Com este artigo, problematizou-se o potencial da formação continuada de professores por meio da educação a distância mediada pelo Moodle. Nessa perspectiva, pesquisou-se, principalmente, a integração hipermidiática das tecnologias nesse ambiente virtual de aprendizagem, no curso a distância de pós-graduação lato sensu em Mídias na Educação. Para isso, selecionou-se uma aula de uma disciplina desse curso oferecida no primeiro semestre de 2011 por uma universidade na qual um dos autores deste artigo trabalhou como professor-tutor. Assim, foi realizada uma investigação com (...) base na abordagem metodológica qualitativa através da observação participante, na qual se percebeu que a integração da hipermídia potencializa o diálogo-problematizador, a interatividade e o desenvolvimento da flexibilidade cognitiva nos professores-cursistas. Dessa forma, observou-se que a navegação em uma hipermídia educacional respeita o ritmo e as maneiras de aprendizagem de cada sujeito, uma vez que possibilita que os temas a serem estudados sejam acessados de forma não-linear, ou seja, de acordo com o interesse de cada aprendente e por meio de diferentes mídias. Isso viabilizou aos cursistas fazerem diversas associações entre diferentes conteúdos inter-relacionados, proporcionando assim uma ampliação da visão sobre os assuntos educacionais abordados na disciplina e, posteriormente, poderem aplicar esse conhecimento em novas situações de ensinoaprendizagem. (shrink)

Com este artigo, pretendeu-se problematizar a integração da hipermídia educacional, nas Atividades de Estudo a Distância (AEDs), como possibilidade de potencializar a interação mediada por computador. Dessa forma, foram apresentadas algumas estratégias que embasaram o planejamento, a organização e a implementação de uma AED mediada pelo Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment (Moodle). Assim, observou-se que é essencial que as AEDs sejam planejadas e organizadas didaticamente pelo professor, que define quais propósitos pretende alcançar no contexto de ensino e aprendizagem mediado pelas (...) Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação (TICs), pois, elaborar uma AED hipermidiática e guiar seu desenvolvimento, tanto com relação à tecnologia quanto ao próprio conteúdo em questão, colabora na proposição de alternativas para resolvê-las e também possibilita uma maior interação entre os envolvidos (professor e alunos) na apropriação crítica do conhecimento escolar, o que contribui para a sustentabilidade do processo ensino e aprendizagem significativo e interativo para todos os envolvidos. (shrink)

Com este artigo, pretendeu-se problematizar a integração da hipermídia educacional, nas Atividades de Estudo a Distância (AEDs), como possibilidade de potencializar a interação mediada por computador. Dessa forma, foram apresentadas algumas estratégias que embasaram o planejamento, a organização e a implementação de uma AED mediada pelo Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment (Moodle). Assim, observou-se que é essencial que as AEDs sejam planejadas e organizadas didaticamente pelo professor, que define quais propósitos pretende alcançar no contexto de ensino e aprendizagem mediado pelas (...) Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação (TICs), pois, elaborar uma AED hipermidiática e guiar seu desenvolvimento, tanto com relação à tecnologia quanto ao próprio conteúdo em questão, colabora na proposição de alternativas para resolvê-las e também possibilita uma maior interação entre os envolvidos (professor e alunos) na apropriação crítica do conhecimento escolar, o que contribui para a sustentabilidade do processo ensino e aprendizagem significativo e interativo para todos os envolvidos. (shrink)

REFLEXÕES SOBRE DEMOCRACIA E ATIVISMO JUDICIAL.

Several countries maintain universal health coverage, which implies responsibility to organize delivery formats of healthcare services and products for citizens. In Brazil, the health system has a principle of universal access for more than 30 years, but many deficiencies remain and the country observes a day practice for those seeking judicial decisions to determine provision of healthcare.

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular practice, (...) from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF. (shrink)

In his seminal book, The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall argues that second-personal reasons can only occur within the realm of practical reason. In order to demonstrate this, Darwall builds on David Velleman’s distinction between substantive and formal aims of thought and action. I show that this distinction shapes Darwall’s conception of the nature of the difference between third-personal and second-personal reasons in such a way that the difference is conceived of as substantive rather than formal. As a consequence, Darwall is (...) left without a satisfactory rendering of both the distinctions between third-and second-personal reasons and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Conceiving of these distinctions as formal, however, would open up the possibility of second-personal forms of theoretical reason. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractDevelopment, life cycle evolution and immunity were among the topics discussed at a recent meeting in Tutzing dedicated to the biology of the ‘basal’ metazoan taxa Porifera, Ctenophora, Placozoa and Cnidaria.

