The paper expands on Goshal’s criticism of what management as a scientific discipline teaches and the effects on managerial and societal ethics. The main argument put forward is that the economisation of management has a detrimental effect on the practice of management and on society in large. The ideology of economism is described and analysed from an epistemological perspective. The paper argues that the economisation of management not only introduces the problems of economics (three are identified and discussed) but destroys (...) the very essence of management because economics is focused on efficiency and management should be focused on effectiveness. What is more, the basic axioms of mainstream economics stand in stark contrast to the philosophy of the Enlightenment and therefore endanger the foundations of Western societies. Management theory (via corporate governance) is the Trojan horse carrying economism into society. (shrink)

"I do solemnly swear" -- Economics in practice : what do economists do? -- Ethical challenges confronting the applied economist -- Historical perspective : "don't predict the interest rate!" -- Interpreting the silence : the economic case against professional economic ethics -- The economic case against professional economic ethics : a rebuttal -- The positive case for professional economic ethics -- Learning from others : ethical thought across the professions -- Economists as social engineers : an ethical evaluation (...) of market liberalization in the south and transition economies -- Global economic crisis and the crisis in economics -- On sleeping too well : in search of professional economic ethics -- Training the "ethical economist" -- The economist's oath. (shrink)

Economists, who adopt the principle of consumer sovereignty, treat preferences as unquestioned for the purposes of their analysis. They also represent preferences for future outcomes as having value in the present. It is shown that these two characteristics of neoclassical modelling rest on similar reasoning and are essential to achieve high aggregatability of preferences and values. But the meaning and broader implications of these characteristics vary according to the arguments given to support these methodological choices. The resulting ambiguities raise (...) questions regarding economists' attitudes towards the study (by other disciplines) of preference formation and reformation. Under a strong, positivist interpretation (which is philosophically problematic), consumer sovereignty represents a rejection of any meaningful study of these subjects; under a weaker, methodological understanding, consumer sovereignty merely draws a boundary between economics and other disciplines. The weaker version is argued to be more defensible, and economists are urged to engage in interdisciplinary work that will clarify how preferences are formed, criticised and reformed. (shrink)

Released in 1984, Steven E. Rhoads' classic was considered by many to be among the best introductions to the economic way of thinking and its applications. This anniversary edition has been updated to account for political and economic developments - from the greater interest in redistributing income and the ascendancy of behaviorism to the Trump presidency. Rhoads explores opportunity cost, marginalism, and economic incentives and explains why mainstream economists - even those well to the left - still value free (...) markets. He critiques economics for its unbalanced emphasis on narrow self-interest as controlling motive and route to happiness, highlighting philosophers and positive psychologists' findings that happiness is far more dependent on friends and family than on income or wealth. This thought-provoking tour of the economist's mind is a must read for our times, providing a clear, lively, non-technical insight into how economists think and why they shouldn't be ignored. (shrink)

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, many economists have blamed economics for having failed to warn us. Paul Krugman, for example, in a well-known New York Times Magazine article, suggests that Classical economists were blinded by the beauty of mathematics, and that Keynesian economics is the path of the future. This paper argues that the evolution of economic thinking is much more nuanced than Krugman portrays it, and that instead of embracing what has become known (...) as Keynesian economics, macroeconomists should rather re-embrace the broader Classical economic tradition, of which Keynes was an important part. (shrink)

The economics of happiness is an influential research programme, the aim of which is to change welfare economics radically. In this paper I set out to show that its foundations are unreliable. I shall maintain two basic theses: (a) the economics of happiness shows inconsistencies with the first person standpoint, contrary claims on the part of the economists of happiness notwithstanding, and (b) happiness is a dubious concept if it is understood as the goal of welfare policies. These two (...) theses are closely related and lead to a third thesis: (c) happiness should be replaced by autonomy as the fundamental goal of welfare economics. To defend my claims I shall show that a hedonic approach to happiness leads to an awkward trilemma. Furthermore, I shall clarify the meaning of and , along with their conceptual relationships. (shrink)

