Clemens Baeumker -- Hedwig Conrad-Martius -- Alois Dempf -- Nicolai Hartmann -- Martin Heidegger -- Eugen Victor Herrigel -- Edmund Husserl -- Hermann Graf Keyserling -- Oswald Külpe -- Arthur Liebert -- Erich Przywara SJ -- Heinrich Rickert -- Eduard Spranger.

In The Netherlands, neonatal euthanasia has become a legal option and the Groningen Protocol contains an approach to identify situations in which neonatal euthanasia might be appropriate. In the 5 years following the publication of the protocol, neither the prediction that this would be the first step on a slippery slope, nor the prediction of complete transparency and legal control became true. Instead, we experienced a transformation of the healthcare system after antenatal screening policy became a part of antenatal care. (...) This resulted in increased terminations of pregnancy and less euthanasia. (shrink)

Diese authentische Beschreibung des Weges der nachhegelschen deutschen Philosophie im zweiten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts aus der Feder eines ihrer hervorragendsten Vertreter halt an Namen, Daten und Werken beschreibend und gliedernd beieinander, was sonst erst muhsam zusammengesucht werden musste. Erdmann, der Hegelianer, nimmt sich dabei vor allem auch der Denker an, die in Opposition zu Hegel und uberhaupt ausserhalb des zeitgenossischen philosophischen Interesses standen. Erdmanns Darstellung ist uberdies ein Beispiel dafur, wie sich Hegels Auffassung der Philosophiehistorie bei seinen Nachfolgern verwandelt (...) hat. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Excerpt from Philosophie des Schönen Es versteht sich von selbst, dass eine solche "philosophie des Schönen, wie sie einerseits induktiv aus der thatsächliohen per sönlichen Vertrautheit des Philosophen mit dem Schönen aller Art verwachsen sein muss, so auch in stetigem geschichtlichen Zu sammenhange rnit den bisherigen Leistungen dieser Art stehen muss. Den Ausweis uber diese historische Kontinuität hat das nachfolgende Buch nicht erst zu erbringen, da er im erstenhistorischkritisohen Theil enthalten ist. 'das Vorausschicken dieses ersten Theiles gestattet mir, nunmehr von (...) allen kritischen und polemischen Erörterungen gegen die Ansichten anderer Aesthétiker Abstand zu nehmen und dem Fluss der eigenen Gedankenentwickelurig ungestört Folge zu geben. Manche Einzelfragen konnte ich öhne Bedenken ganz bei Seite lassen, weil dieselben in der kritischen Behandlung des ersten Theils bereits in ausreichendem Maasse zur Sprache gelangt waren; in anderen Punkten konnte ich aus dem selben Grunde wenigstens auf polemische Sicherstellung und nähere Begrundung verzichten und der überzeugenden Kraft der Wahrheit in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhange vertrauen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

'...a clear and sharp introduction which defines absolutism from both consequentialism and more moderate deontological views...' -ETHICS.

Die University of Tokyo hatte mich zu einem Vortrag über die im Rahmen der Kritischen Gesamtausgabe als Band 9 (in drei Teilbänden) erscheinende Neuausgabe von Ernst Troeltschs “Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen” eingeladen. Das mir vorgegebene Thema lautete: “The Significance of Troeltsch’s Soziallehren for the Present”’. Im ersten Teil skizziere ich die Genese von Troeltschs christentumshistorischem Hauptwerk. Im zweiten Teil geht es um die zentralen Themen seines “Lieblingsbuches”. Im dritten Teil werden einige seiner handschriftlichen Zusätze und Marginalien kurz vorgestellt, (...) die die 2020 erscheinende Kritische Ausgabe der “Soziallehren” erstmals zugänglich macht. Abschließend entfalte ich eine Antwort auf die Frage, warum es sich auch heute noch lohnt, Ernst Troeltsch zu lesen. (shrink)

This collection presents the English-language reader for the first time with essays that are representative of Bernstein's much-neglected revisionist period, 1901-1921. Bernstein himself suggested that this later work included significant new elements, indicating further progress in his liberal-socialist theory. Bernstein's later work acquires additional significance in light of the events of 1989, which have discredited not only Marxism-Leninism, but revolutionary Marxist theory in general, thus making the reevaluation of Bernstein's revisionism a worthwhile experience.

