The edition contains all of Sieyès's "Essential Political Writings" during the revolutionary decade (1789-1799), among them his famous pamphlet What is the Third Estate? as well as the less well known, but no less important later Thermidor speeches.

Previous ed. published as Bd. 43 of series: Politica, Abhandlungen und Texte zur politischen Wissenschaft.

Die politische Ideengeschichte kennt nicht viele Autoren, die derart umstritten sind, wie der Abbé Sieyés: Für manche Interpreten ist er Wegbereiter des Jakobiner-Terrors, für andere dagegen der Vater des parlamentarischen Regierungssystems unserer Zeit. Der vorliegende Band unterzieht diese und ähnliche Klischees einer kritischen Prüfung.

Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès’s 1795 proposal for a Constitutional Jury is usually portrayed as the first proposal for an institution to control the constitutionality of laws, and thus the ancestor of the modern constitutional court. Challenging this view, this article resituates the Constitutional Jury in a broader transatlantic tradition concerned with creating a conservative power, a non-judicial and explicitly political constitutional guardian, and demonstrates the influence of the 1776 Pennsylvania Council of Censors on Sieyès’s Constitutional Jury. Drawing upon (...) the insights provided by this tradition, it then reevaluates the history of constitutionalism and the contemporary crisis of constitutional guardianship. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès remains amongst the most studied thinkers of the French Revolution, his views on international politics remain largely unexplored, despite his significant role in shaping the foreign policy of the French republic after 1794. This article provides a new account of Sieyès as an international political thinker and actor, drawing on published and archival materials to reconstruct Sieyès' diplomatic programme and its intellectual roots. In so doing, it challenges both the notion that (...) class='Hi'>Sieyès was a committed practitioner of an unideological realopolitik and the common assertion that Sieyès was a follower of Immanuel Kant's famous project for perpetual peace. Instead, this article shows that Sieyès charted a distinct course, based on a plan for the ‘republicanisation’ of Europe and its reorganisation into a league of militarily and economically linked states under French hegemony, oriented towards the preservation of republicanism in a hostile world. On this basis it re-evaluates the relationship between Sieyès' and Kant's conceptions of a confederation of republican states, presenting a new account of Kant's Perpetual Peace as a curtailment of his earlier cosmopolitan and pacifist idealism in response to the international situation of the 1790s and the foreign policy pursued by Sieyès and his allies. (shrink)

The abbe Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes distinguished himself as the chief theoretician of the French Revolution--and as a revolutionary constitutional and social theorist in his own right--through his rigorously analytical theory of representative government and its corollary, the representative character of social life in general. He expressed the essence of his thought in a series of three pamphlets published in the months leading up to the meeting of the Estates-General in 1789. This volume presents all three essays--_Views of the (...) Executive Means_, _An Essay on Privileges_, and _What Is the Third Estate?_--in their entirety. The third essay, in a new translation by Michael Sonenscher, is followed by Sieyes's 1791 newspaper debate with Tom Paine on the merits of monarchy versus republicanism. Elucidated by Sonenscher's insightful Introduction, these texts will fascinate anyone interested in the history of the French Revolution, the history of social and political thought, or the origins and character of modern liberalism. (shrink)

Work occupies a central place in most people’s lives, yet a secondary one in most of political philosophy. This article attempts to show the negative theoretical consequences of this neglect by taking the example of the concept of constituent power as it appears in the writings of Emmanuel Joseph Sièyes and Karl Marx. Both authors conceived it as made up of the working classes. This, however, makes them both run into the same paradox: how to politically represent a (...) class that is characterised by a non-political activity – work? I argue that neither of them gives a satisfactory response since both rely on an implausible account of objective class interests based on fragile grounds. I conclude by showing that the political representation of workers is a theoretical and practical problem that the concept of constituent power is unable to resolve. (shrink)

The Abbé Sieyès is usually portrayed as a thoroughly modern thinker and a critic of the nostalgic Classical Republicanism of some of his contemporaries, in favour of a “modern republicanism”, founded upon the division of labour and commercial sociability in a nation composed of equal labourers and producers. But Sieyès’s unpublished manuscripts suggest he, in fact, regarded modern labourers as unskilled “Machines du Travail”, dulled by work and incapable of exercising the duties of citizenship, a critique grounded in (...) a critical account of commercial society as compared to the ideal republican polity. Where most scholars regard this as either a simple contradiction or a passing juvenile nostalgia, this paper argues that, influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sieyès consistently sought to counteract the degrading effects of the inequalities generated by commercial society and the division of labour. It was on this basis that Sieyès sought to construct a new political system which would reconcile participatory politics with representative government, enabling all citizens to enjoy a life of Active Citizenship. Based on these insights, this paper reinterprets Sieyès’s political project as an attempt to reconcile the classical conception of citizenship with the demands of a commercial society. (shrink)

