Gottlob Frege has exerted an enormous influence on the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy, yet the real significance of that influence is still very much a matter of debate. This book provides a completely new and systematic account of Frege's philosophy by focusing on its cornerstone: the theory of sense and reference. Two features distinguish this study from other books on Frege. First, sense and reference are placed absolutely at the core of Frege's work; the author shows that no adequate account (...) of the theory can avoid analysing the notion of thought that underpins it, or explaining how it has clarified our concept of judgement. Second, the theory is situated within the development of Frege's thought; the author reveals how the theory caused Frege to alter many of his fundamental views. In doing so the author presents a clearer picture of the problems the theory was intended to solve, and delineates more sharply the characteristic features of Frege's philosophy. (shrink)

Ranking theory delivers an account of iterated contraction; each ranking function induces a specific iterated contraction behavior. The paper shows how to reconstruct a ranking function from its iterated contraction behavior uniquely up to multiplicative constant and thus how to measure ranks on a ratio scale. Thereby, it also shows how to completely axiomatize that behavior. The complete set of laws of iterated contraction it specifies amend the laws hitherto discussed in the literature.

A new approach to analyze scientific methods as patternsof state transitions is proposed and exemplified by the two mostimportant, general methods: induction and deduction. Though only`local' states of science are considered in this paper, includinghypotheses, data, approximation and degree of fit, the approach caneasily be extended to more comprehensive kinds of states. Two `pure'forms of induction are distinguished, enumerative and hypothesisconstruction induction. A combination of these two forms is proposedto yield a more adequate picture of induction. While the pure forms (...) ofinduction are clearly distinct from the deductive pattern, the patternof the combined form of induction is very similar to the latter. Thepresent account of scientific methods not only points out thedifferences between different methods but – in contrast to usualdiscussions of methodology – also clarifies what they have in common. (shrink)

Truth is a stable, epistemically unconstrained property of propositions, and the concept of truth admits of a non-reductive explanation: that, in a nutshell, is the view for which I argued in Conceptions of Truth. In this paper I try to explain that explanation in a more detailed and, hopefully, more perspicuous way than I did in Ch. 6.2 of the book and to defend its use of sentential quantification against some of the criticisms it has has come in for.

The subject of this paper is a characterization of the $\Sigma_1$ -definable set functions of Kripke-Platek set theory with infinity and a uniform version of axiom of choice: $KP\omega+(uniform\;AC)$ . This class of functions is shown to coincide with the collection of set functionals of type 1 primitive recursive in a given choice functional and $x\mapsto\omega$ . This goal is achieved by a Gödel Dialectica-style functional interpretation of $KP\omega+(uniform\;AC)$ and a computability proof for the involved functionals.

ZusammenfassungDie Mystik gilt im interreligiösen Dialog als diejenige Dimension von Religion, die gemäß dem Essentialismus den gemeinsamen Kern der Religionen darstellt. In Unterschied dazu vertritt der Kontextualismus die These, dass Mystik nur in spezifischen religiösen Kontexten entsteht und so seine unverwechselbare Eigenheit erhält. Saeed Zarrabi-Zadeh vergleicht in seiner Arbeit Meister Eckhart und Rumi methodisch so miteinander, dass er die jeweiligen Stärken des Essentialismus und des Kontextualismus nutzt und ihre Schwächen vermeidet. Auf der Grundlage dieses methodischen Neuansatzes und eines weitgefassten Mystikbegriffs, (...) der Ethik, Praxis, Spekulation und Dogmatik umfasst, kommt er zu neuen Differenzierungen im religionsphänomenologischen Vergleich und legt zugleich erhebliche Differenzen im theologischen Deutehorizont der jeweiligen Mystiker offen. Darüberhinaus arbeitet er mit seiner Interpretation der. (shrink)

The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations. It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. Its (...) central proposal will then be that the fact-regarding normative ranking function must be conceived as the sum of a purely normative ranking function and an epistemic ranking function. The distinctions defends this proposal with a comparative discussion of some critical examples and some other distinctions made in the literature. It gives a more rigorous justification of this proposal. Finally, it starts developing the logic of purely normative and of fact-regarding normative defeasible reasoning, points to the difficulties of completing the logic of the fact-regarding side, but reaches the initial aim of accounting for the defeasible nature of the practical syllogism. (shrink)

Buridan endorses the basic idea that q follows from p iff it is impossible that p is true but q is false. Since he also accepts the law that, if p is impossible, the conjunction (p ∧ q) must be impossible, he comes to regard the principle ‘Ex impossibili quodlibet’ (EIQ) as basically correct. However, his logic is based on a ‘nominalist’ view according to which propositions are tokens of spoken, written or thought language existing in space of time, and (...) the truth of such a proposition presupposes that it exists. This conception prompted Buridan to modify the definition of ‘consequence’, but none of his attempts was fully successful. Yet, a large part of his theory of consequences is based on the usual account of necessary truth-conservation. As regards principle EIQ, Buridan distinguishes two variants of impossibility. Proposition p is possible iff the state of affairs as described by p is possible; this doesn’t guarantee, however, that p is ‘possibly true’. E.g. ‘No proposition is negative’ is considered by Buridan as describing a possible state of affairs, but this proposition is not possibly true, because in order to be true, it would have to exist, and as soon as it comes into existence, it becomes false. Accordingly, EIQ requires that the antecedent p is really impossible and not only impossibly true. (shrink)

