This book explores the universe and its subsystems from the three lenses of evolutionary (diversifying), developmental (converging), and complex (adaptive) processes at all scales. It draws from prolific experts within the academic disciplines of complexity science, physical science, information and computer science, theoretical and evo-devo biology, cosmology, astrobiology, evolutionary theory, developmental theory, and philosophy. The chapters come from a Satellite Meeting, "Evolution, Development and Complexity" (EDC) hosted at the Conference on Complex Systems, in Cancun, 2017. The contributions will be peer-reviewed (...) and contributors from outside the conference will be invited to submit chapters to ensure full coverage of the topics. This book explores many issues within the field of EDC such as the interaction of evolutionary stochasticity and developmental determinism in biological systems and what they might teach us about these twin processes in other complex systems. This text will appeal to students and researchers within the complex systems and EDC fields.. (shrink)

This short essay reviews Robert Allinson’s edited collection, Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots. It begins with remarks on the hegemonic stance of Western philosophy in the arena of what ‘philosophy’ means. It then draws attention to the need for Chinese (and, more broadly, Asian) society to occupy a new position in global conversations, philosophical or otherwise. The review then turns to brief synopses of each of the articles that feature in the collection, returning the conversation to the broader (...) question of how to promote the dialogue for which Allinson’s volume calls. The reviewer suggests that, in addition to setting up collaborative organizations, Western philosophers should think more seriously about what and how to learn from their Eastern counterparts, and Eastern philosophers should begin writing ethical and political works which translate their pragmatic concerns into real conclusions about the values of our global culture. (shrink)

Part I. Space and Time in the History of Philosophy. The Concept of Space in Antiquity / Max Jammer. -- Aristotle and the Sea Battle / G.E.M. Anscombe. -- Questions About Time / St. Augustine. -- Space and Matter / Renè Descartes. -- Absolute Space and Time / Isaac Newton. -- The Relational Theory of Space and Time / Gottfried Leibniz. -- Place, Extension and Duration / John Locke. -- Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time / Immanuel Kant. -- Mirror (...) Images / Immanuel Kant. -- Newton's Views of Time, Space and Motion / Ernst Mach. -- The Unreality of Space and time / F.H. Bradley. -- Duration and Intuition / Henri Bergson. -- The Problem of Infinity Considered Historically / Bertrand Russell. -- Part II. Geomoetry and Physics. What is Geometry? / A.S. Eddington. -- Space and Geometry / Ernest Nagel. -- Non-Eucledian Spaces / Hans Reichenbach. -- Geometry and Definition of Congruence / Hans Reichenbach. -- Geometry as a Branch of Physics / H.P. Robertson. -- Part III. Space-Time and Relativity. Relativity / R.E. Peierls. -- Autobiographical Notes / Albert Einstein. -- The Four-Dimensional World / Moritz Schlick. -- Space and Time / H. Minkowski. The Philosophical Retention of Absolute Space in Einstein's General Theory of relativity / Adolf Grünbaum. -- Part IV. Recent Philosophical Analyses. Ostensible Temporality / C.D. Croad. -- Time : A Treatment of Some Puzzles / J.N. Findlay. -- Time and Language, and the Passage fo Time / Nelson Goodman. -- Time / W.V. Quine. -- Geometrical Objects / W.V. Quine. -- Spatial and Temporal Ananlogies and the Concept of Identity / Richard Taylor. -- Time, Irreversible Processes, and the Physical Status of Becoming / Adolf Grünbaum. (shrink)

Examples of extended cognition typically involve the use of technologically low-grade bio-external resources (e.g., the use of pen and paper to solve long multiplication problems). The present paper describes a putative case of extended cognizing based around a technologically advanced mixed reality device, namely, the Microsoft HoloLens. The case is evaluated from the standpoint of a mechanistic perspective. In particular, it is suggested that a combination of organismic (e.g., the human individual) and extra-organismic (e.g., the HoloLens) resources form part of (...) a common mechanism that realizes a bona fide cognitive routine. In addition to demonstrating how the theoretical resources of neo-mechanical philosophy might be used to evaluate extended cognitive systems, the present paper illustrates one of the ways in which mixed reality devices, virtual objects (i.e., holograms), and online (Internet-accessible) computational routines might be incorporated into human cognitive processes. This, it is suggested, speaks to the recent interest in mixed/virtual reality technologies across a number of disciplines. It also introduces us to issues that cross-cut disparate fields of philosophical research, such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