It is usually held that representative government is not strictly democratic, since it does not allow the people themselves to directly make decisions. But here, taking as her guide Thomas Paine’s subversive view that “Athens, by representation, would have surpassed her own democracy,” Nadia Urbinati challenges this accepted wisdom, arguing that political representation deserves to be regarded as a fully legitimate mode of democratic decision making—and not just a pragmatic second choice when direct democracy is not possible. As Urbinati shows, (...) the idea that representation is incompatible with democracy stems from our modern concept of sovereignty, which identifies politics with a decision maker’s direct physical presence and the immediate act of the will. She goes on to contend that a democratic theory of representation can and should go beyond these identifications. Political representation, she demonstrates, is ultimately grounded in a continuum of influence and power created by political judgment, as well as the way presence through ideas and speech links society with representative institutions. Deftly integrating the ideas of such thinkers as Rousseau, Kant, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Paine, and the Marquis de Condorcet with her own, Urbinati constructs a thought-provoking alternative vision of democracy. (shrink)

This second volume of ReConFort, published open access, addresses the decisive role of constitutional normativity, and focuses on discourses concerning the legal role of constitutional norms. Taken together with ReConFort I (National Sovereignty), it calls for an innovative reassessment of constitutional history drawing on key categories to convey the legal nature of the constitution itself (national sovereignty, precedence, justiciability of power, judiciary as constituted power). In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, constitutional normativity began to complete the legal fixation (...) of the entire political order. This juridification in one constitutional text resulted in a conceptual differentiation from ordinary law, which extends to alterability and justiciability. The early expressions of this 'new order of the ages' suggest an unprecedented and irremediable break with European legal tradition, be it with British colonial governance or the French ancien régime. In fact, while the shift to constitutions as a hierarchically 'higher' form of positive law was a revolutionary change, it also drew upon old liberties. The American constitutional discourse, which was itself heavily influenced by British common law, in turn served as an inspiration for a variety of constitutional experiments - from the French Revolution to Napoleon's downfall, in the halls of the Frankfurt Assembly, on the road to a unified Italy, and in the later theoretical discourse of twentieth-century Austria. If the constitution states the legal rules for the law-making process, then its Kelsian primacy is mandatory. Also included in this volume are the French originals and English translations of two vital documents. The first - Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès' Du Jury Constitutionnaire (1795) - highlights an early attempt to reconcile the democratic values of the French Revolution with the pragmatic need to legally protect the Revolution. The second - the 1812 draft of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland - presents the 'constitutional propaganda' of the Russian Tsar Alexander I to bargain for the support of the Lithuanian and Polish nobility. These documents open new avenues of research into Europe's constitutional history: one replete with diverse contexts and national experiences, but above all an overarching motif of constitutional decisiveness that served to complete the juridification of sovereignty. (www.reconfort.eu). (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's attack on the natural jurisprudence of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf is well known. But what happened to modern natural jurisprudence after Rousseau not very well known. The aim of this article is to try to show how and why it turned into what Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès called “social science” and the bearing that this Rousseau-inspired transformation has on making sense of ideology, or the moral and political thought of the late eighteenth-century French ideologues.

BackgroundDecision-making in end-stage dementia is a complex process involving medical, social, legal and ethical issues. In ESD, the person suffers from severe cognitive problems leading to a loss of capacity to decide matters regarding health and end-of-life issues. The decisional responsibility is usually passed to clinicians and relatives who can face significant difficulty in making moral decisions, particularly in the presence of life-threatening swallowing problems.AimThis study aimed to understand the decision-making processes of clinical teams and relatives in addressing life-threatening swallowing (...) difficulties in ESD in long-term care in Malta.MethodThe study followed a qualitative approach where six case studies, involving six different teams and relatives of six different patients, were interviewed retrospectively to understand their decision-making in connection with the management of swallowing difficulties in ESD. Data were collected through semistructured interviews with each stakeholder. All data were transcribed and subjected to thematic analysis.ResultsFour themes were identified: the vulnerability of patients in dementia decision-making; the difficult role of relatives in decision-making; the decisional conflict between aggressive care through tube feeding versus oral comfort feeding; a consensus-building decision-making process as ideal to facilitate agreement and respect for patient’s dignity.ConclusionDecision-making to manage swallowing difficulties in ESD is a challenging process, which involves an interpretation of personal values, beliefs, patient preferences, care needs and clinical practice. Better communication between clinicians and relatives in dementia helps promote agreement between stakeholders leading to a care plan that respects the dignity of patients at their end of life. (shrink)

