Ensuring the trustworthiness of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence is an important interdisciplinary endeavour. In this position paper, we argue that this endeavour will benefit from technical advancements in capturing various forms of responsibility, and we present a comprehensive research agenda to achieve this. In particular, we argue that ensuring the reliability of autonomous system can take advantage of technical approaches for quantifying degrees of responsibility and for coordinating tasks based on that. Moreover, we deem that, in certifying the legality (...) of an AI system, formal and computationally implementable notions of _responsibility_, _blame_, _accountability_, and _liability_ are applicable for addressing potential responsibility gaps (i.e. situations in which a group is responsible, but individuals’ responsibility may be unclear). This is a call to enable AI systems themselves, as well as those involved in the design, monitoring, and governance of AI systems, to represent and reason about who can be seen as responsible in prospect (e.g. for completing a task in future) and who can be seen as responsible retrospectively (e.g. for a failure that has already occurred). To that end, in this work, we show that across all stages of the design, development, and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems (TAS), responsibility reasoning should play a key role. This position paper is the first step towards establishing a road map and research agenda on how the notion of responsibility can provide novel solution concepts for ensuring the _reliability_ and _legality_ of TAS and, as a result, enables an effective embedding of AI technologies into society. (shrink)

The ‘bat and ball’ is one of the problems most frequently employed as a testbed for research on the dual-system hypothesis of reasoning. Frederick (J Econ Perspect 19:25–42, 2005) is the first to envisage the possibility that different numerical arrangements of the ‘bat and ball’ problem could lead to different dynamics of activation of the dual-system, and so to different performances of subjects in task accomplishment. This possibility has triggered a strand of research oriented to accomplish ‘sensitivity analyses’ of the (...) ‘bat and ball’ problem. The scope of this paper is to test experimentally the specific hypothesis that numerals are responsible for the selective activation of the two systems of reasoning in this task. In particular, we argue that their role goes beyond and cannot be reduced to that of numbers conceived as magnitudes. To test our hypothesis, we devise an experimental setting in which the role of numbers (as magnitudes) is rendered irrelevant. We find experimental results consistent with our hypothesis. We further provide a link between the literature on mathematical problem-solving and that on mathematical cognition research, in particular that branch labeled embodied mathematical cognition. (shrink)

In Mathematics is megethology Lewis reconstructs set theory combining mereology with plural quantification. He introduces megethology, a powerful framework in which one can formulate strong assumptions about the size of the universe of individuals. Within this framework, Lewis develops a structuralist class theory, in which the role of classes is played by individuals. Thus, if mereology and plural quantification are ontologically innocent, as Lewis maintains, he achieves an ontological reduction of classes to individuals. Lewis’work is very attractive. However, the alleged (...) innocence of mereology and plural quantification is highly controversial and has been criticized by several authors. In the present paper we propose a new approach to megethology based on the theory of plural reference developed in To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice. Our approach shows how megethology can be grounded on plural reference without the help of mereology. (shrink)

Environment learning is essential in everyday life. In individuals with Down syndrome (DS), this skill has begun to be examined using virtual exploration. Previous studies showed that individuals with DS can learn and remember paths in terms of sequences of turns and straight stretches, albeit with some difficulty, and this learning is supported by their cognitive abilities. This study further investigates environment learning in the DS population, newly examining their ability to learn a path from actual movements, and to learn (...) increasingly long paths, and how their performance relates to their visuo-spatial abilities and everyday spatial activities. A group of 30 individuals with DS and 30 typically-developing (TD) children matched for receptive vocabulary performed a 4 × 4 Floor Matrix task in a grid comprising 16 squares (total area 2.3 × 2.3 meters). The task involved repeating increasingly long sequences of steps by actually moving in the grid. The sequences were presented in two learning conditions, called Observation (when participants watched the experimenter’s moves), or Map (when they were shown a map reproducing the path). Several visuo-spatial measures were also administered. The results showed a clear difference between the two groups’ performance in the individual visuo-spatial measures. In the Floor Matrix task, after controlling for visuo-spatial reasoning ability, both groups benefited to the same degree from the Observation condition vis-à-vis the Map condition, and no group differences emerged. In the group with DS, visuo-spatial abilities were more predictive of performance in the Floor Matrix task in the Observation condition than in the Map condition. The same was true of the TD group, but this difference was much less clear-cut. The visuo-spatial working memory and visualization tasks were the strongest predictors of Floor Matrix task performance. Finally, the group with DS showed a significant relation between Floor Matrix task performance in the Observation condition and everyday spatial activity. These results enlarge on what we know about path learning in individuals with DS and its relation to their visuo-spatial abilities. These findings are discussed within the frame of spatial cognition and the atypical development domain. (shrink)

Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, raises an interesting philosophical issue, namely, how can one be in touch with past things if they no longer exist? It provides us with a way to address this issue by outlining an ontological view according to which past things still exist within a four-dimensional world. Although one cannot be in touch with past things by means of ordinary perception, one can do so by combining perception and memory. In this sense, In Search (...) of Lost Time helps us to reconcile a four-dimensionalist ontology according to which things have both spatial and temporal parts with a realist phenomenology according to which experience gives us access to things as they are. In so doing, Proust’s masterpiece allows us to shed some light on what it means for a subject of experience to exist in a four-dimensional world. (shrink)

This book uses the conceptual tools of philosophy to shed light on digital media and on the way in which they bear upon our existence. At the turn of the century, the rise of digital media significantly changed our world. The digitizing of traditional media has extraordinarily increased the circulation of texts, sound, and images. Digital media have also widened our horizons and altered our relationship with others and with ourselves. Information production and communication are still undoubtedly significant aspects of (...) digital media and life. Recently, however, recording, registration and keeping track have taken the upper hand in both online practices and the imaginaries related to them. The essays in this book therefore focus primarily on the idea that digital media involve a significant overlapping between communication and recording. (shrink)

In Parts of Classes David Lewis attempts to draw a sharp contrast between mereology and set theory and he tries to assimilate mereology to logic. For him, like logic but unlike set theory, mereology is “ontologically innocent”. In mereology, given certain objects, no further ontological commitment is required for the existence of their sum. On the contrary, by accepting set theory, given certain objects, a further commitment is required for the existence of the set of them. The latter – unlike (...) the sum of the given objects – seems to be an abstract entity whose existence is not directly entailed by the existence of the objects themselves. The argument for the innocence of mereology is grounded on the thesis of composition as identity. In our paper we argue that: arguments for the ontological innocence of mereology are not conclusive. Some arguments against the ontological innocence of mereology show a certain ambiguity in the innocence thesis itself. The innocence thesis seems to depend on a general conception of the nature of objects and on how the notion of ontological commitment is understood. Specifically, we think that the thesis is the manifesto of a realistic conception of parts and sums. Quine‟s notorious criticism of the set-theoretical interpretation of second order logic seems to be reproducible against Lewis‟defence of mereology. To the purpose we construct a mereological model of a substantive fragment of set theory, adequate to ground the set-theoretical semantics of second order logic. (shrink)

The article deals with the theme of love in St. Augustine, highlighting how the Bishop of Hippo himself evolved in his own life from carnal and worldly loves to the love of God, as it appears fundamentally in his Confessions. In order to understand the dynamics of love, the article offers a brief summary of the Augustinian anthropological scheme. Some texts from the In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus and the In Iohannis euangelium tractatus are also highlighted in order to (...) corroborate the conclusions of the article. (shrink)

