Dictionaries distinguish the following senses of ‘punishment’:the act of punishing, or the fact of being punished - where ‘punish’ is defined as: an act of public authority causing an offender to suffer for an offense. As In: ‘the respectable not only obey the law, but punish those who refuse to do so’.that which is inflicted as a penalty for an offense. As in: ‘all punishments are to be carried out in the Barrack Yard’, ‘fit the punishment to the crime’.severe handling (...) or treatment causing heavy damage, injury or loss. As in: ‘the fighter had been subjected to heavy punishment in his losing bout’, ‘the ships received considerable punishment from the batteries’. (shrink)

By strict definition, television journalism, like every form of journalism, has always been ?unreal?; some form of constructed mediated reality.1 But now, television journalism is coming to a crossroads?one where ethics and technology will meet squarely at right angles if not head?on. And it is reality, even the constructed mediated kind, that will be at risk. In a few years, television journalism at the network and local levels will have the capability, through television's emerging conversion from analog to digital technology, (...) to easily manipulate video and audio in utterly fundamental ways. It will be simple to completely re?shape, even to create, reality. The question won't be: ?Is it live or is it Memorex?"2 rather, it will be something like: ?Is it real or is it digitex?"3This article explores this new technology and the concomitant merger of form and substance in television journalism; it presents several hypothetical examples of this kind of unethical behavior and the motivations behind them; and, finally, it wonders what impact unethical digitexing might have on the First Amendment. (shrink)

A unique study, Beyond Certainty is a phenomenological approach to the connection between factual knowledge and moral judgment. Marietta holds logical certainty to be unnecessary for moral decision-making. In point of fact, logical certainty about our moral judgments, according to the author, is impossible. Key dilemmas in recent moral theory are caught within this impasse represented through an "is/ought" dichotomy. Marietta trumps this impasse through a return to concrete reflection on our most primal consciousness of the world.

Classified advertising occupies a prominent place in the history and current economics of the print media in America, including magazines. There are dozens of classifications, most of which are as innocuous as the language that constitutes the individual advertisements. The personals classification, however, is not always so innocuous. Gun-for-hire classified advertisements in one magazine were so blatant that several serious crimes, including murder, were committed as a result of the advertisements. Generally, courts find no liability for disseminators of advertising that (...) causes harm. But the application of the ethical theory of basic mixed rule deontology would mandate that publications should not publish such classified advertising notwithstanding that it is likely legal to do so. (shrink)

The question of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is a major focus for international law, the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, and the foreign policies of nations. Against this background, the 2011 bombing in Libya by Western nations has occasioned renewed interest and concern about armed humanitarian intervention and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. This volume brings together new essays by leading international, philosophical, and political thinkers on the moral and legal issues involved in AHI, and contains (...) both critical and positive views of AHI. Topics include the problem of abuse and needed limitations, the future viability of RtoP and some of its problematic implications, the possibility of AHI providing space for peaceful political protest, and how AHI might be integrated with post-war justice. It is an important collection for those studying political philosophy, international relations, and humanitarian law. (shrink)

Environmental holism has been accused of being totalitarian because it subsumes the interests and rights of individuals under the good of the whole biosphere, thus rejecting humanistic ethics. Whether this is true depends on the type of holism in question. Only an extreme form of holism leads to this totalitarian approach, and that type of holism should be rejected, not alone because it leads to unacceptable practices, but because it is too abstract and reductionistic to be an adequate basis for (...) ethics. (shrink)

In the war on terrorism, the imprisonment of suspected terrorists by the United States has raised a host of issues,1 among them that of indefinite detention. Over the years, there has been a great...

This collection of new essays by eleven distinguished environmental philosophers addresses two main questions: first, whether environmental philosophy and ethics should be seen as a form of applied philosophy or as something else, perhaps best called practical philosophy; and second, how environmental philosophy is practiced in human life, especially in the lives of academics.