The environmental economic response to mainstream neo-classical economics’ disconnect from the natural world was to value external environmental costs and include those into decisions about human welfare. The ecological economic response, heavily influenced by systems ecology, brought the concept of ecological scale or carrying capacity, as a limit to human choice. The divisions between these two theories are not merely cosmetic as illustrated by the highpolitical stakes in recent economic and environmental debates. This article concerns itself specifically with the question (...) how Christian economists position themselves towards the unfolding ecological and economic crises. It is shown that the main positions taken in the policy debates on economy and ecology are closely mirrored in the broader Christian economic community, raising the question whether the Christian economic tradition does have anything particular to offer in response to the ecological and economic crises. We approach this question from two angles, first, reviewing the literature on an earlier debate by the Association of Christian Economists on what Christian economists should be doing and, second, reviewing the literature on the relationships between Christianity and environmental beliefs and behaviour. With reference to eco-theological literature on the varying theological views on the relationship between humanity and the rest of creation, and on different expectations of the eschaton, it is shown why such diverging positions are taken among Christian economists. Nevertheless, the objective reality of Jesus Christ demands a particular Christian ethics and behaviour, which in turn, kindles fertile questions for Christian economists in their practical engagement withthe economic and ecological sciences and with broader culture. (shrink)

Abstract Sam Peltzman has brought discipline and common sense to economic analyses of voting and representation. Yet his approach suffers, like that of other economists, from disciplinary provincialism and a singular devotion to econometrics as a research methodology. Political science offers alternative models and research methods that can enliven and deepen the political analyses of Peltzman and other economists.

Around the globe, economists affect markets by saying what markets are doing, what they should do, and what they will do. Increasingly, experimental economists are even designing real-world markets. But, despite these facts, economists are still largely thought of as scientists who merely observe markets from the outside, like astronomers look at the stars. Do Economists Make Markets? boldly challenges this view. It is the first book dedicated to the controversial question of whether economics is performative--of (...) whether, in some cases, economics actually produces the phenomena it analyzes.The book's case studies--including financial derivatives markets, telecommunications-frequency auctions, and individual transferable quotas in fisheries--give substance to the notion of the performativity of economics in an accessible, nontechnical way. Some chapters defend the notion; others attack it vigorously. The book ends with an extended chapter in which Michel Callon, the idea's main formulator, reflects upon the debate and asks what it means to say economics is performative.The book's insights and strong claims about the ways economics is entangled with the markets it studies should interest--and provoke--economic sociologists, economists, and other social scientists.In addition to the editors and Callon, the contributors include Marie-France Garcia-Parpet, Francesco Guala, Emmanuel Didier, Philip Mirowski, Edward Nik-Khah, Petter Holm, Vincent-Antonin Lépinay, and Timothy Mitchell. (shrink)

This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations to (...) “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of motivations as actors throughout the economy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the reaction to Owen’s work in the circle associated with the liberal Journal des Économistes. It attempts to reconstruct the liberal argument against utopian socialist schemes of ‘regeneration’ and ‘redistribution’, and against those associated with Robert Owen in particular. It focuses on the works of Louis Reybaud (1799–1879) and Adolphe Blanqui (1798–1854) and their critical engagement with the writings of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen. It offers a detailed analysis of Reybaud’s Études sur les réformateurs, ou socialistes (...) modernes (1840), which did much to popularise the term ‘socialist’ in France, and Blanqui’s Histoire de l’économie politique en Europe depuis les anciens jusqu’à nos jours (1837). The article’s central argument is that these works appeared at an inflection point in the history of liberal political economy in France. Both started from the premise, shared with the socialist authors they were analysing, but increasingly suspect to liberal economic opinion, that the solution to the social question lay in the proper harnessing of the spirit of association as opposed to unregulated competition. The question at issue for Blanqui and Reybaud was what form this ‘associationism’ should take. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to provide a slightly different spin on economists' use of the positive-normative distinction by providing some context for its use. The major difference is the following: philosophers and philosophically oriented economists, such as Hilary Putnam and John Davis, see the positive-normative distinction in economics as following from the logical positivist position, and they interpret comments made by economists as reflecting scientific methodological positions that have long since been repudiated by philosophers of (...) science. This article argues that economists' use of the positive-normative distinction developed from the Mill–Keynes methodological tradition, which did not hold logical positivist views. Instead, it had pragmatic purposes and was designed to encourage economists to be more modest in their claims for the implications of economic theory. We conclude by arguing that economist's current use of the positive-normative distinction is problematic, as Davis suggests, but th.. (shrink)

