Background: Currently preterm births are the leading causes of newborn deaths and newborn mortality in developed countries. Infants born prematurely remain vulnerable to many acute complications and long-term disabilities. There is a growing concern surrounding the moral and ethical implications of the complex and technological care being provided to extremely low birth weight infants in neonatal intensive care units in the developed nations. Research purpose: The purpose of this study was to describe the ethical and moral issues that neonatal intensive (...) care nurses experience when caring for low birth weight preterm infants and their families. Research design: A phenomenological method design was used to describe the lived experiences of nurses with ethical and moral issues encountered in the neonatal intensive care unit. One-on-one, semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions were used to gather data from the participants. Research participants: The setting for this study was a 97-bed neonatal intensive care. A total of 16 female nurses were interviewed. Ethical considerations: Approval to conduct the research study was obtained from the institutional review board of the hospital where the study was conducted. Formal signed consent was obtained from each participant. To ensure confidentiality, each participant was asked to choose a confederate name to be used in the interview and the transcriptions. Findings: The thematic analysis identified five recurring themes: (a) at the edge of viability, (b) infant pain and discomfort, (c) crucial decisions, (d) communicating with parents, and (e) letting go. Conclusion: Neonatal intensive care unit nurses indicated that they often had challenges to their own sense of morality as they struggled to protect the infant from pain and unnecessary discomfort, provide care to an infant and their family whom they thought was faced with a lifetime of challenges and poor health, accepting decisions made by parents, and feeling as if parents were not adequately informed about outcomes. (shrink)

All the standard problems with no real surprises in the past or contemporary reading selections. The book's claim to originality and usefulness as a text is a final section of approximately seventy-five pages containing original contributions by Ayer, Blanshard, Passmore, and Lazerowitz, and offering a "reappraisal" of "The Nature of Metaphysics."—E. A. R.

This selection of writings nicely illustrates the many sided career of Joseph Priestley. Priestley is best remembered today for his discovery of oxygen. In his varied career Priestley managed to combine qualities and positions that most men find contradictory. His theological writings offended rationalists because of his defense of Scripture, miracles, and the doctrine of the resurrection, and were even more offensive to orthodox theologians because of his materialism and extreme unitarianism. Though a lifelong defender of civil liberties and minority (...) rights, he yet taught that it is better for the law to punish the innocent than to take a chance on letting the guilty go free. Passmore's excellent introduction summarizes Priestley's career and gives a balanced appraisal of his merits. In Priestley's writings the major intellectual and political movements of the period are reflected and refracted by a mind which, though not profound enough to play a leading role, yet was bold, energetic, and above all else, commonsensical.—E. M. M. (shrink)

Hume assigns a pivotal role to stability in understanding normativity in a variety of theoretical contexts, including the passions, justice, and moral judgment; in epistemology, he seeks to sustain his pretheoretical epistemic intuitions in terms of a stability‐based theory of justification. A distinctive feature of Hume's naturalism is that he tends to ground epistemic obligation in the desire to relieve the discomfort or felt uneasiness in unsettled states. Since he rejects the Pyrrhonian claim that ataraxia or quietude results from an (...) equipollence of opposing arguments where belief is suspended, if tranquillity is to be secured, it will have to be within a system of beliefs. In this regard, a series of hopeful results ultimately give way to a destructive conclusion, a negative assessment of the prospects for stability in belief, and hence for justified belief, at least for the reflective person. This overall interpretive perspective is compared to that of Kemp Smith, MacNabb and Passmore, Garrett, and the reflexive approval interpretation of Baier and Korsgaard. (shrink)

