An influential view of the nature of the language system is that of an evolved biological system in which a set of rules is combined with a lexicon that contains the words of the language together with a representation of their context. Alternative views, usually based on connectionist modeling, attempt to explain the structure of language on the basis of complex associative processes. Here, I put forward a third view that stresses experience-dependent structural development of the brain circuits (...) supporting language as a core principle of the organization of the language system. In this view, embodied in a recent neuroconstructivist neural network of past tense development and processing, initial domain-general predispositions enable the development of functionally specialized brain structures through interactions between experience-dependent brain development and statistical learning in a structured environment. Together, these processes shape a biological adult language system that appears to separate into distinct mechanism for processing rules and exceptions, whereas in reality those subsystems co-develop and interact closely. This view puts experience-dependent brain development in response to a specific language environment at the heart of understanding not only language development but adult language processing as well. (shrink)

Contrary to assumptions that changes in brain networks are possible only during crucial periods of development, research in the past decade has supported the idea of a permanently plastic brain. Novel experience, altered afferent input due to environmental changes and learning new skills are now recognized as modulators of brain function and underlying neuroanatomic circuitry. Given findings in experiments with animals and the recent discovery of increases in gray and white matter in the adult human (...) class='Hi'>brain as a result of learning, the old concept of cognitive reserve, that is the ability to reinforce brain volume in crucial areas and thus provide a greater threshold for age-dependent deficits, has been reinforced. The challenge we face is to unravel the exact nature of the dynamic structural alterations and, ultimately, to be able to use this knowledge for disease management. Understanding normative changes in brain structure that occur as a result of environmental changes and demands is pivotal to understanding the characteristic ability of the brain to adapt. (shrink)

By reviewing most of the neurobiology of consciousness, this article highlights some major reasons why a successful emulation of the dynamics of human consciousness by artificial intelligence is unlikely. The analysis provided leads to conclude that human consciousness is epigenetically determined and experience and context-dependent at the individual level. It is subject to changes in time that are essentially unpredictable. If cracking the code to human consciousness were possible, the result would most likely have to consist of a temporal pattern (...) code simulating long-distance signal reverberation and de-correlation of all spatial signal contents from temporal signals. In the light of the massive evidence for complex interactions between implicit (non-conscious) and explicit (conscious) contents of representation, the code would have to be capable of making implicit (non-conscious) processes explicit. It would have to be capable of a progressively less and less arbitrary selection of temporal activity patterns in a continuously developing neural network structure identical to that of the human brain, from the synaptic level to that of higher cognitive functions. The code’s activation thresholds would depend on specific temporal signal coincidence probabilities, vary considerably with time and across individual experience data, and would therefore require dynamically adaptive computations capable of emulating the properties of individual human experience. No known machine or neural network learning approach has such potential. (shrink)

Recent studies suggest that the tetracycline antibiotic minocycline, or its cousins, hold therapeutic potential for affective and psychotic disorders. This is proposed on the basis of a direct effect on microglia‐mediated frontocortical synaptic pruning (FSP) during adolescence, perhaps in genetically susceptible individuals harboring risk alleles in the complement component cascade that is involved in this normal process of CNS circuit refinement. In reviewing this field, it is argued that minocycline is actually probing and modulating a deeply evolved and intricate system (...) wherein psychosocial stimuli sculpt the circuitry of the “social brain” underlying adult behavior and personality. Furthermore, this system can generate psychiatric morbidity that is not dependent on genetic variation. This view has important ramifications for understanding “pathologies” of human social behavior and cognition as well as providing long‐sought potential mechanistic links between social experience and susceptibility to mental and physical disease. (shrink)

We hypothesize that rapid eye movement or REM sleep evolved, in part, to mediate sexual/reproductive behaviors and strategies. Because development of sexual and mating strategies depends crucially on early attachment experiences, we further hypothesize that REM functions to mediate attachment processes early in life. Evidence for these hypotheses comes from (1) the correlation of REM variables with both attachment and sexual/reproductive variables; (2) attachment-related and sex-related hormonal release during REM; (3) selective activation during REM of brain sites implicated (...) in attachment and sexual processes; (4) effects of maternal deprivation on REM; (5) effects of REM deprivation on sexual behaviors; and (6) the REM-associated sexual excitation. To explain why we find associations among REM sleep, attachment, and adult reproductive strategies, we rely on recent extensions of parent-offspring conflict theory. Using data from recent findings on genomic imprinting, Haig (2000) and others suggest that paternally expressed genes are selected to promote growth of the developing fetus/child at the expense of the mother, while maternally expressed genes counter these effects. Because developmental REM facilitates attachment-related outcomes in the child, developmental REM may be regulated by paternally expressed genes. In that case, REM may have evolved to support the “aims” of paternal genes at the expense of maternal genes. (shrink)

Dreaming in sleep must depend on the activity of the brain as does cognition and memory in wakefulness. Yet our understanding of the physiological subtleties of state differences may still be too primitive to guide theories adequately in these areas. One can state nonetheless unequivocally that the brain in REM is poorly equipped to practice for eventualities of wakefulness through dreaming, or for consolidating into memory the complex experiences of that state. [Hobson et al., Nielsen, Solms, Vertes & (...) Eastman, Revonsuo]. (shrink)

Some dynamic systems approaches posit discontinuous changes, even universal stages, in development. Conversely, Thelen and colleagues see development as gradual because it relies on real-time interactions among many components. Yet their new model hinges on one parameter, neural cooperativity, that should change discontinuously because it engenders new skills that catalyze neural connectivity. In fact, research on cortical connectivity finds development to be discontinuous, and possibly stage-like, based on experience-dependent and experience-independent factors.

Brain Computer Interface (BCI) technology offers potential for human augmentation in areas ranging from communication to home automation, leisure and gaming. This paper addresses ethical challenges associated with the wider scale deployment of BCI as an assistive technology by documenting issues associated with the development of non-invasive BCI technology. Laboratory testing is normally carried out with volunteers but further testing with subjects, who may be in vulnerable groups is often needed to improve system operation. BCI development is (...) technically complex, sometimes requiring lengthy recording sessions to achieve the necessary personalisation of the paradigms, and this can present ethical challenges that vary depending on the subject group. The paper contributes to the on-going ethical discussion surrounding the deployment BCI outside the specialist laboratory and suggests some tentative guidelines for BCI research teams, appropriate to those deploying the technology, derived from experience on a multisite project. Any tension between deployment and technical progress must be managed by a formal process within a multidisciplinary consortium. (shrink)