The Internet provides access to a global space of information assets and computational services. It also, however, serves as a platform for social interaction (e.g., Facebook) and participatory involvement in all manner of online tasks and activities (e.g., Wikipedia). There is a sense, therefore, that the Internet yields an unprecedented form of access to the human social environment: it provides insight into the dynamics of human behavior (both individual and collective), and it additionally provides access to the digital products of (...) human cognitive labor (again, both individual and collective). Such access is interesting from the standpoint of research into machine intelligence, for the human social environment looks to be of crucial importance when it comes to the evolutionary and developmental origins of the human mind. In the present paper, we develop a theoretical account that sees the Internet as providing opportunities for online systems to function as socially-situated agents. The result is a vision of machine intelligence in which advanced forms of cognitive competence are seen to arise from the creation of a new kind of digital socio-ecological niche. The present paper attempts to detail this vision with respect to the notion of socially-scaffolded cognition. It also describes some of the forms of machine learning that may be required to enable online systems to press maximal cognitive benefit from their new-found informational contact with the human social world. (shrink)

The World Wide Web (Web) provides access to a global space of information assets and computational services. It also, however, serves as a platform for social interaction (e.g., Facebook) and participatory involvement in all manner of online tasks and activities (e.g., Wikipedia). There is a sense, therefore, that the advent of the Social Web has transformed our understanding of the Web. In addition to viewing the Web as a form of information repository, we are now able to view the Web (...) in more social terms. In particular, it has become possible to see the Web as providing access to the human social environment. This is important, because issues of social embedding and social interaction have been seen to contribute to the emergence of human cognitive capabilities. The ability of the Web to provide access to the human social environment thus raises an important question: Can humanity play a productive role in the emergence of advanced forms of machine intelligence by virtue of their interactions and engagements with the online realm? The present paper attempts to show why this question is worth asking. It also attempts to highlight some of the ways in which Web-based forms of contact with the human social environment may be relevant to research into machine intelligence. (shrink)

An emerging consensus in cognitive science views the biological brain as a hierarchically-organized predictive processing system that relies on generative models to predict the structure of sensory information. Such a view resonates with a body of work in machine learning that has explored the problem-solving capabilities of hierarchically-organized, multi-layer (i.e., deep) neural networks, many of which acquire and deploy generative models of their training data. The present chapter explores the extent to which the ostensible convergence on a common neurocomputational architecture (...) (centred on predictive processing schemes, hierarchical organization, and generative models) might provide inroads into the problem of digital immortality. In contrast to approaches that seek to recapitulate the connectomic microstructure of the human brain, the present chapter advocates an approach that is rooted in the use of machine learning algorithms. The claim is that a future form of deep learning system could be used to acquire generative models of a given individual or (alternatively) the sensory data that is processed by the brain of a given individual during the course of their biological life. The differences between these two forms of digital immortality are explored, as are some of the options for digital resurrection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 327 claims. And both these tasks, perhaps more especially the former, are of urgent importance for the Christian theological community today. University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana PAUL J. GRIFFITHS WII,LIAM CHRISTIAN AND COMMUNITY DOCTRINES W ILLIAM CHRISTIAN'S book Doctrines of Religious Communities * is a vital contribution to the philosophy of religion, for a number of reasons. First, it goes beyond the individualism that secretly (...) underlies much writing in the field, where in effect the reader is invited to make judgments in isolation. Here he consciously addresses the problems raised by supposing realistically that we are dealing for the most part with more or less recognizable traditions and subtraditions embodied in various communities. Second, the logic of doctrinal claims has not been explored systematically before in relation to both their truth (or rightness, where they incorporate practical tenets) and their authenticity, as genuine do.ctrines of a given community. Third, the book raises some vital questions about the present shape of the world. For instance, the way in which the analysis fits non-religious but analogous cases (e.g. Romanian Marxism) is important; as also the question of how modern eclecticism fits into the picture. Moreover, it leads us to reflect on what happens when a community cannot decide whether certain doctrines or claims are authentic. One of the models Christian contemplates is represented as T/R-A, namely "}'or any sentence (s), ifs is true or right, then s is an authentic doctrine of the community": he offers this as a logical possibility though it is quite doubtful if any community holds it. He uses it to illuminate the alternative A-T/R. It is possible of course to make T/R-A more plausible by placing a restriction on the kind of truth or rightness involved, namely if it "New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 328 REVIEW SYMPOSIUM were in the same class as community doctrines, as defining a worldview and mode of conduct. Most truths of science would not be included, but some generalizations might he, e.g. statements about the srale of the universe or the evolution of homo sapiens which might be held to possess existential impact and a cosmological significance relevant to humanity's "place" in the universe. Christian deals with such problems in treating what he describes as alien secular claims, that is, claims which arise out of secular knowledge, and which may attract a positive evaJuation from the religious community. The evaluation itself would belong to the community 's doctrines and it would (let us suppose) commend the findings of science, for example as aiding a more discriminating worship of the Creator. But I think there is a discomfort in spiritual and intellectual life which arises because we typically belong to more than one community. Let us look upon the most typical primary communities as being four in number-the religious (or ideological) community, the nation, the world of science and practical knowledge, and humanity as a whole. the last is less developed in much human consciousness, but it is at least flickeringly there in most human beings. In modem times loyalties have been sectionalized by the nation State, which is manifested in a mosaic across the planet's surface embracing all human beings. Now it is often the case, and was more so in the past, that nation and religion were made artificially to coincide: to be an English citizen was to be an Anglican: as now you are supposed to be a Marxist if you are a Romanian. At the same time in most countries, through the agency of the State, there is universal education in which to some degree or other a person is inducted into the community of science and practical knowledge. The different communities tend to be in conflict, and so the individual is easily tom. Let me first, before tackling these issues, say a word about the notions of religion and ideology. It appears to me obvious that in many respects ideologies such as Marxism fulfil a function, or set of functions, very similar to those fulfilled by religions. Moreover, Marxisms are often in severe conflict with, and opposition to, religions... (shrink)

