1. Il significato del Parmenide nella filosofia di Platone -- 3. Tempo e verità nella fenomenologia di Husserl -- 4. Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann -- 5. Ingens sylva.

The imminent deployment of autonomous vehicles requires algorithms capable of making moral decisions in relevant traffic situations. Some scholars in the ethics of autonomous vehicles hope to align such intelligent systems with human moral judgment. For this purpose, studies like the Moral Machine Experiment have collected data about human decision-making in trolley-like traffic dilemmas. This paper first argues that the trolley dilemma is an inadequate experimental paradigm for investigating traffic moral judgments because it does not include agents’ character-based considerations and (...) is incapable of facilitating the investigation of low-stakes mundane traffic scenarios. In light of the limitations of the trolley paradigm, this paper presents an alternative experimental framework that addresses these issues. The proposed solution combines the creation of mundane traffic moral scenarios using virtual reality and the Agent-Deed-Consequences (ADC) model of moral judgment as a moral-psychological framework. This paradigm shift potentially increases the ecological validity of future studies by providing more realism and incorporating character considerations into traffic actions. (shrink)

Ambivalence, i.e., the simultaneous holding of negative and positive evaluations toward the same object, is an empirically well-documented phenomenon and an important aspect of ordinary experience. However, it has not received sufficient philosophical attention. This essay accomplishes two aims: first, a comprehensive and empirically informed account of ambivalence is provided; second, the rationality of ambivalence in practical and nonpractical contexts is defended.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War but also the rise of a melancholic vision of history as a series of losses. For the political left, the cause lost was communism, and this trauma determined how leftists wrote the next chapter in their political struggle and how they have thought about their past since. Throughout the twentieth century, argues Left-Wing Melancholia, from classical Marxism to psychoanalysis to the advent of critical theory, a culture of (...) defeat and its emotional overlay of melancholy have characterized the leftist understanding of the political in history and in theoretical critique. Drawing on a vast and diverse archive in theory, testimony, and image and on such thinkers as Karl Marx, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, and others, the intellectual historian Enzo Traverso explores the varying nature of left melancholy as it has manifested in a feeling of guilt for not sufficiently challenging authority, in a fear of surrendering in disarray and resignation, in mourning the human costs of the past, and in a sense of failure for not realizing utopian aspirations. Yet hidden within this melancholic tradition are the resources for a renewed challenge to prevailing regimes of historicity, a passion that has the power to reignite the dialectic of revolutionary thought. (shrink)

Moral intuitions are generally understood as automatic strong responses to moral facts. In this paper, I offer a metacognitive account according to which the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of confidence of a subject. Confidence is a metacognitive appraisal of the fluency with which a subject processes information from a morally salient stimulus. I show that this account is supported by some empirical evidence, explains the main features of moral intuition and is preferable to emotional or quasi-perceptual views (...) of moral intuition. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, one key challenge is ensuring that AI aligns with certain values. However, in the current diverse and democratic society, reaching a normative consensus is complex. This paper delves into the methodological aspect of how AI ethicists can effectively determine which values AI should uphold. After reviewing the most influential methodologies, we detail an intuitionist research agenda that offers guidelines for aligning AI applications with a limited set of reliable moral intuitions, each underlying a (...) refined cooperative view of AI. We discuss appropriate epistemic tools for collecting, filtering, and justifying moral intuitions with the aim of reducing cognitive and social biases. The proposed methodology facilitates a large collective participation in AI alignment, while ensuring the reliability of the considered moral judgments. (shrink)

Moral particularism, in its extreme version, is the theory that argues that there are no invariant context-independent moral reasons. It states also that moral knowledge is not constituted by principles and that these are useless or harmful in practice. In this paper, I intend to argue that this position takes context-sensitiveness of reasons too seriously and has to face many philosophical problems—mainly because its most important argument (the argument from holism of reasons) is not convincing but also because a pluralist (...) generalist account is preferable both from metaethical and normative points of view. (shrink)

