Understanding terrestrial carbon metabolism is critical because terrestrial ecosystems play a major role in the global carbon cycle. Furthermore, humans have severely disrupted the carbon cycle in ways that will alter the climate system and directly affect terrestrial metabolism. Changes in terrestrial metabolism may well be as important an indicator of global change as the changing temperature signal. Improving our understanding of the carbon cycle at various spatial and temporal scales will require the integration of multiple, complementary and independent methods (...) that are used by different research communities. Tools such as air sampling networks, inverse numerical methods, and satellite data allow us to study the strength and location of the global- and continental-scale carbon sources and sinks. Bottom-up studies provide estimates of carbon fluxes at finer spatial scales and examine the mechanisms that control fluxes at the ecosystem, landscape, and regional scales. Bottom-up approaches include comparative and process studies that provide the necessary mechanistic information to develop and validate terrestrial biospheric models. An iteration and reiteration of top-down and bottom-up approaches will be necessary to help constrain measurements at various scales. We propose a major international effort to coordinate and lead research programs of global scope of the carbon cycle. (shrink)

Nella prima parte del volume (Lineamenti generali) viene analizzata sotto un profilo storico-critico l’interpretazione del cristianesimo data dalle più significative correnti filosofiche del Novecento italiano: dal neotomismo all’idealismo, dall’esistenzialismo alle più recenti temperie speculative, come l’ermeneutica ed il “pensiero debole”. Pagine di approfondimento vengono dedicate anche al rapporto tra cristianesimo e politica, così come viene preso in esame sia da autori di tendenza marxista che liberale. In tal modo viene effettuato un excursus che mette in luce il contributo originale di (...) alcune posizioni filosofiche tipicamente italiane e che, allo stesso tempo, evidenzia la fecondità di domande che il messaggio cristiano ha per il lógos umano. La seconda parte del libro (Percorsi di approfondimento) è costituita da cinque saggi sul rapporto tra fides et ratio così com’esso è stato tematizzato in autori e contesti ricchi di intuizioni originali ma che talvolta non hanno trovato adeguati spazi nelle ricostruzioni storiografiche. In particolare ci siamo soffermati sul kantismo di Filippo Masci, sul personalismo di Luigi Stefanini (letto come “ermeneutica filosofica” ante litteram), sul “tomismo essenziale” di Cornelio Fabro, sull’ontologismo di Augusto Del Noce, sull’epistemologia di Dario Antiseri. Tali indagini storiografiche prendono le mosse dall’idea giobertiana della poligonìa del cristianesimo, contraddistinto da una pluralità di confessioni, liturgie e spiritualità: esso non è religio “ad una sola dimensione” ma è un evento in grado di dar vita a molteplici ermeneutiche della condizione umana, a molteplici metodologie che, pur con differenti accentuazioni, tendono ad ampliare gli orizzonti della ragione umana. La Weltanschauung ebraico-cristiana fa intravvedere alla ragione i suoi limiti costitutivi ma, allo stesso tempo, apre ad essa dimensioni di senso e di ulteriorità, altrimenti inattingibili. (shrink)

Reduced self-awareness is a well-known phenomenon investigated in patients with vascular disease; however, its impact on neuropsychological functions remains to be clarified. Importantly, selective vascular lesions provide an opportunity to investigate the key neuropsychological features of reduced self-awareness in neurocognitive disorders. Because of its rarity, we present an unusual case of a woman affected by a combined polar and paramedian bilateral thalamic infarction. The patient underwent an extensive neuropsychological evaluation to assess cognitive, behavioral, and functional domains, with a focus on (...) executive functions. She was assessed clinically in the acute phase and after 6 months from the stroke, both clinically and by magnetic resonance imaging. The patient developed a cognitive impairment, characterised by prevalent executive dysfunction associated with reduced self-awareness and mood changes, in terms of apathy and depression. Such condition persisted after 6 months. In May 2020, the patient underwent the serology test in chemiluminescence to detect IgG antibodies against SARS-CoV-2. The result of the quantitative test highlighted a high probability of previous contact with the virus. We suggest that reduced self-awareness related to executive dysfunction and behavioral changes may be due to combined polar and paramedian bilateral thalamic lesion. Metacognitive–executive dysfunction affecting the instrumental abilities of everyday life might make people less able to take appropriate precautions, facilitating the risk of SARS-CoV-2 contagion. (shrink)

