Using an example of a computer simulation of the convective structure of a red giant star, this paper argues that simulation is a rich inferential process, and not simply a "number crunching" technique. The scientific practice of simulation, moreover, poses some interesting and challenging epistemological and methodological issues for the philosophy of science. I will also argue that these challenges would be best addressed by a philosophy of science that places less emphasis on the representational capacity of theories (and ascribes (...) that capacity instead to models) and more emphasis on the role of theory in guiding (rather than determining) the construction of models. (shrink)

This paper explores the connective ‘because’, based on the idea that ‘_C_ because _A_’ implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedent _A_ as well as of the consequent _C_, and additionally that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. To capture this idea of difference-making a ‘relevantized’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed that takes the antecedent to be relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is true/accepted in a state \(\sigma \) just in (...) case (i) the consequent is true/accepted when \(\sigma \) is revised by the antecedent _and_ (ii) the consequent fails to be true/accepted when \(\sigma \) is revised by the antecedent’s negation. To extend this to a semantics for ‘because’, we add that (iii) the antecedent and (iv) the consequent are accepted/true in the state \(\sigma \). We get metaphysical or doxastic interpretations of these clauses, depending on what we mean by a model and a state. We introduce several semantics known from suppositional conditionals, which we reinterpret for difference-making conditionals and ‘because’. We present a minimal logic for ‘because’ sentences and show how it can be extended in ways that parallel the hierarchy of extensions of the logic of suppositional conditionals. We establish correspondence results between axioms for ‘because’ and properties of states, and prove that the specified logics are sound with respect to the semantics. (shrink)

Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defences, objections, and replies into a convincing defence of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyse causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.

The law of desire has been proposed in several forms, but its essential claim is that agents always act on their strongest proximal action motivation. This law has threatening consequences for human freedom, insofar as it greatly limits agents’ ability to do otherwise given their motivational state. It has proven difficult to formulate a version that escapes counterexamples and some categorically deny its truth. Noticeable by its absence in the literature is any attempt to provide an argument for the law (...) of desire – I propose such an argument here. It is noted that Sripada's “divided mind” theory of willpower provides a counterexample to the version of the law of desire my argument defends, but I note that a reformulated version of the law of desire survives this critique. I conclude that there is a serious case for the law of desire, and note the broader implications of this. (shrink)

Recently improved understanding of evolutionary processes suggests that tree-based phylogenetic analyses of evolutionary change cannot adequately explain the divergent evolutionary histories of a great many genes and gene complexes. In particular, genetic diversity in the genomes of prokaryotes, phages, and plasmids cannot be fit into classic tree-like models of evolution. These findings entail the need for fundamental reform of our understanding of molecular evolution and the need to devise alternative apparatus for integrated analysis of these genomes. We advocate the development (...) of integrative phylogenomics for analyzing these genomes and their histories, with tools suited to analyzing the importance of lateral gene transfer (LGT) and of DNA evolution in extra-cellular mobile genetic elements (e.g., viruses, plasmids). These phenomena greatly increase the complexity of relationships among interacting genetic partners, as they exchange functional genetic units. We examine the ontology of functional genetic units, interacting genetic partners, and emergent genetic associations, argue that these three categories of entities are required for a successful integrated phylogenomics. We conclude with arguments to suggest that the proposed new perspective and associated tools are suitable, and perhaps required, as a replacement for the bifurcating trees that have dominated evolutionary thinking for the last 150 years. (shrink)

I aim to show that one way of testing the mettle of a theory of scientific explanation is to inquire what that theory entails about the status of brute facts. Here I consider the nature of brute facts, and survey several contemporary accounts of explanation vis a vis this subject. One problem with these accounts is that they seem to entail that brute facts represent a gap in scientific understanding. I argue that brute facts are non-mysterious and indeed are even (...) explainable by the lights of Salmon's ontic conception of explanation. The plausibility of various models of explanation, I suggest, depends to some extent on the tendency of their proponents to focus on certain examples of explananda - I ponder brute facts qua explananda here as a way of helping us to recognize this dependency. (shrink)

PET detects changes in metabolism between task periods and is thus insensitive to areas that are activated during all or most of cognition. Depth-recorded, evokedpotentials indicate that many multimodal and limbic cortical areas may be activated during most cognitive tasks. Thus, PET may be insensitive to some core processes of awareness that are difficult to eliminate from the control periods.

