Critics have argued that utilitarians, by the very nature of the system they endorse, cannot maintain their integrity; and that they cannot, in the end, be individuals of the sort human beings want to be. In my dissertation I explore this criticism and argue that utilitarianism need not endanger integrity, that it need not undercut autonomy, and that it need not deny individuality of any sort. ;Bernard Williams is the major proponent of this criticism. Williams argues that a utilitarian cannot (...) maintain the commitment to projects and principles which is necessary for a person to be an individual. He cannot have what Williams calls "ground projects," projects which are so central to him that they are what give point to his life. The reasons Williams gives for this are varied, and the connections between his various criticisms are not always clear. In the thesis I first analyze the arguments Williams uses against utilitarianism. I show that Williams' arguments that a utilitarian cannot have ground projects depends on a false assumption about the emotional attachment required for a person to be committed to his projects in a way that individuates. I argue that Williams demands an emotional attachment that blinds one to rational consideration, in a way that we will find unacceptable. ;Williams offers an account of individuality which claims that utilitarianism does not allow the proper sort of emotional attachment to projects because it is too necessarily rational a system. W. D. Falk, on the contrary, offers a theory which if correct will show utilitarianism to be an insufficiently rational system. Falk argues that any moral system which declares that there are universal moral rules by which all people's behavior should be regulated undercuts the autonomy of the agents to whom it dictates. If one is to be autonomous, one must do only what one has reason to do. An agent has reason to do something only if he would be motivated to do it upon reflection. If utilitarianism does not motivate some particular agent, that agent, in order to preserve rationality and autonomy, ought not to follow utilitarianism. ;In response to these criticisms I suggest a more plausible notion of individuality which requires neither irrational emotional attachment nor Falk's subjective standard of rational choice. I then advocate a modified form of utilitarianism which does not pose the dangers to individuality which traditional forms of utilitarianism may. In this version, we broaden the notion of utility so that our evaluative beliefs are of special importance in our determination of what things have utility. When utility-maximization is construed in this way it does not pose special dangers for individuality. (shrink)

Cette lecture du livre de Gregory Cormann, Sartre. Une anthropologie politique. 1920-1980, est centrée sur la relation de Sartre avec Lucien Lévy-Bruhl sur le thème des émotions, développée dans son dernier chapitre. Cela conduit aussi à suggérer, sous ce rapport, un lien entre Günther Anders Stern e Sartre.

In this paper, I aim at explaining the difference Kant makes between emotion, the beautiful and the sublime. I begin by explaining what an emotion is, showing that it refers to feelings that are related to desire. In contrast, I show that the feeling of beautiful and the sublime give us an inactive delight, that is not related to an interest in the object. The feeling of beautiful is related to the judgment of taste, and it has a universal validity (...) for everyone. I ask then if we can judge art without any emotion at all. According to Kant, not only one can, but one should, since pure judgment of taste is independent from charm and commotion. At the end, I ask if it is possible to enjoy music without emotion. For a lover of music, perhaps the emotion it provokes is the main reason to like it. I show that this is probably the reason why music is considered to have the last place in the beautiful arts for Kant. (shrink)

En la filosofía y la psicología moral existe una discusión actualmente de vital importancia, esto es la relación entre moral y emociones. Después de una larga tradición de pensamiento en donde los procesos de justificación moral se asociaron con el valor normativo de la razón, hoy en día asistimos a una nueva orientación que defiende la integración de aspectos cognitivos y emocionales dentro del análisis de la acción moral y los compromisos ciudadanos. En este contexto, Martha Nussbaum, con su teoría (...) cognitivo-evaluadora de las emociones, aporta una original reflexión ética centrada en lo que ha denominado el juicio eudaimonista ligado al florecimiento de la persona y la comprensión de una vida humana buena. Esta visión posibilita entender las emociones como advertidores de vulnerabilidad, sufrimiento y dignidad humana menoscabada, en momentos en que miles de hombres y mujeres se sumergen en lo infrahumano. In moral philosophy and psychology there is currently discussion of vital importance, this is the relationship between morality and emotions. After a long tradition of thought in which the processes of moral justification were associated with the normative value of reason, today we are witnessing a new orientation that defends the integration of cognitive and emotional aspects within the analysis of moral action and citizen commitments. In this context, Martha Nussbaum, with her cognitive appraisal theory of emotions, contributes an original ethical reflection focused on what has been called the eudaimonist judgment linked to the flowering of the person and understanding of a good human life. This vision makes it possible to understand the emotions as warners of vulnerability, suffering and human dignity undermined, at a time when thousands of men and women are immersed in the subhuman. (shrink)