How do newborns learn to recognize objects? According to temporal learning models in computational neuroscience, the brain constructs object representations by extracting smoothly changing features from the environment. To date, however, it is unknown whether newborns depend on smoothly changing features to build invariant object representations. Here, we used an automated controlled-rearing method to examine whether visual experience with smoothly changing features facilitates the development of view-invariant object recognition in a newborn animal model—the domestic chick. When newborn chicks (...) were reared with a virtual object that moved smoothly over time, the chicks created view-invariant representations that were selective for object identity and tolerant to viewpoint changes. Conversely, when newborn chicks were reared with a temporally non-smooth object, the chicks developed less selectivity for identity features and less tolerance to viewpoint changes. These results provide evidence for a “smoothness constraint” on the development of invariant object recognition and indicate that newborns leverage the temporal smoothness of natural visual environments to build abstract mental models of objects. (shrink)

Depression is vastly heterogeneous in its symptoms, neuroimaging data, and treatment responses. As such, describing how it develops at the network level has been notoriously difficult. In an attempt to overcome this issue, a theoretical “negative prediction mechanism” is proposed. Here, eight key brain regions are connected in a transient, state-dependent, core network of pathological communication that could facilitate the development of depressive cognition. In the context of predictive processing, it is suggested that this mechanism is activated as (...) a response to negative/adverse stimuli in the external and/or internal environment that exceed a vulnerable individual’s capacity for cognitive appraisal. Specifically, repeated activation across this network is proposed to update an individual’s brain so that it increasingly predicts and reinforces negative experiences over time—pushing an individual at-risk for or suffering from depression deeper into mental illness. Within this, the negative prediction mechanism is poised to explain various aspects of prognostic outcome, describing how depression might ebb and flow over multiple timescales in a dynamically changing, complex environment. (shrink)

In our view, a central issue in relating brain development to education is whether classroom interventions can alter neural networks related to cognition in ways that generalize beyond the specific domain of instruction. This issue depends upon understanding how neural networks develop under the influence of genes and experience. Imaging studies have revealed common networks underlying many important tasks undertaken at school, such as reading and number skills, and we are beginning to learn how genes and experience work (...) together to shape the development of these networks. The results obtained appear sufficient to propose research-based interventions that could prove useful in improving the ability of children to adjust to the school setting and to acquire skills like literacy and numeracy. (shrink)

The complexity of the human mind and its interaction with the environment is one of the main epistemological debates throughout history. Recent ideas, framed as the 4E perspective to cognition, highlight that human experience depends causally on both cerebral and extracranial processes, but also is embedded in a particular sociomaterial context and is a product of historical accumulation of trajectory changes throughout life. Accordingly, the human microbiome is one of the most intriguing actors modulating brain function and physiology. Here, (...) we present the 4E approach to the Human Microbiome for understanding mental processes from a broader perspective, encompassing one's body physiology and environment throughout their lifespan, interconnected by microbiome community structure and dynamics. We review evidence supporting the approach theoretically and motivates the study of the global set of microbial ecosystem networks encountered by a person across their lifetime (from skin to gut to natural and built environments). We furthermore trace future empirical implementation of the approach. We finally discuss novel research opportunities and clinical interventions aimed toward developing low‐cost/high‐benefit integrative and personalized bio‐psycho‐socio‐environmental treatments for mental health and including the brain‐gut‐microbiome axis. (shrink)

Many sensory processing regions of the central brain undergo critical periods of experience‐dependent plasticity. During this time ethologically relevant information shapes circuit structure and function. The mechanisms that control critical period timing and duration are poorly understood, and this is of special importance for those later periods of development, which often give rise to complex cognitive functions such as social behavior. Here, we review recent findings in Drosophila, an organism that has some unique experimental advantages, and introduce (...) novel views for manipulating plasticity in the post‐embryonic brain. Critical periods in larval and young adult flies resemble classic vertebrate models with distinct onset and termination, display clear connections with complex behaviors, and provide opportunities to control the time course of plasticity. These findings may extend our knowledge about mechanisms underlying extension and reopening of critical periods, a concept that has great relevance to many human neurodevelopmental disorders. (shrink)

Various neurophysiological experiments have revealed remarkable correlations between cortical neuronal activity and subjective experiences. However, the mere presence of neuronal electrical activity does not appear to be sufficient to produce these experiences. It has been suggested that the explanation for the neural basis of consciousness might lie in understanding the reason that some types of neuronal activity possess subjective correlates and others do not. Here I propose and develop the idea that this difference may be caused by the existence of (...) an elementary nonarbitrary linkage between temporal or spatiotemporal patterns of neuronal activity and their subjective attributes. I also show how cortical neural circuits capable of generating experience-coding patterns could emerge during evolution and brain development, due to the presence of spontaneous stochastic neuronal activity and activity-dependent synaptic plasticity. This hypothesis leads to several testable predictions, principal among which is the idea that the neural correlates of consciousness are essentially innate and universal. (shrink)

The simultaneous recording of brain activity in two or more people, termed hyperscanning, is an emerging field of research investigating the neural basis of social interaction. Hyperscanning studies of adult–infant dyads have great potential to provide insights into how social functions develop. In particular, taking advantage of functional near-infrared spectroscopy for its spatial resolution and invulnerability to motion artifacts, adult–infant fNIRS may play a major role in this field. However, there remains a problem in analyzing hyperscanning data between adult (...) and young populations. Namely, there are intrinsic differences in hemodynamic time latencies depending on age, and the peak latency of the hemodynamic response function is longer in younger populations. Despite this fact, the effects of such differences on quantified synchrony have not yet been examined. Consequently, the present study investigated the influence of intrinsic hemodynamic differences on wavelet coherence for assessing brain synchrony, and further examined the statistical removal of these effects through simulation experiments. First, we assumed a social signal model, where one counterpart of the dyad sends a social signal to the other, which eventually results in simultaneous brain activation. Based on this model, simulated fNIRS activation sequences were synthesized by convolving boxcar event sequences with HRFs. We set two conditions for the event: synchronized and asynchronized event conditions. We also modeled the HRFs of adults and infants by referring to previous studies. After preprocessing with additional statistical processing, we calculated the wavelet coherence for each synthesized fNIRS activation sequence pair. The simulation results showed that the wavelet coherence in the synchronized event condition was attenuated for the combination of different HRFs. We also confirmed that prewhitening via an autoregressive filter could recover the attenuation of wavelet coherence in the 0.03–0.1 Hz frequency band, which was regarded as being associated with synchronous neural activity. Our results showed that variability in hemodynamics affected the analysis of inter-brain synchrony, and that the application of prewhitening is critical for such evaluations between adult and young populations. (shrink)

