This paper first explores a number of themes in the psychological system developed by the Austrian-American psychologist, Egon Brunswik, focusing on those that had a formative influence on Social Judgement Theory. We show that while perception was a recurring ground for Brunswik's empirical and theoretical work, his psychology was a psychology of cognition in the broadest sense. Next, two major themes in Social Judgement Theory functionalism and probabilism are described, and the elegant formulation known as Brunswik's Lens (...) Model is introduced. Some methodological and theoretical implications of these themes are presented. The paper concludes with Hammond's Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT), which is a theory describing modes of cognition and how those modes are influenced by task characteristics. (shrink)

Previous papers have introduced the idea of a Dialectical Inquiring System (DIS), i.e., an Information System which for any issue presents strong pro and con arguments. The previous papers showed how the DIS could be made scientifically operational in terms of Russell Ackoff's Behavioral Theory of Communication. In this paper we show how the DIS can be represented in terms of Egon Brunswik's Lens Model. The Brunswik Lens Model formulation is most appropriate for the design of Behavioral Science (...) experiments. It also illuminates further properties of the DIS. We discuss both the use and current limitations of the model in terms of an example currently under experimental investigation. The paper, in effect, argues vigorously for a new methodology of science that is founded on anexplicit, systematic, andcontrolled use of conflict. (shrink)

Moral judgment and behavior are uniquely resistant to psychological analysis because morality generally is defined in terms that do not admit of psychological predication. Principal among these is the idea of freedom. An agent can act morally only on the condition that it is also free to do otherwise. The respective theoretical premises of C. Sunstein and E. Brunswik are contrasted in order to suggest that Brunswikian theory constitutes a distinct and highly promising new approach to the psychology of (...) moral judgment. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Social Judgement Theory (SJT) evolved from Egon Brunswik's Probabilistic Functionalist psychology coupled with multiple correlation and regression-based statistical analysis. Through its representational device, the Lens Model, SJT has become a widely used, systems-oriented perspective for analysing human judgement in specific ecological circumstances. Judgements are assumed to result from the integration of different cues or sources of perceptual information from the environment. Special advantages accrue to the SJT approach when criterion values (or correct values) for judgement are also available, as (...) this permits the comparison of judgement processes to environmental processes and leads naturally to the generation of cognitive feedback as an aid to facilitate learning. In contrast to more prescriptive approaches to decision analysis, the SJT approach analyses judgements by decomposing the judgement process after judgements have been rendered. This a posteriori decomposition is accomplished by first using multiple regression analysis to recover prediction equations for both the judgement and ecological systems and then using the Lens Model Equation to compare those systems. SJT methods maintain close contact with ecological circumstances by employing the principle of representative design (which focuses on how the researcher obtains the stimuli for judgement) and avoiding unwarranted over-generalisations from nomothetic aggregation (e.g. averaging across judges) through the use of idiographic statistical analysis. SJT methods have proven valuable in the analysis of individual judgements as well as groupbased judgements where conflict becomes likely. (shrink)

Tutte le dottrine tradizionali, da quelle più arcaiche e "primitive" a quelle più evolute e articolate, hanno sempre affermato che l'uomo non è un essere solamente corporeo, sia pur dotato di ingegno e di intelligenza, ma è un essere dalla natura composita, formato da una parte materiale e da una o più componenti invisibili e "sottili" e che in lui risiede un principio immortale di origine divina o comunque soprannaturale. Secondo il modo di vedere tradizionale, l'uomo, per conoscere e realizzare (...) se stesso, deve pertanto prendere coscienza, in primo luogo ed essenzialmente, di questa sua natura di essere composito e immortale, e questa è una di quelle idee universali (per noi forse la più importante) che troviamo diffuse presso tutte le popolazioni del pianeta, anche se con sfumature diverse nelle varie tradizioni..."--Cover flap. (shrink)

