Bu araştırmada, Suriyeli ergen bireylerde dini tutum, psikolojik dayanıklılık ve depresyon arasındaki ilişkiyi tespit etmek amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırmanın örneklemi, Elazığ’da ikamet eden 13–18 yaş aralığındaki 216 Suriyeli bireyden oluşmaktadır. Yaş ortalaması 15,31 olan katılımcıların 124’ü kadın, 92’si erkektir. Verilerin toplanmasında Kişisel Bilgi Formu, Beck Depresyon Envanteri II, Dini Tutum Ölçeği, Çocuk ve Genç Psikolojik Sağlamlık Ölçeği (ÇGPSÖ - 12) kullanılmıştır. Veriler SPSS (22,0) paket programı kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda, Suriyeli ergenlerde depresyon ve dini tutum düzeyleri arasında negatif ve anlamlı bir (...) ilişki; depresyon ve psikolojik dayanıklılık düzeyleri arasında negatif ve anlamlı bir ilişki; psikolojik dayanıklılık ve dini tutum düzeyleri arasında pozitif ve anlamlı bir ilişki olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca araştırma bulguları Suriyeli ergenlerde psikolojik dayanıklılık ve dini tutumun depresyon düzeyindeki toplam varyansın yaklaşık %20’sini açıkladığını göstermiştir. (shrink)

İlahiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi'nde yayımlanan aşağıdaki makalelerde güncellemeler yapılmıştır. Bu bilginin eklenmesi yanlışlıkla unutulmuştur. * “Sigara İçme Arzusu ve Dindarlık İlişkisinde Genel Öz-Yeterliğin Aracı Rolünün İncelenmesi: Lise Öğrencileri Üzerine Nicel Bir Araştırma” (Journal of Ilahiyat Researches 59/1 (June 2023), 71-81. DOI: 10.5152/ilted.2023.23282). Yazarın tez bilgileri makaleye şu şekilde eklenmelidir. Bu makale, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü’nde hazırlanan ‘Ergenlerde Sigara İçme Arzusu, ÖzYeterlik ve Dindarlık İlişkisi’ (İstanbul, 2021) başlıklı yüksek lisans tezi verilerinden üretilmiştir * “Dini Tutum, Psikolojik Dayanıklılık ve Depresyon İlişkisi: Suriyeli (...) Ergen Bireyler Üzerine Nicel Bir Araştırma” (Journal of Ilahiyat Researches 60/1 (December 2023), 36-49. DOI: 10.5152/ilted.2023.23380). Yazarın tez bilgileri makaleye şu şekilde eklenmelidir. Çalışma, Doç. Dr. Zeynep Sağır’ın danışmalığında Erhan Cengiz’in “Suriyeli Ergenlerin Depresyon Düzeyini Yordamada Psikolojik Sağlamlık ve Dini Tutum” başlıklı yüksek lisans tezinden üretilmiştir. * “İlahiyat Fakültesi Öğrencilerinde Hayatın Anlamı ve Yeni Çağ İnançları Üzerine Bir Araştırma” (Journal of Ilahiyat Researches 60/1 (December 2023), 82-96. DOI: 10.5152/ilted.2023.23423). Etik kurul bilgileri şu şekilde eklenmelidir. Bu calışma icin etik komite onayı Erciyes Universitesi’nden (Tarih: 25 Temmuz 2023, Sayı: 2023/270) alınmıştır. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)

The split between analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy has mainly preoccupied scholars of philosophy so far, but in fact, it has broader pedagogical implications. This article argues that conventions of argumentative writing, as taught in colleges today, have their roots in analytic philosophy and its assumptions regarding ways of disseminating knowledge. Behind writing instructors’ emphasis on the ‘thesis and evidence’ structure lie analytic tendencies such as verifiability and intersubjectivity. By contrast, Continental philosophy emphasises the subjective human experience, which leads to (...) a more experimental form of writing. This split and the embeddedness of argumentation in analytic philosophy is indispensable in comprehending the rationale behind the conventions of academic writing taught in colleges today. (shrink)

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to (...) “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him. (shrink)