Philosophy and science employ abstract hypothetical scenarios- thought experiments - to illustrate, defend, and dispute theoretical claims. Since thought experiments furnish no new empirical observations, the method prompts two epistemological questions: whether anything may be learnt from the merely hypothetical, and, if so, how. Various sceptical arguments against the use of thought experiments in philosophy are discussed and criticized. The thesis that thought experiments in science provide a priori knowledge through non-sensory grasping of abstract entities is discussed and rejected. The (...) thesis that thought experimentation consists in manipulations of mental models is examined and found to be of limited epistemological relevance. It is argued that thought experiments are associated with characteristic arguments in a manner similar to ordinary experiments. It is further argued that thought experiments function in the same way as experiments in general: by providing premises for their associated arguments. Like other experiments, a thought experiment is successful when the premises it provides are true. This holds both for philosophical and scientific thought experiments. An argument schema is proposed and shown to be a formal analogue to that associated with ordinary experiments; similar in being subject to epistemological holism; but differing in being modal: in employing statements about possibility and necessity. The evaluation of thought experiments thus depends on how modal statements may be justified. Intuition and conceivability are discussed as sources of modal justification and found problematic. Instead it is suggested that evaluation proceed by accommodation of the statements describing the experiment's hypothetical scenario. The method of accommodation is developed and applied to five influential thought experiments in philosophy: the brain in a vat; Putnam's Twin Earth; Burge's arthritis example; Searle's Chinese Room; and Newcomb's problem. Its application shows some of these to be failed, others to be successful only relative to controversial philosophical doctrines. (shrink)

This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural (...) processes on which they depend. I propose aconception of perceptual experience as a form ofskillful engagement with the environment on the partof the whole person or animal. (shrink)

The rise of molecular epigenetics over the last few years promises to bring the discourse about the sociality and susceptibility to environmental influences of the brain to an entirely new level. Epigenetics deals with molecular mechanisms such as gene expression, which may embed in the organism “memories” of social experiences and environmental exposures. These changes in gene expression may be transmitted across generations without changes in the DNA sequence. Epigenetics is the most advanced example of the new postgenomic and (...) context-dependent view of the gene that is making its way into contemporary biology. In my article I will use the current emergence of epigenetics and its link with neuroscience research as an example of the new, and in a way unprecedented sociality of contemporary biology. After a review of the most important developments of epigenetic research, and some of its links with neuroscience, in the second part I reflect on the novel challenges that epigenetics presents for the social sciences for a re-conceptualization of the link between the biological and the social in a postgenomic age. Although epigenetics remains a contested, hyped, and often uncritical terrain, I claim that especially when conceptualized in broader non-genecentric frameworks,. (shrink)

Experience-dependent neural plasticity is high in the developing brain, presenting a unique window of opportunity for training. To optimize existing training programs and develop new interventions, it is important to understand what processes take place in the developing brain during training. Here, we systematically review MRI-based evidence of training-induced neural plasticity in children and adolescents. A total of 71 articles were included in the review. Significant changes in brain activation, structure, microstructure, and structural and functional connectivity were (...) reported with different types of trainings in the majority of the studies. Significant correlation of performance improvement with neural changes was reported in 51% of the studies. Yet, only 48% of the studies had a control condition. Overall, the review supports the hypothesized neural changes with training while at the same time charting empirical and methodological desiderata for future research. (shrink)

During meditation, consciousness/awareness is usually enhanced because of higher attention and concentration, which inter-dependently co-arise thru appropriate interactions between neural signals. Nāgārjuna rejects ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ in favor of co-dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda), and that is also why he rejects causality; the entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise. Causality is a major issue in metaphysical views. The goals of this article are as follows: (I)Which entities lack ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ and which ones inherently exist? (II) Do the entities (...) that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise and hence can we reject causality as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy? (III) Do the entities that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence? (IV) Do structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other? And (V)We critically analyze, extend, and examine Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co- origination in the extended Dual-Aspect Monism (eDAM) framework. Our analysis suggests that: (i) All conventional entities lack inherent existence. However, the dual-aspect unmanifested state of the primal entity (unified information field (UIF), emptiness, Śūnyatā, a neutral entity of Neutral Monism, or Brahman) inherently exists. The dual-aspect unmanifested state of UIF has (a) physical unified information field (PUIF, quantum vacuum, ‘zero- point field’/ZPF)as physical aspect and (b) unified potential consciousness information field (UPCIF) as the non-physical aspect. The subjective experiences (SEs) of objects and of the subject (self) are the excitations or modes of the UPCIF, so they are derived entities and hence they lack inherent existence. The dual-aspect unmanifested state of UIF/emptiness/Śūnyatā is fundamental and irreducible, and hence it inherently exists. (ii) The entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise, and hence causality for them can be rejected but instead conditions (such as efficient, percept-object, immediate, and dominant conditions) are necessary, as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. (iii) It is unclear that the dual-aspect primal entity UIF (Brahman/emptiness/Śūnyatā) that exists inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence. Most likely, all manifested entities inter-dependently co-arise thru natural laws built-in the UIF when necessary conditions for a manifested entity are satisfied thru interaction among relevant entities. (iv) It is unclear that structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other. A cause must, at the same time, be an effect of another cause. This implies that there is no first cause. Therefore, the structure, function, and experience inter-dependently co-arise thru co-evolution, co-development, sensorimotor co-tuning, and the interaction among relevant entities after the necessary conditions of manifestation of a specific entity are satisfied; and they are linked via conditions. (v) In the extended Dual-Aspect Monism (eDAM) framework, the physical aspect of a state of a manifested entity and that of the non-physical aspect (with functional, qualitative, cognitive, and experiential sub-aspects) of the same state of the same entity inseparably co-exist in each state of each entity at all levels. However, the degrees of manifestations of inseparable physical and non-physical aspects vary with the states, levels of entities, and contexts. Moreover, manifested entities lack inherent existence. In other words, the physical aspect and that of the non-physical aspect of manifested entities dependently co- arise, co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tuned for sensorimotor system appropriately depending on the levels of entities and contexts, which along with common “effective”information entail the inseparability of both aspects. In this sense, the symmetry between physical and non-physical aspects of a state of an entity (such as brain-mind system) is maintained, where the physical aspect (from third person perspective) does not cause the inseparable non-physical aspect (from first-person perspective) in living systems or vice- versa. (shrink)

