The European Union’s common agricultural policy (CAP), in addition to its primary production and farm income goals, is a large source of funding for environmentally friendly agricultural practices. However, its schemes have variable success and uptake across member states (MS) and regions. This study tries to explain these differences by demonstrating differences between policy levels in the understanding of the relationship between nature and farming. To compare constructs and values of the respective policy communities, their discursive construction as it appears (...) in the main strategic EU and MS agricultural policy documents is analysed. The theoretical framework integrates elements from existing frameworks of CAP and environmental discourse analysis; specific agri-environmental discourses, their elements and interplay, are identified. The six discourses suggested here are ‘Productivism’, ‘Classical neoliberal’, ‘Ecological modernisation’, ‘Administrative’, ‘Multifunctionality’ and ‘Radical green’. The discourse analysis of selected documents reveals that there are indeed differences in how farming and the environment are generally conceptualised at different levels of CAP decision-making. At EU level, farming is primarily understood as a sector whose main task is to produce food (‘Productivism’), and the environment is used as a justification for CAP payments (‘Multifunctionality’). At the national/regional level, Rural Development Programmes reflect different value systems: in England, environmental protection is mainly seen as sound management of natural capital (‘Classical neoliberal’); in Finland, a benefit for producers and conscious consumers (‘Ecological modernisation’); in Croatia, a necessity limiting productivity (‘Productivism’) and imposed by an external authority (‘Administrative’ discourse). This diversity shows that differences can visibly manifest despite the Commission constraining the discursive space, helping to explain the differential implementation and success of environmental measures. (shrink)

We investigate the computational complexity of deciding whether a given inference rule is admissible for some modal and superintuitionistic logics. We state a broad condition under which the admissibility problem is coNEXP-hard. We also show that admissibility in several well-known systems (including GL, S4, and IPC) is in coNE, thus obtaining a sharp complexity estimate for admissibility in these systems.

The issue of democracy is alive once more. There is a growing number of works debating the current state of democracy both in theory and practice.1 In particular a pragmatist conception of democracy has also been revived. Not only has a Deweyan version of a participatory democracy become the focus but the intricacies of a Rortian version have also come to the forefront, from both sympathetic as well as critical viewpoints.2 Thus the impression that the contemporary world is in quite (...) an exigent need of reconsidering—and perhaps even forming a novel conception of—democracy seems to be obvious, at least from a global point of view.3 Moreover, the fact that the idea or ideal of democracy still seems to be .. (shrink)

By a well-known result of Cook and Reckhow [S.A. Cook, R.A. Reckhow, The relative efficiency of propositional proof systems, Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 36–50; R.A. Reckhow, On the lengths of proofs in the propositional calculus, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, 1976], all Frege systems for the classical propositional calculus are polynomially equivalent. Mints and Kojevnikov [G. Mints, A. Kojevnikov, Intuitionistic Frege systems are polynomially equivalent, Zapiski Nauchnyh Seminarov POMI 316 129–146] have recently shown p-equivalence of (...) Frege systems for the intuitionistic propositional calculus in the standard language, building on a description of admissible rules of IPC by Iemhoff [R. Iemhoff, On the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 281–294]. We prove a similar result for an infinite family of normal modal logics, including K4, GL, S4, and. (shrink)

Investigates the assumptions of such philosophers as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger and Sartre regarding Jewish existence.

According to John Rawls’s famous Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. The currently dominant interpretation of what is justifiable to persons in this sense is an internalist one. On this view, what is justifiable to persons depends on their beliefs and commitments. In this paper I challenge this reading of Rawls’s principle, and instead suggest that it is most plausibly interpreted in externalist terms. On this alternative view, (...) what is justifiable to persons is not in any way dependent on, or relativized to, their beliefs and commitments. Instead, what is justifiable to all in the relevant sense is what all could accept as free and equal. I defend this reinterpretation of the view by showing how it is supported by Rawls’s account of the freedom and equality of persons. In addition, a considerable advantage of this suggestion is that it allows for an inclusive account of to whom the exercise of political power must be made justifiable. (shrink)

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler’s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in (...) deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent’s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler. (shrink)

We show that the universally axiomatized, induction-free theory equation image is a sequential theory in the sense of Pudlák's 5, in contrast to the closely related Robinson's arithmetic.