A good anthology of articles drawn mainly from the British and American journals over the past twenty-five years. Some of the names appearing are Ziff, Margolis, Weitz, Black, Hospers, Mothersill, Hofstadter, Aiken, Aldrich, Urmson, and Passmore. The editor has contributed an introduction and an additional article of his own. The book is divided into five sections, the titles of which indicate fairly enough their thematic contents. The sections are concerned with the problems of defining, appreciating, and evaluating works of (...) art, "Problems concerning Fiction, Metaphor, Belief, and Artistic Truth," the epistemological tangles surrounding Aesthetic Experience, and "The Nature of Aesthetics and Aesthetic Theories." The price is a bit steep for a paper cover book.--E. A. R. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:JOHN PASSMORE AND HUME'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY1 A quarter century ago, the message undergraduates absorbed about David Hume was as an extremely favourable one. He was the great precursor of logical empiricism and so his philosophy, at least in its main lines, must be nearer the mark than that of any other of the great names. Hume had discovered the right view of causation. He had exposed and banished (...) school metaphysics. He had rightly drawn attention to the problem of induction. He had discovered the isought gap and revealed the practical impotence of reason in the face of the passions. But for his weight problem, he could have walked on water. Those were the circumstances in which I first read John Passmore's book on Hume. Because he was plainly not, like many of Hume's critics, an apologist for Thomism or any of Hegel's offspring, his work could not be dismissed on the grounds of parti pris. It was 2 a shock, therefore, to find him, in Hume's Intentions, presenting an image of Hume a considerable distance this side of idolatry. Passmore's critical and, for its time, boldly unfashionable appraisal is to be admired, taken to heart, and extended. Hume's Intentions concentrates on Hume's philosophy of the understanding. It takes up strands of that philosophy and points to their inherent implausibility and mutual incompatibility. Yet these problems also vitiate other parts of Hume's position. In this paper I attempt to introduce the Passmorian method of reasoning into what are nowadays the moral subjects. Let me remind you of the structure of Passmore's book: it does not mount a consecutive argument so much as take up, tease out, and display one or other leading element in the Humean philosophy. Thus we have chapters on Hume as an enthusiast for the 110. moral (that is, human, or social) sciences, as a critic of traditional Aristotelian logic, as a developer of more suitable methods for scientific advance, as a positivist, a phenomenalist, an associationist theoretician in psychology, and a sceptic. We learn as we read that in these respects Hume is not consistent. Principles which he espouses, principally negative and sceptical principles, lead to conclusions too extreme to suit his major purposes. Accordingly, they must not be pressed to their proper conclusions. Hume's philosophy of the study must be abandoned rather than actually taken seriously. Thus, for example: in methodology, Hume insists that reason cannot yield results in the contingent and fallible natural and human sciences. This should lead him to the view that any scientific hypothesis which goes beyond immediate experience is, so far as reason goes, as good, or as bad, as any other. But he recoils from this, distinguishing sensible men from the foolish and superstitious on the basis of the regularity and consistency of the experiences on which the wise rely. Yet as Passmore points out, on Hume's principles, the preference for regularity and consistency cannot be more than a prejudice. Prejudices do not admit of any genuinely rational defence. There is real substance to the superiority claimed for the wise. Again, consider Hume's positivism. He offers a beguilingly short way with nonsense, especially learned and theological nonsense. School metaphysics and superstition (i.e. Christianity) are to be banished by the use of the impressions and ideas test: When you come upon a word whose meaning you would discover, ask if it refers to an impression or an idea. If to an impression, well and good, its meaning is to be found in present experience. If to an idea, ask from which impression (or impressions) the idea did (or could) Ill, derive. If you cannot find any suitable impressions, the idea is chimerical, and is to be excised from thought as a pathological intruder. This procedure produces most satisfactorily negative results when it comes to the Trinity and the sacraments, or essence, inherence, substantial form, and such metaphysical extravagances. Unhappily the very same procedure, the impressions and ideas test, also wrecks the foundations of Hume's own thought. As Passmore makes sure we remember, the test robs Hume of the resources with which to account for substance and... (shrink)

