the concept of homeostasis would lead to a condemnation of modern capitalist societies, not from an ethical or political point of view, but from a strictly evolutionary one (i.e., a point of view that takes into consideration the preservation of the conditions under which our species can survive in the future). (shrink)

The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic activity of a cognitive agent. The discussion, we claim, is based on two related approaches to consciousness: on Chalmers’ theory of phenomenal and psychological consciousness and on Damasio’s neural theory, which draws a distinction between core and extended consciousness. Two stages of cognitive-semiotic processing are discussed: the moment of perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the metasemiotic processes understood as the human capacity to reflect on signs (...) and their usage, analyse and control processes of recognition, interpretation of signs and to detect and correct errors in semiotic activity. In the case of the first stage, it is argued that signs as meaningful entities have a distincly experiential character. The feeling of meaningfulness is a result of phenomenal consciousness, in particular a result of the so-called valuation features of phenomenal experience. I claim that this aspect of cognitive-semiotic activity is possible owing to a special neural mechanism called a semiotic marker. It is argued that semiotic systems have to be able to use signs as signs, i.e. they should display some metacognitive capacities, in particular an ability to analyse semiosis at a metalevel. It is argued that such metasemiosis is dependent on psychological consciousness and is realized at the neural level in the form of extended consciousness. The paper is based on a particular understanding of cognitive semiotics as a discipline involving analyses of cognitive processes as semiotic processes, i.e. processes requiring usage of signs. (shrink)

Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now (...) seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation. (shrink)

O artigo comenta proposições recentes, de várias disciplinas acadêmicas, sobre o papel de práticas e produções narrativas na explicação da evolução cultural humana, com foco nas consequências práticas de crenças e padrões de comportamento fundamentados em estórias compartilhadas. De Daniel Dor, Robin Dunbar, Michael Tomasello, Dennis Dutton, Nick Enfield, Daniel Hutto e António Damásio, discutimos ideias cujas implicações para a explicação da vida social são sequenciadas, no artigo, num nível ascendente de complexidade, partindo das funções elementares da linguagem humana para (...) chegar à aceleração cultural que tem caracterizado a história da nossa espécie. Para organizar a discussão, parte-se do conceito de narrativa proposto por Richard Walsh, que busca estabelecer estruturas lógicas e formais presentes nas inúmeras funções e manifestações do fenômeno ao longo do tempo. Ordenada a discussão pelo conceito de Walsh, apresenta-se ideias sobre a evolução cultural humana que são colocadas numa relação de complementaridade, formando um conjunto de proposições que sugerem os modos pelos quais as funções originais das práticas narrativas explicam aspectos centras das várias funções e características que essas práticas assumiriam ao longo da história. (shrink)

From one of the world's leading neuroscientists--a succinct, illuminating, wholly engaging investigation of the phenomenon of consciousness. In recent decades, many philosophers and cognitive scientists have declared the question of consciousness unsolvable, but Antonio Damasio is convinced that recent findings in neurobiology, psychology, and AI have given us the necessary tools to solve its mystery. Now, he not only elucidates its myriad aspects, but presents his analysis and insights in a way that is faithful to our own intuitive sense (...) of the experience of consciousness. In the 45 brief chapters of the book, he helps us understand the relation between consciousness and mind; why being conscious is not the same as either being awake or sensing; the essential role of feeling; and the biological brain and development of consciousness. He synthesizes the recent findings of various sciences with the outlook of philosophy, and, most significantly, presents his original research which has transformed our understanding of the brain and human behavior. Here is an indispensable guide to understanding consciousness, the fundamental human capacity for informing--and transforming--our experience of the world around us and our perception of our place in it. (shrink)

Resumen Este trabajo tiene por objetivo considerar el papel atribuido al cuerpo en la discusión contemporánea sobre emociones. Examinaré en particular la metáfora de las emociones en el teatro del cuerpo, presentada por A.Damásio, con el propósito de revisar críticamente dos modelos dominantes de encarnación de la emoción-uno externalista o behaviorista y otro internalista o neurobiológico- y los problemas que ellos suscitan. Revisaré el concepto de cuerpo implicado en esos modelos e intentaré ofrecer una comprensión alternativa de la emoción como (...) un fenómeno corporal y motriz. Para ello profundizaré el análisis de la relación entre movimiento y emoción bajo los presupuestos de la Fenomenología de la Corporeidad desarrollada por M. Merleau-Ponty y sus seguidores. Mi propuesta alternativa consistirá, entonces, en comprender la emoción como performance corporal, lo cual nos proporcionará un modo de evitar los puntos de vista dualistas y reduccionistas comúnmente sostenidos sobre emociones.The central aim of this paper will be to consider the role assigned to the body in contemporary discussions about emotions. I will particularly examine the metaphor of the emotions in the theater of the body, presented by A. Damásio, with the purpose of raising doubts about two dominant models of embodiment of emotions -an externalist or behaviorist and an internal or neurobiological -which remain trapped in several difficulties. So I will reject the general concept of body these models are committed with, and I will suggest an alternative understanding of emotions along the line of a bodily and motor phenomenon. To do that, I will deepen the analysis of the relationship between movement and emotion by considering it under the theoretical framework provided by the Phenomenology of Body developed by M. Merleau-Ponty and his followers. Thus, my alternative proposal will be to take emotions as a bodily performance which can provide us a way to avoid both the dualist and the reductionist standpoint commonly held on emotions. (shrink)

O texto a seguir apresenta em diálogo ou aplica a uma certa concepção de experiência estética um amplo conjunto de evidências experimentais retirado da investigação de outros fenômenos mentais, em particular a experiência subjetiva de emoções e sentimentos. Provém de António Damásio a viga mestra, o esqueleto, a base, a estrutura de toda a minha argumentação. Minha principal hipótese é a de que certos objetos e situações ativam hiper-espaços dispositivos cerebrais associados à ocorrência de fenômenos como sensação de beleza, prazer (...) e alegria. Proponho que a emergência de uma experiência estética deve ser compreendida como resultado de uma percepção sensível que aciona uma rotina somático-cognitiva, função do disparo de um padrão de padrões neurais dispositivos. (shrink)

Pt. 1. Les nouvelles passions de l'âme -- Des passions libérées -- L'amour -- La sexualité -- Des passions récemment apparues -- La consommation -- Le travail -- Le sortilège de la finance -- Des passions qui disparaissent ici, s'affirment là, ou se transmutent -- Le sentiment religieux -- L'attachement à la nation -- L'honneur -- L'humilité -- Des états dont le sens nous reste caché le plus souvent -- Le déni -- L'ennui -- La présence -- Pt. 2. Le (...) problème du corps et de l'esprit aujourd'hui -- L'erreur de Damasio -- L'autre erreur des neurosciences -- Le mirage d'une science prédictive de la pensée -- La question de la diversité des humains -- La descendance de Darwin -- Savoir vieux et savoir neuf -- La redécouverte de l'esprit -- Pt. 3. Règles pour la direction de la vie -- Règle 1 -- Règle 2 -- Règle 3 -- Règle 4 -- Règle 5. (shrink)