Economics is today among the most influential of all professions. Economists alter the course of economic affairs and deeply affect the lives of current and future generations. Yet, virtually alone among the major professions, economics lacks a body of professional ethics to guide its practitioners. Over the past century the profession consistently has refused to adopt or even explore professional economic ethics. As a consequence, economists are largely unprepared for the ethical challenges they face in their work.The Economist's (...) Oath challenges the economic orthodoxy. It builds the case for professional economic ethics step by step-first by rebutting economists' arguments against and then by building an escalating positive case for professional economic ethics. The book surveys what economists do and demonstrates that their work is ethically fraught. It explores the principles, questions, and debates that inform professional ethics in other fields, and identifies the lessons that economics can take from the best established bodies of professional ethics. George DeMartino demonstrates that in the absence of professional ethics, well-meaning economists have committed basic, preventable ethical errors that have caused severe harm for societies across the globe. The book investigates the reforms in economic education that would be necessary to recognize professional ethical obligations, and concludes with the Economist's Oath, drawing on the book's central insights and highlighting the virtues that are required of the "ethical economist."The Economist's Oath seeks to initiate a serious conversation among economists about the ethical content of their work. It examines the ethical entailments of the immense influence over the lives of others that the economics profession now enjoys, and proposes a framework for the new field of professional economic ethics. (shrink)

Physiocracy is still sometimes seen as an oddly archaic programme of agricultural development. The aim of this paper is to show that one of the Physiocrats’ prime concerns was to take the subject of agriculture out of international relations. The fiscal regime that was central to Physiocracy was designed to make every large territorial state self-sufficient and, by doing so, to break the connection between modern great power politics, the international division of labour, and the politics of necessity. From this (...) perspective, the memorandum that Victor Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau, sent to the Berne Economic Society in 1759, contains an early indication of what, had the Physiocratic programme ever been implemented in full, a world reformed on Physiocratic lines might have looked like. (shrink)

Economics is dominated by model building, therefore a comprehension of how such models work is vital to understanding the discipline. This book provides a critical analysis of the economist's favourite tool, and as such will be an enlightening read for some, and an intriguing one for others.

Since economies are dynamic processes driven by creativity, social norms, and emotions as well as rational calculation, why do economists largely study them using static equilibrium models and narrow rationalistic assumptions? Economic activity is as much a function of imagination and social sentiments as of the rational optimisation of given preferences and goods. Richard Bronk argues that economists can best model and explain these creative and social aspects of markets by using new structuring assumptions and metaphors derived from (...) the poetry and philosophy of the Romantics. By bridging the divide between literature and science, and between Romanticism and narrow forms of Rationalism, economists can access grounding assumptions, models, and research methods suitable for comprehending the creativity and social dimensions of economic activity. This is a guide to how economists and other social scientists can broaden their analytical repertoire to encompass the vital role of sentiments, language, and imagination. (shrink)

Thomas reviews economist Leland Yeager's Ethics as Social Science. Yeager presents an argument for a utilitarianism that in its commitment to a reality-oriented, practical, principled ethics of human happiness resembles Rand's Objectivism. The book incorporates a wide and varied literature, including virtually everything written on Objectivism. In sum, it is like an Old Right reconstruction of utilitarianism in response to Randian critiques. The principal shortcoming of the book is its lack of precision, novelty, and clarity in addressing philosophical problems. This (...) results in sloppy reasoning that renders its conclusions unconvincing. (shrink)

Most economists and some philosophers distinguish individual utilities from interpersonal social values. Even if challenges to that conceptual distinction can be met, further philosophically interesting questions arise. I pursue three in this paper, using, as context for the discussion, health economics and its attempt to discern empirically a social welfare function to help guide rationing decisions. (1) To discern these utilities and values in a manner that is morally appropriate if they are to influence rationing decisions, who should be (...) queried? To discern individual health state utilities, persons in precisely those states should be asked (generically, "patients"), but for social values, representatives of the general public should be. (2) To discern social values, what should representatives of the public be asked? They should be asked "person trade-off" (PTO) questions that encompass their own self-interest, not PTO questions that focus only on others. (3) What must public representatives understand before they respond to such questions? Despite the philosophically complex problem of patient adaptation, they should understand (among other things) the health state utilities elicited from actual patients with the conditions at issue. (shrink)

Most economists and some philosophers distinguish individual utilities from interpersonal social values. Even if challenges to that conceptual distinction can be met, further philosophically interesting questions arise. I pursue three in this paper, using, as context for the discussion, health economics and its attempt to discern empirically a social welfare function to help guide rationing decisions. (1) To discern these utilities and values in a manner that is morally appropriate if they are to influence rationing decisions, who should be (...) queried? To discern individual health state utilities, persons in precisely those states should be asked (generically, patients), but for social values, representatives of the general public should be. (2) To discern social values, what should representatives of the public be asked? They should be asked person trade-off (PTO) questions that encompass their own self-interest, not PTO questions that focus only on others. (3) What must public representatives understand before they respond to such questions? Despite the philosophically complex problem of patient adaptation, they should understand (among other things) the health state utilities elicited from actual patients with the conditions at issue. (shrink)