By the end of April 1923, Paul Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1981: The System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods) was published by the German publishing house Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen. Based on numerous source documents from the publishers’ archives and particularly on the correspondence between the publishers Wilhelm and Gustav Ruprecht, hitherto unknown but now edited and commented on here, the present article explains that Tillich wrote his System of the Sciences (...) primarily for the publisher. It was Emanuel Hirsch who established the connection between them as the publishing house was looking for a new editor for their popular series Wege zur Philosophie (Ways to Philosophy), published since 1911. After Hirsch having brought Tillich into play, Wilhelm Ruprecht could convince the Berlin “Privatdozenten” to become the new editor of the series. As to the series, Tillich unfolded the concept of a comprehensive system design which covered 65 topics, i. e. forthcoming volumes. When the publisher then demanded that Tillich prove his abilities to write comprehensively in common language by providing a sample of a first issue of the series, he began to work on his System der Wissenschaften. Although this text contained all sorts of ideas and concepts, it was certainly not very well suited as an introduction to a series of popular accounts of the central themes and matters of philosophy. In the end, the System was published, although not as a volume of the series as having been announced by the publishing house in 1922, but as a text in its own right. (shrink)

Within collective epistemology, there is a class of theories that understand the epistemic status of collective attitude ascriptions, such as ‘the college union knows that the industrial action is going to plan’, or ‘the jury justifiedly believes that the suspect is guilty’, as saying that a sufficient subset of group member attitudes have the relevant epistemic status. In this paper, I will demonstrate that these summativist approaches to collective epistemology are incompatible with epistemic permissivism, the doctrine that a single body (...) of evidence may rationalize multiple doxastic attitudes. In particular, I will make use of epistemic permissivism to provide a general recipe for generating so-called divergence cases, which demonstrate situations in which rationality requires group-level and member-level attitudes to diverge. I will call this class of cases permissive divergence cases. While other divergence cases have been discussed in the literature, permissive divergence cases prove themselves to be less susceptible to many of the worries raised against their competitors, while being directly built on an often-defended epistemological thesis. (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation into the nature of epistemic justification. It brings together themes from traditional, individual-centred epistemology, and collective, group-centred epistemology. The first half of the thesis is concerned with the question of whether rationality is epistemically permissive; that is, whether one body of evidence can rationalise more than one doxastic attitude. In chapter 1, I argue that permissive cases are best understood as epistemic standard conflicts. Doing so provides us with a novel understanding of the arbitrariness objection (...) against permissivism and enables us to reduce questions about epistemic permissibility to questions about the nature of incommensurability. In chapter 2, I show that the defended understanding of permissive cases generalises by defending it against an objection from self-fulfilling beliefs. In chapter 3, I demonstrate that we can use this view of epistemic rationality to generate so-called divergence arguments which show that the epistemic status of group-level attitudes and member-level attitudes can rationally diverge. In the second half of the thesis, I develop a novel evidentialist theory of epistemic justification, called Continuous Evidentialism. Continuous Evidentialism is inspired by some general methodological reflections (chapter 4), which suggest that we should opt for a theory of epistemic justification that analyses the epistemic status of group-level attitudes and member-level attitudes continuously. According to Continuous Evidentialism, to have a justified belief is to possess sufficient evidence and utilise that evidence in an epistemically responsible way when forming the belief. While I argue that we can reduce epistemic responsibility to higher-order evidentialist requirements. In chapter 5, I develop a theory of evidence, evidence possession and epistemic basing. Chapters 6 - 8, discuss various complications of the proposed theory, having to do with the alleged defeasibility of justification (chapter 6), epistemic responsibility (chapter 7), and the proposed reduction of epistemic responsibility (chapter 8). In chapter 9, I compare Continuous Evidentialism to various extant accounts. (shrink)

