Darstellung des Noema in 12 Thesen.\nverwendete Textstellen: Ideen 1: S. 203, 22-23; S. 204, 20-21; S. 357, 19-20: Handlungen sind zielgerichtet. Dabei bedarf eines keines physischen Objekts. Husserl setzt and diese Stelle das Noema. Somit wird auch zielgerichtetes Handeln aufgrund einer Halluzination m{ö}glich, Zielgerichtet zu sein bedeutet ein Noema zu haben.\n1. Follesdal´sche These: Noema ist eine intensionale Entit{ä}t, eine Generalisierung des Begriffs Sinn/Bedeutung.\n2. These: Das Noema hat zwei Bestandteile, a) der noematische Sinn, der allen thetischen Handlungen (erinnern, sich vorstellen usw.) (...) gem{ä}{ß} desselben Objekts mit denselben Eigenschaften in derselben Gerichtetheit gemeinsam ist und b) die Gegebenheitsweise (hat auch Sinncharakter), die sich unterscheidet in Handlungen mit verschiedenem thetischen Charakter.\n3. These: Der noematische Sinn ergibt sich aus der Art und Weise, wie Bewu{ß}tsein zum Objekt in Relation steht.\n!! 4. These: Das Noema einer Handlung ist nicht das Objekt dieser Handlung\n5. These: Das Objekt einer Handlung ist eine Funktion des noematischen Sinns, d.h. mit einem bestimmten Noema kann nur ein Objekt korrespondieren.\n6. These: Jedoch k{ö}nnen mit einem bestimmten Objekt verschiedene Noemata korrespondieren. (z.B. kann ein Objekt das Ziel verschiedener thetischer Handlunge sein, etwa erinnern, wahrnehmen, daher:)\n6. These a): Mit einem bestimmten Objekt korrespondieren verschiedene noematische Sinne.\n7. These: Jede Handlung besteht aus nur einem Noema. Sie wird durch dieses Noema charakterisiert. (Umgekehrt trifft dies nicht zu.)\n8. These: Noemata sind abstrakte Entit{ä}ten. (Sinne sind nicht real. Sie sind bezogen auf Handlungen in tempor{ä}ren Intervallen.)\n9. These: Noemata werden nicht durch unsere Sinnesorgane wahrgenommen.\n10. These: Noemata gelangen durch ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion ins Bewu{ß}tsein.\n11. These: Eine ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion kann iterativ geschehen (ann{ä}herungsweise; in Schritte gegliedert). Dies ist so, weil schon die Korrespondenz zwischen Sinn und Objekt wieder ein Objekt ergibt. Es folgt ein unendlicher Regress.\nPhysische Objekte sind transzendent in dem Sinne, dass sie unendlich viele Noemata haben. Sinn kann sie nie ersch{ö}pfend erfassen.\nNoemata k{ö}nnen andererseits ein physisches Objekt repr{ä}sentieren in der Form, dass mehr intendiert wird als gesehen wird. So denkt man sich etwa bei einem Stuhl, von dem man nur zwei Beine sieht, die beiden {ü}brigen hinzu.\n12. These: Diese Muster der Vorherbestimmung bilden zusammen mit den Gegebenheitsweisen das Noema (s. These 2). (shrink)

SummaryThe central thesis advocated by the author is that the so‐called hermeneutic method is actually the same as the hypothetico‐deductive method applied to materials that are “meaningful” . Five different interpretations of the role of the stranger in Ibsens “Peer Gynt” are discussed and shown to be examples of how interpretation‐hypotheses can be judged by confronting them with the data . The conclusion drawn from the analysis is this: there is no fundamental methodological difference between natural sciences and humanities.

The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of hyle, whose (...) role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Some Basic Ideas of Husserl's Phenomenology Intentionality. Noema, Noesis, Hyle Eidos. The Eidetic Reduction The Transcendental Reduction.