This book develops a new approach to plural arbitrary reference and examines mereology, including considering four theses on the alleged innocence of mereology. The authors have advanced the notion of plural arbitrary reference in terms of idealized plural acts of choice, performed by a suitable team of agents. In the first part of the book, readers will discover a revision of Boolosʼ interpretation of second order logic in terms of plural quantification and a sketched structuralist reconstruction of second-order arithmetic based (...) on the axiom of infinite, a la Dedekind, as the unique non-logical axiom. The work goes on to analyse the pros and cons of the new interpretation, also with respect to Linneboʼs objections to the thesis that second order logic is genuine logic. A theory of concepts that can be labelled as a theory of logical concepts is expounded. In the second part of the book, the authors consider grounding megethology on plural arbitrary reference and argue that the arguments for the ontological innocence of mereology are not conclusive and that – for a certain use of mereology – a thesis of innocence, similar to that of plural arbitrary reference, is defensible. The work proposes a virtual theory of mereology in which the role of individuals is played by plural choices of atoms. This considered work will appeal to scholars from branches of analytic philosophy, logic and the philosophy of mathematics in particular. (shrink)

L'arte è l'espressione intima--ma concepita per essere condivisa--della sensibilità di alcuni individui che avvertono l'urgenza di manifestare il proprio sentire rispetto al reale, o al non-reale. Gli artisti e, di conseguenza, le loro opere non possono non accogliere le sollecitazioni provenienti dall'attualità che li anima elaborando le complessità del mondo contemporaneo. È quindi necessario intrecciare come in una mappa neuronale lo studio delle opere d'arte con altre discipline, come antropologia, filosofia, biologia, perché una più ampia libertà di indagine consente di (...) strutturare con maggiore armonia la storia e la critica d'arte. Realizzare dialoghi plurimi permetterà così una visione più piena e approfondita dell'arte stessa."--Back cover. (shrink)

In Economics individuals are defined by their preferences over the consequences of their own actions and the actions carried out by others. In contrast, Simone Weil depicts the individual as continuously re-constituted by the contact that he establishes with reality via his action. Such an action is aimed at achieving an effect in the physical world, but what makes it human is not success per se, but rather the fact that it stems from reasoning and planning. Affliction is caused by (...) effort carried out mechanically like that of a beast of burden, when the individual has no opportunity to exercise reason for choosing how to confront reality's ever-challenging hazards and necessity. (shrink)

John Rawls and Simone Weil presented two distinct conceptions of political justice, aimed at articulating a common ethos in an inherently heterogeneous society. The terms of the former, chiefly concerned with the distribution of primary goods, underwrite much of today's Western democracies political liberalism. The terms of the latter, chiefly concerned with the way interaction is organised in social activities in view of the body and soul's balancing pairs of needs, are less well known. We explain the sense in which (...) the overlapping consensus in Weil's notion of political justice is “thicker”, and may thus deserve more attention – alongside that of Rawls – for substantiating a democratic ethos within political liberalism. (shrink)

In this article, we describe an ontology aimed at the representation of the relevant entities and relations in the philosophical world. We will guide the reader through our modeling choices, so to highlight the ontology’s practical purpose: to enable an annotation of philosophical resources which is capable of supporting pedagogical navigation mechanisms. The ontology covers all the aspects of philosophy, thus including characterizations of entities such as people, events, documents, and ideas. In particular, here we will present a detailed exposition (...) of the entities belonging to the idea branch of the ontology, for they have a crucial role in the world of philosophy. Moreover, as an example of the type of applications made possible by the ontology we will introduce PhiloSurfical, a prototype tool we created to navigate contextually a classic work in twentieth century philosophy, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. We discuss the potential usage of such navigation mechanisms in educational and scholarly contexts, which aim to enhance the learning process through the serendipitous discovery of relevant resources. (shrink)

In contemporary Western culture, death has been widely censured because of its conceptual implications; it lies at the boundaries between reductionism and metaphysics. There is not yet an efficacious epistemology able to solve this contraposition and its consequent collision with science and tradition. This article analyzes Near Death Experiences as a prototypical argument in which the two perspectives conflict. Specifically, it analyzes the epistemological antinomies of the ontological representations of death, inhering in passage versus absolute annihilation. Indeed, the NDEs theme (...) permits the examination of the logical contradiction between monistic reductionism and its ontological counterpart to improve the discovery of a new paradigm that integrates the ecological with eternalist views. (shrink)