A number of recent books and articles have claimed that environmental ethics should be pluralistic; in response to these J. Baird Callicott has written a strong attack upon moral pluralism. This paper will survey briefly some of the recent work advocating moral pluralism and examine Callicott's defense of moral monism. Then it will examine the justification for building an ethical system upon more than one fundamental source of moral insight. The moral system which succeeds in taking into account all that (...) is morally relevant will be contextualist, and it might need to be pluralistic as well. (shrink)

1 Philosophers on Sexuality Ancient Philosophy A positive and constructive philosophy of sexuality is largely a product of the twentieth century. ...

Christian prayer and worship are not so much derived from as generative of the doctrine of God.

I thank the commentators for their thoughtful remarks about and criticisms of my exploratory essay on the indefinite detention of mega-terrorists.1 Because of space restrictions, I have not been ab...

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is crucially motivated by empirical discoveries of fundamental physics. To this extent its potential to furnish a general metaphysics for science may appear limited. However, OSR also provides a good account of the progress that has been achieved over the decades in a formalized special science, economics. Furthermore, this has a basis in the ontology presupposed by economic theory, and is not just an artifact of formalization. †To contact the author, please write to: 4th Floor, Humanities (...) Building, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294‐1260; School of Economics, Leslie Social Science Building, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701, Cape Town, South Africa; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

— Niels Bohr, 19231 “There must be quite definite and clear grounds, why you repeatedly declare that one must interpret observations classically, which lie absolute ly in thei r essenc e. . . . It must belong to your deepest conviction—and I cannot understand on what you base it.”.

This book is a collection of original essays by some of the leading moral and political thinkers of our time on the ethical and legal implications of humanitarian military intervention. As the rules for the 'new world order' are worked out in the aftermath of the Cold War, this issue is likely to arise more and more frequently, and the moral implications of such interventions will become a major focus for international law, the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, (...) and the foreign policies of nations. The essays collected here present a variety of normative perspectives on topics such as the just-war theory and its limits, secession and international law, and new approaches toward the moral legitimacy of intervention. They form a challenging and timely volume that will interest political philosophers, political theorists, readers in law and international relations, and anyone interested in moral dimensions of international affairs. (shrink)

Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (see, e. g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model-suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]-that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward epistemic risk than the (...) other Bayesian models that have been proposed. I also argue, however, that even the PSR model places unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist's attitude toward epistemic risk. As a result, such Bayesian models of epistemic utilities fail as normative accounts-not just as descriptive accounts (see, e. g., [31], [14])-of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you assert what you believe to be false with the intent to deceive. However, several philosophers (e.g., Carson 2006, Sorensen 2007, Fallis 2009) have pointed out that there are lies that are not intended to deceive and, thus, that the traditional definition fails. In 2009, I suggested an alternative definition: you lie if and only if you say what you believe to be false when you believe that one (...) of Paul Grice's conversational norms (“Do not say what you believe to be false”) is in effect. Faulkner (forthcoming), Stokke (forthcoming), and Pruss (2012) have subsequently argued that my 2009 definition fails as well because it counts some statements that are clearly not lies as being lies. In this paper, I identify some additional counter-examples of this sort. But I argue that my 2009 definition can easily be revised to deal with such counter-examples once we clarify that the relevant norm is really against communicating something false rather than against merely saying it. Nevertheless, I show that even this revised version of my 2009 definition fails because it counts some statements that are lies as not being lies. Lies told by young children – which uncontroversially count as lies on the traditional philosophical definition – suggest that lying (as well as asserting in general) does not require believing that such a norm is in effect. Even so, I claim that, since all liars intend to do something that would violate this norm if it were in effect, there is a successful definition of lying that is at least in the spirit of my 2009 definition. (shrink)