This collection includes papers by such leading thinkers as Michael Ayers, J.A. Passmore, Ian Hacking, Hide Ishiguro, G.E.M. Anscombe, David Pears, A.M. Quinton, and Richard Wollheim.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:UNREAL REAL,JSM RAYMOND DENNEHY University of San Francisco San Francisco,, California Contextual Realism, a Meta-Physical Framework for Modern Science. By RICHARD H. SCHLAGEL. New York: :Raragon House, 1986. Pp. xxiv + 808. $22.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-913729-20-5. The Many Faces of Realism. By HILARY PuTNAM. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987. Pp. 98. $8.95 (paper). ISBN 0-81269043 -5. Varieties of Realism: A Rationale fo!f' the Natural Sciences. By RoM HARR.E. Oxford (...) and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Pp. vii + 375. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-631-12592-2. REN PASSMORE wrote his assessment of British moral philosophy, he lamented that the fifty years which :had elapsed since 1900 had produced nothing beitter than so many variations on utilitarianism. Equally, a lament seems in order over the ourrent state of epistemology. After so many years of grappling with the problem of v,aJidating epistemo1log~cail!l'eailism-consider, for example, the American scene during the first severail decades of this century: Roy Wood Sellars et al. announcing the "new realism '' and George Santayana et al. announcing,the "critical realism "one might have hoped for 1 an oiutcome more reassuring than Hie current £deistic realism. But if the fideism disappoints, its rationalizations fascinate. Take, for examp1e, the trio o.f books discussed herein. They undertake a common project: to forge a raitionaJ justification for realism. They shave other features, not so 1audatory, especiaUy :a merely fideis:tic ioommitment to what might best be deseribed as generic realism, which finally evaporaites into 631 RAYMOND DENNEHY idealism. The mo,sit thait the authors can muster on behalf of realism amounts: to no more than this: " Something (what, we don't know) must e.rist outside our minds heearuse we aict on that premise with considemhle success, not only in daily life hut in scientific prructice, aillld a~l the theories used to explruin it aDJd its successes form a logieally coherent whoJe." In other wo11ds, whait these "defenses'' of rerulism offer is a pragmatic representationalism, organized and ultimaitiely vindi!caited by the ideaJist criterion of coherence and der,iving overai11 inspiration from a blind faith in e~tmmental reality. The tip-off,fa,in the books' titles: Contextual Real-ism, The Many Fa(')es of Realism, and Varieties of Realism. How can you taJk about the "contexts," " v;arieties,'' and "many faces " of realism if__,espreiciaJJy by your own admiss:ion-you cannot identify 11eaJ,ity itself? The answer is found in fideism: you want to affirm extramentaJ reality, even though y;ou find it impossible to justify 1that affirmation,rationaHy. So, in a flush. of ega,1itarian fervur, you aooept au plausible claimants to the title of " reality "; and being unabJ:e to say that any one c~aim­ ant is more or ~ess 11eal than any other, you hope to bring matters to a happy conclusion by apperuling to "varieties," "con- :te:xJts," and "many faces" of rea1ity. Hut the imperatives of life and thought maroe,a harmoniza-,tion of ail1l these " realities'' inevitable if anything resembling tl'IUe and false assertions is to he sav;ed. If, for example, common sense tells us that the11e 1a11e,ice cubes and scienee teHs us that the11e are only indeterminate mass particles, we will want to know how these 1 asse11tions can both be true. Clearly, the V'enerahle correspondence criterion of truth won't do here, is:ince we are fruoed with two oompeting objects of correspondence. It thus becomes necessary to enlist :the aid of the pragmatic theory of tmth to deoide which of the " realities " wil,l be designated " xeal '' in a part:iou~ar set of circumstances. Anticipating PiUtnam's examp~e, we ma.y then say that ice cubes~ and pink ones aJt that__,are real when we wish to mix drinks and that iDJdeterminate mass particles,a~11e reail when we wish UNREAL REALISM 633 to produce a scientific ruoom.mt of the phenomenon caHed " ice cubes." Still,.antil(Jipating Schlagel, not even pragmatism carries us far enough because it depends on knowing which resuJtis are felicitous. We thus turn fo the cohe11ence theory of tmth as our final court of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 205-221 The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy between Books 1 and 2 HARUKOINOUE 1. The Analogy Between Book 1 and Book 2 If the central design of the Treatise is to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" (T 2; SBN xii), as Hume advertises, (...) it seems unquestionable that his intention lies in the illustration of the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the cooperation of the understanding and the passions, which are discussed separately in Book 1 and Book 2, respectively.1 What is yet to be determined is whether any internal or systematic connection between these two books was originally intended by the author. Is it too fanciful to agree with John Passmore, and to suggest that some dynamic system of the human mind would emerge when we open the door which stands between the first two books?2 The key for this door seems to be found in Hume's account of personal identity. We may well remember how he distinguished two aspects of our identity, one regarding the understanding and another regarding the passions, and claimed that the latter "serves to corroborate" the former "by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN Haruko Inoue is Professor of Philosophy, Sapporo University 3-7-3-1 Toyohira-ku, Sapporo 062-8520, Japan. e-mail: [email protected] 206 Haruko Inoue 261). It seems reasonable to agree with Jane Mclntyre, who suggests that "Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's account of the self and its identity."3 And once we get a good understanding of this integrated mechanism of the human mind operating with both wheels, as it were, of the imagination and the passions, all we have to do is to accept his invitation and enjoy the efficiency of this two-wheeled car, driving through the fields of "Morals, Politics, and Criticism." For, if we take his words in his Advertisement seriously,4 it seems quite likely that the Treatise was published first as a set of Book 1 and Book 2, as Passmore suggests,5 and that Book 3 was written as the demonstration of the consistency of his system through the application of the hypothesis established in the first two books. This paper is a modest attempt to illustrate the intimate connection between Book 1 and Book 2: the latter, planned as a proof and reinforcement of the system Hume had established in Book 1, depends on the former. His basic strategy in the Treatise is to explain both systems of the mind by means of the easy transition of the imagination, which connects different perceptions with each other according to two kinds of principles or "properties of human nature " (T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283), viz. "the association both of impressions and ideas, and the mutual assistance they lend each other" (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 284). In Book 1 Hume establishes the system of the understanding in terms of the first association, viz. the association of ideas, and in Book 2 he proceeds to illustrate the system of passions by involving not only the second association but also the concurrence of both kinds of association which he calls "a double relation of impressions and ideas." His basic strategy is thus to apply the same method of reasoning to the illustration of both systems, assuming that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas" (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The intimate connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is illustrated through the demonstration of the "influence of the imagination upon the passions" (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424), or in terms of the dependence of the latter on the former. It is owing to the dependence of the association of... (shrink)