The notion of emotion in phenomenology involves the centrality of the concept of “value.” This general assumption is here articulated in three theses. The first thesis concerns the public, expressive and behavioral nature of emotion. The second thesis relates to its corporeal and material nature. The third maintains that the structure of emotion is essentially temporal. Each of these arguments converges in emphasizing the irruption of an impersonal dimension into human consciousness, and in particular into emotional consciousness. The objective of (...) this essay is to probe this sub-categorical, or inter-corporeal, dimension from the dual viewpoint of phenomenology and psychoanalysis.La notion d’émotion en phénoménologie implique la centralité du concept de « valeur ». Cette supposition est ici articulée en trois thèses. La première concerne la nature publique, expressive et comportementale de l’émotion. La seconde se rapporte à la nature corporelle et matérielle de l’émotion. La troisième soutient que la tructure de l’émotion est essentiellement temporelle. Ces trois arguments permettent de souligner l’irruption d’une dimension impersonnelle au sein de la conscience humaine, et en particulier dans la conscience émotionnelle. L’objectif de cet essai est de sonder cette dimension sous-catégorique, ou inter-corporelle, à partir du double point de vue de la phénoménologie et de la psychanalyse. La nozione di emozione in fenomenologia implica la centralità del concetto di “valore”. Nel presente articolo, questo assunto generale è articolato secondo tre tesi. La prima concerne l’aspetto pubblico, espressivo e comportamentale dell’emozione. La seconda ha a che fare con la sua natura corporea e materiale. La terza afferma il carattere essenzialmente temporale dell’emozione. Queste argomentazioni convergono nel tentativo di mettere in luce l’irruzione di una dimensione impersonale nella coscienza umana, e in particolare nella coscienza emozionale. L’obiettivo di questo studio è esaminare questa dimensione sub-categoriale, o inter-corporea, dal duplice punto di vista della fenomenologia e della psicoanalisi. (shrink)

Leading international scholars present novel dialogues between different psychoanalytic orientations as well as between the particularities of diverse socio-cultural and historical contexts in order to offer critical insights which are ...

El presente estudio se realizó con el objetivo de evaluar el impacto del estrés emocional en la adecuada toma de decisiones y práctica médica oportuna y de calidad de los estudiantes que cursan el quinto año de la carrera en la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Se utilizó una lista de valoración para las competencias de la simulación de reanimación cardiopulmonar avanzada, y un Cuestionario de Maslach Burnout Inventory para valorar los sentimientos, actitudes y de (...) desgaste profesional. Los resultados muestran que aquellos que estaban expuestos a mayor cantidad de labores recientes y estrés fueron más propensos de incidir en errores médicos durante la toma de decisiones y su aprendizaje. This study was conducted with the aim of assessing the impact of emotional stress in the appropriate decision-making and quality medical practice of fifth year medical students from the Faculty of Medicine of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. It was used an assessment list for cardiopulmonary resuscitation simulation competence and a Maslach Burnout Inventory Questionnaire was used to assess feelings, attitudes and professional wear and tear. Results show those who were exposed to a greater number of recent tasks and to greater stress were more likely to make medical mistakes while making decisions and learning. (shrink)

An internal critique of anthropology in recent decades has shifted the focus and scope of anthropological work on emotion. In this article I review the changes, explore the pros and cons of leading anthropological approaches and theories, and argue that—so far as anthropology is concerned—only detailed narrative accounts can do full justice to the complexity of emotions. A narrative approach captures both the particularity and the temporal dimension of emotion with greater fidelity than semantic, synchronic, and discourse-based approaches.

According to cognitivism about emotion, emotions are reducible to some non-emotional states. In one version, they are reducible entirely to cognitive states, such as beliefs or judgments; in another, they are reducible to combinations of cognitive and conative states, such as desire or intention. Cognitivism is plausibly regarded as the orthodoxy in the philosophy of emotion since the 1980s. In a recent paper, however, Montague develops a powerful argument against cognitivism. Here I argue that the argument nonetheless fails.

El presente texto contiene los resultados de una revisión bibliográfica realizada con el objetivo de establecer la importancia de desarrollar competencias emocionales durante el proceso de formación de los profesionales de la salud, especialmente del área de odontología, atendiendo a que la especialidad está registrada como una de las profesiones más estresantes, situación que podría originarse durante el proceso educativo, ya que sus alumnos experimentan altos niveles de ansiedad o estrés durante su formación. Se entiende por competencia emocional el conjunto (...) de conocimientos, capacidades, habilidades y actitudes necesarias para comprender, expresar y regular los fenómenos emocionales. Como conclusión, esta revisión permitió demostrar como la inclusión de estas competencias en el plan de estudios repercutiría significativamente en el bienestar psicológico de estos estudiantes. This paper contains the results of a bibliographical review which was carried out aiming at establishing the importance of developing emotional competence in health professionals' training, especially on the dentistry area; providing that this specialty is one of the most stressful. The educational process might be at the root of this situation, since students experience high levels of anxiety or stress during their training. Emotional competence is understood as the group of knowledge, abilities and attitudes needed to understand, express and regulate emotional phenomena. In conclusion, this review enabled to demonstrate how the inclusion of emotional competence in dentistry major's syllabus would have an influence on student's psychological well-being. (shrink)

Living with the Robots. A Conversation about social Robotics This interview aims at focusing some aspects of an intriguing discipline known as social Robotics. In particular, we try to get familiar with concepts and philosophical frameworks which deal with this new human enterprise. Paul Dumouchel and Luisa Damiano will help us to get in contact with a scenario in which emotions, reason and ethics will be partially revised by a somehow different perspective about human-robot interaction and sociality.