This study used a partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) to estimate curriculum management's direct and indirect effects on university graduate programmes' viability. The study also examined the role of institutional effectiveness in mediating the nexus between the predictor and response variables. This is a correlational study with a factorial research design. The study's participants comprised 149 higher education administrators (23 Faculty Deans and 126 HODs) from two public universities in Nigeria. A structured questionnaire designed by the researchers was (...) used for data collection. The questionnaire was duly validated with an acceptable scale and item content validity indices. The dimensionality of the instrument was determined using exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Convergent validity was based on Average Variance Extracted (AVE), whereas discriminant validity was based on Fornell-Lacker criteria and the Hetero-Trait Mono-Trait (HTMT) ratio. Acceptable composite reliability estimates of internal consistency were reached for the three sub-scales. Following ethical practices, the questionnaire was physically administered to respondents and retrieved afterwards. Smart PLS (version 3.2.9) and SPSS (version 26.0) programs were used for all the statistical analyses. This study uncovered significant direct and indirect effects of curriculum management on the viability of graduate programmes. Institutional effectiveness significantly impacted graduate programmes’ viability while mediating the nexus between curriculum management and graduate programmes’ viability. Curriculum management and institutional effectiveness jointly explained a significant proportion of graduate programmes’ viability variance. The result of this study proved that graduate programmes’ viability depends, to a great extent, on how much curriculum is managed and how effective institutions are with their services. The result of this study can enable institutions seeking to run viable graduate programmes to re-evaluate their curriculum management practices and the effectiveness of their services. (shrink)

In this article, I show how resources for an education for non-dichotomous thinking can be drawn from the two Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Dichotomous thinking can be defined as thinking that considers things in terms of strict and even irreconcilable dichotomous oppositions. The authors of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are known for their criticism of such dichotomous thinking. At the same time however, these authors seem to fall into this very kind of thinking which they criticize. (...) That is to say, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi often promote adherence to conventionally ‘lower’ values over ‘higher’ ones. I believe though that this tension can be resolved if viewed through a pedagogical framework. Specifically, the adherence to ‘lower values’ can be seen as the initial step in the process of Daoist self-cultivation where one reduces the artificial distinctions one adheres to in order to prepare one’s disposition for union with Dao, which in turn entails non-dichotomous thinking. (shrink)

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes (...) close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 3, Page 315-317, July 2012.

This review examines issues relating to biomedical ethics and literature in the African drama The President’s Physician by Emmanuel Babatunde Omobowale. The play investigates the psychological dilemma of Doctor Bituki Warunga, a personal physician to General Kalunga Ntibantunganyah who brutally and inhumanely rules Wavaria, a fictional African country. The doctor is faced with deciding to uphold the ethics of his profession versus terminating the tyrant’s life to set the nation free. The play aims to help budding medical doctors rightly (...) inculcate the principles of medical ethics—autonomy, beneficence, competence, and power—by providing a fictional platform to investigate difficult issues that can arise in clinical practice. The play highlights Warunga’s complex dilemma as he struggles to uphold the Hippocratic Oath and at the same time satisfy his conscience towards his contribution to his country’s freedom. This review explores the difficulties in decision-making when professional duties not only clash with personal preferences but also with the well-being of an entire nation. This discussion is done alongside the ethical concept of utilitarianism and also highlights significant literary concepts such as satire, symbolism, intertextuality, utopian aesthetics, and authorial vision as conveyed in the text. (shrink)

This essay explores and interprets two texts from Parochial and Plain Sermons in light of Newman’s understanding of religious imagination—specifically, the act of realization. Both texts suggest that for Newman, realization is a type of self-appropriation by which a fact or an object is assimilated . One sermon concerns the Passion, the other the Resurrection. He indicates that when the object of the imagination is Christ, realization comes about through meditation on Scripture, and produces a stronger or weaker vision of (...) Jesus in the soul based on one’s personal dispositions. It is often employed when the mind engages in conflicting ideas, such as Christ as both God and man. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 1 Seiten: 373-380.