Peut-on parler de 'critère' sceptique? En tant qu'outil de distinction et de choix, un critère, qu'il soit pratique ou épistémique, est-il compatible avec des philosophies professant un pessimisme gnoséologique prononcé, sinon radical? Faut-il considérer qu'il n'y a pas de critère sans dogmatisme, et que l'absence de critère conduit les scepticismes à l'aporie, ou peut-on identifier des 'critères' sceptiques, dont l'originalité consiste à pouvoir établir des distinctions en suspendant son assentiment? Les études réunies dans le présent volume analysent la rémanence de (...) ces questions à différents moments de l'histoire du scepticisme, et cherchent à faire entendre l'écho entre leurs approches anciennes et modernes."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article reconstructs Kant’s and Hegel’s moral, political, and legal treatment of tolerance in the larger context of their philosophies of religion and freedom. Kant and Hegel have similar initial remarks on tolerance, religion, and fanaticism, then seem to separate when they resort respectively to respect and recognition—they agree in the end when the former defines intersubjective respect as recognition and the latter defines legal and political recognition as including respect. All of this allows us to better understand, first, the (...) extent of their repulse of practical-religious dogmatism, and secondly, that tolerance, in contrast to violent and superstitious fanaticism, is nothing more than a peculiar facet of respect and recognition. (shrink)

El artículo presenta el razonamiento de Zubiri acerca de la plausible existencia de Dios que se deriva de la estructura del cosmos. Dicho razonamiento, que muestra una faceta poco conocida de la fi losofía de la religión de este autor, aborda una de las cuestiones más espinosas de la historia de la filosofía, recurriendo expresamente al modelo estándar del universo que se ha forjado la astrofísica y aplicando varias de las categorías características de la metafísica elaborada por el propio Zubiri. (...) We expound Zubiri's argument for the plausible existence of God, based on the structure of the universe. This argument, which displays a not very well known aspect of Zubiri's philosophy of religion, tackles one of the thorniest subjects in the history of philosophy. It resorts specifi cally to the standard model of the universe developed in 20th century astrophysics, while applying many of the categories which are characteristic of Zubiri's metaphysics. (shrink)

In the domain in which the definition of property energy is available, a rigorous and general proof of additivity is provided. Then, both the definition of energy and the proof of additivity are extended to broader domains.

Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgements. However, the evidence for the default interventionist view is inconclusive and challenged by a growing amount of counterevidence in recent years. (...) The recent empirical findings favour an interdependent rather than conflicting view of the two types of information processing in the moral domain. In this view, which I call dual-process reflective equilibrium, intuition and reflection cooperate in moral reasoning to reach a reflective goal, which is supposedly normative justification. In sum, on the one hand, the scope of moral intuitions extends to selecting relevant information and calling for reflection whenever a problem presents conflicting aspects; on the other hand, the purpose of moral reflection is to rationalize pre-reflective intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of (...) ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice and from the nature of political judgement. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought. (shrink)

In recent years, the epistemic reliability of moral intuitions has been undermined by substantial empirical data reporting the influence of cognitive biases. This paper discusses and elaborates upon a promising strategy in response to the reliability challenge to moral intuitions. The considered argument appeals to the fact that moral intuitions are experienced with different levels of strength and agents accept only strong intuitions, not vulnerable to bias under realistic circumstances. This essay aims to reconstruct this defense from the reliability challenge (...) in its most promising form and to evaluate the plausibility of the argument in light of the available empirical evidence. What emerges from the discussion is that the vindication of moral intuitions fundamentally depends on two distinct premises: first, the hypothesis that agents accept moral intuitions proportionally to their level of confidence, and second, the hypothesis that intuitive confidence is epistemically reliable. While there is consistent evidence for the first hypothesis, there is still no conclusive evidence for the second. (shrink)

Recently, in metaethics, several authors have taken into account the view according to which moral knowledge can be based on perceptual or quasi-perceptual experience. This kind of knowledge is defined as moral perception. This paper aims to introduce the recent debate about moral perception. Specifically, the possibility of moral perception will be discussed, and many different views of moral perception will be compared.