In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In (...) section 2 I argue the same holds true for conative attitudes. And in section 3 I briefly mention some salient aspects of the version of nonreductive analysis I lean toward. (shrink)

Este artículo trata de investigar si es posible que se produzca una emoción partiendo solo de su expresión, y no de un estímulo. Para ello se analizarán algunos trabajos de autores como William James, Francisco Alcayde y Vilar o la psicóloga chilena Susana Bloch. Todos ellos han tratado de demostrar que la expresión de una emoción puede conducir al sujeto a experimentarla. Sin embargo, estas tesis cometen el error de abolir el pensamiento del sujeto, otorgándole una especial importancia a la (...) parte física que diferencian de la que podríamos llamar la parte mental. This article intends to investigate whether an emotion can be born from their expression, and not of an external stimulus. For this reason, I will analyze some works of authors such as William James, Francisco Alcayde and Vilar and Susana Bloch. All of them have tried to show that the expression of an emotion leads a person to experience that emotion. However, these theories are not correct because they invalidate the thinking of the self, and they give special importance to the physical part which they distinguish from what we might call the mental part. (shrink)

Background: Compassion, understood as empathy for another who is experiencing physical, mental, emotional and/or spiritual suffering, is an essential element of our shared understandings of nursing and the constitution of the professional nurse. Theoretical foundation: Charles Taylor account of ethics which concerns ‘what or who is it good to be’ rather than the predominant analytical moral philosophy approach which concentrates on ‘what ought one to do’ is the core concern of this discussion. An ontological appreciation of our shared human condition (...) is the premise upon which the discussion is based. Discussion: This article proposes that concept by opening a dialogical space, nurses can engage in reflection and sense making wherein they explore individually and collectively the conflicts and confusions encountered in their day-to-day work. Through their dialogues, nurses – individually and collectively – orient and reorient themselves and each other towards what they see as meaningful and purposeful in their lives and in doing so they are well positioned to reaffirm their commitment to compassion as a value which both anchors and orients their day-to-day work. Implications: The provision of opportunities in the workplace, in the form of dialogue, to articulate often unspoken assumptions and frameworks in which nursing work is carried out can not only initiate the building of pathways of support but also assist nurses reaffirm their compassion – arguably the essence of their nursing practice. (shrink)

It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...) conceive of the emotions as evaluations. Exploring these parallels constitutes a privileged route for understanding the intuitive appeal of the thoughts that a life without emotions is not worth living and that having plenty of positive emotions must be good. In the first part of our discussion, we review the key insights that are pursued within companion approaches to well-being and the emotions that respectively appeal to feelings and to desires. We explain how emotions end up being good as ends for the individual if one endorses one or the other of these combinations of views. Yet, we argue that the problems faced by these approaches favour a third combination of views: an objective list theory of well-being and a companion theory of the emotions as evaluations. Yet, this approach faces significant worries of its own: it appears to force upon us the deflationary conclusion that emotions are only instrumentally good for the individual and to promote an understanding of the emotions which makes them incapable of accounting for the insights fuelling hedonist and conativist approaches. The task of the second part of our discussion is to dissipate these worries. We explain why conceiving of emotions as evaluations allows to revisit the insights underpinning the three accounts of well-being and promotes a rich understanding of why emotions are valuable as ends for objective, hedonic and conative reasons. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo propone definir la integridad moral a partir de la autorreflexión, la meta emoción y la identidad. Se parte de la autorreflexión de H. Frankfurt y se amplía su evaluación de los deseos mediante los conceptos de autorreflexión débil y fuerte de C. Taylor. Si bien las emociones tienen relevancia en la motivación, lo que cuenta para evaluar la reflexividad de alguien son sus acciones. Se plantea que las emociones, aun sin cristalizar en acción, son relevantes para determinar (...) la identidad moral. Así mismo, se presentan las metaemociones como un tipo de deseo de segundo orden que no se enlaza necesariamente a la volición, pero que tiene potencial similar a las voliciones de segundo orden. Se propone considerar a las emociones morales, según las define C. Korsgaard, como equivalentes a las metaemociones que, junto con las razones, determinan la integridad moral. ABSTRACT The purpose of the article is to define moral integrity on the basis of self-reflection, meta-emotion, and identity. Starting out from H. Frankfurt’s notion of self-reflection, the article expands his assessment of desires with the help of C. Taylor‘s concepts of strong and weak self-reflection. While it is true that emotions are relevant for motivation, it is an individual’s actions that count when assessing reflexivity. The article suggests that emotions, even when they have not materialized into actions, are relevant in determining moral identity. Likewise, it discusses meta-emotions as a type of second-order desire that is not necessarily linked to volition, but whose potential is similar to that of second-order volitions. It suggests that moral emotions, according to C. Korsgaard, be considered equivalent to meta-emotions, which, together with reasons, determine moral integrity. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their corresponding evaluations, desires, behavior and goals. Such conceptual relation is of the utmost importance in order to account for the unity or oneness of emotion, for if the different aspects of emotion are linked conceptually, then to have one such aspect would imply having all the others. After I discuss how emotions are related to their corresponding evaluations, desires and behavior, I show how each aspect of emotion is (...) related to the others. Next, I argue that indeed there is such conceptual or quasi-conceptual relation between emotions, evaluations and conative or desiderative states. However, while intentional behavior in terms of actions is conceptually related to some emotions, other times the emotion-specific desires are either non-forward-looking, and thus do not give rise to intentional actions, or they may be overridden, and the resultant behavioral manifestations are not conceptually related to emotion. Next, I argue that emotions are eudaimonistic, in the sense that they are essentially concerned with important goals, concerns and attachments that comprise our conception of the good life and well-being. Finally, I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their respective goals, and argue that while emotions logically presuppose such goals, the reverse is not the case. (shrink)