Il volume analizza il tema della soggettività umana così come esso è stato affrontato nel pensiero francese del Novecento, a partire dal clima filosofico dello spiritualismo fino agli esiti teoretici della stagione post-strutturalista. Il presente lavoro vuole offrire l’occasione per approfondire e problematizzare le questioni del soggetto umano e dell’identità personale tramite lo specifico contributo che a queste tematiche hanno dato grandi autori del clima filosofico francese, un clima particolarmente ricco di prospettive speculative e soprattutto aperto al confronto critico con (...) le scienze umane, tra queste la psicoanalisi in particolare. La prima parte del volume (Lineamenti generali) delinea i principali tratti delle diverse filosofie che hanno caratterizzato il Novecento francese: in essa vengono presi in considerazione lo spiritualismo, il personalismo, l’esistenzialismo, lo strutturalismo, l’ermeneutica e la stagione di pensiero comunemente definita post-moderna. Si tratta di un excursusche descrive in maniera sintetica le metodologie tramite le quali i temi della soggettività e della persona sono stati affrontati nei diversi contesti filosofici. Nella seconda parte del libro (Percorsi di approfondimento) presentiamo undici saggi nei quali le tematiche della soggettività e dell’identità personale vengono trattate in riferimento ad uno specifico autore e contesto storiografico. Nei saggi sono presi in esame il concetto di riconoscimento intersoggettivo (Anerkennung) elaborato da Alexandre Kojève a partire dai suoi studi hegeliani, la figura emblematica dell’homme révolté in Albert Camus, la nozione di persona in Emmanuel Mounier e in Jacques Maritain, l’ontologia dell’homo capax in Paul Ricoeur, la decostruzione del sé in Jacques Derrida, il significato dell’alterità in Emmanuel Lévinas, l’ermeneutica del sé in Michel Foucault e l’analisi ontologica della soggettività compiuta da Alain Badiou. Gli ultimi due saggi del libro si caratterizzano per un approfondimento del tema della soggettività in ambito psicoanalitico: essi vertono sulle questioni sollevate da una “clinica del soggetto” e si rivolgono in particolare al pensiero di Jacques Lacan e di René Kaës. (shrink)

This paper deals with Kant’s view of a “philosophical chiliasmus”, by which it is to be understood the political hope of a perpetual peace between the world’s states. In his philosophical and political writings, Kant shows how this peace can be achieved through diplomatic means, trying to define the original concept of a “cosmopolitical right” (Weltbürgerrecht). This paper aims at highlighting the modernity of Kant’s political perspective, which has been renewed and developed in the twentieth century by many philosophers and (...) jurists as Hans Kelsen and John Rawls. (shrink)

The paper proposes a new understanding of the relationship that links philosophy and literature, assuming the Greek tragedy of the 5th century BC as the exemplary occasion for the development of this enquiry. In this perspective, moving from the original interpretation of the tragedy recently offered by Pierre Judet de La Combe, the paper shows how the specific cognitive function of the tragedy, understood as “artistic form”, consists in its ability to bring to manifestation, in exemplary way, the “conditions of (...) sense” that make possible any knowledge of experience, with the consciousness of the aesthetical-imaginative and not logical-conceptual character of these same conditions. From this point of view, the critical and reflexive function of the tragedy is due – according to the Adornian interpretation – to the autonomy of the “form”, i.e. to the sensible configuration of the tragedy. What emerges, here, is the “non-reproductive” but “productive” nature of the tragic form: what it offers to the spectator is not the representation of a sense already given in the world, but rather an “indefinite opening to meaning”, i.e. a form able to construct an indeterminate multiplicity of “possibilities of sense”. (shrink)

The paper proposes a focus upon the notion of “aura” as it emerges from the work of Baudelaire. In particular, the paper shows how the relevance of such a work lies precisely in its capacity to critically interrogate the relationship between art, aura and modernity: in its capacity to exhibit exemplary, on the one hand, the irremediable decline of aura understood as “uniqueness” and “originality” of the artwork (therefore, the aura as expression of a sense given once and for all) (...) and, on the other hand, the possible survival of an aura conceived rather as appearance of an inaccessible “distance”, and then of an irreducible otherness. From this point of view, in staging a short-circuit between spleen and idéal, i.e between “myth” and “hope”, the Baudelairian artistic form offers itself to us as an expression of authentic “auratisation of the datum”. (shrink)