This work is understood as an up-to-date philosophical and neurobiological answer to materialist positions concerning the nature of the human mind maintained in the English-speaking philosophy of today. Against physicalist and parallelist views of the body-mind relationship a "strong dualist-interactionist" theory of this relation is defended, in which the primacy is ascribed to the self using, modifying, and shaping its brain in deliberate autonomy. This theory is proposed and clarified in 3 sections. In the first part of the book, (...) Popper mainly examines materialist philosophies of the mind and gives "a history of the body-mind problem since Descartes and especially of the steps which led to parallelism". Physicalist theories of the self, like radical materialism and behaviorism, psycho-physical parallelism, epiphenomenalism, or identity theories are found to be incompatible with the irreducible reality and activity of 3 worlds : the universe of physical entities, the world of mental states, including states of consciousness, psychological dispositions, and unconscious states, and the world of the products of the human mind. Phenomena of consciousness seem "radically different" from what is found in the physical world; due to conscious and purposeful action dramatic changes have taken place in the physical environment of man. The idea of the closedness of W1 is "clearly refuted" by the existence of W3. Plato's and Descartes' conceptions of the body-mind relationship are basically correct--in spite of the fact that the Cartesian model of physical causation has broken down. The "brain is owned by the self, rather than the other way around". This philosophical view of the ultimate superiority of the self over the brain finds its scientific confirmation in Eccles's review of physiological findings concerning structure, function, and development of the nervous system offered in part II of the book. As especially Sperry's studies of brain-split patients have shown, the self stands in direct liaison with the body "only in relationship to activities in the dominant hemisphere" ; only specific neuronal structures, "the modules in the cerebral cortex," and these only in special conditions, are open to an interaction with the self. The evidence for the dependence of the mind upon determined brain centres in sensory, emotional and motoric behavior, in the acquisition and use of language and memory is presented. This dependence is found never to be automatic, instantaneous, or merely passive; nor does it offer an explanation of the experienced unity of the self or even of an image of perception. As a result of his survey of contemporary physiological knowledge, the author proposes "a radical new hypothesis" concerning the self-brain relations. The self-conscious mind "is an independent entity" actively engaged in reading out from the multitude of active centres in the modules of the brain's liaison areas, deliberately selecting from these centres in accord with its interests, integrating its selections into the unity of conscious experience, and acting back on the neuronal centres. The self-conscious mind developed in relationship to W3 influence on the self "exercises a superior interpretative and controlling role upon the neuronal events by way of a two-way interaction" between W1 and W2. (shrink)

Psychologists have long debated the underlying cause of infants' perseverative reaching. Thelen et al. explain the error in terms of general processes that make goal-directed actions to remembered locations. The context- and experience-dependent nature of their model implies that there is no single cause of the A-not-B error, and, more generally, no core essence to cognitive development.

This study compared professional and amateur classical musicians matched for age, gender, and education on reaction times during the Stroop color-word test, brainwaves during an auditory ERP task and during paired reaction-time tasks, responses on the Gibbs Sociomoral Reflection questionnaire, and self-reported frequencies of peak experiences. Professional musicians were characterized by: lower color-word interference effects , faster categorization of rare expected stimuli , and a trend for faster processing of rare unexpected stimuli , higher scores on the Sociomoral Reflection questionnaire, (...) and more frequent peak experiences during rest, tasks, and sleep. Both groups had high values on the Brain Integration Scale. These findings are interpreted in light of a Unified Theory of Performance, which posits that effectiveness in any area is influenced by one’s level of mind-brain development—emotional, cognitive, moral, ego and cortical development—with higher mind-brain development supporting greater effectiveness in any domain. (shrink)

It is argued that the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. the fact that we have experience, stems from a conceptual confusion between consciousness and experience. It is concluded that experience has to be considered as a basic characteristic of ongoing interactions at even the most simple level, while consciousness is better defined as reflexive awareness, possible since symbolic language was developed. A dynamic evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can (...) be defined as a characteristic linked closely to specific pattern matching, a characteristic which is already apparent at the molecular level at least. Awareness then can be regarded as the special experience of one or more central, final modules in the animal neuronal brain. From evolutionary considerations, awareness can be understood functionally and physiologically. As such, awareness is what experience is to animals. Finally, consciousness could be defined as reflexive awareness, instead of using the term as synonymous to awareness. The ability for reflexive awareness is distinctly different from animal and human awareness and depends upon the availability of a separate frame of reference, as provided by symbolic language. As such, words have made reflexive awareness - a specific and infrequent form of awareness - possible. Conciousness might be defined as the experience evoked by considering, i.e. thinking about experiences themselves. Explaining and understanding awareness and consciousness as evolved biological characteristics of the functioning of animals and later humans, poses no philosophical problems. The nature of experience itself remains elusive, but this is not a problem specific toawareness or consciousness. If there is a hard problem of explaining consciousness, than this actually must be considered as the hard problem of explaining experience. While the definition of experience could be broadened to include all molecular and biological pattern specific recognition events, the true nature of consciousness might be better understood when considering it as a very specific form of awareness, made possible by language. (shrink)

Our species of hominin, Homo sapiens, is an extremely social animal. We are born with social brains. The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is a methodological approach to social consciousness that offers significant advantages in terms of uncovering and describing the essential structures of our social perceptions and actions. This is especially true in this period of post-neuro-turn social science, because the structures described by Husserlian “pure” phenomenology with its emphasis upon “returning to the things,” performing reductions, and developing the skills (...) available to the phenomenological attitude are in synch with neuroscientific research on the neural correlates of consciousness. For the anthropology of consciousness, the Husserlian methodology allows us to explore consciousness in cross-cultural settings in greater detail and depth of understanding. This is especially the case with respect to the experience of intersubjectivity, the roots of which are found to be part of the inherent life-world that all normal humans depend upon to true their experiences of the environing world, regardless of cultural background. The Husserlian approach to intersubjectivity challenges the discipline of anthropology to move past its knee-jerk distinction between nature and nurture, and its erroneous assumption that human experience is somehow “culture all the way down.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Visual Aesthetic ExperienceElisa Steenberg, Independent ScholarMan can shift his attitude to the surrounding world into an experience of its visual appearance. He perceives colors, lines, shapes, etc.—at times denoted as form. Furthermore, these phenomena may be experienced as having various properties. A color may be experienced as warm or cold, as cheerful or somber; a line as soft or hard, as merry or aggressive; a shape as light or (...) heavy. Moreover, such experiences may include pleasure or displeasure, implying that what is experienced is liked or disliked. The individual has a preference value experience. This should not be confounded with an evaluation, a value judgment, which requires cognitive activity and a comparison. The experience described I designate a visual aesthetic experience.Research into processes in the brain may offer explanations of the neurological antecedents to the visual aesthetic experience. To see a color as cold or warm may depend on sense-interrelating processes. To experience a color or line as cheerful, somber, etc., might be explained as due to simultaneous processes in the regions of the brain that are the mainsprings of emotions. The preference valuations might be due to processes in the brain's so-called primary reward-aversion center. It seems most likely that future brain research, with the help of such techniques as PET scanning (Positron Emission Tomography) or MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging)—what has been called "windows into the human brain"—may offer explanations regarding the physiological and biochemical processes that happen when our attitude to the world around us is shifted into what is here designated a visual aesthetic experience.1When did man first evince visual aesthetic experiences and when do they first occur in an individual's life? Certain anthropologists assert that positive visual aesthetic experiences first occurred when man was able to experience form as symmetrical and balanced, colors as bright and possibly shiny. This they claim is due to balance and order being a fundamental condition in man's life, and preferences for bright colors they consider due to man being a daylight creature who feels insecure in darkness.2 We know that so-called primitive people and young children like symmetric patterns and bright colors. The child reaches out for light red and yellow objects rather than for dark and black ones. With increasing age, though, the child's [End Page 89] visual preferences usually change, and this occurs mainly within the framework of his or her manmade surroundings. The child becomes accustomed to seeing certain objects while feeling pleasure and thus comes to appreciate their appearance. However, such experiences are rather vague before the child reaches the age when its personality is formed. Then especially girls often develop a keen interest in the appearance of objects around them.A general survey among adults shows that there are considerable varieties in individuals' inclinations for visual aesthetic experiences. There are those who have them rather seldom. Their attitudes to the surrounding world are primarily cognitive. Their attentions are focused on meanings, the "what" not the "how," in order to understand and to cope with what they see. On the other hand, there are individuals who most frequently hold an aesthetic attitude to their surroundings. They pay attention to shapes, colors, and color combinations of all kinds of objects, natural or manmade. They choose their clothes and their home furnishings under careful aesthetic considerations. This inclination may possibly be claimed to be due to an innate disposition for holding visual aesthetic attitudes, to be compared with, for example, an individual's innate musicality. However, it is undoubtedly also due to certain social circumstances.Visual aesthetic experiences are denoted taste manifestations. As such they may be investigated not only as to their occurrences and changes in an individual's life but also as a changing sociocultural phenomenon.3Verbalizing the Visual Aesthetic ExperienceThe psychic content of a visual aesthetic experience may be revealed to other individuals by application of aesthetic property terms to the appearance of objects. The terms are either what is here called descriptive or they are value terms. Examples of descriptive aesthetic terms are graceful, garish, gaudy, clumsy, elegant, dainty, vivid, flamboyant, etc. These terms may... (shrink)

