In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more predictively successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that T1 is comparatively true is to say that T1 (...) is closer to the truth than its competitors, T2, T3, ..., Tn. Park offers two arguments against Relative Realism. The first is an argument by analogy to NBA players, which is supposed to show that, contrary to what the relative realist argues, absolute judgments about the (approximate) truth and (predictive) success of competing theories are rationally justified. The second is what Park calls “The Argument from Double Spaces,” which is supposed to show that, contrary to what the relative realist argues, relative judgments about the (comparative) truth of competing theories are not rationally justified. I argue that Park’s arguments fail to do what he wants them to do. (shrink)

I report the results of a follow-up study, designed to address concerns raised by Kurthy and Lawford-Smith in response to my original study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Like the results of the original study, the results of the follow-up study do not support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. The results of both studies suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I have argued in my paper, I take this (...) to mean that OIC can no longer be taken as axiomatic. It must be argued for without appealing to intuitions. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2021) reply to my (Mizrahi 2021) reply to his (Park 2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say (...) that T1 is comparatively true is to say that T1 is closer to the truth than its competitors, T2, T3, …, Tn. In his latest reply, Park (2021) clarifies his notions of “T-space” and “F-space,” which he now labels “T-space” and “O-space,” and further develops what he calls the “Argument from Double Spaces,” which is supposed to show that, contrary to what the relative realist argues, relative judgments about the comparative truth of competing theories are not rationally justified. I argue that Park’s revised version of the “Argument from Double Spaces” still fails as an argument against Relative Realism. (shrink)

Most philosophical or scientific theories suppose that colour composition judgments refer to the way colours appear to us. The dominant view is therefore phenomenalist in the sense that colour composition is phenomenally given to perceivers. This paper argues that there is no evidence for a phenomenalist view of colour composition and that a conventionalist approach should be favoured.

“AI4Science” refers to the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in scientific research. As AI systems become more widely used in science, we need guidelines for when such uses are acceptable and when they are unacceptable. To that end, I propose that the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, which comes from philosophy of science, may provide a preliminary but still useful guideline for acceptable uses of AI in science. Given that AI systems used in scientific (...) research are black boxes, for the most part, we should use such systems in the context of discovery but not in the context of justification. The former refers to processes of idea generation, which may be unproblematically opaque whether they occur in human brains or artificial neural networks, whereas the latter refers to scientific methods by which scientific ideas are tested, confirmed, verified, and justified, which should be transparent. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe the way in which I introduce arguments for the existence of God to undergraduate students in Introduction to Philosophy.

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who (...) think that a certain kind of understanding—objectual understanding—is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive. (shrink)