THE QUESTION TO BE CONSIDERED is the relation of Hume's celebrated scepticism to his own constructive philosophical projects and analyses. Since Thomas Reid there have been those who detect an unresolved tension between, on the one hand, Hume's Enlightenment devotion to science with its attendent opposition to dogmatism and superstition and, on the other, his explicitly sceptical manner and principles. Some (e.g., Green and Kolakowski) find this tension unresolvable in principle and utterly subversive of Hume's positive ambitions; others (e.g., Flew (...) and Passmore) propose revisionary interpretations of Hume that will mitigate the tension. Still others adopt the view made popular by Kemp Smith and Hendel, according to which the special virtue of Hume's philosophy is precisely his employment of the principle of "natural interpretation" to overcome the apparent conflict between science and scepticism. The reading of Hume proposed here fits comfortably into none of the traditions, largely because of the emphasis placed upon the changes, both in the character of Hume's scepticism and, more fundamentally, in his own conception of his philosophical project. I shall argue: that Hume began his study of human nature with reformist aspirations toward an accurate and serf-evident "science of man"; that the critical method adopted in pursuit of this goal occasioned corrosive doubts concerning the very possibility of science; that reflection upon the failure of his initial effort led Hume to replace his earlier scientific ideal with a less rigorous program of "natural, unforced interpretation"; that this new "academical philosophy" succeeded neither in providing workable criteria for distinguishing justifiable belief from superstition nor in avoiding the excesses of unmitigated scepticism; and, finally, that there is evidence that Hume was aware of and tacitly conceded these difficulties. (shrink)