Which standards should we employ to evaluate the global order? Should they be standards of justice or standards of legitimacy? In this article, I argue that liberal political theorists need not face this dilemma, because liberal justice and legitimacy are not distinct values. Rather, they indicate what the same value, i.e. equal respect for persons, demands of institutions under different sets of circumstances. I suggest that under real-world circumstances – characterized by conflicts and disagreements – equal respect demands basic-rights protection (...) and democratic participation, which I here call ‘political justice’. I conclude the article by considering three possible configurations of the global order – the ‘democratic world-state’, ‘independent democratic states’, and ‘mixed’ models – and argue that a commitment to political justice speaks in favour of the latter. (shrink)

Principles of distributive justice bind macro-level institutional agents, like the state. But what does justice require in non-ideal circumstances, where institutional agents are unjust or do not e...

In this paper we show that the usual intuitionistic characterization of the decidability of the propositional function B prop [x : A], i. e. to require that the predicate ∨ ¬ B) is provable, is equivalent, when working within the framework of Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory, to require that there exists a decision function ψ: A → Boole such that = Booletrue) ↔ B). Since we will also show that the proposition x = Booletrue [x: Boole] is decidable, we can (...) alternatively say that the main result of this paper is a proof that the decidability of the predicate Bprop [x : A] can be effectively reduced by a function ψ A → Boole to the decidability of the predicate ψ = Booletrue [x : A]. All the proofs are carried out within the Intuitionistic Type Theory and hence the decision function ψ, together with a proof of its correctness, is effectively constructed as a function of the proof of ∨ ¬ B). (shrink)

L’articolo qui riproposto e apparso originariamente nel 1988 anticipa alcune questioni fondamentali trattate nel presente numero, in riferimento alla collaborazione tra il video-artista Paolo Rosa e il suo gruppo Studio Azzurro e il regista teatrale Giorgio Barberio Corsetti. L’articolo sottolinea come l’incontro tra video-arte e teatro, tra arti tecnologiche e arti performative, rinnovi uno dei tratti caratteristici della pratica artistica moderna, dalla letteratura alle arti visive e performative: lo statuto del soggetto, in cui è in gioco l’interazione tra l’interno e (...) l’esterno della vita, della coscienza e dell’esperienza individuale. La collaborazione di Rosa e Studio Azzurro con Barberio Corsetti si collega così alla tradizione artistica moderna, sottolineata in modo particolare dall’opera letteraria di Rainer Maria Rilke. (shrink)

A prominent view in contemporary political theory, the ‘associative view’, says that duties of justice are triggered by particular cooperative relations between morally significant agents, and that ‘therefore’ principles of justice apply only among fellow citizens. This view has been challenged by advocates of global justice, who point to the existence of a world-wide cooperative network to which principles of justice apply. Call this the challenge from geographical extension. In this paper, I pose a structurally similar challenge to the associative (...) view: the challenge from species extension. This says that the existing network of cooperation extends beyond the human species, to encompass some non-human animals, particularly domesticated dogs. In light of this, if one believes that (i) certain non-human animals are morally significant (i.e. objects of moral concern), and that (ii) justice applies to fellow cooperators, one should also hold that domesticated dogs are owed justice in much the same way our human fellow citizens are. I conclude by considering the implications of this argument for the associative view, and animal-rights theory. (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of the obligation to obey the law is its content-independence. We ought to do what the law commands because the law commands it, and not because of the law's content—i.e., the independent merits of the actions it prescribes. Despite its popularity, the notion of content-independence is marked by ambiguity. In this paper, I first clarify what content-independence is. I then develop a simple test—the “content-independence test”—which allows us to establish whether any candidate justification of the (...) obligation to obey the law delivers genuine content-independence. I apply this test to prominent such justifications and conclude that several of them, surprisingly, fail it. (shrink)

