Derek Parfit (1942-2017) is the most famous philosopher you've likely never heard of. In 1984, Parfit published what was, and is still, hailed by many philosophers as a work of genius - one of the most cited works of philosophy since World War II, Reasons and Persons. At its core, he argued that we should be concerned less with our own interests and more with the common good. His book brims with brilliant argumentative detail and stunningly inventive thought experiments that (...) challenged contemporary views about what it means to be a person, why one should forego concern for oneself as an identity that persists over time, what it means to act on the basis of reasons, and what we owe to future generations. Parfit also - unfashionably at the time - believed in a kind of grand unified theory of morality, what he called theory x, a non-religious ethical theory wherein all the major moral theories were converging from different sides on the same mountaintop. Parfit has had an enormous influence not only on philosophy, but also beyond, particularly amongst those in the fields of climate ethics, poverty relief, and charitable giving. In this book, the first-full scale biography of Parfit, Dave Edmonds tells the story of the thinker that many philosophers consider the most important moral philosopher of the last century. Edmonds' rendering of the man in full skilfully illuminates the person behind the acclaimed philosopher. Despite Parfit's extraordinary mind, outward appearances suggest his was also an extraordinarily uneventful life - one largely spent in cloistered institutions from Eton to Oxford and one seemingly monomaniacally devoted to ideas. Edmonds' aim is to show how this son and grandson of missionaries went from a genial and outgoing history student to a captivating, yet monkish philosopher singularly devoted to saving morality. In doing so, Edmonds makes Parfit's profound, but often impenetrable, ideas accessible to a broad audience and gives life and body to the thoughts of a seemingly pure thinker that captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. (shrink)

From the author of Wittgenstein's Poker and Would You Kill the Fat Man?, the story of an extraordinary group of philosophers during a dark chapter in Europe's history On June 22, 1936, the philosopher Moritz Schlick was on his way to deliver a lecture at the University of Vienna when Johann Nelböck, a deranged former student of Schlick's, shot him dead on the university steps. Some Austrian newspapers defended the madman, while Nelböck himself argued in court that his onetime teacher (...) had promoted a treacherous Jewish philosophy. David Edmonds traces the rise and fall of the Vienna Circle—an influential group of brilliant thinkers led by Schlick—and of a philosophical movement that sought to do away with metaphysics and pseudoscience in a city darkened by fascism, anti-Semitism, and unreason. The Vienna Circle's members included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and the eccentric logician Kurt Gödel. On its fringes were two other philosophical titans of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. The Circle championed the philosophy of logical empiricism, which held that only two types of propositions have cognitive meaning, those that can be verified through experience and those that are analytically true. For a time, it was the most fashionable movement in philosophy. Yet by the outbreak of World War II, Schlick's group had disbanded and almost all its members had fled. Edmonds reveals why the Austro-fascists and the Nazis saw their philosophy as such a threat. The Murder of Professor Schlick paints an unforgettable portrait of the Vienna Circle and its members while weaving an enthralling narrative set against the backdrop of economic catastrophe and rising extremism in Hitler's Europe. (shrink)

When first published twenty years ago, The Logic of Medicine presented a new way of thinking about clinical medicine as a scholarly discipline as well as a profession. Since then, advances in research and technology have revolutionized both the practice and theory of medicine. In this new, extensively rewritten edition, Dr. Murphy includes changes to show how these different areas of scholarship may affect details of "the logic of medicine" without compromising its fundamental coherence. New to this edition are discussions (...) of the challenge of the flood of new empirical data, new ideas in genetics, molecular biology, homeostasis, pathogenesis, cancer, aging, and Alzheimer's disease. Murphy also comments on such new theoretical topics as dynamic systems, chaos, and fractals and their impact on the burgeoning fields of philosophy and practice of medicine. Written with medical students in mind, the book includes a glossary, many new examples, and problems for solutions with comments on each. An entirely new chapter deals with modeling. Clinicians and researchers will also find the principles thought-provoking and illuminating. (shrink)