Locke’s critique of enthusiastic religion is an attempt to undermine a form of supernaturalist belief. In this paper, I argue for a novel interpretation of that critique. By opening up a middle path between the views of John Passmore and Michael Ayers, I show that Locke is accusing the enthusiast of being a self-deceived believer. First, I demonstrate the manner in which a theory of self-deception squares with Locke’s intellectualist epistemology. Second, I argue that Locke thinks he can show (...) that the enthusiasts’ most cherished beliefs are in fact contrary to manifest evidence. In “matters of ultimate concern” to us---i.e., our religious beliefs---the critique is thus meant tobuttress Locke’s commitment to a naturalistic ethics of belief. (shrink)

Tutte le dottrine tradizionali, da quelle più arcaiche e "primitive" a quelle più evolute e articolate, hanno sempre affermato che l'uomo non è un essere solamente corporeo, sia pur dotato di ingegno e di intelligenza, ma è un essere dalla natura composita, formato da una parte materiale e da una o più componenti invisibili e "sottili" e che in lui risiede un principio immortale di origine divina o comunque soprannaturale. Secondo il modo di vedere tradizionale, l'uomo, per conoscere e realizzare (...) se stesso, deve pertanto prendere coscienza, in primo luogo ed essenzialmente, di questa sua natura di essere composito e immortale, e questa è una di quelle idee universali (per noi forse la più importante) che troviamo diffuse presso tutte le popolazioni del pianeta, anche se con sfumature diverse nelle varie tradizioni..."--Cover flap. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:429 THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1985 The Hume literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; £9.50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. (The book is still in print.) Publications of the years 1977 to 1984 were listed in previous issues of Hume Studies. What follows here will bring the (...) record up to the end of 1985. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and keenly requested to send me offprints of their own articles and reviews. Hardly any do so at present, and it would greatly ease the labour of collection. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of this annual bibliography, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recently appearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQ American Philosophical Quarterly HPQ History of Philosophy Quarterly JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JP Journal of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PB Philosophical Books PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review RIP Revue Internationale de Philosophie RM Review of Metaphysics TLS Times Literary Supplement 430 Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard (no. 4148). AGASSI, J. "The Unity of Hume's Thought", Hume Studies (10th Anniv. Issue), 87-109. AUSTIN, W. H. "Philo's Reversal", Phil. Topics 13, no. 2, 103-12. BADIA CABRERA, M. A. "Hume's Natural History of Religion: Positive Science or Metaphysical Vision of Religion", Diálogos 20, 71-8. BAIER, A. Postures of the Mind, ch. 10 ("Promises, Promises, Promises"), ch. 11 ("Civilizing Practices"). London, etc. BEHAN, D. P. "Hume's Labyrinth", HPg 2, 309-22. BENNETT, D. "Hume's Pride", in B. Vermazen, Essays on Davidson, 89-91. Oxford. BIRO, J. L. "Hume and Cognitive Science", HPQ 2, 257-74. BLANDINO, G. "Le causalitate. Discussion sur le criticas de D. Hume" [in Interlingua, with French and English], Aquinas 28, 247-57. BRICKE, J. "Locke, Hume and the Nature of Volitions", Hume Studies (10th Anniv. Issue), 15-51. BROOKS, D. "Hume's Bundle Theory of the Mind", S. African J. Phil. 4, 75-84. BROOKS, D. H. M. "Strawson, Hume, and the Unity of Consciousness", Mind 94, 583-6. CAMPBELL, K. "John Passmore and Hume's Moral Philosophy", Hume Studies 11, 109-24. CAPALDI, N. "The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Hume's Theory of the Self", in A.J. Holland, Philosophy, Its History and Historiography, 271-85, Dordrecht, etc. 431 CARLSON, G. R. "Hume and the Moral Realists", Australas. J. Phil. 63, 407-18. CHAKRABARTI, T. K. "Hume's Definitions of Cause", J. Indian Council Phil. Res., 67-75. CHEN, W. -S. Article (in Chinese) on Hume on personal identity, in Phil. Rev. (Taiwan) 8, 123-42. CLARK, S. R. L. "Hume, Animals and the Objectivity of Morals", P£ 35, 117-33. CLERO, J. P. La philosophie des passions chez David Hume. (301 pp.) Paris. DANIEL, S. C "The Problem of Identity of Objects in Hume's Philosophy", Indian Phil. Q. 12, 1916. DAVIE, W. "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character", HPQ 2, 337-48. DEWITT, R. "Hume's Probability Argument of I, iv, 1", Hume Studies 11, 125-40. DONNICI, R. "Husserl sull' etica di Hume. Dalle lezioni inedite del 1902", Rivista di storia della filosofia 40, 449-70. ENC, B. "Hume on Causal Necessity: A Study from the Perspective of Hume's Theory of Passions", HPQ 2, 235-56. FERREIRA, M.J. "Hume's Naturalism - 'Proof and Practice", P£ 35, 45-57. FLAGE, D.E. "Hume on Memory and Causation", Hume Studies (10th Anniv. Issue), 168-88. [11 (1985) 166-72] FLAGE, D.E. "Perchance to Dream: A Reply to Traiger", Hume Studies 11, 173-82. (on Traiger 1985b) FLAGE, D.E. "Hume's Ethics", Phil. Topics 13, no. 3, 71-88. FLEW, A. "Impressions and Experiences: Public or Private?", Hume Studies 11, 183-91. 432 FOGELIN, R.J. Hume's Skepticism... (shrink)