One of the main characteristics of the contemporary aesthetic debate is the recovery of the concept of mimesis, as a dimension that is originally involved in the foundation of human culture and the processes of cultural learning. This is evident in the aesthetic reflection developed by Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf. For these two authors, mimesis is never a mere reproduction of the given reality, but always implies the production of the New, of the Other, of the different with respect (...) to the empirical world, i.e. to the existing categorical order of the world. In particular, Gebauer and Wulf underline the constitutive ambivalence of the notion of mimesis: on the one hand, it favors the processes of reification fueled by capitalist society and, on the other hand, it contributes to the affirmation of a critical and “utopian” instance that can counter “instrumental reason” and the primacy of identity. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to show how the reading of Kafka’s Prometheus offered by Hans Blumenberg in Arbeit am Mythos authorizes a re-understanding of this short story as a device within which the meta-representative moment and the questioning moment are configured as two indissolubly linked aspects. In this perspective, starting from the recognition of the key role played by the mechanism of irony in the construction of the Kafkaesque short story, the article aims to highlight the three different (...) levels of articulation of such a mechanism, with particular reference to its ability to exhibit – at the same time – the transcendibility of the datum and the need to think the sense as «infinite deferral». (shrink)

Il volume analizza il pensiero trascendentale di Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) nei suoi elementi costitutivi. In particolare viene messo in evidenza che l’intento principale della filosofia fichtiana è quello di edificare un “sistema della libertà”, fondato sul primato del pratico (das Praktische) e dei costitutivi pratici della coscienza umana: l’intuizione intellettuale, l’immaginazione produttiva, lo Streben ed in primis il volere. Viene quindi sottolineato che uno dei vertici della speculazione di Fichte è rappresentato dal concetto di “volere puro” che costituisce il (...) fondamento del conoscere e dell’agire, determinando la natura stessa dell’uomo e dell’assoluto. Nel volume vengono ampiamente utilizzati i nuovi testi messi a disposizione dall’edizione critica delle opere fichtiane curata da Reinhard Lauth: particolare attenzione viene data ai manoscritti di lezioni Dottrina della scienza nova methodo (1796-99) e all’epistolario intercorso tra Fichte e F.H. Jacobi sul rapporto tra la riflessione filosofica e la fede religiosa. Nella parte finale del libro compaiono due Appendici: la prima è dedicata al filosofo bretone Jules Lequier (1814-1862), autore che - ispirandosi a Fichte - elabora una filosofia della libertà tesa a superare una concezione della natura umana deterministica e positivistica; la seconda Appendice è incentrata sull’originale interpretazione del pensiero cartesiano data da Reinhard Lauth (1919-2007): quest’ultimo scorge nel cogito cartesiano il fondamento di una filosofia trascendentale ante litteram che anticipa le posizioni di Kant e di Fichte e che pone le basi per un “pensiero trascendentale della libertà”. -/- AUTORE Tommaso Valentini (Spoleto, 1979) è professore associato di “Filosofia politica” presso l’Università degli Studi “Guglielmo Marconi” di Roma, dove insegna anche “Storia della filosofia moderna”. È docente incaricato di “Ermeneutica filosofica” presso la Pontificia Università Antonianum. Nel 2003 si è laureato in Filosofia sotto la guida del Prof. Armando Rigobello; nel 2008 ha conseguito il titolo di Dottore di ricerca (PhD) in “Etica e antropologia filosofica” presso l’Università degli Studi del Salento. Dal 2006 al 2008, grazie ad una borsa di studio, ha condotto le sue ricerche sul pensiero classico tedesco a Monaco di Baviera presso la Ludwig-Maximilians Universität e la Fichte-Kommission dell’Accademica Bavarese delle Scienze. Dal 2015 è membro del Consiglio nazionale dell’ADIF (Associazione Docenti Italiani di Filosofia). È co-direttore della rivista scientifica on line «Aretè. International Journal of Philosophy, Human & Social Sciences». Ha pubblicato numerosi articoli su Kant, J.G. Fichte, il personalismo e l’ermeneutica filosofica (in particolare Paul Ricoeur). Tra le sue pubblicazioni: Soggetto e persona nel pensiero francese del Novecento, Editori Riuniti university press, Roma 2011; I fondamenti della libertà in J.G. Fichte, Editori Riuniti university press, Roma 2012; Filosofia e cristianesimo nell’Italia del Novecento, Drengo Edizioni, Roma 2012; nel 2015 è stato curatore del volume Natura umana, persona, libertà. Prospettive di antropologia filosofica ed orientamenti etico-politici, LEV, Roma 2015; nel 2017 è stato curatore (con il Prof. Luca Mencacci) del volume collettaneo dal titolo “La dialettica esaurita? A 100 anni dalla Rivoluzione d’Ottobre. Interpretazioni politiche, filosofiche, estetiche”, Presentazione del Prof. Rocco Pezzimenti, Drengo Edizioni, Roma; per la rivista «Aretè» ha curato (con il Prof. Andrea Gentile) due numeri monografici: nel 2017 il volume dal titolo “A partire da Kant: interpretazioni e metamorfosi del trascendentale”, nel 2019 il volume dal titolo “Dialettica. Sui molteplici significati di un concetto teoretico e storico-politico”. (shrink)

