It has recently been argued that, contrary to first appearances, knowledge is not distinctively valuable. The argumentative strategy of value sceptics in epistemology is to identify a challenge that any satisfactory account of the distinctive value of knowledge will have to meet and to argue that no viable theory of knowledge does the job. This paper argues that the value sceptical argument is unsuccessful in that it does not establish that a virtue epistemological account of the value of knowledge fails.

Tijdens zijn bewogen leven schreef Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert (1522-1590) vele teksten en voerde hij talloze gesprekken. Zijn doel: zijn medemensen overtuigen van het belang om niet slaafs achter anderen aan te lopen maar zélf na te denken. Want elk mens heeft voldoende redelijke vermogens om het leven zelfstandig vorm te geven en het goede te doen. De Kruidhofjes bevat twee bundels met dialogen – gesprekken die Coornhert zelf voerde of onderweg heeft gehoord. De dialogen zijn te zien als medicijnen (...) class='Hi'>tegen wat Coornhert zag als de ziekte van zijn tijd: onnadenkendheid en religieuze scherpslijperij. Enerzijds probeert Coornhert obstakels voor een goed en gelukkig persoonlijk leven weg te halen. Hier gaat het vooral om het bestrijden van onbegrip en onwetendheid. Anderzijds probeert Coornhert obstakels voor vreedzaam samenleven op te ruimen. Dat is de reden waarom nogal wat dialogen ingaan op religieuze kwesties als kerkbezoek, de mis en kerkelijke ceremonies; onenigheid over deze onderwerpen vormde immers de belangrijkste oorzaak van de heftige onderdrukking, vervolging en oorlog in de zestiende eeuw. Dit verklaart ook de felheid van veel van de dialogen. Discussies over religieuze denkbeelden en gebruiken waren niet zomaar interessant tijdverdrijf voor bij de borrel. Het ging ergens om: om de waarheid, je zielenheil en de inrichting van de maatschappij. In 45 dialogen probeert Coornhert zo zijn medemens te motiveren tot eerlijkheid naar zichzelf en verdraagzaamheid naar de ander. (shrink)

Pleidooi om in een democratie naast of zelfs in plaats van verkiezingen een systeem van loting in te voeren.

The fundamental argument against scientism This paper presents and discusses a major worry for scientism, which I take to be the view that only natural science (reliably) delivers rational belief. The argument is that natural science itself is, in some sense of the word, based on the fundament of the deliverances of non-scientific sources of belief, such as auditory perception, metaphysical intuition, logical intuition, and memory, so that if we were to discard these non-scientific sources of belief, we would have (...) to discard natural science as well. After spelling out what I mean by ‘scientism’, I lay out the Fundamental Argument in detail. Subsequently, I discuss three objections that might be leveled against the argument, namely that scientism suffers merely from a local rather than a global basing problem, that the results of natural science are confirmed or repeatable, whereas the deliverances of non-scientific belief sources are not, and that the results of natural science are inter-subjective, whereas the deliverances of non-scientific are not. I argue that each of these objections is unconvincing. I then consider two more sophisticated versions of scientism that are meant to sidestep the Fundamental Argument. On Scientism 2.0, only natural science and those non-scientific sources of belief that are presupposed by natural science deliver rational belief. On Scientism 3.0, only those propositions can be rationally believed that can in principle be known on the basis of natural science. I argue that both of these more sophisticated versions of scientism either fail to escape from the Fundamental Argument or become trivial and uninteresting claims. (shrink)

An accurate analysis of the text shows that the small treatises have a logical structure and a style which is in all aspects unspinozistic. The main points of difference are : a formalistic interpretation of mathematics‚ the opposition between mathematics and physics‚ slavish cartesianism‚ the presence of numerous pleonasms‚ carelessness of expression‚ parade of learning‚ prolixity‚ attention for irrelevant qualities of authors quoted‚ educational purpose. Together with De Vet’s demonstration that the author of SRR and RK is still alive in (...) 1693 (see Tijdschr. v. Filosofie 45‚ 1983) these arguments force us‚ to consign Spinoza’s authorship‚ recently still defended by Petry a.o.‚ to the realm of fancy. (shrink)

Dans son De abstinentia, cette fervente apologie du végétarisme, Porphyre s'élève nécessaire pour pouvoir vivre „selon l'esprit”. Notre esprit est par sa nature „impassible”, disent-ils, et son activité n'est même pas entravée par les affections sensibles que nous éprouvons. Il ne faut donc pas se soucier de ce qu'on mange : tout cela est indifférent à la vie de l'esprit. Cette conception a corrompu même beaucoup de „barbares” : par mépris de ce monde ils se sont jetés sur tout forme (...) de plaisir pensant qu'ils ne peuvent être souillés par aucune chose matérielle à cause de „la profondeur de leur liberté”. Ces barbares critiqués par Porphyr sont des gnostiques, comme on peut le démontrer par plusieurs textes parallèles. La mêmes critique de leur indifférentisme éthique se rencontre déjà chez Plotin (II, 9). On ne peut pourtant nier qu'il y a une certaine ressemblance entre la conception gnostique et la doctrine plotinienne de l'âme. Pour Plotin l'âme ne descend jamais tout entière dans la génération : sa partie supérieure reste „en haut”, toujours pensant et impassible. Probablement, il y avait des gens dans le groupe de Plotin qui associaient ses idées à la conception gnostique de l'esprit „inaltérable” et en tiraient les mêmes conséquences amorales. Ce sont eux qui sont visés par Porphyre dans De abst., I, p. 113-118. (shrink)

Aesthetic normativity is the core issue of philosophical aesthetics. It cannot be solved by statistical knowledge or neurophysiology, nor by evolutionary explanation. I argue that aesthetic normativity concerns how we see things. We can see things wrongly and by suitable prompting someone may help us seeing it aright. So aesthetic normativity is to do with human interaction.