In this dissertation I analyse the concepts of pleasure and unpleasantness and outline an approach whereby the insights gained about pleasure and unpleasantness are applied to the analysis of a number of feeling and emotion concepts. In trying to understand what pleasure is and hew it is related to pain and unpleasantness, I tackle various basic questions about the role of pleasure, pain, and unpleasantness in motivation and about the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and the intrinsic badness of pain and (...) unpleasantness. In pleasure's nature of being good, wanted, and sought and pairfs nature of being bad, unwanted, and avoided we locate the way in which pleasure and pain are opposites and the central defining properties of the 'pleasant' and the 'unpleasant'. Within my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness I reach the conclusion that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'special experiences' : I explain what is involved in this claim and defend it against the objections which Ludwig Wittgenstein raised in his Private Language Argument. The view of the emotions which I outline and defend is the view which Aristotle, Spinoza, and many other philosophers have held. According to this view, emotions or 'feelings' such as con¬ fidence or fear, delight or misery, and pride or shame, are 'modes' of pleasure or unpleasantness. Given my views on pleasure and unpleasantness, it would follow that a number of emotions are, in part, the 'special experiences' of pleasure and unpleasantness. (shrink)

A theory is proposed that views emotional feelings as pivotal for action control. Feelings of emotions are valued interoceptive signals from the body that become multimodally integrated with perceptual contents from registered and mentally simulated events. During the simulation of a perceptual change from one event to the next, a conative feeling signal is created that codes for the wanting of a specific perceptual change. A wanted perceptual change is weighted more strongly than alternatives, increasing its activation level on (...) the cognitive level and that of associated motor structures that produced this perceptual change in the past. As a consequence, a tendency for action is generated that is directed at the production of the wanted perception. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a comparative analysis of the place of emotion from Indian and Western philosophical perspectives. Both Eastern and Indian philosophy consider three mental states as being involved with the arousal of emotions, i.e., cognitive (epistemic), conative (desire), and affective. In Indian philosophy, there is no such single term or specific equivalent definition to the Western term ‘emotion.’ Further, there is no clear dichotomy (cognitive & non-cognitive) between reason and emotion in Indian culture. In Indian scriptures, (...) there are various, at times intermingled conceptions of emotion. From a religious standpoint, emotion can be an expression of religious devotion (bhakti), and often emotions are viewed as barriers to having true knowledge and are considered a cause of attachment and an obstacle to liberation. After comparing a large amount of discussion on emotion following Western and Indian conceptions, and analyzing some real-life experiences where emotion plays various roles (intellectual, personal, and spiritual) within each philosophical tradition this paper concludes that it is critical to engage in a comparative, collaborative study of emotion. (shrink)

El objetivo del estudio se orientó a analizar el desarrollo socioemocional de niños(as) con habilidades diferentes que participaron en actividades de equinoterapia en la ciudad de Lima. La muestra del estudio, realizado con diseño fenomenológico, estuvo constituida por los padres o madres de familia que participaron en la implementación de actividades de equinoterapia y ofrecieron información de sus hijos(as) con autismo, síndrome de Down o trastorno por déficit de atención con y sin hiperactividad. El recojo de datos se utilizó un (...) cuestionario de preguntas abiertas que se enfocaron en las áreas social y emocional del desarrollo de niños(as), el cual fue administrado a 25 informantes, número que se alcanzó por saturación. Se encontró como resultado que los(as) niños(as) que participan en actividades de equinoterapia con enfoque holístico se ve favorecido su desarrollo socioemocional, referente a la relación de apego y control de emociones en el área emocional, y las relaciones. (shrink)

Las habilidades socioemocionales es el conjunto de hábitos, pensamientos y emociones que facilitanlas relaciones interpersonales mediante la expresión adecuada de las emociones y la consideración de suimpacto en los demás. Respaldadas por la neurología, estas habilidades son cruciales para el aprendizaje yla contribución de los docentes a las nuevas generaciones. El ensayo tiene como objetivo reflexionar sobrelas habilidades socioemocionales de los futuros profesionales de la educación, explorando su influencia en laenseñanza y su contribución a la sociedad. Dada la situación de (...) la pandemia, se propone presentar el papelde la educación socioemocional en las actividades curriculares universitarias de formadores de docentes enChile, utilizando el método crítico-interpretativo y la fenomenología hermenéutica. La discusión se basa enla experiencia, el diálogo con grupos de alumnos y profesores, identificando puntos clave para la inclusión dehabilidades emocionales en la formación docente. El proceso involucró la participación activa del docente,quien asumió el rol inicial en la intervención mediante la entrega de instrucciones y guías para el desarrollode las habilidades socioemocionales sobre ética y educación en sus diversos contextos, realizada de maneravirtual en un centro de educación superior de Chile. La conclusión subraya la urgencia y necesidad de integrarla educación socioemocional en el currículo de formación de profesionales de la educación universitaria.Se destaca la coincidencia entre Goleman, Bisquerra y Morin, teóricos que han profundizado la temática,aunque se señala la persistencia de modelos educativos ortodoxos que excluyen las emociones, enfocándoseexcesivamente en las capacidades intelectuales y pasando por alto la necesidad de una formación emocionalintegral para afrontar los desafíos contemporáneos de la sociedad. (shrink)

This book has an ambitious aim—to make convincing the rejection of the hard and fast cognitive–conative divide currently so prevalent in philosophy of mind and moral psychology. Only such a rejection, Helm believes, can solve—or dissolve—the two major problems of practical reason. The ‘motivational problem’ is ‘a puzzle about the connection between our choosing something as the outcome of deliberation and our being motivated to pursue it’ (p. 1); the ‘deliberative problem’ concerns ‘how deliberation about value is possible’ (p. (...) 11) given that ‘our concept of value is pulled in seemingly opposed directions of objectivity and subjectivity’ (p. 200). Helm ‘suggests’ in chapter one, and argues with respect to particular attempts to solve these problems in later chapters, that acceptance of the cognitive-conative divide makes them quite intractable. (shrink)