Latifa ez-Zeyyat is among the leading women writers of Egypt in the twentieth century. She has many works in different fields such as novels, stories, critical articles and translations. The period when she started her writing career was a period when Socialism and Marxism movements peaked in the Arab world. These movements influenced many writers of that period and this situation was also reflected in their works. Since Zeyyat has a Marxist view of life, traces of these movements can be (...) seen in her works. Zeyyat, one of the Socialist Realist writers, generally focused on social themes in her works. The story "el-Memerru'd-Dayyik" is a story in Zeyyât's "e-Şeyhûha ve Kısasun Uhrâ" story series. The story is fictionalized in the context of the life adventures, struggles and family relationships of the mother and her two primary school daughters. However, the writer's criticisms of society and socio-economic order also show themselves in the story. In this study, the technical analysis of Latîfe ez-Zeyyât's "el-Memerru'd-Dayyik" story was made and the story was examined within the framework of sociological criticism and psychoanalysis literary theories. In this way, it is aimed to have information about the structure of the story, its fiction, the themes it deals with and the author's story. (shrink)

The city of Kūfa has come to the forefront since the early periods of Islam by dealing with religious sciences and developing these sciences. While these sciences were initially limited to religious sciences, they gradually began to diversify as a result of the expansion of the Islamic geography. Because the Arabs' encounter with the Byzantine and Sassanid empires did not only lead to struggle but also allowed them to get to know their cultures. As a result of this contact, the (...) scientific basin in the Islamic world began to be filled with sciences from different cultures. This geographical expansion had both positive and negative aspects. One of these negative sides was the deterioration of the languages of the Arabs who mixed with foreign peoples in the conquered lands and the spread of this deterioration to the reading of the Quran. In response to this negative situation, studies on grammar sciences emerged in the city of Basra and were transferred to the city of Kūfa a century later. Kūfa grammar school was formed as a result of the intensive work of grammarians from Kūfa regarding grammar science, which also attracted attention in the city of Kūfa. The greatest share in the transformation of Kūfa grammar into a school belongs to al-Kisā’ī and his student al-Farrā. Although there were grammar studies and lessons in Kūfa before al-Kisā’ī and al-Farrā, they were not at a level that would ensure the transformation into a school or compete with Basra grammar school. Muādh al-Herrā is one of the pioneers of Kūfa grammar school. Muādh al-Herrā, about whose life there is not much information, was interested in scientific fields such as syntax grammar, language, tafsir, hadith, recitation and poetry. Muādh al-Herrā is one of the important figures in the history of Kūfa grammar, as he dealt with grammar in the early periods of Kūfa grammar, gave lessons and taught scholars such as al-Kisā’ī and al-Farrā, who helped developing the school of Kūfa grammar. In this study, the life of Muādh al-Herrā, about whom we have not come across any independent study, is presented, in the context of his scientific views as reflected in the sources, information about his scientific personality is presented and the issue of whether he is the founder of the sarf is examined. (shrink)

Turkey, in direct lineage of the Ottoman Empire, experimented a particularly violent nation-building out of the imperial ashes. Non-Muslims corresponding to one fifth of its population have been annihilated for the creation of a homogeneous nation State. These crimes have never been accounted for, giving way to a culture of impunity, self-righteousness, contempt for the rule of law and justice which, over years, pushed the polity towards an illiberal if not totalitarian essence and praxis, domestically against its own constituency and (...) externally against neighbours through an extensive neo-imperial drive. Paradoxically, such an outcome seems to constitute a belated retribution for the unaccounted crimes. (shrink)

The article examines the resources and the shortcomings of pluralism in today’s Turkey in light of the spring 2013 Gezi protests in İstanbul’s Taksim district. The protests have had ecological and civic as well as political implications and were a turning point in the country’s political life.

My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.