Several lines of evidence have underscored the remarkable neuroplasticity of the primate sensorimotor cortex, characterizing these cortical areas as dynamic constructs that are modelled in a use-dependent manner by behaviourally significant experiences. Their plasticity likely provides a neural substrate that may contribute to the dynamic systems paradigm argued by Shanker & King (S&K) as crucial for development of communication skills.

Neurobiologists talk of linking mind to molecular dynamics in and between neurons. Such talk is dismissed by cognitive scientists, including many cognitive neuroscientists, due to the number of “levels” that separate behaviors from these molecular events. In this paper I explain what neurobiologists mean by such claims by describing the kinds of experiment tools that have forged these linkages, directly on lab benches. I here focus on one of these tools, gene targeting techniques, brought into behavioral neuroscience from developmental biology (...) more than a quarter-century ago. Discussion of this tool does more than illuminate these claims by neurobiologists, however. An account of its development shows the doubly dependent role that theory plays in neurobiology. Our best current theories about “how the brain works” depend entirely on the experiment tools neuroscientists have available. And these tools get developed via the solution of engineering problems, not the application of theory. Theory is thus of tertiary importance in neuroscience, not of the primary importance that many cognitive scientists assume it to occupy. (shrink)

The canonical Buddhist account of the cognitive processes underlying our experience of the world prefigures recent developments in neuroscience. The developments in question are centered on two main trends in neuroscience research and thinking. The first of these involves the idea that our everyday experience of ourselves and of the world consists in a series of discrete microstates. The second closely related notion is that affective structures and systems play critical roles in governing the formation of such states. Both of (...) these ideas are contained within the Buddhist theory of dependent co-origination. This paper explicates the theory of dependent co-origination in light of the aforementioned developments. It examines the role of the theory of dependent co-origination within Buddhism and it draws attention to critical differences with the neuroscientific account of the same process. Finally, it discusses specific ways in which these differences may be usefully applied to neuroscience research and thinking. (shrink)

The hippocampal formation is a structure critical to navigation and many forms of memory. In mammals, the firing of place cells is widely regarded as the fundamental unit of HF information processing. Supporting homology between the avian and mammalian HF, context-specific patterns of Egr1 have been reported in birds that are comparable to those produced by place cell firing in mammals. Recent electrophysiological data, however, suggest that many avian species lack place cells, potentially undermining the correspondence between Egr1 and place (...) cell-related firing in the avian brain. To clarify this, the current study examines Egr1 expression in Japanese quail under conditions known to elicit only weakly spatially modulated firing patterns and report robust context-dependent Egr1 expression. These data confirm that context-dependent expression of Egr1 is not dependent on precise place fields and provide insight into how these birds are able to perform complex spatial tasks despite lacking mammalian-like place cells. (shrink)

Performance and control of upright bipedal posture requires a constant and dynamic integration of relative contributions of different sensory inputs (i. e., sensory reweighting) to enable effective adaptations as individuals face environmental changes and perturbations. Children with gymnastic experience showed balance performance closer to that of adults during and after proprioceptive alteration than children without gymnastic experience when their center of pressure (COP) was analyzed. However, a particular COP sway can be achieved through performing and coordinating different postural movements. The (...) aim of this study was to assess how children and adults of different gymnastic experience perform and control postural movements while they have to adjust balance during and after bilateral tendon vibration. All participants were equipped with spherical markers attached to their skin and two vibrators strapped over the Achilles tendons. Bipedal stance was performed in three 45-s trials in two visual conditions (eyes open, EO, and eyes closed, EC) ordered randomly in which vibration lasted 10 s. Posture movements were analyzed by a principal component analysis (PCA) calculated on normalized and weighted markers coordinates. The relative standard deviation of each principal movement component (principal position, PP-rSTD) quantified its contribution to the whole postural movements, i.e., quantified the coordinative structure. The first (principal velocities, PV-rSTD) and second (principal accelerations, PA-rSTD) time-derivatives characterized the rate-dependent sensory information associated with and the neuromuscular control of the postural movements, respectively. Children without gymnastic experience showed a different postural coordinative structure and different sensory-motor control characteristics. They used less ankle movements in the anterior-posterior direction but increased ankle movements in medio-lateral direction, presented larger hip and trunk velocities, and exhibited more hip actions. Gymnastic experience during childhood seemed to benefit the development of proprioceptive reweighting processes in children, leading to a more mature form of coordinating and controlling posture similarly to adults. (shrink)