Resumen: El Transhumanismo es una perspectiva que aboga por la posibilidad de mejorar la condición humana física, emocional y cognitiva utilizando el progreso y la tecnología. Las cuestiones que plantea requieren asumir dos premisas, una normativa y otra empírica: la primera es que la formación para el uso de las tecnologías requiere una educación ética y jurídica, además de científica. La segunda implica que en un futuro próximo habrá robots muy sofisticados y dotados de inteligencia artificial avanzada que podrán tomar (...) decisiones operativas, así que ¿cómo regular estas capacidades? Las aplicaciones en el ámbito sanitario muestran los términos del trilema normativo relativo a la distinción conceptual entre “terapia”, “mejora” y “superación” de la condición humana. Abstract: Transhumanism stands up for the physical, emotional and cognitive human enhancement by progress and technology. The issues in question involve both a normative and an empirical assumption: the first one undertakes that the use of new technologies demands not only a scientific approach but also an ethical and legal one. The second means that in the near future advanced robots with artificial intelligence will make working decisions. So, how shall we have to rule those abilities? Many health implementations show the normative trilemma posed by the conceptual difference between therapy, enhancement and going beyond the human condition. (shrink)

Because previous scholars have offered few comprehensive models to understand the benefits of corporate social responsibility image in terms of customer behaviour, the authors of this paper propose a hierarchy of effects model to study how customer perceptions of the social responsibility of companies influence customer affective and conative responses in a service context. The authors test a structural equation model using information collected directly from 1,124 customers of banking services in Spain. The findings demonstrate that corporate social responsibility (...) image influences customer identification with the company, the emotions evoked by the company and satisfaction positively. Identification also influences the emotions generated by the service performance and customer satisfaction determines loyalty behaviour. The findings have significant implications for service managers because they demonstrate that there are two paths to explain the satisfaction and loyalty of service customers. The first path is composed of the beliefs and emotions generated by the company at the institutional level. The second path is composed of the thoughts, attitudes, emotions and feelings generated by the company’s services. (shrink)

_Review of: Failla, Mariannina and Sánchez Madrid, Nuria (eds.), _Kant on Emotions. Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context_, Berlin-Boston, de Gruyer, 2021, 190 p., ISBN: 9783110720716._.

To make progress related to long-standing questions related to the nature of emotion, we offer the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion. The IAC-E is not another con...

This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the fault of the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that (...) she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them. (shrink)

Professor Allen undertakes two tasks: first, to show that moral discriminations do not originate from a cognitive faculty; and, second, to establish that such discriminations originate from a non-cognitive faculty which determines which desires and emotions are appropriate on particular occasions. Some of his objections to cognitive ethics are that it can neither explain how knowledge can motivate action nor, since it holds that our moral obligations originate from an external source, justify moral toleration. When obligations originate from an external (...) source, toleration seems justified only when one believes that his moral convictions could be in error. Whenever our moral convictions are firm, there would be no reason to tolerate opposing ones that seem wrong or sinful. (shrink)

Il concetto di atmosfera può essere inteso in due sensi diversi — da un lato come atmosfera terrestre, la cui composizione viene studiata con i metodi delle scienze naturali; dall’altro come fluido sentimentale-spaziale, capace di condizionare affettivamente gli uomini in determinate circostanze. L’atmosfera terrestre è oggetto delle scienze naturali, mentre le atmosfere affettive sono oggetto di una pluralità di discipline non-scientifiche eterogenee, sia dal punto di vista paradigmatico che...

Clarifying the concept of emotions is an essential task of 21st century societies. We cannot continue living if we ignore the importance they have in our everyday thinking and acting. Emotions are fundamental both to the private and the public sphere It is becoming increasingly important to learn to identify what we feel and what those around us feel, how we express these feelings and understand their consequences, in order to enable us to transform harmful emotions into others more favorable (...) to the well-being of our personal relationships and our relationship with the environment. With this objective in mind, my text proposes a form of emotional education in the framework of peace education, initiated in early childhood, which acts to develop the emotional capacity required for the realization of a form of critical, ethical and creative global citizenship. This work recovers the methodology of the school of philosophy with children, which gives a great sense of philosophical praxis to the text, by putting it in dialogue, also, with studies in philosophy for peace. Thus, it is essential to vindicate empathy and moral imagination from the time we are children. Through thinking based on care, fthe cultivation of an emotional education will stimulate to wonder about other emotional alternatives, escaping from our own limits and exploring the perspectives of others until we come to merge with their horizons. (shrink)

This paper aims to inspect the political potential of Kant’s grounding of hope and its content breaks down in three parts. First, I give an account of Kant’s approach to right and hope as a rule for our judgments and actions, shedding light over the shift that Kant’s notion of the Highest Good undergoes from a theological framework to a political one, which makes of individuals the main feature of action. Second, I focus on the intergenerational exercise of imagination inasmuch (...) as it foreshadows the material and symbolic needs of the forthcoming generations, highlighting the key role it plays for addressing the political agency of hope. Moreover, I focus on the capacity of this kind of imagination to resist against the devices and (mis-)informative tendencies that lead human imagination to collapse as the headquarters of critical mental activity. Third, I address the epistemic framework that seems more adequate to continue drawing to hope as a promising tool to build up subjects conscious of the shortcomings of the world and the society they are embedded in. Finally, I display some concluding remarks about the interaction between material structures and culture of emotions as a key issue stemming from this enquiry of Kant’s conceptual legacy about hope. (shrink)