This paper experimentally investigates the altruistic behavior of physicians and whether this behavior is affected by payment system and uncertainty in health outcome. Subjects in the experiment take on the role of physicians and decide on the provision of medical care for different types of patients, who are identical in all respects other than the degree to which a given level of medical treatment affects their health. We investigate physician altruism from the perspective of ethical principles, by categorizing physicians according (...) to how well their treatment decisions align with different principles for priority setting. The experiment shows that many physicians are altruistic toward their patients but also that the degree of altruism varies across patients with different medical needs. We find a strong effect of payment system that is overall unaffected by the introduction of risk and ambiguity in patients health outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across individuals, in particular under the capitation payment system where physicians responses to the introduction of uncertainty in patient health are modulated by their own generic risk and ambiguity preferences. (shrink)

What is death: a process or a specific declaration? Is it a biological continuum of events or a decision based on medical, ethical, and legal criteria? In our view, it is both, and there are philos...

This essay explores the implications of historicising John Rawls’s theory of justice. While historical research on Rawls and his social context has provided valuable insights, some scholars argue that historicising carries significant philosophical consequences. This paper critically examines one such argument that contends that historicising Rawls’s theory demonstrates its contextual nature, undermines its diagnostic powers, and leads to its complete dissolution. We offer a reconstruction of this argument and show that it fails. Further, while we argue that this argument fails, (...) we go on to suggest that historical evidence may contribute to a defensive argument against appeals to expert opinion. By examining the appropriate relationship between historical research and philosophy, this essay contributes to the evaluation of the historicist critique and offers insights into the broader role of historical research in philosophical discourse. (shrink)

1. Fichtes idealismus und die geschichte. Rechtsphilosophie. Hegel in seinem verhältnis zur weltanschaung der aufklärung. Gibt es einen "Primat der praktischen vernunft" in der logik?--2. Die logik der philosophie und die kategorienlehre. Die lehre vom urteil.--3. Platon. Zum system der logik. Zum system der wissenschaften.

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

This paper considers the view that the basis of equality is the range property of being a moral person. This view, suggested by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971), is commonly dismissed in the literature. By defending the view against the criticism levelled against it, I aim to show that this dismissal has been too quick. The critics have generally failed to fully appreciate the fact that Rawls's account is restricted to the domain of distributive justice. On (...) Rawls's view distributive justice is a matter of the fair terms of cooperation among the participants of a system of social cooperation. I argue that this understanding of distributive justice can provide a compelling rationale for considering moral personality as the basis of equality for this domain of morality. That moral persons are indeed equal is further supported by an intuitive argument concerning the irrelevance of morally arbitrary factors, giving us reasons to believe that varying capacities among moral persons does not result in an unequal moral status. The dismissal of Rawls's account of equality has thus been premature, and it remains an important view to consider. (shrink)

John Rawls A Theory of Justice har haft ett monumentalt inflytande på den moderna politiska filosofin. Jag försöker här genom några nedslag i den nutida diskussionen förmedla en bild av detta inflytande, och av bokens fortsatta filosofiska relevans. Jag inleder med en kort presentation av huvuddragen i Rawls rättviseteori. Efter det går jag igenom, och bemöter, kritiken mot idealteori. Jag diskuterar sedan förhållandet mellan rättvisa och ekonomisk ojämlikhet, och förklarar varför teorin är radikalare än vad många kritiker insett. Slutligen går (...) jag igenom hur en kontraktsteori av detta slag kan hantera frågan om rättvisa mellan generationer. (shrink)