Drawing on research in the psychology of judgment and decision making, I argue that individual economists acting as experts in matters of public policy are likely to be victims of significant overconfidence. The case is based on the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, the nature of the task facing economists?as?experts, and the character of the institutional constraints under which they operate. Moreover, I argue that economist overconfidence can have dramatic consequences. Finally, I explore how the negative consequences of overconfidence (...) can be mitigated, and how the phenomenon can be reduced or eliminated. As a case study, I discuss the involvement of Western experts in post?communist Russian economic reforms. (shrink)

In this paper, I present some responses to an argument made by an economist in an online video: that when Britain leaves the European Union, it will be taking many high ranking universities with it, which will lead to an innovation deficit in the union. I present some responses by means of a pastiche of a widely read European fiction writer.

In Great Economists before Keynes, a chronological guide is included for readers wishing to trace the development of economic thought from early mercantilist writings to the pivotal work of John Maynard Keynes. Each article briefly discusses the life and enduring contributions of economists such as Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, David Ricardo, and Leon Walras. Wherever possible, portraits accompany the text. Mark Blaug is Emeritus Professor of the Economics of Education at the University of London Institute of Education, and (...) Consultant Professor at the University of Buckingham. He is the author of numerous articles and books in the field of economics and economic history, including Economic Theory in Retrospect, an established classic in the field. (shrink)

This article addresses the difficulties that the phases of economic evaluations give rise to in theory and practice. It provides a brief outline of the meaning of economism — as a term and a concept — and then explores the issues that are related to the measurement and monetary valuation of the items to be included in economic evaluations, otherwise known as the valuation problem. The article also deals with the commensurability problem and the intrinsic value problem. Finally, some of (...) alternatives and recommendations that can help avoid the pitfalls of economism are discussed. (shrink)

Jonathan Wolff is Professor of Philosophy at University College London. He is the author of Robert Nozick (1991), An Introduction to Political Philosophy (1996) and Why Read Marx Today (2002). He is currently working on a number of topics at the intersection of political philosophy and public policy.

Cet article s’intéresse à l’histoire et au contenu de la pensée corporatiste française pendant la période de l’Occupation. Dans ce cadre, son objet se limite cependant à l’étude de la contribution intellectuelle des seuls économistes français, et parmi eux uniquement aux universitaires. La référence à la pensée corporatiste concerne ici à la fois leurs analyses et leurs choix méthodologiques, ainsi que leurs réflexions en matière de politique économique. Notre article ne s’intéressera donc que très brièvement à l’origine strictement historique du (...) corporatisme à moins qu’elle ne recoupe certains des débats de fond qui ont eu lieu sous l’Occupation. La première partie de notre contribution porte sur le contexte de l’émergence de la pensée économique corporatiste pendant la période de l’Occupation allemande. La deuxième partie s’intéresse aux recherches universitaires qui ont tenté de mener un travail à dominante économique sur le corporatisme. Six auteurs voient leurs contributions mi... (shrink)

The current Covid-19 pandemic has attracted significant attention from epidemiologists and economists alike. This differs from the 1918–1920 Spanish influenza pandemic, when academic economists hardly paid attention to its economic features, despite its very high death toll. We examine the reasons for that by contrasting the ways epidemiologists and economists reacted to the Spanish flu at the time and shortly after the pandemic. We also explore, but less extensively, some economic and epidemiologic writings during the twenty-five years (...) that followed. (shrink)

Until quite recently, some economic methodologists (particularly, those who began their careers in the late 1970s) were of the opinion that Karl Popper was misguided about economics. Some others claimed that Popper said little about economics. Yet, many economics students who began their appreciation of Popper after reading his Open Society and Its Enemies have quickly realized how easy that book is to understand because it is a generalization of neoclassical economics in terms of both methodological individualism and situational analysis. (...) While today it might be easy to complain that basing one's understanding of Popper on neoclassical economics leads to a narrow and useless appreciation of Popper, this too is misleading. The problem is not neoclassical economics but neoclassical economists. After all, Popper himself thought the best way to teach economists about his views concerning methodology was to emphasize that his views can easily be understood as a generalization of neoclassical economics. (shrink)

