Abstract‘Synod’ and ‘synodality’ have become synonymous with Pope Francis. Since Pope Paul VI instituted the Synod of Bishops as a permanent office in 1965, there hasn't been any pontificate that has given these matters as much profile and attention as his has. Why is this the case, and what is Pope Francis’ vision for a synodal Church? More fundamentally, what is synodality, according to tradition of the Church, and Pope Francis? Several years into both local and global synodal-type processes and (...) formation gatherings, it seems many people, even prominent Church leaders, readily admit that they still do not fully understand it. For this reason, this article sets out to provide a general overview and introduction. (shrink)

This collection of essays represents the work of fifteen scholars in four disciplines: philosophy, theology, sociology, and cultural studies. It offers an interdisciplinary reflection on the role and impact of technology in society, focusing on the i.

Eamonn Callan; McLaughlin on Parental Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467.

Suppose your friends had to ascribe a single vice to you in large measure, along with any virtues that could be coherently combined with that salient vice. Suppose further that the vice had to be either cowardice or impatience. Which would you choose? I believe almost everyone would choose impatience without hesitation. There are sound moral as well as purely self-regarding reasons for despising cowardice, and to that extent our preference would be reasonable. If we say that a man who (...) is a coward is also compassionate, we know that his compassion cannot be relied upon in any circumstances where it must contend with fear, and if he has a sense of justice, that will be useless if oppression has to be resisted. We cannot even expect him to pursue his own good whenever he perceives that to be hazardous, and so even the self-regarding virtues are corrupted by his dominating vice. On the other hand, a pronounced impatience may seem to be compossible with abundant virtue. Those who are just but cannot patiently endure tyranny are perhaps the most formidable threat to tyranny, and people who boldly go out to seize their own good often fare rather better than those who patiently await its arrival. (shrink)

Any liberal democratic state must honour religious and cultural pluralism in its educational policies. To fail to honour them would betray ideals of freedom and toleration fundamental to liberal democracy. Yet if such ideals are to flourish from one generation to the next, allegiance to the distinctive values of liberal democracy is a necessary educational end, whose pursuit will constrain pluralism. The problem of political education is therefore to ensure the continuity across generations of the constitutive ideals of liberal democracy, (...) while remaining hospitable to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those very ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this crucial problem. In lucid and elegant prose, Professor Callan, one of the world's foremost philosophers of education, identifies both the principal ends of civic education, and the rights that limit their political pursuit. This timely new study sheds light on some of the most divisive educational controversies, such as state sponsorship and regulation of denominational schooling, as well as the role of non-denominational schools in the moral and political development of children. Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. The series editors are David Miller and Alan Ryan. (shrink)

How does teaching veer? In what ways can we tell if a literature lesson veers constructively or otherwise? How do we determine its limits and the correlations between success or failure in our teaching when — individually or collectively — we veer in a novel, a short story or a poem? If veering, as Nicholas Royle argues, can offer us a more dynamic critical vocabulary for reading literary works by developing singular responses to risk, failure, uncertainty and difficulty, then surely (...) it can also be a profitable way to determine the peripheries of pedagogical practice, what we can and cannot expect from the experience of education. Using the example of the short story ‘Powder’ by Tobias Wolff, and the responses from a given class in the specific context of reading this story, this article examines moments of veering and the difficulties of responding responsibly to the vicissitudes of what I will call moments of unlearning. The questions are, can we veer from theories of literature to theories of teaching? Have critique and difficulty (critique as an experience and practice of difficulty) run aground in our current context? Is it time, consequently, to veer away from difficulty as the purpose of teaching and learning? And if so, what would that veering look like as a practical pedagogical action? (shrink)

Popular filmic and literary stereotypes of teachers from Brodie and Chips to Keating and Schneebly have not only reflected a public desire for radically innovative and perverse teaching practices, but also created those paradigms in ways that are not always readily identifiable or traceable. This article seeks to analyse tensions between traditional institutional protocols and contemporary populist opinion on the role of the effective teacher. In doing so, the article takes Peter Weir’s Dead Poets Society (1989) as a primary example (...) of those tensions and argues for a perverse ‘foolosophical’ view of pedagogical performance and a new appreciation for the necessity of ignorance in the classroom. Since ignorance and understanding are not taken as unambiguous antonyms, the article proposes that effective teaching and learning occur most effectively in the interstices between humility and hospitality. (shrink)

Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing (...) autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals. (shrink)

Autonomy as a personal ideal presupposes a conception of the self who owns and rules in a life that exemplifies the ideal. Philosophical discussion of autonomy continues to be injuenced by the thesis that the governing core of the self resides in our capacities for disengaged rational reflection, even when the thesis is not explicitly avowed. This conception of autonomy is shown to be inadequate because it alienates us from what matters in our lives. An alternative conception of autonomy is (...) presented that accords a substantial role to rejection and choice within an autonomous life without falling preq, to the charge of alienation. Some divergent implications of the two rival conceptions of autonomy for an understanding of liberal education are examined. Finally, the question of the value of autonomy from a social perspective is briefly discussed. (shrink)

What does it mean to be un? This is not my question; it’s Jacques Rancière’s. In what follows I assign myself the simple task of explaining this turbulent little prefix and of recounting what this un connotes in Jacques Rancière’s work. More specifically, I tease out what it means in view of his prodigious writings on the politics and practice of education, of what it means to teach, to learn, and to fail to do either, of the aftermath of knowing (...) what it means to know that one does not know what one is doing when one conscientiously engages in teaching and learning, and how that uncertain knowledge can initiate an emancipatory awareness of what is often referred to in Rancière’s work as... (shrink)

Electron redistribution is the cornerstone of our understanding of chemical reactivity. For the vast majority of organic reactions electrons are assumed to move in pairs providing explanatory mechanisms through the generation of intermediate structures. But for many transformations these discrete steps are idealized constructs, involving intermediates assumed but not empirically justified. This unitary perspective predicated on the curved arrow formalism has resulted in the scenario where for many organic transformations our supposed understanding far surpasses our growing knowledge. Reformulating organic mechanisms (...) to include single electron transfer as a component of, or an alternative to, the prevailing iconic descriptions can provide for a more empirically adequate mechanistic description. In addition using the language of SET presents an opportunity to unify mechanistic concepts under a common donor/acceptor framework. (shrink)

Pity is an emotion which is intimately connected with virtue. If I were impervious to anger I could still be a paragon of rectitude. My emotional peculiarity might even be explained by moral saintliness. If I had a pitiless heart my entire life would surely be an abject moral failure. The imputation of an inability to pity strikes us as a damning moral criticism; it is one we are likely to make, for example, against those who commit acts of extreme (...) cruelty. Yet pity is hardly ever welcomed by its recipients, and for that reason it differs in a puzzling way from other emotions which are closely associated with virtue, such as gratitude or compassion. The prospect of becoming an object of pity is alarming, and not merely because we fear the misfortune that would evoke pity in others; it is alarming in part because we suspect that being on the receiving end of that emotion could seriously aggravate our plight. We also regard an aversion to being pitied as commendable, perhaps even morally commendable. There is something shameful in wanting to be pitied, just as there is in the indulgence of self-pity. The aged and the physically disabled do not want our pity, as a rule, and we think better of them for not wanting it. Finally, we know that those who give pity are frequently guilty of serious wrongdoing. A pitiless heart may be a terrible thing, but a fondness for dispensing pity is scarcely any better. (shrink)

Educational practices that encourage children to understand ethical diversity commonly conflict with the parental desire to instil unswerving identification with a particular way of life. This paper examines whether the scope of parents’ rights to educational choice includes the option of vetoing such practices. Although parents’ rights are no less important than the rights of their children, the option of denying children experiences that would expose them to ethical diversity cannot be rightfully claimed by any parent without repudiating the egalitarian (...) basis of rights discourse. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Faith, Worship and Reason in Religious Upbringing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 183–193, https://do.

Anne Conway’s Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, first published in 1690, is probably the most ambitious contribution to early modern metaphysics by a woman writing in the English language. This beautifully prepared edition makes Conway’s treatise available to twentieth-century readers in an accessible English translation of the 1690 Latin text—itself a translation of an original English manuscript that has long been lost.