In 1975, Colwyn Trevarthen first presented his groundbreaking explorations into the early origins of human intersubjectivity. His influential model dictates that, during intimate and playful spontaneous face-to-face protoconversations, the emotions of both the 2–3-month-old infant and mother are nonverbally communicated, perceived, mutually regulated, and intersubjectively shared. This primordial basic interpersonal interaction is expressed in synchronized rhythmic-turn-taking transactions that promote the intercoordination and awareness of positive brain states in both. In this work, I offer an interpersonal neurobiological model of Trevarthen’s (...) intersubjective protoconversations as rapid, reciprocal, bidirectional visual-facial, auditory-prosodic, and tactile-gestural right brain-to-right brain implicit nonverbal communications between the psychobiologically attuned mother and the developing infant. These co-constructed positive emotional interactions facilitate the experience-dependent maturation of the infant’s right brain, which is in an early critical period of growth. I then address the central role of interpersonal synchrony in intersubjectivity, expressed in a mutual alignment or coupling between the minds and bodies of the mother and infant in face-to-face protoconversations, as well as how these right brain-to-right brain emotional transmissions generate bioenergetic positively charged interbrain synchrony within the dyad. Following this, I offer recent brain laterality research on the essential functions of the right temporoparietal junction, a central node of the social brain, in face-to-face nonverbal communications. In the next section, I describe the ongoing development of the protoconversation over the 1st year and beyond, and the co-creation of a fundamental energy-dependent, growth-promoting social emotional matrix that facilitates the emergence of the highly adaptive human functions of mutual play and mutual love. In the final section, I discuss the clinical applications of this interpersonal neurobiological model of intersubjectivity, which has a long history in the psychotherapy literature. Toward that end, I offer very recent paradigm-shifting hyperscanning research that simultaneously measures both the patient and therapist during a psychotherapeutic interaction. Using the Trevarthen’s two-person intersubjective model, this research demonstrates changes in both brains of the therapeutic dyad and the critical role of nonverbal communications in an emotionally-focused psychotherapy session. These studies specifically document interbrain synchronization between the right temporoparietal junction of the patient and the right temporoparietal junction of the clinician, a right brain-to-right brain nonverbal communication system in the co-constructed therapeutic alliance. Lastly, I discuss the relationship between the affect communicating functions of the intersubjective motivational system and the affect regulating functions of the attachment motivational system. (shrink)

In the third Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we have discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE)framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizingthem and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfishlove)into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives (Vimal, 2009b). In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as (...) follows. (1) In (Vimal, 2010), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) We developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) We found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect ofconsciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) We proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) We investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) We discussed Nâgârjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) We linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) We introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dualaspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems. Keywords: Evolution of consciousness; Internal representation; Sensorimotor interaction; Dual-aspect model; Subjective experience; Protoexperiences, Explanatory gap; Mind-brain problem; Purusha; Prakriti; Eastern and Western perspectives; Yoga; Sublimation process; Whitehead; Process and Reality; Occasions of experience; Superposition; Subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas); Superposition-then-integration-emergence; Integration-emergence; Intelligent mechanism; Vacuum/Aether; qualia; Mind; Awareness; Nâgârjuna; Classical and quantum physics; Loop quantum gravity; String theory. (shrink)

A high percent of oxidative energy metabolism is needed to support brain growth during infancy. Unhealthy diets and limited nutrition, as well as other environmental insults, can compromise these essential developmental processes. In particular, iron deficiency anemia has been found to undermine both normal brain growth and neurobehavioral development. Even moderate ID may affect neural maturation because when iron is limited, it is prioritized first to red blood cells over the brain. A primate model was used (...) to investigate the neural effects of a transient ID and if deficits would persist after iron treatment. The large size and postnatal growth of the monkey brain makes the findings relevant to the metabolic and iron needs of human infants, and initiating treatment upon diagnosis of anemia reflects clinical practice. Specifically, this analysis determined whether brain maturation would still be compromised at 1 year of age if an anemic infant was treated promptly once diagnosed. The hematology and iron status of 41 infant rhesus monkeys was screened at 2-month intervals. Fifteen became ID; 12 met clinical criteria for anemia and were administered iron dextran and B vitamins for 1–2 months. MRI scans were acquired at 1 year. The volumetric and diffusion tensor imaging measures from the ID infants were compared with monkeys who remained continuously iron sufficient. A prior history of ID was associated with smaller total brain volumes, driven primarily by significantly less total gray matter and smaller GM volumes in several cortical regions. At the macrostructual level, the effect on white matter volumes was not as overt. However, DTI analyses of WM microstructure indicated two later-maturating anterior tracts were negatively affected. The findings reaffirm the importance of iron for normal brain development. Given that brain differences were still evident even after iron treatment and following recovery of iron-dependent hematological indices, the results highlight the importance of early detection and preemptive supplementation to limit the neural consequences of ID. (shrink)

Ample evidence from various quarters indicates that the perceptual-cognitive competence of the pre- and perinatal human being is significantly greater than was once thought. Some of the evidence of this emerging picture of early competence is reviewed, and its importance both as evidence of the biogenetic structural concept of “neurognosis” and for a theory of enculturation is discussed. The literature of pre- and perinatal psychology, especially that of developmental neuropsychology, psychobiology, and social psychophysiology, is incorporated, and some of the implications (...) of these data for a theory of enculturation are suggested. (shrink)

Prosocial behavior is critical for the natural development of an individual as well as for promoting social relationships. Although this complex behavior results from gratuitous acts occurring between an agent and a recipient and a wealth of literature on prosocial behavior has investigated these actions, little is known about the effects on the recipient and the neurobiology underlying them. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify neural correlates of receiving prosocial behavior in the context of (...) real-world experiences, with different types of action provided by the agent, including practical help and effort appreciation. Practical help was associated with increased activation in a network of regions spanning across bilateral superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, temporal pole, and medial prefrontal cortex. Effort appreciation was associated with activation and increased task-modulated connectivity of the occipital cortex. Prosocial-dependent brain responses were associated with positive affect. Our results support the role of the theory of mind network and the visual cortices in mediating the positive effects of receiving gratuitous help. Moreover, they indicate that specific types of prosocial behavior are mediated by distinct brain networks, which further demonstrates the uniqueness of the psychological processes underlying prosocial actions. (shrink)

A variety of studies show that parental absence early in life leads to deleterious effects on the developing CNS. This is thought to be largely because evolutionary-dependent stimuli are necessary for the appropriate postnatal development of the young brain, an effect sometimes termed the “experience-expectant brain,” with parents providing the necessary input for normative synaptic connections to develop and appropriate neuronal survival to occur. Principal among CNS systems affected by parental input are the monoamine systems. In the (...) present study,N= 434 rhesus monkeys (233 males, 201 females) were reared in one of two conditions: as mother-reared controls (MR;n= 269) or without adults with 24-h access to same-aged peers (PR;n= 165). When subjects were six-months-old, they underwent a separation paradigm involving 4, sequential, four-day social separations from their mothers or peers, with each separation followed by three-day reunions with their mothers or their peers. Prior to the separation paradigm, baseline cisternal CSF samples were obtained, as well as at the end of each the four social separations, and after final separation, during a recovery period. CSF was assayed for concentrations of monoamine metabolites and a blood sample was genotyped for the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) genotype. Replicating earlier landmark findings, PR subjects with thesallele exhibited lower baseline concentrations of the serotonin metabolite 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), when compared to PR subjects homozygous for theLallele. MR subjects were undifferentiated by genotype. PR subjects exhibited lower CSF 5-HIAA concentrations during baseline, but higher CSF 5-HIAA during social separations, when compared to MR subjects. There were rearing effects for the dopamine metabolite homovanillic acid (HVA) and for the norepinephrine metabolite 3-methoxy-4-hydroxyphenylglycol (MHPG), with PR subjects showing higher HVA and lower MHPG when compared to MR subjects. These findings indicate that there are long-term deficits in the response of monoamines following early maternal absence. The results of this study confirm and extend earlier findings that early parental absence has deleterious consequences for the development of the monoamine systems, and that these consequences are modulated by the 5-HTT genotype. (shrink)