We sketch out two basic paradigms informing banking practice: the economistic paradigm focusing on profit maximization and the humanistic one, serving the common good. We then highlight paradigmatic cases to explore how each of these business models fared during the quasi-natural experiment of the financial crisis. We find that many humanistic banks outperformed traditional economistic banks. Despite the uneven playing field humanistic banks fared remarkably well with regard to traditional financial performance judgements, muting criticisms of competitiveness. We find that overall (...) both paradigms can provide a basis for successful banking as long as social and financial value generation are blended. We conclude by providing lessons learned for better banking. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper compares two alternative answers to the question ?Who is the addressee of welfare economics?? These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics and have different implications for how welfare economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that welfare economics is addressed to a ?social planner?, whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined (...) as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice. The alternative contractarian answer is that welfare economics is addressed to individuals who are seeking mutually beneficial agreements; a contractarian recommendation has the form ?It is in the interests of each of you separately that all of you together agree to do x?. Each of these answers should be understood as a literary convention that uses a highly simplified model of politics. I defend the contractarian approach and show that it is less supportive of ?soft paternalism? than is the welfarist approach. (shrink)

Jeffrey Friedman credits Popper for calling attention to our scientific ignorance, but faults him for failing to recognize that we are at least as ignorant about politics as we are about science. He also credits Hayek for realizing that the public could not successfully engage in piecemeal economic regulation, but faults him for not recognizing that this is due to the public's ignorance of economic theory. Friedman suggests that the types of ignorance overlooked by Popper and Hayek compromise the very (...) possibility of democracy—or at least social democracy. He assumes, however, that the success of social democracy and “piecemeal social engineering” depend upon their ability to produce “good” policies. This does not do justice to Popper's views about democracy and piecemeal engineering, and it also presumes an underlying economism that Popper criticized—but to which Friedman and Hayek adhere. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, most Latin American countries have significantly expanded noncontributory pension programs. In explaining this wave of expansion, research has focused on the protagonism of left parties and social movements and on electoral competition, generally disregarding the roles of organized business and conservative policy experts. This article demonstrates, through a detailed analysis of Chile’s 2008 noncontributory pension reform, that conservative economists played active roles in formulating a noncontributory pension policy characterized by moderate, targeted, and “incentive-compatible” benefits and financed (...) by the general budget. The conservative design of the program facilitated broad support from employers and private pension funds, critical for the eventual passage of the reform. The analysis illustrates the need to incorporate business interests into explanations of welfare state reforms in Latin America and the broader Global South, in particular by distinguishing the interests of employers and private providers and by focusing on their interaction with conservative policy experts. (shrink)

Drawing on insights from evolutionary psychology and modern neuroscience, this paper highlights propositions about human nature that have far reaching consequences, when applied to leadership. We specifically examine the main factors of human survival and extend them to a model for leadership in the twenty-first century. The discussion concludes with an outlook on the organizational and structural conditions that would allow for better and more balanced leadership.

Listening, seeing and reading Gilles Deleuze has had an influence on my thinking more than most of the economic writings I have consulted over the past quarter of a century. This discovery and furtherance of knowledge enriched my reflection and also allowed me to go beyond the general philosopher, as a philosopher opening the way to new horizons. It makes the researcher aware that the most important thing is not the philosopher man but the man philosopher, i.e. the one who (...) writes something that touches a human being at his deepest level and concerns him in his life every day. New generations of economists should meditate on this by going beyond the chapel quarrels coming from the Schumpeterian dichotomy 'science versus ideology'. To quote one of Deleuze's main ideas, no thinking against anything has been important over a long period; what counts are thoughts for something new that affect people's lives, and which are produced with rigor. This opens the way to a thought for life and not against life, which is in line with the progress of research in methodology, where it is a question of giving more importance to social ontology as a level of analysis and not focusing solely on epistemology in the narrowest sense. (shrink)