Partiendo de los desarrollos de Hegel sobre el derecho de propiedad de la persona sobre su cuerpo, este artículo intenta esclarecer ciertos límites para su ejercicio e hipotetizar argumentos para defender derechos subjetivos que involucran al cuerpo. En primer lugar, se aborda el concepto hegeliano de persona. La autorreferencia del yo y el reconocimiento intersubjetivo son dos elementos claves para su configuración. En segundo, se presenta el enfoque hegeliano de los derechos de propiedad. Se explica (a) por qué la propiedad (...) privada es una institución jurídica necesaria, (b) qué relación establece la persona con su cuerpo y (c) cuáles son los límites en el ejercicio de los derechos sobre el cuerpo. Finalmente, se examinan las tesis hegelianas centrándose en cuestiones contemporáneas e hipotetizando argumentos para rechazar el derecho a la venta de órganos y defender el derecho al aborto y a la reasignación de sexo. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the multiple layers of representation which occur in the South Africa Pavilion at the Art Biennale in Venice in order to understand how they constitute and affect the state’s political imaginary. By analysing three artworks (David Koloane’s The Journey, Sue Williamson’s For thirty years next to his heart, and Zanele Muholi’s Faces and Phases) which were exhibited in the 2013 Pavilion, two key arguments emerge: 1) in this context artistic representation can be (...) understood as a form of political representation; and, 2) these artists are simultaneously state and citizenry representatives. A tension emerges between the political imaginary desired by the South African state and the political imaginary enacted by its representatives. The article draws on seven months of participant observation fieldwork at the Biennale, which involved 76 interviews with people associated with the South Africa Pavilion, including government representatives, exhibition organisers, artists, and visitors. Part I explores the concept of representation in order to establish the two philosophical trajectories (political and artistic) with which this article engages – with particular reference to Michael Saward’s framework of the representative claim. Part II explores the multiple representative claims which the three artists and their artworks enact.Abbreviations: Biennale: Venice Art Biennale; DAC: Department of Arts and Culture; For thirty years: For thirty years next to his heart, by Sue Williamson; TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission; US: United States of America. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the conceptual foundations of sovereignty in Hegel’s Philosophy of Law in order to provide an answer to this question and thus be able to evaluate the scope of contemporary sovereignty and the adequacy of its claims. As will be seen, Hegel constructs his own position in critical dialogue with Hobbes’ and Kant’s approaches, with more or less explicit references. The development of this article is divided into three parts. In the first, the Hegelian conception of (...) sovereignty is presented in the framework of his organicist understanding of the state, taking into account both its internal and external aspects. The second, analyses Hegel’s theoretical foundations of war and his position in international relations. Finally, the scope of sovereignty today is discussed in the light of Hegelian thought. (shrink)

We describe the ethical leadership dilemmas confronting Verdant Power. Formed in 2000, this New York City marine renewable energy company develops projects and technology that delivers electricity directly into the local power grid. Set in early 2010, the case outlines the tensions, challenges and costs (both financial and time) that management faces as it attempts to commercialize a technology in an industry with strict and rigid regulatory policies. The key teaching objectives of the case include a) understanding the leadership role (...) that the company must assume in paving the way for regulatory reform for US-based marine renewable technology ventures, and b) appreciating the importance and implications of sustainability given the pursuit of the financial and environmental mission of the founders. (shrink)

Communication, Culture, and Human Rights in Africa provides a comprehensive and interdisciplinary analysis of the interface between human rights and civil society, the media, gender, education, religion, health communication, and political processes, weaving theory, history, policy, and case analyses into a holistic intellectual and cultural critique while offering practical solutions.

Journalistic practice and professionalism across the globe are characterized by certain universals as well as unique particularities. In most post-colonial societies, the ethical philosophies and professional ethos of journalists reflect the tension between the commitment to integrity and social responsibility, shared by journalists worldwide, and the contextual interpretation and application of these principles. This article examines the ethics and ethos of development journalism as a philosophically, culturally, and historically evolving professional ideology. It surveys the ethical landscape of development journalists and (...) shows how development journalists balance the dialectic of a universalist ethical philosophy and a relativistic professional ethos. (shrink)

This article re-contextualizes Sigmund Freud's interest in the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics in terms of the socio-political connotations of Lamarckism and Darwinism in the 1930s and 1950s. Many scholars have speculated as to why Freud continued to insist on a supposedly outmoded theory of evolution in the 1930s even as he was aware that it was no longer tenable. While Freud's initial interest in the inheritance of phylogenetic memory was not necessarily politically motivated, his refusal to abandon (...) this theory in the 1930s must be understood in terms of wider debates, especially regarding the position of the Jewish people in Germany and Austria. Freud became uneasy about the inheritance of memory not because it was scientifically disproven, but because it had become politically charged and suspiciously regarded by the Nazis as Bolshevik and Jewish. Where Freud seemed to use the idea of inherited memory as a way of universalizing his theory beyond the individual cultural milieu of his mostly Jewish patients, such a notion of universal science itself became politically charged and identified as particularly Jewish. The vexed and speculative interpretations of Freud's Lamarckism are situated as part of a larger post-War cultural reaction against Communism on the one hand, and on the other hand, against any scientific concepts of race in the wake of World War II. (shrink)