Apresentamos uma experiência de convivência entre uma professora e seus estudantes atuando em parceria e legitimidade, na qual a aprendizagem emerge a partir de um fluir de coordenações de ações recursivas. O texto se constitui como uma narrativa cartográfica que “mapeia” o fluir das ações e dos movimentos relacionados à convivência. Para explicar as experiências vivenciadas foi feito o uso da Teoria da Biologia do Conhecer, proposta por Humberto Maturana e por Francisco Varela, em especial os conceitos de convivência, de (...) coordenações de ações recursivas, de acoplamento estrutural e de autopoiese. Nessa perspectiva teórica, a aprendizagem é um processo intersubjetivo que acontece na experiência, em acoplamento com a estrutura do sujeito e do meio. A abertura ao fluir das ações, a parceria entre professora e estudantes, em legitimidade, são aspectos que permitiram a emergência de experiências com potencial de desencadear movimentos autopoiéticos relacionados aos processos de ensinar e de aprender. Dentre elas, destacam-se a meditação, aqui pensada a partir do conceito de Enação, e o Conversar Liberador, que oferece princípios para desencadear movimentos de observação de si e de autotransformação. Por fim, através da narrativa cartográfica, apresentamos algumas pistas para práticas pedagógicas articuladas aos princípios apresentados. Entendemos que a missão de educar, sob esse ponto de vista, constitui-se em uma incumbência grandiosa, que implica em ter fé e amor pela vida nas suas diferentes dimensões, atitude que poderá contribuir com a emergência de uma nova consciência planetária, que sustente o viver e o conhecer alicerçado em uma outra forma de ser e de estar na experiência humana. (shrink)

This article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to (...) a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism. (shrink)

This article has as its theme the relationship between "power", "reason" and "religion" in O alienista, one of the central texts of Machado de Assis, written in 1881 and initially published in eleven chapters, between October 1881 and March 1882. It is intended to identify and analyze the power relations between the State ("Throne") and the Catholic Church ("Altar"); as well as to highlight the relations between "reason" (science) and its "absence" (madness); without neglecting the Machadian denunciations and criticisms of (...) scientism prevailing in the nineteenth century. To do so, at first, it is presented, even if summarily, the Author and the Tale; in a second moment, shedding lights on its "space", "time" and "action" its plot, necessary assumption for the last moment, where the "Power", "Reason" and "Religion" will be analyzed. This research is justified by the relevance of the author, the place that the alienist occupies in the set of his works, as well as the social relevance of his ironic criticisms. In this analysis, a bibliographic method of critical-analytical reading of the Tale was used, using also the interpretations of some scholars, listed in the References. (shrink)

Observa-se, no Brasil, um movimento significativo para consolidação de escolas inclusivas em que estudantes com deficiência possam encontrar efetivas possibilidades de aprendizagem. Este artigo apresenta uma revisão de literatura realizada com o objetivo de identificar, em artigos nacionais, os principais desafios à inclusão de estudantes com deficiência física em escolas comuns. Para situar a análise, uma discussão introdutória a respeito do conceito de deficiência física permite compreendê-lo como uma construção influenciada pelo paradigma ou modelo de deficiência. A revisão de literatura (...) foi realizada utilizando o banco de dados do Portal de Periódico da Capes, por meio do cruzamento dos descritores deficiência física, inclusão escolar, educação inclusiva e paralisia cerebral. Os 29 artigos selecionados foram analisados utilizando a análise de conteúdo qualitativa. O presente artigo apresenta uma discussão de quatro categorias. A análise permitiu identificar aspectos específicos relativos à inclusão de estudantes com deficiência física. Em relação à formação de professores, os estudos destacam as demandas ocasionadas pela perspectiva da inclusão e as críticas à formação inicial e continuada. Outros aspectos evidenciados são o desconhecimento acerca da tecnologia assistiva ou de seu uso, a falta de recursos e as barreiras que os estudantes continuam enfrentando. Os estudos apontam, ainda, à necessidade de dar maior apoio às equipes multidisciplinares nas escolas e à importância das adaptações curriculares à aprendizagem e ao desenvolvimento dos estudantes com deficiência. As pesquisas revelam que estamos longe ainda de ter as condições ideais para aprendizagem e desenvolvimento integral de estudantes com deficiência física em nossas escolas. Palavras-chave: Deficiências físicas. Inclusão educacional. Educação inclusiva. Educação especial. (shrink)