In June 1947 Paul Tillich signed a contract with The University of Chicago Press for a “Systematic Theology” in two volumes. Having published the first volume in April 1951, he asked the publisher to split the second volume into two parts, which were published in 1957 as volume II and 1963 as volume III. In this article the different editions of “Systematic Theology” are described, and the economic aspects of writing and publishing this very influential academic book are explained. Many (...) unknown sources are presented. Some of them show Tillich as an author in real despair. (shrink)

Humphreys and Forde conceptualize object representations as structural descriptions, without discussing the implications of structural description models. We argue that structural description models entail two major assumptions – a part-structure assumption and an invariance assumption. The invariance assumption is highly problematic because it contradicts a large body of findings which indicate that recognition performance depends on orientation and size. We will delineate relevant findings and outline an alternative conception.

The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

Prospective memory is required for many aspects of everyday cognition, its breakdown may be as debilitating as impairments in retrospective memory, and yet, the former has received relatively little attention by memory researchers. This article outlines a strategy for changing the fortunes of prospective memory, for guiding new research to shore up the claim that prospective memory is a distinct aspect of cognition, and to obtain evidence for clear performance dissociations between prospective memory and other memory functions. We begin by (...) identifying the unique requirements of prospective memory tasks and by dividing memory's prospective functions into subdomains that are analogous to divisions in retrospective memory (e.g., short- versus long-term memory). We focus on one prospective function, called prospective memory proper; we define this function in the spirit of James (1890) as requiring that we are aware of a plan, of which meanwhile we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we made the plan earlier. We give an operational definition of prospective memory proper and specify how it differs from explicit and implicit retrospective memory and how it might be empirically assessed. (shrink)

"Allerdings, das ist eine grosse Frage, der ich zu sehr ausgewichen bin, die Evidenz des Ich als ein Identisches, das also doch nicht in dem Bündel bestehen kann." (Husserl, 1907) Bekanntlich verwirft Husserl in den Logischen Untersuchungen die Auffassung, "dass die Beziehung auf das Ich etwas zum we sentlichen Bestande des intentionalen Erlebnisses selbst Gehöriges sei'',! und bildet um 1907, nach Einführung der phänomenolo gischen Reduktion, "die Beziehung auf das Ich zu unterlassen, oder von ihr zu abstrahieren" geradezu die Bedingung, (...) ein "reines Phänomen im Sinne der Phänomenologie" 2 zu gewinnen. Und bekanntlich heisst es demgegenüber in den Ideen von 1913: "Unter den allgemeinen Wesenseigentümlichkeiten des tran szendental gereinigten Erlebnisgebietes gebührt eigentlich die erste Stelle der Beziehung auf das,reine' Ich",3 und revidiert Husserl in der zweiten Auflage der Logischen Untersuchungen von 4 1913 seine Stellungnahme zur Frage des reinen Ich. Weniger bekannt ist bisher, wie Husserl auf seinem Denkweg von der einen zur anderen Stellungnahme zum Problem des Ich gekommen ist. Was bewegte ihn, das "Ich" in die phänomeno logische Problematik einzubeziehen? Zu vermuten war, dem Wandel in der Stellung zum Problem des Ich liege ein Wandel im Verständnis der Phänomenologie selbst zugrunde. Welche Phänomene motivierten, auf dem phänomenologischen Boden selbst, die Einbeziehung des Ich? Vor allem dieser Frage gehen wir, unter Berücksichtigung des Nachlassmaterials des Husserl Archivs (Leuven), in unserer Studie nach. (shrink)

In the context of «reassessing the relationship between explanation and phenomenology», the paper discusses the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has an explanatory potential in consciousness studies. It takes a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind on this topic. At the center is an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of conscious experiences. It will concentrate on explicating acts (...) of intuitive representification ( anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen) as intentional modifications of perception, making up higher, radical novel levels of intentionality. Acts of remembering, imagining, depicting something, as well as iterations and combinations of such acts, will serve as examples. A formal notation will be used with the intention to make the reflection-based theoretical language of phenomenology more precise and easier to survey. (shrink)