From the standpoint of the theory of medicine, a formulation is given of three types of reasoning used by physicians. The first is deduction from probability models (as in prognosis or genetic counseling for Mendelian disorders). It is a branch of mathematics that leads to predictive statements about outcomes of individual events in terms of known formal assumptions and parameters. The second type is inference (as in interpreting clinical trials). In it the arguments from replications of the same process (data) (...) lead to conclusions about the parameters of a system, without calling into question either the probabilistic model or the criteria of evidence. The third is illation (as in the elucidation of symptoms in a patient). It is a process whereby, in the light of the total evidence and the conclusions from the other types of reasoning, one may modify, expand, simplify or demolish a conceptual framework proposed for deductions, and modify the nature of the evidence sought, the criteriology, the axioms, and the surmised complexity of the scientific theory. (The process of diagnosis as applied to a patient may in extreme cases lead to the discovery of an entirely new disease with its own, quite new, set of diagnostic criteria. This course cannot be accommodated inside either of the other two types of reasoning.) Illation has something of the character of Kuhn's scientific revolution in physics; but it differs in that it is the nature, not the degree or frequency of change that distinguishes it from Kuhn's normal science. (shrink)

In this paper I shall try to analyse appropriate logic and actual methods as a preliminary to developing expert systems that will simulate clinical diagnosis. It is doubtful that all diagnoses address the same kind of problem and hence no one logic will suffice. Sometimes the signs and symptoms manifest an underlying disorder that cannot be observed directly (the substantialist model); sometimes there seems to be no underlying disorder and the diagnosis is a rearrangement of the data (the nominalist model). (...) In deciding their merits in the particular case, we must identify the sources of variation; what is meant by saying that the data are independent; and what can be meant by wrong diagnosis and misclassification. Problems arise in human diagnosis because the data may be false, even lies; because the known list of diseases is not exhaustive; and because the probability of multiple unrelated diseases increases with age. Special difficulties arise from homeostasis (which is fundamental in defining and understanding disease) because the primary disturbances may be hard to distinguish from the homeostatic responses to them. (shrink)

[email protected] http://bruce.edmonds.name Abstract. Two kinds of problem are distinguished: the first of finding processes which produce complex outcomes from the interaction of simple parts, and the second of finding which process resulted in an observed complex outcome. The former I call the easy complexity problem and the later the hard complexity problem. It is often assumed that progress with the easy problem will aid process with the hard problem. However this assumes that the “reverse engineering” problem, of determining the process (...) from the outcomes is feasible. Taking a couple of simple models of reverse engineering, I show that this task is infeasible in the general case. Hence it cannot be assumed that reverse engineering is possible, and hence that most of the time progress on the easy problem will not help with the hard problem unless there are special properties of a particular set of processes that make it feasible. Assuming that complexity science is not merely an academic “game” and given the analysis of this paper, some criteria for the kinds of paper that have a reasonable chance of being eventually useful for understanding observed complex systems are outlined. Many complexity papers do not fare well against these critieria. (shrink)

Dans un passage de Physique iii (7, 207b15-21), Aristote s’exprime d’une manière qui suppose valide l’implication suivante : « Si une grandeur peut être infinie en puissance, une telle grandeur peut aussi être infinie en acte ». Cette implication a intrigué les commentateurs tant anciens et médiévaux que modernes. Ces derniers se sont en général bornés à constater que l’implication n’est pas logiquement valide, sans expliquer comment et en quel sens Aristote avait pu la tenir pour telle. En rapprochant le (...) passage précité d’un autre passage de Physique iii (6, 206b16-27), le présent article en propose une interprétation qui semble lever toutes les difficultés. Au Moyen Age, le sens de l’implication a été très discuté, et l’interprétation proposée ici a été vue et soutenue par plusieurs commentateurs : on l’étudie chez quelques-uns de ceux-ci en situant leur position dans le cadre du débat médiéval sur la question, notamment en référence aux deux interprétations alors fameuses proposées par Averroès. (shrink)

Thus far in the development of the discipline of medical ethics, the overriding concern has been with solutions to specific problems. But discussion is hampered by lack of understanding of the scope and methodology of medical ethics, and its scientific and philosophical basis. In Underpinnings of Medical Ethics Edmond A. Murphy, James J. Butzow, and Edward L. Suarez-Murias offer much-needed clarification of the purview, ontological basis, and methodology of a medical ethics that is to be comprehensive and yet readily (...) accepted by all. The authors begin by describing the scope of the analysis and discussing possible ethical systems and paradigms. They then deal with the structures and concepts necessary in the formulation of a coherent philosophy: normality and disease, scientific and juridical law, certainty and certitude, decisions. Finally, they introduce particular human dimensions, such as quality of life, pain, and responsibility. Throughout, case examples illustrate the authors' theoretical framework. (shrink)