Laura Valentini’s Justice in a Globalized World presents, with admirable clarity, a new, hybrid conception of global justice that builds on insights from both cosmopolitans and statists, especially their relational variants. Relational cosmopolitans generally argue that substantial economic cooperation and interdependence (i.e., the relevant economic relations) trigger robust obligations of distributive justice. They then argue that, as a matter of fact, these relations obtain globally in virtue of intensifying global trade, capital flows, and labor migration. Thus, relational cosmopolitans conclude (...) that obligations of distributive justice directly apply to the global economic order. Relational statists, by contrast, argue that obligations of distributive justice are trigged by coercive, political relations. Furthermore, these coercive relations only obtain—and can only be justified—within a state. As a consequence, the global order is a ‘secondary site’ of justice that ought to be con. (shrink)

This paper presents an attempt to solve Laura Valentini’s ideal theory paradox, in a way which makes me think of G.E. Moore but I shall leave the classification of the solution to the experts. I also discuss the claim that philosophy is so easy.

Revisiting the 1927 Solvay conference and the early interpretation of quantum mechanics Content Type Journal Article Category Essay Review Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9555-z Authors Martin Jähnert, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Boltzmannstraße 22, 14195 Berlin, Germany Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Il testo analizza, attraverso il confronto Cristianesimo-Ebraismo in H.de Lubac e Y. de Montcheuil, il problema del dialogo interreligioso e i suoi rischi.

Background Journal editors are responsible for what they publish and therefore have a duty to correct the record if published work is found to be unreliable. One method for such correction is retraction of an article. Anecdotal evidence suggested a lack of consistency in journal policies and practices regarding retraction. In order to develop guidelines, we reviewed retractions in Medline to discover how and why articles were retracted. Methods We retrieved all available Medline retractions from 2005 to 2008 and a (...) one-in-three random selection of those from 1988 to 2004. This yielded 312 retractions (from a total of 870). Details of the retraction including the reason for retraction were recorded by two investigators. Results Medline retractions have increased sharply since 1980 and currently represent 0.02% of included articles. Retractions were issued by authors (63%), editors (21%), journals (6%), publishers (2%) and institutions (1%). Reasons for retraction included honest error or non-replicable findings (40%), research misconduct (28%), redundant publication (17%) and unstated/unclear (5%). Some of the stated reasons might have been addressed by corrections. Conclusions Journals' retraction practices are not uniform. Some retractions fail to state the reason, and therefore fail to distinguish error from misconduct. We have used our findings to inform guidelines on retractions. (shrink)

Background: Breaches of publication ethics such as plagiarism, data fabrication and redundant publication are recognised as forms of research misconduct that can undermine the scientific literature. We surveyed journal editors to determine their views about a range of publication ethics issues. Methods: Questionnaire sent to 524 editors-in-chief of Wiley-Blackwell science journals asking about the severity and frequency of 16 ethical issues at their journals, their confidence in handling such issues, and their awareness and use of guidelines. Results: Responses were obtained (...) from 231 editors (44%), of whom 48% edited healthcare journals. The general level of concern about the 16 issues was low, with mean severity scores of <1 (on a scale of 0–3) for all but one. The issue of greatest concern (mean score 1.19) was redundant publication. Most editors felt confident in handling the issues, with <15% feeling “not at all confident” for all but one of the issues (gift authorship, 22% not confident). Most editors believed such problems occurred less than once a year and >20% of the editors stated that 12 of the 16 items never occurred at their journal. However, 13%–47% did not know the frequency of the problems. Awareness and use of guidelines was generally low. Most editors were unaware of all except other journals’ instructions. Conclusions: Most editors of science journals seem not very concerned about publication ethics and believe that misconduct occurs only rarely in their journals. Many editors are unfamiliar with available guidelines but would welcome more guidance or training. (shrink)

Studies examining the ways in which the training of engineers and scientists shapes their research strategies and scientific identities.