The popular debates about the future organization of work through artificial intelligence technologies focus on the replacement of human beings by novel technologies. In this essay, we oppose this statement by closely following what has been developed as AI technologies and analyzing how they work, specifically focusing on research that may impact work organizations. We develop this argument by showing that the recent research and developments in AI technologies focus on developing accurate and precise performance models, which in turn shapes (...) organizational patterns of work. We propose that the increased interest in the relationship between human cognition and performance will shortly bring human cognition to the focus on AI systems in workplaces. More specifically, we claim that the cognitive load measurement will shape human performance in manufacturing systems shortly. (shrink)

There are many parameters to understand the Qur’ān correctly. One of them is to determine the siyaq-context in which the verses are included. This word expresses the relevance of any verse with what is before and after it, in terms of meaning. Attempting to interpret the verse independently, without considering the siyaq, internal and external context, in short, the integrity of the Qur’ān, makes any mistake inevitable. There are many verses that have been taken out of its context and drived (...) into different areas. One of them is the 30th verse of sura al-Muddaththir. In this article, we have tried to concentrate on three main issues in the context of verses 30th and 31th. First of all, we tried to deal with the issues of siyaq and sibaq of the relevant verses, the reference of the pronoun in “عليها” and who was tested and how and in both verses. The aforementioned pronoun points to the angels in charge of hell and states their number as nineteen. However, there have been people and groups that have interpreted the number nineteen in a different way from this understanding. They not only attribute holiness to this number, but also claim that the entire system of the Qur’ān was constructed according to this number. With this number, Allah tests the believers, the people of the Book, disbelievers, and those with diseases in their hearts. Allah, the Exalted, wanted to test these groups with their reaction to the number nineteen. From this perspective, the article aims to provide a perspective towards correct understanding of the relevant verses in the context of nineteen. (shrink)

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...) fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

The article argues that the failure of political Islam in Turkey is correlated with the characteristics of the polity that are broadly undemocratic. Political Islam not only failed to propose a new narrative but produced the so-called New Turkey that displays familiar totalitarian features. The article examines the approaches political Islam used to assert its rule, namely, dewesternization, Islam’s nationalization and instrumentalization, majoritarianism, empowering devout masses, and synergizing with the undemocratic culture.

Şair duygularını anlatmak için bazen ölçünlü dilin dışına çıkıp kural dışı kullanımları tercih eder. Dil kurallarının bozulmaması için standart dil yapısına aykırı olan bu tasarruflar sınırlandırılmış ve bu konuda temel ölçüt, eski Arap şairleri olmuştur. Onların kural dışı kullanımları, şiir zarureti olarak kabul edilirken diğerlerinin tasarrufları laḥn olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Câhiliye şairlerinin dile aykırı tasarruflarının çeşitli şekillerde yorumlandığı bu düşünce, sadece edebiyat alanında değil, diğer disiplinlerde de büyük ölçüde kabul edilmiştir. Böylelikle Câhiliye şiiri zamanla kanonlaşıp (otorite) sorgulanamaz hale gelmiştir. Eski Arap (...) şairlerinin dili kullanırken hata edip etmediklerinin tartışıldığı bu çalışmada Câhiliye dönemi şairlerinin standart dil kurallarına aykırı kullanımlarına dikkat çekilip bunların laḥn olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu doğrultuda çalışmanın girişinde istişhâd edilen Arap şiirinin sınırları belirlenecek, birinci bölümde ise kanon kavramı ve Câhiliye şiiri üzerinde durulacaktır. Akabinde ise Câhiliye şairlerinin yaptığı bazı dil hataları ve sonraki dönem edebiyat münekkitlerinin bunları savunmak için ortaya koydukları zorlama yorumlar tartışılacaktır. (shrink)

Two analyzes of Spark engine performance strategies to implement the Spark technique in a matrix distributed computational algorithm, the multiplication of a sparse multiplication operational test model. The dimensions of the two input sparse matrices have been fixed to 30,000 × 30,000, and the density of the input matrix have been changed. The experimental results show that when the density reaches about 0.3, the original dense matrix multiplication performance can outperform the sparse-sparse matrix multiplication, which is basically consistent with the (...) relationship between the sparse matrix multiplication implementation in the single-machine sparse matrix test and the computational performance of the local native library. When the density of the fixed sparse matrix is 0.01, the distributed density-sparse matrix multiplication outperforms the same sparsity but uses the density matrix storage, and the acceleration ratio increases from 1.88× to 5.71× with the increase in dimension. The overall performance of distributed operations is improved. (shrink)