Como as definições de causa e causalidade são estabelecidas na Ciência Política? A explicação causal tornou-se fundamental para a constituição da disciplina como ciência capaz de produzir não só entendimentos, como também previsões acerca dos fenômenos políticos. Porém, a centralidade da causalidade tem sido reduzida à questão da inferência causal, elidindo discussões ontológicas, epistemológicas e metodológicas sobre o significado de causa. Nesse artigo, exploramos os modelos de explicação causal na Filosofia como forma de promover um diálogo entre as concepções de (...) causalidade na Ciência Política para além do problema da inferência causal. Argumentamos que a Ciência Política recorre a diferentes concepções de causalidade, mas seu engajamento com reflexões mais substantivas ainda é limitado. Propomos um canal de diálogo com a literatura do realismo filosófico e suas intervenções sobre poderes causais, capacidades e tendências, as quais oferecem uma base ontológica para as discussões de causalidade na Ciência Política. (shrink)

In November 2020, the world received the good news that some vaccine candidates were highly effective at preventing COVID-19. Yet, the demand for COVID-19 vaccines within the global free market has led wealthy nations to procure most of the vaccine supply, leaving low- and middle-income countries in dire circumstances. This article considers the morality of our global procurement strategies and argues that, although what we are witnessing may be adhering to the parameters set out in global business and global politics, (...) it nonetheless has moral deficiencies.RésuméEn novembre 2020, le monde a reçu la bonne nouvelle que certains vaccins candidats étaient très efficaces pour prévenir la COVID-19. Pourtant, la demande de vaccins COVID-19 sur le marché libre mondial a conduit les pays riches à se procurer la majeure partie de l'approvisionnement en vaccins, laissant les pays à revenus faible et intermédiaire dans des circonstances désastreuses. Cet article examine la moralité de nos stratégies d'approvisionnement mondiales et soutient que, bien que ce à quoi nous assistons puisse adhérer aux paramètres définis dans le commerce international et la politique mondiale, la situation présente néanmoins des lacunes morales. (shrink)

André Gorz (1923-2007), pionnier de l'écologie politique, est en voie de reconnaissance.

Durant le XIXe siècle, la montée socio-économique et l'assimilation culturelle des Juifs allemands engendrent deux tendances contradictoires: d'un côté, leur volonté d'intégration dans la nation allemande et, de l'autre, leur cosmopolitisme, lié à leur position, au centre d'un réseau socio-économique et d'un vaste mouvement migratoire de dimension continentale. Les Juifs contribuent ainsi à l'essor d'une idée culturelle de Mitteleuropa opposée à celle, géopolitique et expansionniste, défendue par le pangermanisme. Le cosmopolitisme judéo-allemand se manifeste dans plusieurs domaines: sur le plan religieux, (...) l'école de la « science du judaïsme » (Wissenschaft des Judentums) s'impose comme modèle de modernisation de la culture juive à l'échelle européenne ; sur le plan économique, les Juifs allemands émancipés consolident un réseau financier et commercial transnational dont les origines remontent à l'époque des «Juifs de cour» (Hofjuden); sur le plan politique, ils jouent un rôle majeur dans la diffusion du marxisme comme courant de pensée universaliste, dépassant les frontières nationales. D'une manière plus générale, les Juifs allemands seront le pivot d'un processus de transferts culturels étalé sur plus d'un siècle. Après l'avènement du nazisme, le cosmopolitisme judéo-allemand prendra la voie de l'exil, où il se chargera de sauver l'héritage de l'Aujkliirung. (shrink)