Institutional investors are increasingly becoming active owners through voting their shares and engaging in dialogue with investee companies to improve corporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance. This article applies a model of stakeholder salience to the shareholder context, analysing the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, to determine the factors that are likely to enhance shareholder salience. It is found that a strong business case and the values of the managers of investee companies are likely to be the (...) most important contributors to shareholder salience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:96 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY La Controri]orma della Dialettica: Coscienza e storia nel neoidealismo italiano. By Francesco Valentini. (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1966.Pp. 154.Paper, L. 1,500.) This volume consists of a re-examination of the views of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, in the light of their respective positions in the history of philosophy. Valentini proposes that some important notions in the philosophies of Croce and Gentile ]ustify a Kantian (...) interpretation and thus constitute a counter-reformation with respect to some important assumptions in Hegel's doctrine. This proposal is especially interesting with regard to Croce, since it contradicts Croce's evaluation of his own position as representing a furtherance of the viable portions of Hegel's system, just as Hegel's system is supposed to represent a furtherance of Kant's view. Moreover, since Croce's evaluation follows from his general philosophic assumptions, Valentini's proposal attacks not only Croce's evaluation of his own position, but also his views on the nature of history and philosophy. According to Valentini, the views of Croce and Gentile agree in the abandonment of the "dogmatism" of Hegel and in a return to a transcendental philosophy which examines the conditions which make experience possible, rather than experience itself, in its concrete, historical development. (Gentile's view is supposed to be fundamentally the same as Croce's, save that Gentile's conclusions are more radical and thus, according to Valentini, more deo structive.) However, according to Valentini, this return to an examination of the nature of consciousness represents a retrogression, not only historically, but also philosophically with respect to the empirical and historical portions of Hegel's philosophy. In Chapter I of Part I, Valentini begins his discussion of Croce's notion of spirit, by stating that Croce generally professed an antitheological and antimetaphysical attitude, but that his intended resolution of the religious and theological into the mundane is not always complete. Accordingly, Valentini believes that he has discovered two prejudices which derive from this incomplete resolution: the first is supposed to be a monistic prejudice, which means the attempt to reduce all aspects of reality to the same characteristic or structure; and the second--a bias towards "inwardness", which shows preference for everything which can be reduced to the autonomous operation of consciousness. Chapter II examines Croce's view of the nature of consciousness, as well as the subjective aspects of his views of historical judgment. The relations between the forms of experience, aesthetic, conceptual and practical are discussed and criticized according to the views of modem psychology. Croce's subjectivism is supposed to lie in his notion that all history is contemporary and is formed by a kind of cognitive construction of the past. Here Valentini maintains that Italian idealism has made a "subjective correction" of Hegel's philosophy of history. Chapter IH treats of the development of Croce's views on historicism and describes his attitude as being characteristic of anti-enlightenment doctrines of the nineteenth century. Chapter IV traces what Valentini believes to be a certain ambivalence in Croce's aesthetics, that is, a vacillation between two themes which are supposed to be present throughout Croce's philosophy--the idealist theme which emphasizes the nature of consciousness and the theme of historicism. The idealist aspect can be perceived in Croce's theory of intuition and above all, in certain romantic developments of his doctrine, such as, the vindication of the character of "cosmic totality" and in the notion of the "eternality" of artistic expression. The theme of historicism can be found in some corrections which Croce made in his theory of intuition, as well as in some judgments and literary preferences, which are not completely reconcilable with his theoretical formulations. The fifth and last chapter of Part I treats of Croce's ethical doctrine and generally distinguishes between the views of Croce and Hegel on this topic. The second part of Valentini's work discusses Gentile as a philosopher of consciousness and is divided into four chapters. The topic of Chapter I is the attitude which is presupposed by the philosophy of "actual" idealism. This philosophy demands an unshakable faith in an ideal, a mission to accomplish... (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the study of equality-free logic, that is, first-order logic without equality. We mainly devote ourselves to the study of algebraic characterizations of its relation of elementary equivalence by providing some Keisler-Shelah type ultrapower theorems and an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type theorem. We also give characterizations of elementary classes in equality-free logic. As a by-product we characterize the sentences that are logically equivalent to an equality-free one.

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)