This paper dwells on the debate on the question of what is/are responsible for African underdevelopment and, by extension, what will influence African development. The debate currently dwells on how much of development is human and how much is environmental, extraneous and beyond human control. Joseph Agbakoba thinks that development involves both nature and human agency, acknowledges the effect of nature, equally sees philosophy as a critique of worldview and ideology, and African philosophy as saddled with the critique of (...) the African worldview and ideology, which he sees as malfunctioning in the context of the modern African civic society imported from Europe and needs certain adjustments. In other words, he sees development in Africa as not beyond human control. J. Obi Oguejiofor attempts to refute Agbakoba’s claim that worldview has anything to do with the African predicament, and concludes that the African predicament is as a result of geography, biogeography and history, but his advancement of these factors as being solely responsible for the African predicament completely ignores the human agency in development and lands him in determinism raising the question of the very relevance of African philosophy to African development. Conceptual analysis informs the dominant method of the paper. (shrink)

A philosoph and a sociologist inspired by Durkheim with whom he started L’Année sociologique, Célestin Bouglé (1870-1940) has been for a long time known for his Essais sur le régime des castes (1908) and his critique of Lapouge’s anthroposociology. His sociological interests however are intimately linked with his republican and solidarity ideals. This article explores the importance and the form of democracy in Bouglé’s political thought. On this topic, the influence of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) on Bouglé’s thought is important (...) in order to understand the particularity of Bouglé’s solidarism by contrast with Léon Bourgeois’. This particularity is however for Bouglé an attempt to complete Bourgeois’ philosophy of solidarity rather than to confront it. (shrink)

Philosophe et sociologue proche de Durkheim avec lequel il lancera L’Année sociologique, Célestin Bouglé est surtout connu pour ses Essais sur le régime des castes et sa critique de l’anthroposociologie de Lapouge. Ses intérêts sociologiques demeurent toutefois indissociables de son attachement au républicanisme démocratique. En s’attardant sur la philosophie sociale de Bouglé, cet article vise à explorer la forme que prend la démocratie dans sa pensée politique et républicaine en s’attardant sur l’influence que Proudhon a pu exercer sur cette pensée. (...) Cette influence semble conférer à la philosophie de la solidarité de Bouglé une dimension particulière par rapport à la pensée du père du solidarisme, Léon Bourgeois. Sans s’opposer à ce dernier, le solidarisme de Bouglé semble plutôt être une tentative de compléter le projet politique de Bourgeois par l’ajout d’une réflexion sur la question morale de l’expression de la solidarité dans la quotidienneté. (shrink)

The remarkable interest in ethical theory shown over the last decade may simply be a return to the norms of literary scholarship. After all, ethics has dominated criticism of literature since Plato and Aristotle, and even with the emergence of formalism, in both its Russian and American varieties, ethical justifications of literature remained in place.However, the increasing influence of Emmanuel Levinas upon literary theory raises questions about the relation of ethical philosophy to literature.1 As his 1948 essay “Reality and (...) Its Shadow” reveals, the ethics of Levinas represents an uncompromising challenge not only to classical Greek ethical thought and the aesthetics that stems from it but to contemporary... (shrink)

Rousseau -- Karl Marx -- Dostoevsky -- Friedrich Nietzsche -- Henry Adams -- Emmanuel Mounier -- Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre.

SummaryThis article examines the role played by conceptions of friendship in the francophone Catholic world during the early-to-mid twentieth century, focusing particularly on the review La Relève, a significant French Canadian publication of the 1930s and 1940s. For many francophone Catholic intellectuals during this period, friendship signalled a shared commitment to common religious, social and political goals. These notions of community and friendship were especially central to Catholic thinkers such as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, who participated in the (...) personalist movement, an influential current of philosophy in mid-twentieth-century France. While the young writers at La Relève were initially a small and cliquish group of old schoolmates, their growing interest in personalism led them to conceive of their group in more inclusive and communitarian terms. Their personal ties to Maritain also allowed them to cultivate links with a broader, international network of francophone Catholic authors. These relationships would come to fruition during the Second World War, when the Relève group would act as publishers for many European anti-fascist intellectuals living in North American exile. The example of La Relève thus allows us to see how friendship served as both an idealised form of social relationship and a means for building up a larger community of like-minded Catholic intellectuals and social activists. (shrink)