It is well known that Max Scheler framed his ethics in opposition to Kant’s “formalistic” ethical framework. However, it is a lesser-known fact that Scheler offered a critique of the ancient Greek moral vision. Although this critique was less developed than the one of Kant, the critique of the ancients was no less significant. First explicated in 1912 in Ressentiment, its central theme is reprised in nearly all of Scheler’s main texts even up until his death. Scheler’s contention is with (...) what he calls the “love of goodness,” which he also happens to think Aristotle’s ethics represents. This paper will primarily examine the love of goodness, first, as one side of the “categorial form” of "Pharisaism"—that is, as it represents a “moral illusion”—then as the other side—namely, as it corresponds to “epistemological error." Finally, I consider the specific moral context in light of where it naturally leads Scheler: to the principle of solidarity. (shrink)

Traditional Christology maintains that Christ was a single divine person with two natures (human and divine). According to kenotic Christology, certain divine properties such as omniscience and omnipotence were divested in order for Christ to acquire essential human properties. However, such a view appears to conflict with perfect-being theology, which takes omniscience and omnipotence to be essential properties for being divine. I propose a view that adopts a Thomistic theory of essences in order to show that there need be no (...) conflict, and hence Christ can give up the property of being omniscient while still being essentially omniscient. (shrink)

La philosophie de Quine n'aurait pas lieu d'être s'il y avait des propositions. L'existence de celles-ci rangerait la logique aux côtés des mathématiques ; la rupture entre, d'une part, la science et, d'autre part, le langage et le sens commun serait alors établie et le programme empiriste devrait renoncer à rendre compte du fait de la science ; ce qui était précisément son but initial. Quine a si brillamment analysé les difficultés de la notion de proposition , qu'on a peu (...) songé à examiner la nature de ce par quoi il les remplace : les énoncés. En s'appuyant sur des considérations élémentaires ressortant à des matières scientifiques philosophiquement neutres, on tente de montrer que la notion d'énoncé n'est :ni logiquement distincte de la notion de proposition : c'est une notion confuse ;ni linguistiquement claire : c'est une notion obscure. (shrink)

This paper argues that the classification of propositional attitudes into the de re, de dicto, and de se is incomplete. De se attitudes are widely agreed to be closely connected to de re attitudes. But there is a species of belief that is linked to agent-centered action in the way that de se beliefs are, but is also associated with entities, places, and especially times, under a description. These mark out a fourth kind. One way to think about what makes (...) them distinctive is that, despite being ‘essentially indexical’ they can be retained across different contexts of evaluation without having diagonal content. The paper also discusses the connection between such beliefs and the kinds of utterances (like ‘Don't put off for tomorrow what you can do today’) that are contested as examples of what David Kaplan called ‘monsters.’. (shrink)

Ernesto Neto's installation at the Panthéon in Paris, Leviathan Toth (2006), brings us into a semiotics of intensities that does not belong to the ‘aesthetic regime’ as described by Jacques Rancière but rather to a Diagrammatic Agency of Contemporary Art. In this case study, the latter is constructed after Deleuze and Guattari – from a politics of the Body without Organs critically and clinically identified to a Body without Image.

Une place minimale serait-elle à réserver aux perceptions d’équité et de justice, en médiation? Nous noterons les évolutions récentes tracées par les acteurs supranationaux européens, avant d’observer la manière dont jurisprudences et doctrines, belges et françaises, raisonnent l’homologation lorsqu’il s’agit de vérifier le respect en médiation d’une garantie suffisante de justice et d’équité. Pour finir, nous comparerons les enseignements de deux arrêts de principe, l’un prononcé par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et l’autre par la Cour suprême canadienne, (...) jugeant les pratiques amiables de règlement de conflit. (shrink)

Critical reception of Marcel Duchamp since the 1970s has tended to elevate him into the very figure of the Artist he sought to attack. One aspect of this domestication has involved neglecting Duchamp’s fin de siècle ‘eroticism’ with its sexual innuendos and double-entendres. Yet this very readymade vulgarity allows us to recover a Duchamp still capable of disrupting the genres of Art and the gendered Artist, by revealing a theory embedded in his work which continually reverses and displaces phallocentrism in (...) a game consisting of the confusion of genders and genres. We argue that Duchamp’s disruption of the discursive typologies of the genre of art can be profitably read through this apparently trivial sexualized wordplay, particularly in the transgender passage into Rrose Sélavy. Reading this aspect of Duchamp after, i.e. within and against, Lacan demonstrates how Duchamp’s singular regime of signs governed by equivocity and indetermination subverts the ‘phallic function’ of the signifier. (shrink)