Arguments about ethics often centre on traditional questions of, for instance, euthanasia and abortion. Whilst these questions are still in the foreground, recent years have seen an explosion of new moral problems. Moral and political clashes are now as likely to be about sexuality and gender and the status of refugees, immigrants and borders, or the ethics of social media, safe spaces, disability and robo-ethics. How should we approach these debates? What are the issues at stake? What are the most (...) persuasive arguments? Edited by best-selling philosophy author David Edmonds, Ethics and the Contemporary World assembles a star-studded line-up of philosophers to explore twenty-five of the most important ethical problems confronting us today. They engage with moral problems in race and gender, the environment, war and international relations, global poverty, ethics and social media, democracy, rights and moral status, and science and technology. Whether you want to learn more about the ethics of poverty, food, extremism, or artificial intelligence and enhancement, this book will help you understand the issues, sharpen your perspective and, hopefully, make up your own mind. P> Whether you want to learn more about the ethics of poverty, food, extremism, or artificial intelligence and enhancement, this book will help you understand the issues, sharpen your perspective and, hopefully, make up your own mind. (shrink)

In order to entertain the argument to be presented here, you have to begin by casting away a presupposition. The ultimate aim will be to restore it again as a presupposition, but the immediate aim will be to test for and make clear its undoubted worth and usefulness by imagining what happens to our knowledge-system when we remove it.

This book reflects upon the manner in which medical research is performed and interpreted.

Originally published in 1955, The Moral Decision remains today a fresh, lively, and literate quest for moral guides in the American system of law. Each topic is introduced with a real courtroom case followed by a summary of the uncontroverted facts, the issues before the court, the judge's opinion, and Edmond Cahn's objective and penetrating discussion of the ethical issues involved. The cases chosen operate as prisms, revealing an entire spectrum of moral forces—personal ambitions, group standards, lusts, sufferings, and (...) ideals. A new foreword by Norman Redlich, Dean of the New York University School of Law, affirms the value of The Moral Decision as an authoritative and humane introduction to law and morality. (shrink)

This book is an archetypal product of the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) school of multi-agent systems. It presents what is now the mainstream view as to the best way forward in the dream of engineering reliable software systems out of autonomous agents. The way of using formal logics to specify, implement and verify distributed systems of interacting units using a guiding analogy of beliefs, desires and intentions. The implicit message behind the book is this: Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) can be a respectable (...) engineering science. It says: we use sound formal systems; can cite established philosophical foundations; and will be able to build reliable and flexible software systems. (shrink)

The authors O'Regan & Noë (O&N) have ignored the case for the visual field as being non-epistemic evidence internal to the brain, having no pictorial similarity to the external input, and being material in ontological status. They are also not aware of the case for the evolutionary advantage of learning as the perceptual refashioning of such non-epistemic sensory evidence via motivated feedback in sensorimotor activity.

Steven Lehar allows too much to his direct realist opponent in using the word “subjective” of the sensory field per se. The latter retains its nonconceptual, nonmental nature even when explored by perceptual judgement. He also needs to stress the evolutionary value of perceptual differences between person and person, a move that enables one to undermine the direct realist's superstitious certainty about the singular object.

Interesting as the experiments are, their relevance to the real-life situation is rendered questionable by the unthinking use of given singularities as target objects. The evolutionary process does not respect what one agent takes to be a singular referent. A “singling” from the continuum is rather a varying feature of the necessity to track what is rewarding in it.

The perspective of modelling agents rather than using them for a specificed purpose entails a difference in approach. In particular an emphasis on veracity as opposed to efficiency. An approach using evolving populations of mental models is described that goes some way to meet these concerns. It is then argued that social intelligence is not merely intelligence plus interaction but should allow for individual relationships to develop between agents. This means that, at least, agents must be able to distinguish, identify, (...) model and address other agents, either individually or in groups. In other words that purely homogeneous interaction is insufficient. Two example models are described that illustrate these concerns, the second in detail where agents act and communicate socially, where this is determined by the evolution of their mental models. Finally some problems that arise in the interpretation of such simulations is discussed. (shrink)