Political realism is characterised by fidelity to the facts of politics and a refusal to derive political judgments from pre- political moral commitments. Even when they are not taken to make normative theorising impossible or futile, those characteristics are often thought to engender a conservative slant, or at least a tendency to prefer incremental reformism to radicalism. I resist those claims by distinguishing between three variants of realism—ordorealism, contextual realism, and radical realism—and contrasting them with both non-ideal theory and utopianism. (...) I then develop a version of radical realism as a form of debunking and vindicatory genealogy. Even though this new approach eschews both feasibility constraints (unlike non-ideal theory) and prescriptions about the ideal society (unlike utopianism), I show how it has more radical potential than morality-driven (and hence often ideological) political theory, and how it supports both open-ended, radical social critique and concrete forms of prefigurative political action. (shrink)

In this essay we criticise Rainer Forst's attempt to draw a connection between power and justification, and thus ground his normative theory of a right to justification. Forst draws this connection primarily conceptually, though we will also consider whether a normative connection may be drawn within his framework. Forst's key insight is that if we understand power as operating by furnishing those subjected to it with reasons, then we create a space for the normative contestation of any exercise of power. (...) He calls this the noumenal understanding of power. Against the conceptual connection between power and justification, we argue that (i) on most plausible accounts of political freedom, some freedom-restrictions commonly attributed to the successful exercise of power would perplexingly count as failures of power on Forst's view, and that (ii) on the most plausible account of reason-recognition, namely an appropriateness of response account, a justification relation is only a sufficient but not necessary condition for recognition. Against the normative connection, we argue that (iii) Forst can establish the existence of a right to justification only if he reconsiders the transcendental aspirations of his theory. (shrink)

Can political theory be action-guiding without relying on pre-political normative commitments? I answer that question affirmatively by unpacking two related tenets of Raymond Geuss’ political realism: the view that political philosophy should not be a branch of ethics, and the ensuing empirically-informed conception of legitimacy. I argue that the former idea can be made sense of by reference to Hobbes’ account of authorization, and that realist legitimacy can be normatively salient in so far as it stands in the correct relation (...) to a theory of justice and problematizes its sources of value through what Geuss terms ‘political imagination’. (shrink)

In many countries, prenatal testing for certain fetal abnormalities is offered via publicly funded screening programs. The concept of reproductive autonomy is regarded as providing a justificatory basis for many such programs. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine the normative basis of public prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities by changing our perspective from that of autonomy to obligation. After clarifying the understanding of autonomy adopted in the justification for public prenatal screening programs, we identify two problems concerning this (...) justification: first, the extent to which the government is obliged to meet this demand is not evident; and, second, it is not clear whether the provision of public screening is the most appropriate way to promote autonomy. Next, to tackle these problems, we focus on Onora O’Neill’s argument of rights and obligations. Drawing on this argument, we show that, in addressing the problems above, it is important to change our normative perspective from rights or autonomy to obligation. Our argument will show that since the government does not have an incontrovertibly fundamental obligation to promote autonomy, this obligation needs to be constrained in terms of compatibility with other fundamental obligations. In addition, even if a government is obliged to promote autonomy to some degree, there could be more appropriate means to achieve it than providing public prenatal screening; therefore, it is not necessary for government obligations to extend to the provision of public prenatal screening. (shrink)

This paper examines how radical realism, a form of ideology critique grounded in epistemic rather than moral normativity, can illuminate the relationship between ideology and political power. The paper argues that radical realism can has both an evaluative and a diagnostic function. Drawing on reliabilist epistemology, the evaluative function shows how beliefs shaped by power differentials are often epistemically unwarranted, e.g. due to the influence of motivated reasoning and the suppression of critical scrutiny. The paper clarifies those mechanisms in order (...) to address some recent critiques of radical realism. The paper then builds on those clarifications to explore the how tracing the genealogy of legitimation stories can diagnose the distribution of power in society, even if ideology does not play a direct stabilising role. This diagnostic function creates a third position in the debate on ideology between culturalists and classical Marxists, and it can help reconciling aspects of structural and relational theories of power. (shrink)