Eamonn Callan; Freedom and Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 45–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1983.

Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness (...) are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered. (shrink)

Why Ayn Rand is important -- Rand's life and writings -- A timeline of Rand's life and work -- Outline of Rand's worldview -- Rand on the nature of reality -- How we understand the world -- Rand on morality -- Politics and economics -- Rand on public issues -- The nature and importance of art -- Rand's novels -- Rand's critics -- Quotations by and about Rand.

Why does knowledge of philosophy presuppose knowledge of reality? What are the characters in Deleuze’s theatre and philosophy? How are his famous metaphysical distinctions secondary to the concept of philosophy as practice and politics? These questions are answered through careful analysis and application of Deleuzian principles.

It is argued that the generality of strong reciprocity theory (SRT) is limited by the existence of anonymous spontaneous cooperation, maintained in the absence of punishment, despite free-riding. We highlight how individual differences, status, sex, and the legitimacy of non-cooperation need to be examined to increase the internal and ecological validity of SRT experiments and, ultimately, SRT's external validity.

Eamonn Callan; Godless Moral Education and Liberal Tolerance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 267–281, https://doi.or.

This article provides a phenomenological understanding of contemporary sport and its digital game incarnation. The latter is highlighted as, currently, an example par excellence of what Martin Heidegger referred to as Enframing : the essence of modern technology that discloses being only in its availability for consumption. This concept is clarified and compared with a phenomenological comprehension of art and play. Building upon these notions, the physical sport and its digital emulation are compared and contrasted, illustrating how key criteria for (...) play and artwork are met or nullified. Finally, we come to a diagnosis of the sport digital game in its current form, suggesting how it may meet these criteria through acknowledgement and appreciation of its technological basis. (shrink)

We respond to criticisms of our paper “The Free Will Theorem”, and produce a new form of the theorem based on weaker assumptions.

This paper suggests that certain characteristics of resourcerelated conflict reveal areas of contemporary Just War Theory that are insufficiently rigorous or robust in their current form. Water security in particular, reveals ambiguity in the Just War framework’s treatment of the jus ad bellum criteria of ‘just cause,’ which in turn challenges the credibility of the entire system. The insufficiency that is exposed has consequences for the effectiveness and cogency of the bodies of international law and global community, which are fundamentally (...) based, and function according to, this predominantly Western moral framework. Key problem areas relating to flexible notions of ‘aggression,’ coincide with a persistent dilemma of simultaneously advocating responsibility to a global community while maintaining sovereign rights and security. Focusing on the ‘just cause’ criteria, justification for acts of war over certain resources is evaluated. Worryingly, the same powerful strategic reasons that might motivate a state to engage in what would otherwise be labelled a ‘realist’ war over certain resources, appear to gain moral merit through interpretation of the jus ad bellum in the specific case of water security, while argument against military action appears increasingly absolutist and impractical. The aim here then is to show the vulnerability of a dangerous prescriptive void in the Just War framework itself. Central to this is the question of the moral weight and significance, if any, of vital resources, as defined by strategic and humanitarian necessity. (shrink)

Educational practices which reinforce cultural diversity are often commended in the name of pluralism, though such practices may be condemned on the same grounds if they are seen as a threat to the fragile sense of political unity which holds a pluralistic society together. Therefore, the educational implications of pluralism as an ideal are often ambiguous, and the ambiguity cannot be resolved in the absence of a clear understanding of the particular civic virtues which a pluralistic society should engender. Two (...) influential conceptions of civic education which purport to affirm the ideal of pluralism are examined and both are found wanting. Liberal political theory proclaims the paramount importance of justice in public life, and justice can be construed in a way that accomodates diversity. However, the kind of civic education which liberalism entails does too little to restrain the centrifugal forces latent in cultural diversity. Communitarian political theory exalts civic friendship as the supreme public virtue, but the civic education it supports is compatible with only a highly attenuated cultural diversity. A third alternative is canvassed which combines the liberal stress on justice with a conception of patriotism distinct from civic friendship. The implications of this alternative for disputes about bias in public schools are briefly discussed. (shrink)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Philosophy of Education, Department of Educational Foundations.