This book examines the extremely important issue of the consistency of medical involvement in ending lives in medicine, law and war. It uses philosophical theory to show why medical doctors may be involved at different stages of the capital punishment process. The author uses the theories of Emmanuel Kant and John S. Mill, combined with Gerwith's principle of generic consistency, to concretize ethics in capital punishment practice. This book does not discuss the moral justification of capital punishment, but rather (...) looks at the possible forms of involvement and shows why consistency would demand medical involvement. The author takes a general approach, using arguments that may apply universally. The book broaches different academic fields, such as medicine, ethics, business, politics and defense. The Ethics of Medical Involvement in Capital Punishment is of interest to students, teachers, lecturers and researchers working in the areas of capital punishment, medical, legal and business ethics, and political philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.2 (2001) 49-69 [Access article in PDF] The Communication of the Impossible Joseph Suglia Death is the death of other people, contrary to the tendency of contemporary philosophy, which is focussed on one's own solitary death. Only the former is central to the search for lost time. But the daily death—and the death of every instant—of other persons, as they withdraw into themselves, does not belong to (...) an incommunicable solitude: that is precisely what nurtures love. That is Eros in all its ontological purity, which does not require participation in a third term (tastes, common interests, a connaturality of souls)—but direct relationship with what gives itself in withholding itself, with the other qua other, with mystery. —Emmanuel Levinas, "The Other in Proust" Desire, pure impure desire, is the call to bridge the distance, to die in common through separation. —Maurice Blanchot, L'écriture du désastreOf the many challenges to the Heideggerian analytic of mortality that emerged throughout the twentieth century, none has been more groundbreaking than that of Maurice Blanchot. 1 The originality and singularity of this confrontation consists in its accent on the social character of mortality: the "experience" of death appears, in this body of discourse, as a relation to the autrui.Death is, for Heidegger, an individual engagement. 2 Heidegger absolutely excludes from his existential analytic of mortality any consideration of the Other's dying as a possible object of experience. 3 Although Sein und Zeit (1927) posits cobeing (Mitsein) as a structure essential to the constitution of selfhood, 4 death belongs exclusively to the solitary Dasein. 5 The problematic of sacrifice is irrelevant to the existential analytic, since the representative function of sacrifice does not correspond to the unrepresentable [End Page 49] character of death. 6 This is because, as Heidegger points out, even if one dies for the Other, one does not take away the Other's death. 7 As Heidegger remarks, Dasein may never experience the Other's arrival at the end (Zuendegekommensein) [SZ 239] (the true object of thanato-ontology), but only its transition into something unliving (Unlebendiges) [SZ 238]. 8 For this reason, no ontological study of death could take the death of the Other as an object of formal research.Although the "fate" of Dasein is communal (occurring within the shared context of a community), Dasein takes no part in the Other's relation to its most proper possibility: the anticipation of death, which discloses every other possibility and which makes possibility itself possible. Individuals in the community relate to their respective fates as a series of disconnected possibilities of impossibility. There is, at most, a "holding-in-common" of deaths that are infinitely separated from each other. In destiny (Geschick), individual Daseins share nothing more than the mutual impossibility of experiencing each other's deaths: there is an infinite distance between the death of the self and the death of the Other, an impossible articulation or interlacing of incommensurable nonexperiences. Every death is a parallel death—and nothing else besides.There is, then, for Heidegger, essentially no rapport between the death of the self and the death of the Other. Dasein is beside the Other in its dying without ever dying in the place of the Other. As Heidegger puts it in paragraph forty-seven of Sein und Zeit, "Wir erfahren nicht im genuinen Sinne das Sterben der Anderen, sondern sind höchstens immer nur 'dabei'" [We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense, but are, at the very most, always just 'there'] [SZ 239]. Holding death in common is what holds the members of the relation together in their mutual separation. Despite the methodological sleight of hand that Heidegger terms "destiny," Dasein's relation to its own death is constitutively dissociated from that of the Other.In contrast to this tendency, Blanchot conceives of the self's relation to its own death as an exposure that opens onto the death of the other person. Such is Blanchot's most important contribution to the thought of death, as well as what distinguishes his position most radically from... (shrink)