Corporatist opposition against the introduction of a system of proportional representation in Belgium can essentially be reduced to the opposition by Joris Helleputte. The main reason for this anti-proportionalism way that proportional representation would seriously endanger the growth of a catholic corporatist party and - in the long run - of a catholic corporatist state. In 1894 though, political corporatism isalready on its way back, and so is socio-economie corporatism from 1899 on.In the "Belgische Volksbond" a large majority has come (...) to accept proportional representation. This is one of the main reasons which lead Joris Helleputte on the 21th of July 1895 to definitely resign as a president of this association. Hid 1894 Helleputte had already founded the antiproportionalist newspaper "L'Union" but this disappeared within that same year. Another newspaper venture of his, "Le XXm Siècle" wilt prove more successful, and wilt become an eminent propaganda-tool against proportional representation.On the 4th of July 1899 Helleputte - together with Woeste - presents a proposal in parliament to introduce the uninominal system.A judicious gerrymandering would then ensure a huge catholic majority.Helleputte took it for granted that within the catholic party each "stand" would get a fair share of the seats. But the Helleputte-Woeste proposal dit not receive sufficient support. And eventually proportional representation for the legislative elections was introduced by law on the 29th of December 1899. (shrink)

Terrorisme valt buiten alle democratische kaders en daarom hebben democratische landen er geen adequate antwoorden op. Het enige antwoord op de krachten, die chaos en angst zaaien is een wereldwijde open samenleving, met politieke vrijheid en ruimte voor religies.

The mise en scène of resistance against a global society. An analysis of (a)symmetrical distinctions The concept of oikophobia is often used as an answer and rebuttal to the accusation of xenophobia that is often raised against nationalist groups. Oikophobia denounces the image of nationalists as people who first and foremost hate what is foreign or the foreigner. They describe themselves, on the contrary, as having a strong attachment to their own culture and their opponents as having a fear of (...) or aversion to their origin or (cultural) home. This game of asymmetrical descriptions is the subject of this contribution, which focuses on the logic of distinctions that lies behind this resistance to (hostile) images. What then also lights up is that the global polarization we see between nationalist and cosmopolitan movements also concerns the status of asymmetrical distinctions themselves. The nationalist resistance to world society can be interpreted as a resistance to the becoming symmetrical of existential distinctions, i.e. distinctions that create identity and belonging. (shrink)

De burgemeester van Etterbeek liet tijdens de afgelopen periode van vrieskou daklozen van straat halen. Soms tegen hun wil in. Omdat het soms nodig is om mensen tegen zichzelf te beschermen.

Ondanks antidiscriminatiebeleid en de lippendienst die universiteiten tegenwoordig bewijzen aan ‘inclusie’, ‘sociale veiligheid’ en ‘gelijke kansen’, is discriminatie binnen de universiteit nog steeds wijdverspreid. Ervaringen met discriminatie op de universiteit zijn vooral pijnlijk voor degenen die geen hogere functie krijgen, ook al voldoen ze aan alle eisen. Klachten worden vaak niet serieus genomen, waarna universiteitsbestuurders vaak hardnekkig ontkennen dat ze iets verkeerd hebben gedaan, waardoor de slachtoffers zich vernederd en gedemoraliseerd voelen.

Does the use of armed drones influence the chance of success in the fight against terrorism? In this article we analyse whether armed drones influence the chance of success in the fight against terrorism. The reasonable chance of success principle is a just war theory principle, focusing on the likelihood of reaching the war objectives. Without a reasonable chance of winning the war, it is better not to start it. This principle will first be explained. Next, the focus lies on (...) those elements that influence the chance of success in the fight against terrorism when armed drones are used. Success in the fight against terrorism might be a diminishing of the terrorist threat or the elimination of the terrorist organisation. The drone attacks in the fight against terrorism very often result in systematic collateral damage, which is detrimental to the objective, because it forms a breeding ground for terrorist organisations. One of the reasons for this collateral damage is systematic risk transfers, which will be explained in greater detail in the article. In the third part, the focus lies on other potentially positive elements that influence the chance of success, in order to compensate for the collateral damage. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in this research domain about the consequences for the terrorist organisation of killing a terrorist leader. Besides, research reveals that it is more productive to concentrate on political participation and on policing (law enforcement and arrest). The article calls not for a complete ban of armed drones; after all, collateral damage could already be limited if the risk transfers were to be limited. To limit these transfers, men on the ground are needed, in order to intervene when human shields are used. Agents on the ground are needed to collect human intelligence in order to have reliable and complete intelligence and to investigate the intentions, to see who is prepared to negotiate and who to surrender. It would be an illusion to think that there is a reasonable chance of success in this fight with a party that takes zero physical risks. (shrink)