La gestión del aprendizaje es una obra que refleja el quehacer educacional de los educadores que tienen la responsabilidad de formar al ser humano en la sociedad del conocimiento, bajo la óptica de la educación críti-reflexiva que permita al humano insertarse en la sociedad eficientemente. La condición cambiante del mundo contemporáneo hace que el concepto de aprendizaje tome una dimensión más amplia y que se maneje en función del cambio en el significado de la experiencia, para que puedan desarrollarse los (...) humanos con comportamientos a la altura de los tiempos en que vivimos y no a los anteriores, en que el aprendizaje era el símbolo del que más sabía. El aprendizaje es hoy algo que esta en estrecha vinculación con la formación cognitiva, afectiva, valórica y motriz, a partir de la visión holística que se requiere para poder mirar los fenómenos desde una óptica más global que nos permita ver el proceso ante nosotros como una complejidad justo en la medida de lo que es. La gestión del aprendizaje es lo que se requiere para lograr estos propósitos. (shrink)

Riassunto: Questo contributo si propone di instaurare un proficuo dialogo tra la Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes hegeliana e i principali studi neuroscientifici e psicologici sulle emozioni. Ciò alla luce del fatto che caratteristica dell’attuale dibattito sulle emozioni è proprio l’interazione tra neuroscienze, psicologia e filosofia. Dopo aver mostrato come Hegel abbia elaborato una Theorie des Gefühls, mediante un’analisi del ruolo di Empfindungen e Gefühle nella Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, emergerà come il dialogo tra il pensiero hegeliano e le prospettive contemporanee (...) sulle emozioni possa contribuire a chiarire questioni quali la distinzione tra diversi tipi di emozioni o la differenza che sussiste tra il loro aspetto cognitivo e quello affettivo. È l’aspetto cognitivo insito nelle emozioni, come sottolineato sia da Hegel sia dai più recenti studi sulle emozioni, che consente al soggetto di orientarsi nel mondo. Parole chiave : G.W.F. Hegel; Spirito soggettivo; Emozione; Sentimento; Cognizione Hegel’s Theorie des Gefühls in Dialogue with Contemporary Theories of Emotions: Considering the relevance of the interaction between neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy in the contemporary debate on emotions, this paper aims at establishing a fruitful dialogue between Hegel’s Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes and the most important neuroscientific and psychological research on emotions. By means of an analysis of the role of Empfindungen and Gefühle in the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, we will show that Hegel developed a Theorie des Gefühls. The proposed dialogue between Hegel’s thought and contemporary theories is useful for distinguishing the various types of emotions and their cognitive and affective aspects. In fact, it will emerge that both Hegel and recent studies on emotion consider emotions to be characterized by a cognitive valence which enables a person to orient herself/himself in the world. Keywords: G.W.F. Hegel; Subjective Spirit; Emotion; Feeling; Cognition. (shrink)

A causally efficacious conscious will is a small part of our everyday activities, but a part that deserves to be recognized, studied, and cherished, perhaps as a fundamental, emotion- and conation-related, right hemispheric neuronal process. Such brain functions might be less in doubt if we consider all the pieces of the larger pie, especially those where our passions and desires reside.

Resumen El reconocimiento facial es una tecnología que se ha utilizado para el control de la población a fin de combatir los efectos de la pandemia por COVID-19. Sin embargo, esta tecnología se utiliza hace bastante tiempo en muchos ámbitos del quehacer económico, social y político. Este trabajo analiza el reconocimiento fa cial entendida como la captura de micro expresiones faciales mediante la cual se puede medir y evaluar emociones con el fin de vigilar movimiento, predecir com portamientos y anticipar (...) intenciones de compra y de voto. Nuestro objetivo es revisar los enfoques teóricos que sustentan esta tecnología que ha devenido en una nueva oportunidad de negocio, para proponer después algunas reflexiones éticas derivadas.Facial recognition is a technology that is used to control people in order to fight the impacts of COVID-19. However, this technology has been used formany years in many economical, social and political areas. This work provides an analysis of the new business based on technologies of facial micro-expressions recognition. By means of this procedure, the involved companies measure and evaluate emotions with the aim of monitoring the movement, predicting behaviors, intentions of purchase and vote, between other applications. Our purpose is to check the theoretical suppositions that sustain this business, to propose later some ethical derivative reflections. (shrink)

This article provides a critical analysis of the manner in which prostitution and trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation was ‘framed’ by official discourses in order to support the reforms in England and Wales contained within the Policing and Crime Act 2009. Drawing upon the recent work of Judith Butler, emphasis will be placed on how the schema of the vulnerable prostitute was fundamental to invoking emotional affects, which justified certain political effects, especially the move towards criminalising the purchase (...) of sexual services. However, on closer analysis the article will uncover an agenda influenced by law and order/morality, immigration and a ‘fear of the enemy’. Furthermore, it will be argued that New Labour’s framing of the problematic enabled the State to avoid dealing with the more difficult, but more urgent, issues of the differential distribution of wealth, precarity and the engendering of an ethical and global responsibility for the other. (shrink)