Le point de départ de l'article est la théorie de la signification et de la référence des termes scientifiques présentée par Hilary Putnam dans son article « The Meaning of 'Meaning7 » et quelques autres essais de Mind, Language and Reality. Dans la partie critique du texte la thèse et les arguments de Putnam, ainsi que sa prétention d'éviter le problème de rincommensurabilité des théories rivales, sont évalués à la lumière de la distinction que nous introduisons entre référence et dénotation. (...) Dans sa partie constructive le texte propose les grandes lignes d'un traitement de la référence des termes scientifiques qui s'appuie sur notre conception de la structure de la théorie physique, le pragmatisme constructif.The paper's starting point is Hilary Putnam's theory of meaning and reference for scientific terms, as presented in " The Meaning of 'Meaning' " and several other essays from his Mind, Language and Reality. A critique of Putnam's thesis and arguments, as well as of his claim to avoid the problem of incommensurability of competing theories, is offered in the light of our own distinction between reference and denotation. In the process we develop an outline of a theory of reference for scientific terms that builds on our view of the structure of physical theory: constructive pragmatism. (shrink)

The introduction of open source in the life sciences is increasingly being suggested as an alternative to patenting. This is an alternative, however, that takes its shape at the intersection of the life sciences and informatics. Numerous examples can be identified wherein open source in the life sciences refers to access, sharing and collaboration as informatic practices. This includes open source as an experimental model and as a more sophisticated approach of genetic engineering. The first section discusses the greater flexibly (...) in regard of patenting and the relationship to the introduction of open source in the life sciences. The main argument is that the ownership of knowledge in the life sciences should be reconsidered in the context of the centrality of DNA in informatic formats. This is illustrated by discussing a range of examples of open source models. The second part focuses on open source in synthetic biology as exemplary for the re-materialization of information into food, energy, medicine and so forth. The paper ends by raising the question whether another kind of alternative might be possible: one that looks at open source as a model for an alternative to the commodification of life that is understood as an attempt to comprehensively remove the restrictions from the usage of DNA in any of its formats. (shrink)

Qui, de nos jours, veut encore " faire son âge "? Les enfants sont adolescents de plus en plus tôt, les jeunes le restent de plus en plus tard, les adultes rechignent à quitter leur jeunesse, et les vieux n'aspirent qu'à en connaître une seconde... Alors que la vie est plus longue et plus sûre que jamais, les étapes qui en rythmaient autrefois le cours semblent aujourd'hui confuses. Pourquoi grandir? Pourquoi vieillir? De telles questions sont désormais ouvertes. Incertitudes dans l'éducation, (...) crise de l'âge adulte, problème des retraites, drame de la grande vieillesse : autant de signes d'un désarroi inédit, reflétant l'ébranlement profond de l'idée même de maturité. L'examen des grandes philosophies du passé permet de mettre en lumière les nombreuses métamorphoses de l'idéal de la maturité adulte. Il se pourrait qu'une ultime recomposition s'opère sous nos yeux : la maturité, devenue " maturescence ", ne désigne plus un état stable, mais un processus indéfini par lequel nous gagnons en expérience, responsabilité et authenticité. Bref, l'adulte n'est pas mort, et sa cause mérite d'être défendue. En dépit des tentations " jeunistes ", l'idéal demeure, plus exigeant que jamais, invitant chacun d'entre nous à ce que la philosophie antique réservait aux plus sages des sages : devenir toujours plus grand. (shrink)

Within the continuation of the controversy provoked by Alain Badiou’s Deleuze , the article proposes a reading of Saint Paul. The foundation of universalism which follows engages in exploring the political basement of the conflict between the two paradigms of the multiple developed respectively in the philosophies of Deleuze and Badiou. Saint Paul - or the universalism of grace against the materialism of life.

The notion of digital virus covers, in our view, two points: computer viruses that infect our computers and technological solutionism, the unreasonable passion that consists in considering that the solution to all social problems lies in the digital world. Yet the digital world is as vulnerable as the biological world. Moreover, it is dangerous because it pushes us into a digital bondage that undermines democracy. The solution to the crisis is not less democracy, but more democracy. More precisely, we will (...) argue that digital devices do not strengthen democratic communication, they promote a digital connection that hinders deliberation and threatens the very idea of democracy. (shrink)

This book reminds us that "in inwardness I am in myself. " It defines our experience in terms of subjectivity, private self-awareness, and complex relationships between interiority and outwardness. The book shows that our inwardness need not confine us to narcissistic self-absorption, but may expand our capacity for richer, more sympathetic relations with others.