When Emmanuel Levinas writes that Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung is “a work too often present in this book to be cited,” he effectively names his debt to F. W. J. Schelling as well, for Rosenzweig’s work was a sustained attempt to carry to completion Schelling’s great philosophical fragment, the Weltalter. Scholars of Levinas have explored Levinas’s relationship to Schelling, but I confess that, as a Schelling scholar, I knew nothing of this connection until rather recently. I credit above (...) all the energetic work of Jason Wirth for helping me see its importance — and more generally the importance of reading Schelling in the context of recent work in continental philosophy. None of this has been easy. The very thing that Schelling and Levinas have in common, their resistance to the implicit solipsism of overcoming mystery with clarity, make them poor candidates for quick appropriation and comparison. Indeed, Schelling anticipated Nietzsche by openly mocking the scholars who make it their business to “appropriate and compare.” Mockery and ridicule is, ofcourse, not Levinas’s way of going about things. Even so, he too is so relentless in his polemic against the totalizing desire to know that he forces his reader to pause and question just what a proper scholarly response to his work might be. As such, the very first result of taking up the question of Schelling and Levinas might be that we are forced to set aside the scholarly mask, testimony of one’s acquiescence to the order of the same, in order to step forth as the human beings that we are. Whether this is an act of humility or of arrogance is not at all clear. Dispensing with the pretense of knowledge takes a kind of boldness on our part — for what but knowledge might give us a claim to the attention of others? (shrink)

Cet ensemble ne cherche pas à gommer par des ponts et des raccords le disparate des préoccupations, l'aléatoire des sollicitations. Il forme toutefois un ouvrage qui a ses obsessions, ses retours, ses insistances. Le cours de l'Histoire et les philosophies qui ont cherché à le comprendre, la place dominante prise aujourd'hui par le discours économique, les quêtes extrêmes de sens, aux limites de la raison, la fidélité à des causes qui ont pu passer pour utopiques, voilà quelques tracés qui se (...) rendent visibles. Quoi de commun entre l'espoir fou d'Antonin Artaud de "guérir la vie" en transgressant les frontières de la rationalité occidentale, et la tentative d'Emmanuel Lévinas de fonder l'éthique sur le visage de l'autre pour subvertir la tyrannie de l'universel et de l'impersonnel? Quoi de commun entre la temporalité anhistorique de l'Islam et l'espoir militant d'une libération des femmes qui ouvre une autre Histoire? Dans le choc des réflexions aux prises avec l'inattendu, dans l'irruption des conjonctures inquiétantes, ces effets de brisures, ces fractures du temps, ne contredisent pourtant pas un souffle d'irréversible, qui confirme ce que les pensées de l'Histoire et leur foi dans l'avenir ont pressenti. J.J.G. (shrink)

DIREITO E HISTÓRIA NA FRANÇA PÓS-REVOLUCIONÁRIA: CONSIDERAÇÕES A RESPEITO DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DE EMMANUEL SIEYÈS PARA O CONSTITUCIONALISMO MODERNO.

In On the People’s Terms, Philip Pettit incorporates the Sieyèsian notion of constituent power into his constitutional theory of non-domination. In this article, I argue that Emmanuel Sieyès’s understanding of liberty precludes such an appropriation. While a republican, his conceptualisation of liberty in the face of commercial society stood apart from theories of civic vigilance, preferring instead to disentangle individuals from politics and maximise what he understood to be their non-political freedoms. Sieyès saw that liberty was heightened (...) through relations of representation and commercial dependency. This conception of liberty was pivotal to the identity of the nation, and so allowed Sieyès to assess forms of collective injustice committed by the French nobility. It also provided the normative foundation of his theory of constituent power. For Sieyès, constituent power guarded against legislative excess in a decidedly minimal sense, intending instead to separate citizens from the political sphere so they were not burdened with ongoing participation or public vigilance. (shrink)