The notion of stench appears to have two faces. On one side, it seems to belong to the world that surrounds us. This is the case, for example, when we say that the smell of sewers is unbearable or that curdled milk stinks. On the other side, variations in people’s preferences for certain smells suggest that the attribution of stench to certain objects or substances is not objective as they first appear. Stench and Olfactory Disgust, by Vivian Mizrahi, explains (...) the bifacial nature of stench by arguing in favor of the idea that stench has to be understood in emotional rather than in strictly perceptual terms. Mizrahi’s strategy consists in showing that stench is the object of olfactory disgust. This puts her in a position to maintain that no smell is intrinsically unpleasant. The defense of these claims leads Mizrahi to lay out a view of olfactory disgust and to explain the singular nature of the relation between smell and stench. In the process, she examines the notion of hedonic value for smells and offers a non-polar opposition view of olfactory pleasantness. According to this view, olfactory disgust does not have an opposite emotion. A smell can be pleasant for a variety of reasons: it may whet our appetite or trigger different other positive emotions, but none of these positive olfactory emotions is strictly the opposite of olfactory disgust. (shrink)

Ethical behavior among businesses has gained significant prominence in recent years. Survey evidence shows that Asian consumers demand for greater social responsibility among businesses. Thus, a deeper understanding of the factors that contribute to such a demand is useful. This study examines the influence of religiosity and values on corporate social responsibility (CSR) support among consumers in Hong Kong and Singapore. Primary data collected among consumers in these cities point to a significant direct relationship between religiosity and CSR support. In (...) Hong Kong, this attitude is due both to altruistic as well as for egotistical (or face saving) reasons. In Singapore, this is mainly due to the latter. The results imply that different motivations should guide CSR strategies in these two cities. (shrink)

In his latest attack, even though he claims to be a practitioner of “close reading” (Wills 2018b, 34), it appears that Wills still has not bothered to read the paper in which I defend the thesis he seeks to attack (Mizrahi 2017a), or any of the papers in my exchange with Brown (Mizrahi 2017b; 2018a), as evidenced by the fact that he does not cite them at all. This explains why Wills completely misunderstands Weak Scientism and the arguments (...) for the quantitative superiority (in terms of research output and research impact) as well as qualitative superiority (in terms of explanatory, predictive, and instrumental success) of scientific knowledge over non-scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective (...) colors. Most color variations are then real and result from the extreme richness of color properties. (shrink)

In “What’s So Bad about Scientism?” (Mizrahi 2017), I argue that Weak Scientism, the view that “Of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge” (Mizrahi 2017, 354; emphasis in original) is a defensible position. That is to say, Weak Scientism “can be successfully defended against objections” (Mizrahi 2017, 354). In his response to Mizrahi (2017), Christopher Brown (2017) provides more objections against Weak Scientism, and thus another opportunity for me to show that (...) Weak Scientism is a defensible position, which is what I will do in this reply. In fact, I think that I have already addressed Brown’s (2017) objections in Mizrahi (2017), so I will simply highlight these arguments here. (shrink)

I reply to Patton's "Incommensurability and the Bonfire of the Meta-Theories".

In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then (...) the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical (...) hypotheses or knowledge closure. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that all transparent objects are colorless. This thesis is important for at least three reasons. First, if transparent objects are colorless, there is no need to distinguish between colors which characterize three-dimensional bodies, like transparent colors, and colors which lie on the surface of objects. Second, traditional objections against color physicalism relying on transparent colors are rendered moot. Finally, an improved understanding of the relations between colors, light and transparency is provided.