Frank Jackson's criticisms have helped me recognize some of the weaknesses in my proposed vindication of induction. The core of the argument I offered was that induction is the only method of predicting which is based in a nonarbitrary way on the facts. I still believe that this is so and that because of this property induction is the only reasonable way of predicting. However I now recognize defects in the argument by which I attempted to establish that the uniqueness (...) of this property to induction constitutes its justification. (shrink)

The paper proposes an explication of causation in terms of laws and their explanatory systematization. A basic notion is "nomic dependence". The definition given by David Lewis is suitable for deterministic laws, and a general definition drawing on Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance model of explanation is proposed. A test is offered for establishing that one chain of nomically dependent events is more direct than another that ends with the same event by considering the relationship between the two chains when an explanation (...) in terms of more basic laws is sought. The chain to an event can be defined as causal if it is the most direct nomically linked chain leading up to that event. (shrink)

J. J. Katz in “The Problem of Induction and its Solution” argues that not only a validation but also a vindication of induction is impossible. In the course of his argument a number of interesting issues arise about what is actually required for a satisfactory vindication. The aim of those who have sought to provide a vindication for induction has been to show that it is the most satisfactory means for forming expectations about the future; they have accepted the impossibility (...) of showing that induction must, or will probably, lead to true predictions. Feigl gives a general characterisation of vindication as an “argument concerning means with respect to ends” and contrasts it to validation which is a justification of a knowledge claim by establishing it as true or probably true. We cannot validate the rules of induction but we can give a vindication of the adoption of these rules. Katz accepts Feigl's distinction in general terms but proposes some modifications to meet certain defects which he believes to be present in the latter's account. Katz distinguishes two senses of vindication, an “expediency vindication” which “establishes a justificandum as a suitable means,” while a “preferability vindication” “establishes the justificandum as the preferable means for achieving the end.” An expediency vindication shows that the proposed means is a sufficient condition for achieving the end in view, but it need not establish this means as necessary to achieve this end. A preferability vindication will establish the means as necessary to achieve this end in the best way. He then proceeds as follows: “an argument which demonstrates that a justificandum is a necessary condition—but only a necessary condition—for achieving the relevant end is not a real vindication.” He holds that the vindication of a certain means must show at least that it will achieve the end sought, and preferably that it is the best way of achieving this end. (shrink)

Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds".

This article focuses on the interaction between recipes unearthed from tombs datable to the Han dynasty and the early history of the materia medica. We observed that the two medicographic media, i.e. the materia medica and the recipes, share the following logical structure: [Substance] A [produces] → [effect] B Our arrow indicates a variety of relations, which the present article tries to categorize.

In consulatu sexto et septimo postquam bella civilia exstinxeram per consensum universorum [potitus rerum own]ium rem publicam ex mea potestate in senat[us populique Romani a]rbitrium transtuli. There is very little doubt about the reading of the Latin text, except that the Greek has suggested to Schönbauer that ‘compos’ should be read for ‘potitus’. He urges that ‘compos’ has a ‘milder meaning’ than ‘potitus’ and has no connotation of the use of force. The change to ‘compos’ is worthy of consideration, but (...) suggests that the Latin ran ‘compos factus’ if ‘compos’ was used, and the phrase ‘compos factus’, though good Augustan Latin, is perhaps too retarding in rhythm to fit this place, though to that stylistic feeling too much weight should not be assigned. (shrink)

We show how a simple nonlinear dynamical system (the discrete quadratic iteration on the unit segment) can be the basis for modelling the embryogenesis process. Such an approach, even though being crude, can nevertheless prove to be useful when looking with the two main involved processes:i) on one hand the cell proliferation under successive divisions ii) on the other hand, the differentiation between cell lineages. We illustrate this new approach in the case of Caenorhabditis elegans by looking at the early (...) stages of embryogenesis, up to several hundreds of cells (lima bean larval stage). We show how the many results that have been obtained by several groups can be interpreted in terms of values for the parameters controlling the dynamical system. Furthermore, we can extend the model to the cases of genetic mutations. More precisely the teratogenetic and lethal effects are associated with abnormal variation of the control parameters with time. (shrink)

The current debate regarding the suitability of anencephalics as organ donors is due primarily to misunderstandings. The anatomical and neurophysiological literature shows that the anencephalic lacks a cerebrum because of the failure of neuralplate fusion. However, even the incomplete function of an atrophic brain stem is currently accepted at law in most if not all countries as sufficient for brain life: which is to say, cessation of breathing is currently required in order to make the diagnosis of brain death. Because (...) of the extensive incompleteness of the anencephalic's brain, it is not possible to postpone death significantly by mechanical ventilation and intravenous feeding. It is acceptable to maintain life for a short period of time in order to allow organ transplantation subsequent to the declaration of death at the point of cessation of the capacity for spontaneous respiration. The most important issue is not transplantation, but the issue of brain life raised by the case of anencephalics. Since brain life in any significant sense begins only after the closure of the neural tube on the 30th day after conception, it is reasonable to take this as the point at which brain life begins. Laws should be amended in all countries to allow the abortion of anencephalics at any time, in that they do not at any time possess brain life. (shrink)