István Hont identified a point in the history of political thought at which republicanism and commercialism became separated. According to Hont, Emmanuel Sieyès proposed that a monarchical republic should be formed. By contrast the Jacobins, in favour of a republic led by the people, rejected not only Sieyès’s political proposal, but also the economic ideology that went with it. Sieyès was in favour of a commercial republic; the Jacobins were not. This was, according to Hont, a (...) defining moment in the history of political thought. In this article, I offer a different analysis of that particular moment in the history of the commercial republic, one that instead of focusing on Sieyès and the Jacobins, looks at the thought of Girondins philosophers Nicolas de Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy. I argue that their arguments provide sound models for a commercial republic, reconciling late 18th century republican ideals in which virtue was central, with the need for a flourishing and internationally active market economy. (shrink)

This essay goes beyond the dominant conception of constituent power developed by Emmanuel Sieyès and Carl Schmitt by excavating an alternative through the practices of twentieth-century workers’ councils and the interpretations of council democracy by Cornelius Castoriadis and Hannah Arendt. Interpreters of the constituent power often agree on its fundamentally antagonistic relation to constituted power, hereby making constituent politics a momentary experience, which cannot be sustained in constituted politics. Council democracy, instead, discloses a modality of politics, which bridges (...) the gap between constituent power and political form in order to provide institutional means through which the spirit of revolution can survive the founding moment. With this alternative concept of council democratic constituent power, this essay contributes to radical democratic theory by stipulating ways in which institutions can be rethought radically democratic as a way in which constituent power (creativity, novelty, freedom) can be institutionally approximated and continually reexperienced. (shrink)

In this book, Joseph Millum explains how parental rights and responsibilities are acquired, what they consist in, and how parents should go about making decisions on behalf of their children. In doing so, he provides a set of frameworks to help solve pressing ethical dilemmas relating to parents and children.

This chapter evaluates whether AI systems are or will be rights-holders, explaining the conditions under which people should recognize AI systems as rights-holders. It develops a skeptical stance toward the idea that current forms of artificial intelligence are holders of moral rights, beginning with an articulation of one of the most prominent and most plausible theories of moral rights: the Interest Theory of rights. On the Interest Theory, AI systems will be rights-holders only if they have interests or a well-being. (...) Current AI systems are not bearers of well-being, and so fail to meet the necessary condition for being rights-holders. This argument is robust against a range of different objections. However, the chapter also shows why difficulties in assessing whether future AI systems might have interests or be bearers of well-being—and so be rights-holders—raise difficult ethical challenges for certain developments in AI. (shrink)

Aunque fueron muchos los intentos en la modernidad de superar el dualismo cuerpo y mente, las teorías filosóficas del lenguaje en muchos casos lo reintrodujeron de manera sutil pero no menos eficaz. El artículo discute varios teoremas para pensar la materialidad del signo y muestra la preponderancia, desde Kierkegaard hasta el estructuralismo post-Saussuriano, de pensar la materialización como algo necesario, pero arbitrario en su modalidad. En esta concepción, el cuerpo del lenguaje no es solamente aquello que se puede sino aquello (...) que se debe poder modificar: la corporalidad de la expresión es lo que debe poder ser absolutamente sustituible para conservar la unidad del sentido. Sin embargo, en muchos casos, el sentido emerge precisamente de la singularidad insustituible, de la configuración de los signos en la poesía o de la gestualidad inimitable del actor. El articulo argumenta en favor de introducir, en esta discusión, la distinción fenomenológica entre Kó'rper y Leib, que - como Husserl sugirió - también puede pueden pensarse según la diferencia entre lo representable y lo irrepresentable, entre lo que no tiene papel constituyente y que desde luego puede ser sustituido, y lo que permite ser representado por otro porque es insustituible. Although in the modern age there were plenty of attempts to overcome the mind-body dualism, its philosophical theories of languages reintroduced it in a subtle but not less effective way. In this article several theorems to think on the materiality of the sign are discussed, and the preponderance, from Kierkegaard to the post-Saussurean structuralism, of thinking the materialization as something necessary but arbitrary in its modality, is shown. The body of language under this understanding is not only that which can be modified, but that which must be modifiable: the corporeality of the utterance must be substitutable in order to preserve the unit of meaning. Nevertheless, in many cases, the meaning comes precisely from the unsubstitutable singularity, from the configuration of the signs in poetry or from the inimitable actor's gestures. The article argues for introducing in this discussion the phenomenological distinction between Kórper and Leib, which - as Husserl suggested - may also be thought from the difference between the representable and the irrepresentable, between what does not have a constituent role and hence can be substituted, and what allows to be represented by another because it is unsubstitutable. (shrink)