The fact that digitalization and technology-supported systems, which are among the most basic applications of the 21st century, are an integrated and vital part of our lives, has increased the demand for financial technologies. It is seen that Islamic financial technology (Islamic FinTech) applications have an important place, especially with financial technology (FinTech). In this context, FinTech and Islamic FinTech applications are conceptually included in the study. By referring to the literature studies on these two concepts, the concept of Islamic (...) finance is discussed from a religious perspective. In this study, basic conclusions were obtained that Islamic finance and FinTech concepts/applications are very up to date, their development and critical aspects are obvious, Islamic finance contains uncertainties in terms of jurisprudence, and that more innovation, diversity, breadth, equipment and time are needed in the applications of the Fintech system to meet the needs of Islamic finance applications. (shrink)

Since the 6thCentury B.C., Philosophy was defined as the love of wisdom in Ancient Greece. And it has always discussed of truth, wisdom and the metaphysics of existence. Nowadays, courses on philosophy have been an integral part of the curriculum since the establishment of faculties of Theology (FoTs). However, the presence, significance and objective of those courses are, they unfortunately are still under discussion despite their almost seventy-year old history.Based on this problem, our study aims to determine whether FoTs students’ (...) attitudes towards philosophy courses differ from their beliefs in the relationship between religion and philosophy. This study`s sample group consists of FoTs students of Kastamonu University, Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University and Osh University. The study`s sample consisted of 276 students from these universities. The data were collected using a “Philosophy Attitude Scale” (PAS) and a “Scale ofBeliefs in Philosophy–Religion Relationship” (SBPRR) which was developed for this study. T test, one-way analysis of variance and Pearson Correlation were used for the data analysis. Participants’ arithmetic mean scores on some PAS and SBPRRsubscales differed by gender, college, grade level, mother’s education level, number of philosophy courses taken at college but not by father’s education level and religious education and philosophy education before college. Many factors affect the negative attitude of the students toward the philosophical courses and issues; like the methods of teaching it and the contents of the courses and etc. For altering this negative conception towards philosophy, we should focus on two main things; teaching the future-parents and those potentially future teachers philosophy in a right manner. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to (...) clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other. (shrink)

Unintentional plagiarism abounds at universities. The literature offers several explanations for students’ difficulties with acquiring standards of good academic practice. In this paper, I propose an alternative account: unintentional plagiarism can only be understood in the context of implicit but irreconcilable forms of knowledge. While higher education institutions mainly operate within the framework of propositional epistemology, institutions of primary and secondary education tend to furnish students with encyclopedic epistemology. Accordingly, universities and institutions of pre-college education tend to propagate conflicting assumptions (...) regarding the nature of knowledge. Put simply, propositional epistemology is characterized by dialogue, agency and the exchange of ideas, which are ideally made explicit in academic writing. By contrast, encyclopedic epistemology tends to present knowledge monologically, leaving the scholarly conversation around it out. It is highly likely that the hardwired legacy of encyclopedic epistemology among students impedes the acquisition of the dialogism of academic inquiry at universities, resulting in cases of unintentional plagiarism. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.

Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties (...) of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the antifunctionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two. (shrink)

Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis of which is that the (...) subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) Even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of (...) an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary’s epistemic progress when she first experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.

How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to (...) insist that perceptual experiences provide epistemic reasons for perceptual beliefs about the external world as we pre-reflectively take it to be, then one should find a way of avoiding Cartesianism. Here are the two main aims of this paper: firstly, identify the premise that is doing the heavy-lifting work in the Cartesian thinking; and, secondly, formulate an adequate way of denying that premise. The adequacy I claim for my formulation of a way of denying the premise will roughly amount to this: the way I offer is not as susceptible to Cartesian traps as other apparently available ways of denying the premise are. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument (...) from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.

In “A well-founded solution to the generality problem,” Comesaña argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief’s being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim: It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesaña, the legitimacy claim follows straightforwardly from (...) the unavoidability claim. The third one is what I call the basing solution claim: An appeal to the notion of basing relation is all we need to solve the generality problem for (process) reliabilism. In this paper, I will argue that the unavoidability claim and the basing solution claim are false and that the legitimacy claim might be true only in a qualified sense. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argument against embellished wide-scopism. I argue that despite its formidable virtue (...) of demonstrating the need for an account of thick subjective rationality, the Reasoning Argument works neither against bare-bones wide-scopism nor against embellished wide-scopism. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found (...) in Klein’s works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.