La _mousikē_ (μουσική) es el núcleo del programa educativo que Aristóteles diseña en la _Política_ para el mejor régimen. El filósofo le asigna a esta disciplina diferentes funciones y propone una consideración jerárquica de ellas. Aunque men­ciona explícitamente tres propósitos musi­cales, a saber, el juego, la educa­ción y el ocio, en el últi­mo capítulo de la obra refiere a la _katharsis_ (κάθαρσις) como una función diferen­ciada, cuyo vínculo con las restantes no precisa (_Pol_. 1341b38-40). Mi propósito en el presente trabajo (...) es mostrar que resulta proble­mático determinar el lugar que ocupa la _katharsis_ en el esquema de las funciones musicales que Aristó­teles bosqueja en _Pol_. VIII 3, 5-7, en espe­cial, en relación con la función lúdica y con la educativa. En tal sentido, intentaré demostrar que su posición oscila entre ambas y que, en el caso particular de los ciuda­danos del mejor régimen, la función ética es condición de la _katharsis_. Con vistas a ello, analizaré los pasajes de _Pol_. VIII 5-7 en los que el filósofo tácita o explícita­mente refiere a este término, con especial aten­ción a la valiosa y singular considera­ción general sobre su signifi­cado, que ofrece en _Pol_. 1342a5-15. (shrink)

The paper discusses some thematic issues that emerge from the Kantian study of diseases of cognition and volition, taking into consideration his anthropological works and some problems emerging from his main critical works. Starting from the explanation of the taxonomy of the main mental illnesses, some epistemological themes will be illustrated, linked to the fallible relationship between transcendental truths and the empirical dimension of knowledge and to the Kantian concept of error. Subsequently, the study of affects and passions, conceived as (...) illnesses of volition, will show the difficulties linked to a total involvement of reason in moral action, concerning the shortcomings of human action with respect to the principle of responsibility. Finally, the paper will focus on the role of legal imputability in relation to moral responsibility and to mental diseases. (shrink)

In Mexico, there is little research on the study of self-injury and even less on possible explanatory models. With this in mind, this study aimed to determine the relationship between self-injury and depression, emotional dysregulation, and coping styles, to generate an explanatory model of the problem. The study was carried out using a quantitative, cross-sectional, explanatory scope, design and a sample of 5835 adolescents enrolled in 62 public high schools in the state of Sonora. Logistic regressions were performed for data (...) analysis, and as a result it was found that, for students with severe self-injury, the model explains 61 % of the variance in the data and correctly classifies 84.1 % of the participants; whereas, in mild self-injury, the model explains 72 % of the variance in the data and correctly classifies 88.2 % of the students. Likewise, the depression dimensions showed the highest explanatory level and positive correlations with emotional dysregulation and avoidance coping style, as well as negative correlations with approach coping style. At the end, the importance of the independent variables for future research is discussed, as well as anomalous results and other data of interest. (shrink)

This work deals with the discussion about the characterization of the emotions that maintain the so called "cognitive current" and "perceptive current". These have been canonically conceived as incompatible ways of accounting for the same phenomenon: the basic emotions. In this paper I intend to examine the disagreement between these opposing approaches, seeking to clarify the scope of this disagreement, and to elucidate the key concepts on this discussion. The article reviews the structure that is detailed below. Each of the (...) positions in question is presented first. To this end, both philosophy and psychology have been considered: R. Solomon and R. Lazarus (cognitive perspective) and W. James and R. Zajonc (perceptive perspective). In this section (The approaches in dispute) I will try to offer a conceptual reconstruction of each of the positions, establishing the fundamental theses of each of them, to be examined in depth in the next section (Cognition and perception) in order to show that the disagreement itself and the difficulties that emerge from it, to provide an adequate characterization of the phenomenon, that can be overcome or at least, must be reconceptualized. In this sense, I will offer two ways in which this reconceptualization can be given: in a dissolute sense, by showing that the discrepancy between the two perspectives are based on false dichotomies, turning the discussion into a terminological disagreement. Second, I will outline a mode of resolution in the proper sense along with consideration. (The meaning of "emotion": are there unconscious emotions?). (shrink)

How comes that two organisms can interact with each other or that we can comprehend what the other experiences? The theories of embodiment, intersubjectivity or empathy have repeatedly taken as their starting point an individualistic assumption (the comprehension of the other comes after the self-comprehension) or a cognitivist one (the affective dimension follows the cognitive process). The thesis of this book is that there are no two isolated entities at the origin which successively interact with each other. There is, rather, (...) an impersonal stratum – the original affectivity (Gefühlsdrang) – which lets the living organisms be constitutively attuned with the expressive dimension of the life from the very beginning. The book aims to rethink the issue of corporality on the basis of a biosemiotics of the interaction between lived body (Leib) and environment (Umwelt). The human emotions reveals themselves as devices that experiment further attunement levels and expose the human being – because of her ex-centricity – to the alienation in various forms of the psychopathological existence. This is an unprecedented perspective that turns to psychopathology to reread against the light the watermark weaving the structure of personal singularity. What emerges is an intermediate territory confining both with philosophy and psychiatry: the psychopathology of ordo amoris. The author advances the project of a new psychopathology of ordo amoris, not only tackling with the 19th-century tradition of psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology, but also with the contemporary disputes on intersubjectivity in phenomenology and with those on schizophrenia as disruption of aida or as disembodiment process in psychiatry. What results from his project is the first systematic study on the international level showing the relevance of Schelerian concepts of body schema (Leibschema) and order of feeling (ordo amoris) to understand the disruptions of emotional regulation on the psychopathological dimension as well as on the formation process of the singularity. (shrink)

If emotion is not an arbitrary compilation of fixed types of (descriptive, conceptual, conative, prescriptive) content, nor a state that can be reduced to other types of pre-existing (perceptual, cognitive, behavioral) states, then what sort of thing is it really? Tom Cochrane has proposed that emotions are valent representations of situated concerns. Valent representation is a type of mental content whose function is to detect the presence or absence of certain conditions; what makes that type of content valent is (...) that without needing the mediation of any other state, a response is triggered that is disposed to increase or decrease the presence of the condition represented. I raise doubts about the plausibility of that account in light of recent work in philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