The world of work is being changed at an unprecedented rate as a result of the rise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This rate of change was accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which left organizations and their leadership to deal with myriad of challenges. These changes also impacted leaders’ identities in their work and their roles in their organizations. We examine how leaders responded to the various workplace challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and what this meant for their work (...) identities as leaders. To do this, we made use of role identity theory, social identity theory, and leader identity. A qualitative study was conducted with a group of eight senior leaders from various South African and global organizations who had between five and 10 years’ work experience, and some had even more. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, conducted virtually and in person. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data. The main finding that emerged from the research was that leaders employed virtual leadership to ensure that customers’ expectations were met, and to manage team-and organizational performance. These leaders achieved this by fostering a digital culture and building effective teams. They achieved their leadership goals by ensuring social identity continuity amongst their teams. This required them taking on extra roles, such as strategist, technology expert, entrepreneur, coach, mentor, and member of the team. Their leader role identity, as part of their work identity, was amplified by the pandemic. The implication is that organizations should develop leadership development programs to increase and strengthen leader identities to capacitate them for times of crisis. (shrink)

Includes emotional and affective feelings. Mood builds on the human organism's body, but you must turn to the development of affective experience of the body. I did not last for more than the physical body Zhumo, this article from the mood in the body discussed the rise of the body, to significant problems of the body by the body to experience over the body, as well as the physical body plays in the emotional life of role, will be particularly (...) focused on the discussion of the role of the brain. Basically, the emotional mood of the rise in the body surface of the body, but the emotion does not stop the body. Since the emergence of human consciousness with the intention of the role, so there are feelings of the development. Affective refers to the so-called intentional sexual feelings, especially those that point to the meaning and value of high-level emotions, such as aesthetic, moral feelings and religious sentiments. This paper illustrates how the human experience from the development of the aesthetic experience of the body, powered by the desire to develop a sense of beauty and art have meaning in the world. Furthermore, affective development also has its ethical dimension. This paper by discussing Aristotle's "practical wisdom", as well as Confucianism, Taoism-related ideas, show affection broad sense of the ethical dimension. Finally, to discuss the religious aspects of affective life, and do a little due. Human affectivity includes emotions and feelings. Emotions have their physiological foundation on human body as organism, whereas intertional feelings refer to body as lived. The present author has in his previous writings put emphasis on body as lived, but few words have touched upon body as organism. This paper makes a remedy on this point and attempts to deal with problems such as how emotions arises from body as organism so as to make clear the transition from body as organism to body as lived, and the role organic body played in our emotional life, focus being put on the functions of the brain. Basically speaking, the emotional aspect of human affectivity is originated from, but not limited to, organic body. I see our body as the locus of human desire, defined as a dynamic energy towards the meaningfulness of life. Because of the emergence of consciousness and its intentionality, we have a further development of life of our intentional feelings. "Intentional feeling" denotes those feelings with intentionality that directs iself towards meaningulness and values, especially those intending higher levels of mental activities such as aesthetic feeling, moral feeling and religious sentiment. We will discuss first how aesthetic feelings emerge from body as lived, in the way that desire as dynamism of meaning develops into a world of aesthetic values. Intentional feeling has its ethical dimensional, in the sense determined by Aristotle's idea of ​​phronesis, Confucian idea of ​​moral praxis and Daoist idea of ​​life praxis. In the end, this paper will try to shematize the religious dimension of intentional feeling. (shrink)

Müller provides a valuable synthesis of neurobiological evidence on the epigenetic development of neural structures involved in language acquisition. The pluripotentiality of developing neural tissue crucially constrains linguistic/cognitive theorizing about supposedly innate neural mechanisms and contributes significantly to our understanding of experience–dependent processes involved in language acquisition. Without this understanding, any proposed explanation of language acquisition is suspect.

Everything we experience and do as individuals is assumed to be a function of the nervous system. It is as though we were born with a total supply of algorithms for all given forms of psychic states and solutions for immediate or eventual actions. There is evidence that the forebrain is, so to speak, the central processor for psychic experience and psychologically directed behavior. Since information itself is immaterial, all forms of psychic experience represent immaterial emanations of the forebrain, including (...) sensations, perceptions, drives, affects, thoughts, and the precisely measured, cold hard facts of science. But it is to be emphasized that there can be no manufacture or communication of information without the intermediary of behaving entities. Because of the immateriality of information and the Gödel-like problem of self-reference, a central question arises as to whether or not we can ever rely on the brain with its viscoelastic properties to achieve a reliable yardstick for measuring time and space and the general nature of things. Most needed at the present time is a refined picture of the anatomy and chemistry of the brain’s circuitry accounting for its particular species of algorithms. Emphasis is given to the basic role of various proteins in generating subjective experience. Because of the role of resonance in contributing to the dynamical excitability of neural circuits, examples are given here of how it might play an algorithmic role at macroscopic, microscopic, molecular, and atomic levels. To describe this idea attention is focused on three evolutionary types of cortex that have developed in the triune evolution of the mammalian forebrain from the mammal-like reptiles to human beings. (shrink)

A number of conditioning experiments utilize food as a reward. Hunger is considered to be a critical factor governing the animal's behavior in these experiments. Despite its significance, most theories of animal conditioning fail to take hunger into consideration while analyzing the behavioral data. In this paper, we analyze the neuroscientific data supporting the hypothesis that hunger and food consumption affect the brain's dopamine system, which in turn governs the animal's behavior. According to this hypothesis, chronic hunger results in (...) a decrease in the extra-cellular dopamine levels in the animal's brain. This decrease is believed to trigger a series of reactions that increase the responsivity of the phasic dopamine system. A direct consequence of this is an increased vigor of all dopamine-dependent behaviors. The level of extra-cellular dopamine is also modulated by the process of food consumption via the neurotransmitter Acetylcholine. Food consumption raises the dopamine above the baseline level. This rise depends on the animals' hunger, which when satisfied increases the level of Acetylcholine, which causes the dopamine level to fall back to the baseline. Thus, extra-cellular dopamine governs the response vigor, with an increase in dopamine resulting in a more vigorous response. This paper makes two primary contributions. Firstly, we present an abstract mathematical model based on the above hypothesis. Our mathematical model is able to provide a simple explanation for a number of behavioral findings. Another contribution of this paper is the development of a neurocomputational Leabra model of dopamine and acetylcholine activity in the basal ganglia to incorporate hunger and satiation. The experimental results obtained from this neural model are also largely in agreement with behavioral findings. (shrink)