Take open-future Humeanism to comprise the following four tenets: (T1) that truth supervenes on a mosaic of local particular matters of fact; (T2) that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences; (T3) that there is a dynamic present moment; and (T4) that there are no future facts; that is, contingent propositions about the future obtain truth values only when their referents are actualised. Prima facie this is a deeply problematic metaphysic for the Humean, since given that the widely accepted (...) Humean conception takes all truths (inclusive of nomological truths) to supervene on an omnitemporal mosaic of local particular matters of fact, if there are no future facts, then the Humean can neither provide laws of nature, nor justify many everyday inductive inferences. However, I argue that this eternalist metaphysic is in tension with at least one of Hume’s central metaphysical claims concerning causation, e.g. that causal regularities may cease to hold at any time. In this paper I propose and defend one possible open-future Humean metaphysic which admits of “true-to-Hume” causal and nomological facts. Furthermore, although I am happy to concede that induction is problematic for the open-future Humean, I demonstrate that it poses no greater threat to the open-future conception than it does to the popular Lewisian conception of natural law. (shrink)

Thinking about thought -- Everything's an inference -- Out of context or the situation -- The rational unconscious -- The formerly dismal science -- Should you think like an economist? -- Spilt milk and free lunch -- Foiling foibles -- Coding, counting, correlation, and causality -- Odds and Ns -- Linked up -- Experiments -- Ignore the hippo -- Experiments natural and experiments proper -- Eekonomics -- Don't ask, can't tell -- Thinking, straight and curved -- Logic -- Dialecticism -- (...) Knowing the world -- Kiss and tell -- Keeping it real -- Whom to believe. (shrink)

Urban resilience is critical for ensuring the sustainability and adaptability of cities in the face of growing challenges such as climate change, population growth, and infrastructure degradation. Predictive analytics, powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT), offers a transformative approach to enhancing urban resilience. This paper explores how AI-driven predictive analytics can optimize disaster preparedness, infrastructure maintenance, and resource allocation in smart cities. By integrating real-time data from IoT sensors with advanced machine learning models, cities (...) can proactively address vulnerabilities and improve decision-making. This study highlights key applications, challenges, and future directions for leveraging predictive analytics to build resilient urban ecosystems. (shrink)