Max Weber's magnum opus Economy and Society was for the most part published only after his premature death in June 1920. Only the chapters on basic sociological terms, the categories of social action, and the Three Times of Legitimate Domination were sent to the publishers by Weber himself; the other manuscripts were found in a pile on his desk. The editions by Marianne Weber and Melchior Palyi and by Johannes F. Winckelmann are in many ways unsatisfactory, and the controversy about (...) the correct composition of Economy and Society persists. This article reconstructs the origins of the various texts of Economy and Society on the basis of the available source material, notably the correspondence between Weber, Marianne Weber, and the publishers. It shows that in many ways the editions available at present do not live up to Max Weber's own intentions. Both the arrangement and the precise wording of the texts are unreliable, and the time sequence of the texts written from 1909 to 1914 and then in part rewritten and reorganized in 1919–1920 is uncertain. A segment of an earlier draft of parts of the chapter on Communities found among Weber's papers allows the conclusion that as early as 1905–1906, Weber had outlined a universal historical scheme of all known civilizations. This is to say that Economy and Society is not as closely linked to Weber's work on the Outline of Social Economics as has been previously assumed. This article offers a precise reconstruction of the complicated history of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Soziologie-the exact title agreed upon by Weber and his publisher Paul Siebeck shortly before his death. It shows the development of Weber's theoretical conceptions and the corresponding changes of his terminology much more clearly, and paves the way to a better understanding of his magnum opus. (shrink)

The paper argues that the standard decision theoretic account of strategies and their rationality or optimality is much too narrow, that strategies should rather condition future action to future decision situations (a point of view already developed in my Grundlagen der Entscheidungstheorie, sect. 4.4), that practical deliberation must therefore essentially rely on a relation of superiority and inferiority between possible future decision situations, that all this allows to substantially broaden the theory of practical rationality, that a long list of points (...) attended to in the literature can be subsumed under the broadened perspective (including a novel view on the iterated prisoner's dilemma and on iterated Newcomb's problem, which, however, is revised in Spohn (2003) "Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation"), and that the task to complete and systematize this list indeed forms a fruitful research programme. (shrink)

This paper deals with Hans Reichenbach's common cause principle. It was propounded by him in, and has been developed and widely applied by Wesley Salmon, e.g. in and. Thus, it has become one of the focal points of the continuing discussion of causation. The paper addresses five questions. Section 1 asks: What does the principle say? And section 2 asks: What is its philosophical significance? The most important question, of course, is this: Is the principle true? To answer that question, (...) however, one must first consider how one might one argue about it at all. One can do so by way of examples, the subject of section 3, or more theoretically, which is the goal of section 4. Based on an explication of probabilistic causation proposed by me in,, and, section 4 shows that a variant of the principle is provable within a classical framework. The question naturally arises whether the proved variant is adequate, or too weak. This is pursued in section 5. My main conclusion will be that some version of Reichenbach's principle is provably true, and others may be. This may seem overly ambitious, but it is not. The paper does not make any progress on essential worries about the common cause principle arising in the quantum domain; it only establishes more rigorously what has been thought to be plausible at least within a classical framework. (shrink)

I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE BEGINNING Phenomenology begins in the work of Edmund Husserl; the first of his phenomenological publications ...

This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as independent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is shown that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explanatory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the researchers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued that verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as independent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the “dependent” overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds of (...) data must be seen as two illustrations of the same representational contents. The researchers’preference for using verbal data to assess the independent variable and the tendency to introduce a causal relationship between representation and behaviour is shown to result from misplacing folk-beliefs. Folk-beliefs about intentional causality, it is shown, pertain to the same level as other beliefs about the world on the part of the subjects. Hence they are part of the folk-representation itself and must be treated as such; their use in scientific accounts of the belief-action relationship is not implied by data on rational belief systems. It is suggested to conceptualize social representations as integral units of beliefs and action which may be used to explain causally subsequent contingent social events. The function of folk-beliefs in intentional causality for the self-concept of rational people and for social accountability is discussed. (shrink)

This article investigates three technological developments that are related to spatial determinations and that influence behavior in both the public and the private spheres of life. Examined are the changing relative size of movie screens and their venues, the seeming conflicting dynamic of entertainment and communication screens in the private sphere both increasing and decreasing in size, and the influence of action-at-a-distance technology.

Cognitive Action Theory of Reality presents an original and thought-provoking theory of consciousness. Adopting a panpsychist approach, the book argues that a primitive consciousness takes place in all material, assuming the observer's existence is the foundational premise underlying all further scientific inquiry. The human brain is treated as the ultimate measuring instrument, creating objective reality as an explanation for sensory stimulation in an internal mental model. The book presents a truly multi-disciplinary approach to the study of consciousness, drawing on the (...) author's knowledge of psychology, physics, computer science, and philosophy. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)