This paper argues that, contrary to most interpretations, e.g., those of Reid, Popkin and Passmore, Hume is not a sceptic with regard to reason. The argument of Treatise I, IV. i, of course, has a sceptical conclusion with regard to reason, and a somewhat similar point is made by Cleanthes in the Dialogues. This paper argues that the argument of Treatise I, IV. i is parallel to similar arguments in Bentham and Laplace. The latter are, as far as they (...) go, sound, and so is Hume’s. But the limitations of all mean that they cannot sustain a general argument against reason. Hume the historian is quite aware of these limitations. So is Hume the philosopher. A careful examination of the other references in the Treatise to the argument of I, IV. i reveals that Hume not only rejects but constructs a sound case against accepting the sceptical conclusion, arguing that reason can indeed show the sceptic’s argument to be unreasonable. A close reading of the Dialogues shows that Hume there also draws the same conclusion. The thrust of the paper is to go some way towards showing that it is a myth that Hume is a pyrrhonian sceptic. (shrink)

A highly contentious issue in recent philosophy of logic has been the question of whether there can be contingently true identity statements. In this paper I want to investigate a possible loop-hole in the standard argument of the necessitarians (i.e., those who maintain that any true identity statement is necessarily true).

Rescher has presented a proof that a completed science is logically impossible; not every truth can be known. I show that the proof is valid only if it is read de re. One of its premises, however, is an obvious truth only on a de dicto reading; read de re it is false. What the proof shows, therefore, is that science has no limits and any true proposition can be known. We can, however, know it only in the meagre de (...) re, and not in the informationally rich de dicto, sense of 'know'. (shrink)

In a recent broadcast talk it was said that philosophers commonly base arguments and theories on garbled versions of science. Professor Passmore's article in the April number of Philosophy seems to go some way to justifying this complaint. The article discusses the objectivity of history by a series of comparisons with science under various heads representing criteria of objectivity.

Throughout the long history of Classic Maya hieroglyphs, a logosyllabic writing system used from the late first millennium BCE through the mid-second millennium CE in southern Mesoamerica, the most commonly recorded phonetic value was the syllable u (/ʔu/). With over a dozen different u hieroglyphs, Classic Maya scribes had more options for recording /ʔu/ than any other syllable or logograph. Cognitive approaches to writing systems typically attribute graphemic variation (i.e., alternation between signs with equivalent linguistic value) to semantic differences like (...) animacy or to non-linguistic factors like identity. Distribution of Classic Maya u hieroglyphs, however, suggests that morphosyntactic context influenced which grapheme scribes wrote and when. This case suggests that scribal knowledge of Classic Maya hieroglyphs included ideas about writing's relationship to language. It also highlights the cognitive relevance of morphosyntax for a writing system's users as they differentiate among graphic signs with identical linguistic denotation. (shrink)