In this first study of the role of scepticism in literature, Fred Parker offers a lively and stimulating introduction to key issues in eighteenth-century literature and philosophy. Parker traces the presence of sceptical thinking in works by Pope, Hume, Sterne, and Johnson, relates it more broadly to the social self-consciousness of eighteenth-century culture, and discusses its source in Locke and its inspiration in Montaigne.

It was not until the nineteenth century that Western nations came to replace mutilation, corporal punishment, and banishment as the favored method of criminal punishment with the more humane concept of imprisonment. Even then, however, a convicted inmate was viewed as nothing more than a slave of the state, entitled only to the most basic of human rights and subject to the whim and peril of his jailor's desire. The shift to imprisonment gradually was accompanied by the additional humanitarian demand (...) that prisons avail their charges of some minimum standard of human decency and necessity, which, by the early part of the twentieth century, had come to encompass the provision of medical care. The courts later came to acknowledge this as a fundamental right grounded in the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.Although the scope of a prisoner's constitutional right to medical care has been the subject of much debate before the courts, the majority of cases have focused only on the circumstances under which the deprivation of care will amount to a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. (shrink)

Excerpt from Talks on Wrote This In The discussion of the doctrine of Concentration presented in this book is the outcome of work done in the Cook County Normal School. In 1883 I resigned my position as one of the Supervisors of the Boston schools in order to come into closer range and con tact with children's minds. The work done in Quincy was a slight beginning of something far better. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of (...) rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The theses maintained in Professor Martin's work are of two quite different types: theses about the natures and interrelations of the various kinds of knowledge and theses about the true philosophy and the false ones. The true philosophy is classical realism, the philosophy of "the Aristotelian-Aquinas tradi- tion". What is the relation between these two kinds of theses, between Mr. Martin's theory of the order and integration of knowledge, on the one hand, and his classical realism, on the other? Although (...) Mr. Martin's view on this question is not entirely clear, it seems to be the following: "Moderate realism is the most adequate metaphysical position to account for the nature and kinds of knowledge"; but "this adequacy, in itself, is not sufficient for demonstrating the truth of realism. Rather it is one sign, among others, of its truth." We shall return to this question of the relation between these two kinds of theses after considering them separately. Since my own philosophical background and orientation tend to be similar to Mr. Martin's, the following discussion may present only an insider's view, though one more positively influenced by outsiders than is Mr. Martin's. (shrink)

Of the philosophers in recent times who have striven to heal this rupture between head and heart perhaps none has caught the fancy or stirred the hopes of the American philosophical community as Alfred North Whitehead has. But since the master started this task too late in life, it was left to his disciples to complete his work. And of those disciples who have continued the master's healing in theology, perhaps none has been so energetic or resourceful as Professor Charles (...) Hartshorne. While Professor Hartshorne has usually practised this therapy alone and unaided, he has on one notable occasion enlisted the aid both of another contemporary theological therapist, Professor William L. Reese, and also of most of the great philosophers in history. The fruit of this collaboration, Philosophers Speak of God, while not adding anything essentially novel to Professor Hartshorne's earlier work, presents the physician not only as an isolated laboratory researcher but also, with Professor Reese's help, in the process of actually confronting and healing his patients. Hence this book is an especially interesting and valuable case study of one type of contemporary attempt to cure theological schizophrenia. Theological therapists are to be found among scientists as well as among philosophers, moreover, for even in science the intellect does not- succeed in quieting the restless heart until it finds the God for which that restless heart seeks. Going "through the world with a reverent attitude yet an almost total absence of doctrine or belief--with a religious heart and a skeptical head... is," as we are told in a recent book representing this theological therapy from the point of view of a scientist--a biologist and natural historian--Alexander F. Skutch's The Quest of the Divine, "a most unsatisfactory way to live.". (shrink)

Mr. Williams argues that subjectivism or epistemological dualism is just as compatible with knowledge of objective things themselves as his own Objectivism is, that it is false that "if we experienced only...'subjective' impressions and ideas, we should never know anything of the rest of the world, not even that it exists". He maintains this on the ground that "subjective or objective... the datum is an existent and can't help being evidence about existents". It is indeed true that the datum, being (...) an existent, can't help being evidence for other existents if we know that there are other existents. But this is just what we could not know if subjectivism or epistemological dualism were true, if we knew only subjective existents. For while such subjective existents might be evidence of objective existents if there were any, we could not know that there were any and hence could not know that our subjective existents were evidence of them. (shrink)

This book is a guide to the interpretation of the history of Western philosophy. It covers, in readable and clear text, history from the pre-Socratics to the modern period of the 19th century.

We know that all natural beings have evolved from simpler to more complex states; and we also know that man himself has evolved physically, even within the comparatively short time of his recorded history. It would therefore be strange indeed if man had not also evolved psychically or spiritually. Such psychic evolution may, I think, be discovered in many of man's cultural works; and I believe that it may also be revealed through the history of western philosophy, and, indeed, even (...) more sharply and clearly there. If philosophy is the most general and abstract reflection of human existence, as I think it is, then the history of philosophy should be the most general and abstract expression of the history of human existence. As such it should display most purely, essentially, and definitively that evolution of western man which is manifested less clearly, essentially, and definitively in the history of any other aspect of human life. I do not mean that later stages are necessarily better than earlier ones; ancient man may very well have been better off than modern man is—and in one sense he indeed was, as my remarks may show. Better off or not, however, ancient man is still ancient and modern man modern; and the later stage is a more evolved or developed form than the earlier one in the sense that the later presupposes the earlier genetically and even logically, whereas the earlier does not presuppose the later. (shrink)

2. Thesis 2 I accept insofar as it asserts the relation of possibility to actuality to be a fundamental aspect of things. This relation is sui generis.

Insight, by F. H. Parker.--Why be uncritical about the life-world? By H. B. Veatch.--Homage to Saint Anselm, by R. Jordan.--Art and philosophy, by J. M. Anderson.--The phenomenon of world, by R. R. Ehman.--The life-world and its historical horizon, by C. O. Schrag.--The Lebenswelt as ground and as Leib in Husserl: somatology, psychology, sociology, by E. Paci.--Life-world and structures, by C. A. van Peursen.--The miser, by E. W. Straus.--Monetary value and personal value, by G. Schrader.--Individualisms, by W. L. McBride.--Sartre the individualist, (...) by W. Desan.--The nature of social man, by M. Natanson.--The problem of the will and philosophical discourse, by P. Ricoeur.--Structuralism and humanism, by M. Dufrenne.--The illusion of monolinear time, by N. Lawrence.--Can grammar be thought? By J. M. Edie.--The existentialist critique of objectivity, by S. J. Todes and H. L. Dreyfus.--Bibliography (p. 391-400). (shrink)