With the mobility and ease of connection, wireless sensor networks have played a significant role in communication over the last few years, making them a significant data carrier across networks. Additional security, lower latency, and dependable standards and communication capability are required for future-generation systems such as millimeter-wave LANs, broadband wireless access schemes, and 5G/6G networks, among other things. Effectual congestion control is regarded as of the essential aspects of 5G/6G technology. It permits operators to run many network illustrations on (...) a single organization while maintaining higher service quality. A sophisticated decision-making system for arriving network traffic is necessary to confirm load balancing, limit network slice letdown, and supply alternative slices in slice letdown or congestion. Because of the massive amount of data being generated, artificial intelligence and machine learning play a vital role in reconfiguring and improving a 5G/6G wireless network. In this research work, a hybrid deep learning method is being applied to forecast optimal congestion improvement in the wireless sensors of 5G/6G IoT networks. This proposed model is applied to a training dataset to govern the congestion in a 5G/6G network. The proposed approach provided promising results, with 0.933 accuracy, and 0.067 miss rate. (shrink)

In a world surrounded by smart objects from sensors to automated medical devices, the ubiquity of ‘smart’ seems matched only by its lack of clarity. In this article, we use our discussions with expert stakeholders working in areas of implantable medical devices such as cochlear implants, implantable cardiac defibrillators, deep brain stimulators and in vivo biosensors to interrogate the difference facets of smart in ‘implantable smart technologies’, considering also whether regulation needs to respond to the autonomy (...) that such artefacts carry within them. We discover that when smart technology is deconstructed it is a slippery and multi-layered concept. A device’s ability to sense and transmit data and automate medicine can be associated with the ‘sting’ of autonomy being disassociated from human control as well as affecting individual, group, and social environments. (shrink)

The Target Article “Non-invasive prenatal testing for ‘non-medical’ traits: ensuring consistency in ethical decision making” by Bowman-Smart et al. (2023) raises the important issue that “decision-...

: The dual perspective model of agency and communion predicts that observers tend to interpret a target’s behavior more in terms of communion than agency, whereas actors interpret their behavior more in terms of agency. The present research for the first time tests this model in real interactions. Previously unacquainted participants had a short conversation and afterwards rated their own behavior and their interaction partner’s behavior in terms of agency and communion. Supporting the dual perspective model, observers rated the actor’s (...) behavior higher on communion than on agency, and higher on communion than actors themselves did. Findings for actors were more complex: Actors rated their own behavior as more agentic than observers did. However, they also rated their behavior high on communion. We discuss implications for the dual perspective model as well as for understandings in social interactions. (shrink)

Chinese cities are increasingly using digital technologies to address urban problems and govern society. However, little is known about how this digital transition has been implemented. This study explores the introduction of digital governance in Shenzhen, one of China's most advanced smart cities. We show that, at the local level, the successful implementation of digital systems faces numerous hurdles in long-standing data management and bureaucratic practices that are at least as challenging as the technical problems. Furthermore, the study finds (...) that the digital systems in Shenzhen entail a creeping centralisation of data that potentially turns lower administrative government units into mere users of the city-level smart platforms rather than being in control of their own data resources. Smart city development and big data ambitions thereby imply shifting stakeholder relations at the local level and also pull non-governmental stakeholders, such as information technology companies and research institutions, closer to new data flows and smart governance systems. The findings add to the discussion of big data-driven smart systems and their implications for governance processes in an authoritarian context. (shrink)

This review of Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group's Simple heuristics that make us smart focuses on the role of heuristics in discovery, invention, and hypothesis-testing and concludes with a comment on the role of heuristics in population growth.

I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...) effect, construing the relation between physical and mental properties as a supervenience relation?although he was not yet using the word ?supervenience?. I assumed that a materialistic metaphysics was correct, and that integral to materialism is the idea that higher-level sciences (including psychology) are reducible to lower-level ones?ultimately to microphysics. One idea I pressed in the dissertation was that biconditional ?bridge laws? would not suffice for genuine intertheoretic reduction if these inter-level laws were additional fundamental laws of nature alongside those of the reducing science; they would be what Herbert Feigl and J.J. C. Smart, in their writings on the psychophysical identity theory, called ?nomological danglers.? I argued that the higher-level property in a bridge law should bear a relation of strict supervenience to its correlated lower-level property, rather than merely being nomically correlated with it. The basic idea was that there are no two physically possible worlds w1 and w2?where a physically possible world is, roughly, a world in which the laws of microphysics obtain and in which there are no nonphysical substances like entelechies or Cartesian souls?such that the actual-world bridge laws obtain in world w1 but not in world w2. (Thus, the bridge laws themselves are fixed relative to the fundamental physical facts and fundamental laws, rather than being fundamental laws themselves alongside those of microphysics.) Already when. (shrink)