Love, fear, hope, calculus, and game shows-how do all these spring from a few delicate pounds of meat? Neurophysiologist Ian Glynn lays the foundation for answering this question in his expansive An Anatomy of Thought, but stops short of committing to one particular theory. The book is a pleasant challenge, presenting the reader with the latest research and thinking about neuroscience and how it relates to various models of consciousness. Combining the aim of a textbook with the style of a (...) popularization, it provides all the lay reader needs to know to participate in the philosophical debate that is redefining our attitudes about our minds. Drawing on the rich history of neurological case studies, Glynn picks through the building blocks of our nervous system, examines our visual and linguistic systems, and probes deeply into our higher thought processes. The stories of great scientists, like Ramon y Cajal, and famous patients, like Sperry's split-brained epileptics, illuminate the scientific issues Glynn selects as essential for understanding consciousness. Some might argue that his lengthy explorations of natural selection overemphasize evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena, but they must also agree that evolutionary psychology has distanced itself mightily from social Darwinism in recent years and merits a reappraisal. The great consciousness debate may form the core of the 21st-century Zeitgeist; get ready for it with An Anatomy of Thought. -Rob Lightner From Publishers Weekly How do we know? What do we think? How could a philosophical problem-'the mind-body problem,' say-induce a headache? What can evolutionary theory, molecular biology, the history of medicine and experimental psychology tell us about the features of human consciousness, and (once again) how do we know? Glynn, a physician and Cambridge University professor, meticulously attempts to answer these questions and more, setting forth the results of all sorts of research relevant to our brains-from 19th-century dissections to Oliver Sacks-like case studies, work with monkeys and supercomputers, and the enduring puzzles of philosophy, which he rightly saves for near the end. After explaining evolution by natural selection and 'clearing away much dross,' Glynn lays out the experiments and theories that have shown 'how nerve cells can carry information about the body, how they can interact' and how sense organs work; demonstrates the 'mixture of parallel and hierarchical organization' in our brains and 'the striking localization of function within it'; considers where neuroscience is likely to go; and admits that, among the many fields of exciting research just ahead, 'we can be least confident of progress toward a complete, scientific explanation of our sensations and thoughts and feelings.' Other recent explaining-the-brain books have sometimes advanced simplistic, or implausibly grand, claims about the nature and features of consciousness in general. Instead, Glynn offers a patient, informative, well-laid-out researcher's-eye view of what we have learned, how we figured it out and what we still don't know about neurons, senses, feelings, brains and minds. (Apr.) Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Library Journal The nature of consciousness, which perennially troubles the minds of scientists and philosophers, is the subject of an ever-growing body of literature. Two of the latest entries approach the topic from different perspectives. Glynn, a professor of physiology and head of the Physiological Laboratory at Cambridge, offers a comprehensive summary of what we know about the brain-both its evolution and its mechanisms. Among the topics he covers are natural selection, molecular evolution, nerves and the nervous system, sensory perception, and the specific structures responsible for our intellect. Using the mechanisms involved in vision and speech as models, Glynn skillfully describes various neurological deficiencies that can lead to 'disordered seeing' and problems with the use of language. He carefully distinguishes what we know through experimental evidence from what we know through the observation of patients with neurological damage. He also describes some of the major theories that attempt to explain why these structures arose. While his book concentrates on the structures that make up the mind, Glynn is well aware that some physical events appear explicable only in terms of conscious mental events-a situation that conflicts with the laws of modern physics. Only briefly, however, does he consider the various approaches that have been taken to deal with the issues of mind/body and free will. In contrast, this is the primary focus of The Physics of Consciousness. After reviewing the fundamentals of classic physics, Walker (who has a Ph.D. in physics) summarizes elements of the new physics in which our knowledge of space, time, matter, and energy are all dependent on the moment of observation. Walker explores the meaning of consciousness as a characteristic of the observer. In this context both the observer and the act of measurement are critical. In essence, Walker leads his reader on a journey through his concept of a 'quantum mind,' which can both affect matter (including other minds) and can be affected by other distant matter/minds. To break up what would otherwise be an extremely dense text, Walker also relates the very touching story of the loss of his high-school sweetheart to leukemia. Indeed, it is his memory of their relationship that drives Walker to seek an understanding of ultimate reality. At times, he has a tendency to be dogmatic-as when he concludes, 'our consciousness, our mind, and the will of God are the same mind.' While An Anatomy of Thought is appropriate for most academic libraries, the Physics of Consciousness will be most accessible to readers with some knowledge of advanced physics. -Laurie Bartolini, Illinois State Lib., Springfield Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Booklist The codiscoverers of natural selection-Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace-disagreed over the possibility of finding an evolutionary explanation for the human mind. Glynn here argues Darwin's side of the debate, tracing an eons-long path of development starting from simple amino acids floating in primal seas and extending through the erect hominids in which the powers of a massive brain first manifest themselves. Patiently adducing evidence of an evolutionary origin for the underlying molecular machinery, Glynn dissects the nerve centers that make possible speech and hearing, sight, and reading. Pressing deeper, he lays bare the cortical foundations of personality. But those who deal with the mind must attend also to the arguments advanced by philosophers. And it is when he turns from dendrites to syllogisms (especially the vexing mind-body paradox) that Glynn's empirical reasoning fails him. In the end, he concedes his perplexity in trying to conceive of an evolutionary origin for human consciousness. This concession may set the shade of Alfred Wallace to chortling, but it will draw readers into an honest confrontation with a profound enigma. Bryce Christensen. (shrink)

"This collection of chapters illustrates how Posner's examination of elementary processes has moved the field toward a fundamental level of understanding about human cognition. This basic understanding will greatly affect how we deal with cognitive development problems that derive either from deficiency of experience or from genetic differences."--Jacket.

Upon consideration of the unconditioned and particularly the conditioned stimuli that have been proposed to participate in the generation of incentive motivational states and, by extension, of extraversion, the nature of the contribution of NAS DA becomes less clear. Different kinds of conditioned stimuli can also exert strong control over the expression of behavioral sensitization. How might such stimuli affect the ability of experience-dependent processes to introduce stable individual differences in the development and expression of extraversion trait levels?