Enrico Berti has had a profound influence on the birth and development of Italian studies in ancient philosophy. His sizable work has shaped a great part of Italian studies on Aristotle and other ancient philosophers. To celebrate him and express their gratitude for his work, some of his disciples, under the impulse of the late Franco Volpi, have brought together a volume in his honour, requesting the participation of some foreign scholars particularly close to him. The volume comprises essays (...) by Pierre Aubenque, Jonathan Barnes, Terence H. Irwin, Tomás Calvo-Martínez, Jaap Mansfeld, Pierre Pellegrin, Gerhard Seel and Alejandro G. Vigo. The main themes are Aristotle's metaphysics and practical philosophy. A Selected Bibliography by E. Berti himself completes the volume."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

v. 1. Demoniaco e problema del male. Umanesimo e pensiero simbolico. Tempo e temporalità -- v. 2. Ermeneutica e demitizzazione. Storia della filosofia. Filosofia della religione.

Enrico Müller legt hier die erste philosophische Gesamtdarstellung zur Bedeutung der Griechen für Nietzsches Denken vor. Er zeigt, wie sich in Auseinandersetzung mit dem Griechentum Nietzsches eigene Philosophie entwickelte, und problematisiert deren Abgrenzungen von der Logosphilosophie der griechischen Klassik. Müller kommt dabei zu dem Schluss, dass auch Nietzsches Philosophie letztlich auf die Vorgaben der sokratisch-platonischen Dialektik angewiesen bleibt.

. “The Notebook Corner,” edited by Enrico Pattaro, makes its first appearance here as a new section of Ratio Juris. This new section can be described in a sense as an offshoot of the project for A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, a work still in progress composed of five theoretical volumes and six historical ones. The theoretical volumes receive a brief presentation in the paper immediately below, with a specific focus on Volume 1, entitled The Law (...) and the Right: A Reappraisal of the Reality That Ought to Be. This volume is then discussed as well by Rosaria Conte and Cristiano Castelfronchi in the second paper of this “Notebook Corner”. (shrink)

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Stacie Friend’s claim that fiction is a genre, her notion of genre can be fruitfully applied to a paradigmatic genre such as science fiction. This article deploys Friend’s notion of genre in order to improve the influential characterization of science fiction proposed by Darko Suvin and to defend it from a criticism recently raised by Simon Evnine. According to Suvin, a work of science fiction must concern “a fictional ‘novum’ validated by cognitive (...) logic.” While Suvin conceives of his characterization as a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the genre, I propose to cast the notions of “fictional novum” and “cognitive validation” as standard features of the genre, which works of science fiction should have but might lack. I argue that this amended version of Suvin’s characterization can better account for two basic properties of science fiction as a genre, namely its historicity and its relevance to appreciation. Lastly, I show that the amended version can shed some light on the affinity between works of science fiction and philosophical thought experiments. (shrink)

Works of art are usually meant to elicit psychological effects from their audiences whereas paradigmatic technical artifacts such as hammers or cars are rather meant to produce physical effects when used. This suggests that works of art and technical artifacts are sharply different entities. However, recent developments in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of technology have individuated special artifacts, namely cognitive and affective artifacts, which also generate psychological effects. In particular, affective artifacts, which have the capacity to alter the (...) affective condition of agents, seem to share crucial features with works of art. Can we subsume works of art under that kind? I will argue that we cannot. Still, comparing art with affective artifacts will help us to clarify the relationship between art and technology, and to introduce a new category, namely the experiential artifact, which can properly encompass works of art. (shrink)

This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds, individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that, while standards concerning kinds, individuals (...) and features can be relevant also to ordinary perception, standards concerning standpoints are specific to pictorial experience. Drawing on all this, the paper proposes an ontology of depiction according to which a picture is constituted by both its visual appearance and its standard of correctness. (shrink)