What is Albert Einstein’s place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy of science? Were one to consult the histories produced at mid-century from within the Vienna Circle and allied movements (e.g., von Mises 1938, 1939, Kraft 1950, Reichenbach 1951), then one would find, for the most part, two points of emphasis. First, Einstein was rightly remembered as the developer of the special and general theories of relativity, theories which, through their challenge to both scientific and philosophical orthodoxy made vivid the (...) need for a new kind of empiricism (Schlick 1921) whereby one could defend the empirical integrity of the theory of relativity against challenges 1 coming mainly from the defenders of Kant. Second, the special and general theories of relativity were wrongly cited as straightforwardly validating central tenets of the logical empiricist program, such as verificationism, and Einstein was wrongly represented as having, himself, explicitly endorsed those same philosophical principles. As we now know, logical empiricism was not the monolithic philosophical movement it was once taken to have been. Those associated with the movement disagreed deeply about fundamental issues concerning the structure and interpretation of scientific theories, as in the protocol sentence debate, and about the overall aims of the movement, as in the debate between the left and right wings 2 of the Vienna Circle over the role of politics in science and philosophy. Along with such differences went subtle differences in the assessment of Einstein’s legacy to logical empiricism. Philipp Frank–himself a dissenter from central points of right-wing Vienna Circle doctrine–deserves.. (shrink)

We want to keep hackers in the dark about our passwords and our credit card numbers. We want to keep potential eavesdroppers in the dark about our private communications with friends and business associates. This need for secrecy raises important questions in epistemology (how do we do it?) and in ethics (should we do it?). In order to answer these questions, it would be useful to have a good understanding of the concept of keeping someone in the dark. Several philosophers (...) (e.g., Bok, 1983; Carson, 2010; Mahon, 2009; Scheppele, 1988) have analyzed this concept (or, equivalently, the concept of keeping secrets) in terms of concealing and/or withholding information. However, their analyses incorrectly exclude clear instances of keeping someone in the dark. And more important, they incorrectly focus on possible means of keeping someone in the dark rather than on what it is to keep someone in the dark. In this paper, I argue that you keep X in the dark about a proposition P if and only if you intentionally cause X not to have a true belief that P. In addition, I show how this analysis of keeping someone in the dark can be extended from a categorical belief model of epistemic states to a credence (or degree of belief) model. (shrink)

Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that thing. Or equivalently, someone knowing something is necessary and (...) sufficient for someone else losing privacy about that thing. In this paper, I argue that both of these suggestions are incorrect. I begin by arguing, contra Goldman, that protecting privacy often leads to more knowledge being acquired. I argue in the remainder of the paper, contra the defenders of the knowledge account of privacy, that someone knowing something is not necessary for someone else losing privacy about that thing. (shrink)

Phronesis, a popular Aristotelian concept that emphasizes deliberation and moral action, should replace the phrase ‘research‐based practice’ as the guiding light for nursing practice. Knowledge from research is still essential, of course, but is insufficient by itself for practice. In this paper, the author describes assumptions behind the apparent superiority of research‐based knowledge, and offers a critique of this position. One critique is that by automatically accepting the superiority of research‐based knowledge other types of knowledge (e.g. intuitive, ethical, personal) are (...) devalued. A second critique is that undeliberated, indiscriminate use of research findings may lead to inappropriate nursing practice.Phronesisis then described, and its application to nursing. For example,phronesisrequires that the context of the situation be considered very carefully before acting. Aristotle stated that the goal of personalphronesisis to reacheudaimonia, or genuine happiness or ‘human flourishing’. Infusing nursing practice withphronesismeans that an anthropomorphized discipline'seudaimoniawould be theeudaimoniaof patients. That is, nursing practice would be guided by a desire for patients' genuine happiness or human flourishing. The final section of the paper offers rebuttals to potential criticisms. (shrink)

Several philosophers have used the framework of means/ends reasoning to explain the methodological choices made by scientists and mathematicians (see, e.g., Goldman 1999, Levi 1962, Maddy 1997). In particular, they have tried to identify the epistemic objectives of scientists and mathematicians that will explain these choices. In this paper, the framework of means/ends reasoning is used to study an important methodological choice made by mathematicians. Namely, mathematicians will only use deductive proofs to establish the truth of mathematical claims. In this (...) paper, I argue that none of the epistemic objectives of mathematicians that are currently on the table provide a satisfactory explanation of this rejection of probabilistic proofs. (shrink)