Several stages can be identified in Darwin's effort to formulate natural selection. The first stage corresponded, roughly speaking, to the period up to 1844. It was characterized by Darwin's attempt to base his model of geographic speciation on an individualistic dynamics, with species understood as reproductively isolated populations. Toward the end of this period, Darwin's ignorance of the laws of variations and heredity led him to adopt varieties and species as the units of variations. This had the extremely important effect (...) of stimulating him to consider the process of speciation as involving populations. At the end of this period, Darwin also began to regard adaptation as being exclusively toward places in the economy of nature. Thus he faced the problem of integrating the process of natural selection with the process of speciation. Individual variants were the units that fueled the first process, whereas varieties produced new speices. There was no link between adaptation and speciation, except whatever could be supplied by a quasi-historical, developmental idea of optimizing the amount of life.In the second stage, I contend, Darwin's reading of Milne-Edwards crystallized his previous insights into a coherent whole. Milne-Edwards' comments on the advantage of functional specialization could readily be understood in terms of the advantage accruing to the individual, relative to other members of its species, from occupying a different niche. Milne-Edwards' discussion of the division of labor suggested that organisms which moved into unoccupied niches would enjoy reduced competition, and hence a differential advantage in survival and reproduction; thus they would induce the species to do likewise. Rather than base his explanation on an analogy with the artificial economy, Darwin chose the principle of the optimalization of the amount of life per unit area as the overall explanatory principle. The difficulties connected with integrating different levels of description were therefore circumvented, insofar as the problem of diversity and speciation was concerned. Although natural selection considered individuals as the units of selection, and the units of variations were varieties and species, the dynamics of the process understood in terms of natural selection, competition, division of labor and niches could give a plausible account of how individual advantage could be transferred to the species, and how diversity resulted from this mechanism. The problem of the different levels of descriptions was confined to how the properties of variations in individuals (in particular, the frequency of variations and their transmission) were responsible for the assumed variability characteristic of varieties and species. This problem Darwin never solved.A third stage occurred in 1858 with the amalgamation of the tree-of-life vizualization of the process of speciation. Speciation, geographic distribution, and systematics were all then embedded in a conceptual matrix with vast explanatory powers. (shrink)

Few disagree that altruism exists. The frequency and source of altruistic behavior remain mysterious, however.

A centipede can walk until it thinks about howit does so. Thereafter it stumbles, over thesheer impossibility of the information andcoordination required. Life in the economy islittle different. Those engaged in productionand exchange discover, pragmatically, ways tomake them work. Those observing the processsee, realistically, the immense improbabilitythat it should do so. That most economies workin practice, but must pass such toughteleological tests to succeed in theory,highlights a difference between players' andspectators' outlook which may help to explainwhy the game has repeatedly (...) been thrown wideopen just when conclusive results seemed withinreach.Section 1 of this paper identifies the fourforms of realism which economists have tendedto adopt. Section 2 considers the pragmatism ofeconomic agents, when observed in action bypsychologists and management scholars notoverly steeped in economic theory. Theconcluding section reviews the ways in whicheconomists have tried to blur the distinction,by reclassifying agents as realistic or theirown views as pragmatic, and suggests that amore pragmatic economics might bridge thedivide. (shrink)

Volume 17, Issue 5, November 2020, Page 494-509.

Pay-for-performance represents an effort to improve the quality of health care by paying physicians more if they meet specified target measures. There are both empirical and theoretical reasons to be deeply suspicious of P4P schemes applied at the level of the individual physician or health provider. Most P4P programs were implemented before there were any good data to demonstrate that they achieved the desired results. Once such schemes were in use, the available data are far from reassuring. Common findings are (...) that providers may do more of the specific procedure that is being measured, but in the process may neglect to do other things that equally affect quality of care. Payers often find that the cost of implementing a P4P program far exceeds the value of the very modest resulting improvements; and payments may unfairly benefit providers who are already meeting quality targets while disadvantaging those who make the most strenuous efforts to improve. (shrink)

A number of recent discussions about ethical issues in climate change, as engaged in by economists, have focused on the value of the parameter representing the rate of time preference within models of optimal growth. This essay examines many economists' antipathy to serious discussion of ethical matters, and suggests that the avoidance of questions of intergenerational equity is related to another set of value judgments concerning the quality and objectivity of economic practice. Using insights from feminist philosophy of (...) science and research on high reliability organizations, this essay argues that a more ethically transparent, real-world-oriented, and flexible economic practice would lead to more strongly objective, reliable, and useful knowledge. (shrink)

Goldman joins the ranks of epistemologists, philosophers, and science studies scholars trying to use economic models of science. For Goldman, these models are part of social rather than individual epistemics. His hope is that these models will illustrate that non-epistemic goals of individual scientists such as professional success do not necessarily undermine epistemic aims of science such as the acquisition of truth. This paper shows that there are inconsistencies between Goldman's individual and social epistemics, that these models do not live (...) up to Goldman's standards of evaluation, and that the economic models that Goldman uses are not social. (shrink)