This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenomena with such impressive (...) accuracy. On the other hand, antirealists argue that the success of science does not warrant belief in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. This is because the history of science is a graveyard of theories that were once successful but were later discarded. The author eventually settles on a middle ground position between scientific realism and antirealism called "relative realism.". (shrink)

Slavná kniha Elementární formy náboženského života francouzského sociologa Émile Durkheima je jedním z nejdůležitějších příspěvků k sociologii náboženství. Po řadu let byla vychvalována a citována, stejně jako kritizována a zavrhována. Kniha se stala chartou celé řady sociálně vědních badatelů, zejména těch, kteří se zaměřovali na studium společnosti a náboženství. V roce 1966 však vyšel článek amerického antropologa Clifforda Geertze nazvaný „Nábo- ženství jako kulturní systém", v němž autor tvrdil, že Durkheimova teorie náboženství, stejně jako teorie náboženství Sigmunda Freuda, Bronislawa Malinowského (...) a Maxe Webera, by měla být překonána dokonalejší teorií náboženství. Touto dokonalejší teorií měla být Geertzova teorie. Porozuměl však Geertz Durkheimově teorii dostatečně, aby nás to opravňovalo k tvrzení, že Durkheim byl na poli teorie náboženství překonán? (shrink)

In my (2017a), I defend a view I call Weak Scientism, which is the view that knowledge produced by scientific disciplines is better than knowledge produced by non-scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge can be said to be quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as scientific disciplines produce more impactful knowledge–in the form of scholarly publications–than non-scientific disciplines (as measured by research output and research impact). Scientific knowledge can be said to be qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as such knowledge is (...) explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively more successful than non-scientific knowledge. Brown (2017a) raises several objections against my defense of Weak Scientism and I have replied to his objections (Mizrahi 2017b), thereby showing again that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. Since then, Brown (2017b) has reiterated his objections in another reply on SERRC. In this paper, I respond to Brown's objections, thereby showing once more that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. (shrink)

The study aims to measure the link between CSR and economic growth. This study investigates whether CSR expenses shown by the banks are contributing to the sustainability of an emerging economy like India. For this study, CSR spending of 21 commercial banks, on nine development areas of the Indian economy, the human development index of India, and its indicators along with the growth rate of GDP of India and state-wise GDP for the year 2014-2015 to 2017-2018 have been taken as (...) secondary data. The research techniques used are the case analysis method, correlation, and descriptive analysis. The study highlights that CSR activities are more of a myth and a far-reaching possibility in developing nations like India, where most institutions are engrossed in such activities to gain laurels and secure investors from the globe. (shrink)

This paper explores the impacts of neurological intervention on selfhood with reference to recipients’ claims about changes to their self-understanding following Deep Brain Stimulation for treatment of Parkinson’s Disease. In the neuroethics literature, patients’ claims such as: “I don’t feel like myself anymore” and “I feel like a machine”, are often understood as expressing threats to identity. In this paper I argue that framing debates in terms of a possible threat to identity—whether for or against the proposition, is mistaken and (...) occludes what is ethically salient in changes from DBS. Rather, by adopting a relational narrative approach to identity and autonomy, I show that the ethically salient issue from DBS is impacts on autonomous agency—whether one’s actions and beliefs are one’s own, and how DBS may hinder, or foster, embodied, relational autonomy competences. This approach recognizes that if sufficiently significant, impacts on autonomy competences may pose a threat to one’s ability to contribute to the process of authoring one’s own life and so pose a threat to identity formation. I argue this approach resolves the confusion in the literature about whether and how DBS threatens identity and provides a complex picture of how DBS may affect selfhood by disrupting narrative identity formation and revision, distorting agency and/or undermining autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is a crucial auxiliary assumption (...) that needs to be taken into account. The auxiliary assumption is that making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases about the subject matter in question (e.g., knowledge or proper names) is a good method for finding out truths about that subject matter. Without good reasons to think that this assumption is warranted, the negation of a philosophical theory whose content is alleged to be in conflict with the content of an intuition cannot be justifiably derived using an argument that employs the method of counterexamples. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Psychological Essentialism (PE), the view that essences are a heuristic or mental shortcut, is a better explanation for modal intuitions than Metaphysical Essentialism (ME), the view that objects have essences, or more precisely, that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties. If this is correct, then the mere fact that we have modal intuitions is not a strong reason to believe that objects have essential properties.