Articles: Smart, "Quine's Philosophy of science"; Harman, "An Introduction to 'Translation and Meaning', Chapter Two of Word and Object"; Stenius, "Beginning with Ordinary Things"; Chomsky, "Quine's Empirical Assumptions"; Hintikka, "Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation"; Stroud, "Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation"; Strawson, "Singular Terms and Predication"; Grice, "Vacuous Names"; Geach, "Quine's Syntactical Insights"; Davidson, "On Saying That"; Follesdal, "Quine on Modality"; Sellars, "Some Problems about Belief"; Kaplan, "Quantifying In"; Berry, "Logic with Platonism"; Jensen, "On the Consistency of a Slight (...) (?) Modification in Quine's New Foundations"; Quine, "Replies"; Publications of W. V. Quine. (shrink)

A history of the history of philosophy. Smart deals with representative thinkers in short chapters, expounding and criticizing their doctrines and methods. All of them are found inadequate, though perhaps Bergson and Jaspers less so than the others. In his concluding chapter Smart outlines a view of his own which seems to incorporate the major stresses of the criticized views. He views philosophy as a continuing dialectical play of sometimes antithetical ideas of the past and present: a dialectic (...) which makes the history of philosophy an integral part of philosophy but not the whole of the enterprise. Every philosophy makes its contribution and all reveal their short-comings in the trans-historical dialectic of philosophy itself.--W. G. E. (shrink)

This book is both an introduction to the philosophy of religion and a defence of the reasonableness, though not a proof of the truth, of Christianity. The topics of miracles, freedom, God's existence, religious experience, and evil are taken up in that order, with Hume, Kant, Aquinas, Otto, and Tennant serving as points of departure for the various discussions. Smart's approach to philosophy of religion runs counter to contemporary mainstreams. He sees the traditional problems, as traditionally formulated, as genuine (...) problems. Religions make claims to truth, and the defenders of religion must show that it is reasonable to believe that such claims are true. Smart's arguments are clear and lucid, but he does not seem to fully appreciate the force of objections to traditional Christian theism.—A. E. J. (shrink)

Throughout the philosophical tradition there usually have been those philosophers who have either denied the existence of mental entities outright, or else have claimed that they were, in some sense, reducible to physical entities. And, on this score, the twentieth century has been no exception. In the last twenty or so years, the various denials of the existence of mental entities have taken three distinct forms. First, there is the sort of behaviorism advocated by Quine and Ryle. Second, there is (...) the materialism of J. J. C. Smart and D. M. Armstrong. And, third, there is the so-called Identity Theory as advocated by Donald Davidson, Thomas Nagel, and a host of others too numerous to mention. (shrink)

In this, the Henriette Hertz Philosophical Lecture for 1965, Geach adopts a shotgun technique to save Time from the reductionists, both physicalistic and idealistic. The victims of the blasts are variously Quine, Smart, and McTaggart; Russell does not escape unscathed either. At the back of Geach's seeming arbitrary dismissal of various forms and consequences of the reduction of Time lurks an ontology of substance fortified by what Geach envisages as the successful development of a logic of temporal concepts based (...) on modal logic. The key to this ontology emerges at crucial points as the basic inviolability of first-person knowledge and discourse: e.g., "we do know that our plans and purposes radically alter our physical environment, and there's an end on't; any contrary [deterministic] theory, however plausibly argued, just has to be false".—E. A. R. (shrink)

The 1964 Congress of the Australasian Association of Philosophy was the occasion for the delivery of the five major papers in this volume. Comments by J. J. C. Smart on four of the papers are included, since, not surprisingly, discussion of the identity theory was centered almost exclusively around Smart's formulation of it. Of the four papers upon which Smart commented, three are very critical of the identity theory while the fourth is sympathetic but uncommitted. The fifth (...) paper, "Ryle and the Mechanical Hypothesis," is a greatly expanded version of the paper Brian Medlin read to the Congress. Medlin's paper is largely an ad hoc defense of central state materialism against objections which might be raised by a Rylean. Rollins and Herbst have added replies to Medlin's paper; Herbst's comments are, in particular, quite acute in the way in which they bring out the ideological undersurface of the identity theory. In the critical papers, Gunner argues that Smart has not sufficiently clarified the notion of identity so as to make the thesis meaningful; Rollins argues that Smart has failed to notice the context-dependency of an explanation, i.e., an explanation is an explanation for some--but not necessarily all--purposes; Herbst suggests that Smart has given no intelligible account of how the identity theory could be verified without begging the question. In his "Comments" Smart reaffirms his faith in physicalism and announces his recent conversion to a Feyerabendian contextual account of a truth. This conversion solves all the difficulties of the theory. The effects are inconclusive, when not evasive.--E. A. R. (shrink)