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, under the prefecture of Joseph Ratzinger, published its instruction Donum vitae in 1987 to provide moral guidance on bioethical issues. Since 1987, many new ethical issues have arisen, especially in the areas of regenerative medicine (which includes stem cellresearch) and assisted reproduction. To address these the CDF, under the prefecture of William Levada, published the bioethical instruction Dignitas personae inDecember 2008. The present symposium includes reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the (...) new document by six moral theologians noted for theirwork in bioethics: Christian Brugger, John Finnis, Luke Gormally, Christopher Kaczor, William E. May, and Peter F. Ryan, S.J. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9.3 (Autumn 2009): 461–483. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 493 La Trinite Creatrice. By GILLES EMERY. Paris: Vrin, 1995. Pp. 590 (paper). It was only a question of when, not if, the late rejection of Thomism in Catholic circles would be followed by the next tum toward the thought of the Angelic Doctor. This movement is already underway, and on the European continent two groups of young Dominicans are playing prominent roles. In Toulouse, though he (...) only assumed its editorship in 1991, S.-T. Bonino already has made the venerable Revue thomiste indispensable reading again. Two recent thematic issues are especially noteworthy: "Autour d'Etienne Gilson" (94 [1994): 355-553) and "S. Thomas et l'onto-theologie" (95 [1995): 1-192). Bonino's own bulletins et recensions are erudite and lively, and he is very clear about the present situation: After the decline of the last decades, Thomism is searching for a new 6lan, a new look, and not without success:... the corpse of Thomism is stirring again. Though the new look is not yet complete, one feature is set: One common point unites all now approaching the works of St. Thomas, whatever their ultimate goals: the necessity to put Thomistic doctrine into serious historical perspective.... Historical-doctrinal study of St. Thomas is opening the possibility of an authentic revival of Thomism. (Revue thomiste 95 [1995]: 485-6) While Anglo-Americans approaching Aquinas from neoscholastic or analytic perspectives might not be so enthusiastic about history, Fr. Bonino is simply correct. For evidence, he turns to the historical work of the other group of Dominicans, at Fribourg. Chief among them is J.-P. Torrell, whose masterful 1993 biography, Initiation d saint Thomas d'Aquin, is now in English, and was accompanied by a Festschrift for the eminent professor of theologyOrdo sapientiae et amoris, ed. C.-J. de Oliveira. Not least among Torrell's contributions has been to direct the thesis of Gilles Emery-La Trinite creatrice. One paragraph of Emery's helpful general conclusion reveals three dominant themes in his important work: In virtue of the nexus mysteriorum, faith in the Trinity clarifies faith in the creative and saving activity of God, while the doctrine of creation in its turn clarifies our approach to the mystery of the Trinity. It is this mutual clarification and support among the articles of faith that we mean by speaking of the "function" of the theme of the creative Trinity. The unity of the Trinity in its works ad extra constitutes a fundamental rule of the trinitarian theology of our scholastics. But it does not exhaust their theological discourse on the subject of God as creator. To arrive at a balanced doctrine, trying to give all the aspects of the mystery their due, one must add to the rule of unity a second rule, which completes it: the procession of the divine persons is the origin of the procession of creatures. (519) Emery's primary theme is captured in the title-The Creative Trinity. Creation involves not only the one God as efficient cause bestowing existence 494 BOOK REVIEWS on a multitude of creatures (rule 1), but also the Trinitarian multiplicity within God as exemplar cause of the procession of creatures (rule 2). The neoscholastics ignored rule 2, separating creation (which was turned over to the philosophers) from Trinity (the exclusive domain of the theologians). This too neat division oflabor produced unhappy consequences: a doctrine ofcreation with no role for the Trinity, and a doctrine of the Trinity with no function in creation. What can be called Emery's Trinitarian theme is a corrective for such mistakes. To understand this side of creation rightly, Emery situates Aquinas's thought in relation to Albert and Bonaventure, on whom he heavily depends. This is his hi,storical theme. From the development of these two principal themes there gradually emerges a third, less overt, but in the long run of signal importance for the new look of Thomism-what might be called the integration theme, uniting reason and revelation in Aquinas's theology. To break through the crust that had built up around Aquinas's genuine doctrine of creation Emery turns to history. Limiting himself to the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, he finds the Trinitarian... (shrink)

Throughout the long history of Classic Maya hieroglyphs, a logosyllabic writing system used from the late first millennium BCE through the mid-second millennium CE in southern Mesoamerica, the most commonly recorded phonetic value was the syllable u (/ʔu/). With over a dozen different u hieroglyphs, Classic Maya scribes had more options for recording /ʔu/ than any other syllable or logograph. Cognitive approaches to writing systems typically attribute graphemic variation (i.e., alternation between signs with equivalent linguistic value) to semantic differences like (...) animacy or to non-linguistic factors like identity. Distribution of Classic Maya u hieroglyphs, however, suggests that morphosyntactic context influenced which grapheme scribes wrote and when. This case suggests that scribal knowledge of Classic Maya hieroglyphs included ideas about writing's relationship to language. It also highlights the cognitive relevance of morphosyntax for a writing system's users as they differentiate among graphic signs with identical linguistic denotation. (shrink)

It is not infrequently said that the true justification of moral beliefs lies in theology. I wish here to examine precisely what is meant by this contention, and by what arguments, if any, it can be substantiated. The view I am examining is not that the only valid reason for doing what is right is a theological reason ; as if we could know independently of theology what was right, but required a theological motive to make it reasonable to do (...) it. It is rather that the very fact that it is right is logically dependent on certain facts of a theological nature; or, to express the matter otherwise, that from certain theological propositions it is possible validly to draw certain conclusions in the form of propositions which state what I ought to do, and that this fact is the source of the validity of these latter propositions. This, however, is not yet a sufficiently precise account of the theory in question, since it might cover a number of different contentions, some of which I think may be reasonably maintained, while others, I think, may not. I propose to work towards a clearer formulation by considering certain arguments which have been advanced in order to deny outright the very possibility of arguing validly “from theology to ethics”; for I do believe that these arguments prove something , and rule out certain theories as untenable. (shrink)