If we take conceptual art seriously, that is, if we consider that art does not have clear-cut boundaries and that it is not limited to the production of aesthetic objects, then a whole spectrum of possible artworks is open to us. Not only can random objects be conceived as artistic, but cognitive states and behaviors can also be meaningfully conceived as pieces of art by their producer and by any sensitive observer. If one is to take one’s life as a (...) piece of conceptual art, one then faces the question of what kind of life would count as a worthwhile piece of art, i.e., what kind of life can have any artistic worth. In this paper, I discuss the possibility that the pursuit of a worthwhile life in the Aristotelian sense, more particularly the meticulous design of a character as a set of good emotional, conative, and behavioral dispositions, can count as an artistic endeavor. My aim is to show how this can be the case, and to show that this bears on major issues in contemporary philosophy of art concerning the relation between ethics and aesthetics. (shrink)

Metaphors are emotionally engaging, influenc-ing the evaluation of arguments. The paper empirically in-vestigates whether metaphors in the premise can lead the evaluator to judge an ad hominem argument as sound when the arguer instead committed a fallacy. The results show that ad hominem arguments with conventional and positive metaphors are more persuasive compared to those with novel and negative metaphors. Arguments with conventional metaphors are also perceived as more am-biguous, but less convincing, and emotionally appealing. Additionally, participants believe in the (...) conclusion more when the premise contains a positive rather than a nega-tive metaphor, which instead helps the evaluator detect the fallacy. Résumé: Les métaphores sont émotionnellement engag-eantes et ainsi influencent l’évaluation des arguments. L'article étudie empiriquement si les métaphores em-ployées dans la prémisse peuvent amener l'évaluateur à juger un argument ad hominem comme solide bien que ce sophisme soit commis. Les résultats montrent que les ar-guments ad hominem utilisant des métaphores conven-tionnelles et positives sont plus convaincants que ceux utilisant des métaphores nouvelles et négatives. Les argu-ments utilisant des métaphores conventionnelles sont également perçus comme plus ambigus, mais moins con-vaincants et émotionnellement attrayants. De plus, les participants croient davantage à la conclusion lorsque la prémisse contient une métaphore positive plutôt que néga-tive, ce qui aide plutôt l'évaluateur à détecter le sophisme. (shrink)

Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases do (...) not necessarily challenge the idea that shame and pride are about the emoting subject. Rather, we claim that some of the most paradigmatic scenarios of shame and pride induced by others can be accommodated by taking seriously the consideration that, in such cases, the subject “group-identifies” with the other. This is the idea that, in feeling these forms of shame or pride, the subject is conceiving of herself as a member of the same group as the subject acting shamefully or in an admirable way. In other words, these peculiar emotive responses are elicited in the subject insofar as, and to the extent that, she is (or sees herself as being) a member of a group – the group to which those who act shamefully or admirably also belong. By looking into the way in which the notion of group identification can allow for an account of hetero-induced shame and pride, this paper attempts to achieve a sort of mutual enlightenment that brings to light not only an important and generally neglected form of self-conscious emotions, but also relevant features of group identification. In particular, it generates evidence for the idea that group identification is a psychological process that the subject does not have to carry out intentionally in the sense that it is not necessarily triggered by the subject’s conative states like desires or intentions. (shrink)

__: In this essay I explore the account of imaginative phenomenology developed by Uriah Kriegel in _The Varieties of Consciousness_. On his view, the difference between perceptual phenomenology and imaginative phenomenology arises from the way that they present the existential status of their object: While perceptual experience presents its object as existent, imaginative experience presents its object as non-existent. While I agree with Kriegel that it’s likely that the difference between imaginative phenomenology and perceptual phenomenology is one not just of (...) degree but of kind, I worry about the particular account that he has developed. I thus develop two lines of criticism. First, I question whether Kriegel is right that imagination presents its object as non-existent. Second, I question whether this account of imaginative phenomenology is consistent with other commonly-accepted facts about the nature of imagination. _Keywords_: Imagination; Perception; Phenomenology; J.-P. Sartre; Epistemic Value; Emotion ___Fenomenologia dell’immaginazione e status esistenziale_ _Riassunto_: In questo articolo intendo indagare l’approccio alla descrizione della fenomenologia dell’immaginazione sviluppata da Uriah Kriegel in _The Varieties of Consciousness_. Dal suo punto di vista, la differenza tra fenomenologia della percezione e fenomenologia dell’immaginazione si mostra nel modo in cui queste presentano lo status esistenziale dei loro oggetti: se l’esperienza percettiva presenta il proprio oggetto come esistente, l’esperienza immaginativa lo presenta come non-esistente. Per un verso, concordo con Kriegel sulla probabilità che la differenza tra fenomenologia dell’immaginazione e fenomenologia della percezione non sia di grado ma di genere, mentre, per altro verso, non sono convinta della correttezza del suo approccio. Pertanto vorrei sollevare due criticità. In primo luogo, mi chiedo se Kriegel sia nel giusto quando ritiene che l’immaginazione presenti il proprio oggetto come non-esistente; in secondo luogo, mi chiedo se questa descrizione della fenomenologia dell’immaginazione sia coerente con altri fatti, comunemente accettati, circa la natura dell’immaginazione. _Parole chiave_: Immaginazione; Percezione; Fenomenologia; J.-P. Sartre; Valore epistemico; Emozione. (shrink)