This volume can be considered a supplement to A. Plantinga's similar book on the Ontological argument, and includes classic texts and contemporary commentary on both the Cosmological and the Teleological arguments, though there is no extended consideration of the problem of evil as it bears particularly on the Teleological argument. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Kant give the classic arguments for and against the Cosmological argument. Geach, Edwards, Plantinga, and Penelhum provide the contemporary commentary. Paley, Hume, Mill, and Kant state (...) and criticize the classical Teleological argument, while A. E. Taylor, Ducasse, and Broad provide the contemporary rejoinder. A concluding postscript includes articles by Smart and Taylor, with a brief selection from Tillich. It is helpful to have as much of the material as is possible on the theistic arguments under one cover. It is unfortunate, however, that editorial limitations and imagination were not stretched or reapportioned to provide some contemporary commentary from outside the orbit of Anglo-American philosophy. In addition, the editor's introduction contains some serious misstatements about the classical Cosmological arguments. The classical argument did not maintain in any sense that God is a "self-causing cause" or that the "Prime Mover is not only the initial member in a temporal series..." ; God is not "the initial member in a temporal series" at all. Nor does the editor distinguish between natural theology and the philosophy of religion; something close to obfuscation is the consequence of this failure in his remark that linguistic analysis has "demonstrated that a definition of God is the starting point for the philosophy of religion."—E. A. R. (shrink)

Policymakers need to start considering the impact smart connected toys (SCTs) have on children. Equipped with sensors, data processing capacities, and connectivity, SCTs targeting children increasingly penetrate pervasively personal environments. The network of SCTs forms the Internet of Toys (IoToys) and often increases children's engagement and playtime experience. Unfortunately, this young part of the population and, most of the time, their parents are often unaware of SCTs’ far-reaching capacities and limitations. The capabilities and constraints of SCTs create severe side (...) effects at the technical, individual, and societal level. These side effects are often unforeseeable and unexpected. They arise from the technology's use and the interconnected nature of the IoToys, without necessarily involving malevolence from their creators. Although existing regulations and new ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence provide remedies to address some of the side effects, policymakers did not develop these redress mechanisms having children and SCTs in mind. This article provides an analysis of the arising side effects of SCTs and contrasts them with current regulatory redress mechanisms. We thereby highlight misfits and needs for further policymaking efforts. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s defense of a Lockean representationalist theory of perception is both tightly and boldly argued. It is a first-rate analytic dissection of the relevant arguments for and objections against the representationalist position and takes up swords with D. M. Armstrong, J. J. C. Smart, G. J. Warnock, Aune, Anscombe, Price, and others, with meticulous care. It is equally forthright in accepting and defending implications of the theory which have heretofore, for one reason or another, caused the less clear (...) and more timid to quiver, if not tremble. For example, in dealing with the question whether sense-data exist in space, he writes, "I am sometimes asked why I do not follow the lead of those who locate mental objects in a special, private space. To me, this is like saying, ‘I find it mysterious that mental objects are in normal space, so I will locate them in mysterious space'". (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

Introduction: All is trash that reason cannot reach : unenlightened writers and the postmodern world -- Learning to read, learning to listen in Robinson Crusoe -- The hymns of Isaac Watts and postmodern worship : aesthetic knowledge as a response to the Enlightenment critique of religion -- Jonathan Swift's information machine and the critique of technology -- Christopher Smart's poetry and the dialogue between science and theology -- Festival and discipline in revolutionary France and postmodern times -- Remembering things (...) past : tradition as a way of knowing in Edmund Burke and Hans-Georg Gadamer -- Reconciling the heart with the head : the poetry of William Cowper and the thought of Michael Polanyi. (shrink)