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 2 Seiten: 330-374.

The problem of algorithmic fairness is typically framed as the problem of finding a unique formal criterion that guarantees that a given algorithmic decision-making procedure is morally permissible. In this paper, I argue that this is conceptually misguided and that we should replace the problem with two sub-problems. If we examine how most state-of-the-art machine learning systems work, we notice that there are two distinct stages in the decision-making process. First, a prediction of a relevant property is made. Secondly, a (...) decision is taken based (at least partly) on this prediction. These two stages have different aims: the prediction is aimed at accuracy, while the decision is aimed at allocating a given good in a way that maximizes some context-relative utility measure. Correspondingly, two different fairness issues can arise. First, predictions could be biased in discriminatory ways. This means that the predictions contain systematic errors for a specific group of individuals. Secondly, the system’s decisions could result in an allocation of goods that is in tension with the principles of distributive justice. These two fairness issues are distinct problems that require different types of solutions. I here provide a formal framework to address both issues and argue that this way of conceptualizing them resolves some of the paradoxes present in the discussion of algorithmic fairness. (shrink)

Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on, or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot (...) accept and accommodate this possibility without thereby undermining the assumed capacity of emotions to justify corresponding aesthetic evaluations – that is, without undermining the very sentimentalist idea at the core of its account. And I will also try to show that sentimentalists can hope to deny the possibility of faultless disagreement only by giving up the further view that aesthetic assessments are intersubjective – a view which is almost as traditional and widely held in aesthetics as sentimentalism, and which is indeed often enough combined with the latter. My ultimate conclusion is therefore that this popular combination of views should better be avoided: either sentimentalism or intersubjectivism has to make way. (shrink)

Consider the following objection of Bennett to Kant: The least swallowable part of Kant's whole theory of freedom is the claim that the causality of freedom is not in time. This follows from Kant's doctrine that time is an appearance, and anyway the theory of freedom needs it: it is because the noumenal cause of an event is not in time, and thus is not itself an event, that it escapes the causality of nature. Kant is unembarrassed: ‘Inasmuch as it (...) is noumenon, nothing happens in it; there can be no change requiring dynamical determination in time, and therefore no causal dependence upon appearances … No action begins in this active being itself; but we may yet quite correctly say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world’ [KrV, A541=B569]. That is indefensible. Something in which ‘nothing happens’ cannot be ‘active’ or ‘begin’ a train of events. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 2, Page 166-190, Spring 2023.

In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...) all. This personal-level difference in agency and purposiveness has, furthermore, the consequence that instances of mind-wandering do not constitute unified and self-contained segments of the stream of consciousness—in stark contrast to focused daydreams. Besides, the two kinds of mental phenomena differ in whether they possess a narrative structure, and in how we may make sense of the succession of mental episodes involved. (shrink)

Nucleosomes “talk” to each other about their modification state to form extended domains of modified histones independently of the underlying DNA sequence. At the same time, DNA elements promote modification of nucleosomes in their vicinity. How do these site-specific and histone-based activities act together to regulate spreading of histone modifications along the genome? How do they enable epigenetic memory to preserve cell identity? Many models for the dynamics of repressive histone modifications emphasize the role of strong positive feedback loops, which (...) reinforce histone modifications by recruiting histone modifiers to preexisting modifications. Recent experiments question that repressive histone modifications are self-sustained independently of their genomic context, thereby indicating that histone-based feedback is relatively weak. In the present review, current models for the dynamics of histone modifications are compared and it is suggested that limitation of histone-based feedback is key to intrinsic confinement of spreading and coexistence of short- and long-term memory at different genomic loci. See also the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/3bxr_xDEZfQ. Communication between nucleosomes and site-specific recruitment of histone modifiers act together to enable spreading and epigenetic memory of histone modifications. This review essay compares current models that describe these phenomena and outline a mechanism for how epigenetic short- and long-term memory can coexist in the same cell. (shrink)

Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox seems to show that we must give up one of three very plausible beliefs about the relative goodness of certain outcomes, which would put a strong damper on our hopes of finding an acceptable theory of benevolence dealing with issues of procreation. I shall argue that such a result can be avoided if we challenge some basic assumptions about moral reasoning which underlie Parfit's argument. An alternative account of the nature of moral reasoning will be given, (...) and a non-standard version of Utilitarianism capable of solving the Paradox will be developed and defended. (shrink)

In the deep joint work Deleuze-Guattari there is the demand of consider it as a political theory of literature, a literary politics. The following paragraphs, to some extent respond to that demand, enroll the Deleuze-Guattari micropolitics in a concatenation between the revolutionary and artistic machines, in this case, literary. Considering this conjecture, in this article we propose to address the relationships between the concept of minor literature, the spatial dynamics and the informative order.

Martin Heideggers Abendgespräch in einem russischen Kriegsgefangenenlager zwischen einem Jüngeren und einem Älteren ist datiert auf den 8. Mai 1945, den Tag, an dem der Nationalsozialismus besiegt wurde. Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Textes ist ein Zitat aus dem klassischen daoistischen Buch Zhuangzi. Warum wendet sich Heidegger an diesem Tag der chinesischen Philosophie zu? Für den Philosophen und Sinologen Fabian Heubel birgt das Abendgespräch die einzigartige Gelegenheit, Heideggers Öffnung für östliches Denken kritisch zu erörtern. Zugleich zeigt sich die Kommunikationsverweigerung zwischen (...) Heidegger und Adorno in neuem Licht, indem das Buch beide mit Hilfe daoistischen paradoxen Denkens ins Gespräch kommen lässt. Im Kommunizieren dieser drei Momente tritt eine transkulturelle Kritik hervor, die durch geschichtliches Bewusstsein von Nöten gezeichnet ist. Heideggers Kehre nach Osten ist gescheitert. Andererseits gibt es keinen philosophischen Weg nach China, der an seinem Denken vorbeiführt."-- Back cover. (shrink)

Adorno notoriously asserted that there is no 'right' life in our current social world. This assertion has contributed to the widespread perception that his philosophy has no practical import or coherent ethics, and he is often accused of being too negative. Fabian Freyenhagen reconstructs and defends Adorno's practical philosophy in response to these charges. He argues that Adorno's deep pessimism about the contemporary social world is coupled with a strong optimism about human potential, and that this optimism explains his negative (...) views about the social world, and his demand that we resist and change it. He shows that Adorno holds a substantive ethics, albeit one that is minimalist and based on a pluralist conception of the bad - a guide for living less wrongly. His incisive study does much to advance our understanding of Adorno, and is also an important intervention into current debates in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Justin Garson has recently argued that proper functions are proximal activities of traits selected by phylogenetic or ontogenetic selection processes, and that traits are dysfunctional only if they cannot perform their proper functions for constitutional reasons. We partially agree with Garson, but reject the view that functions are proximal activities, as well as his account of dysfunctions. Instead, we propose our own theory that biological functions are selected dispositions and that a trait is dysfunctional in virtue of not having the (...) dispositions for which it was selected. This account can explain both defects (or dysfunctions in Garson’s sense) and dysfunctions due to environmental factors. Moreover, it offers a neat way to explain the graduality of dysfunction. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a surge in research addressing the question which properties predictive algorithms ought to satisfy in order to be considered fair. Three of the most widely discussed criteria of fairness are the criteria called equalized odds, predictive parity, and counterfactual fairness. In this paper, I will present a new impossibility result involving these three criteria of algorithmic fairness. In particular, I will argue that there are realistic circumstances under which any predictive algorithm that satisfies counterfactual (...) fairness will violate both other fairness criteria, that is, equalized odds and predictive parity. As will be shown, this impossibility result forces us to give up one of four intuitively plausible assumptions about algorithmic fairness. I will explain and motivate each of the four assumptions and discuss which of them can plausibly be given up in order to circumvent the impossibility. (shrink)

The measure of what can be considered “new” is what is already known. What is “new” – be it a (technical) invention, a new method, or a newly discovered natural phenomenon – must distinguish itself...

The Covid-19 pandemic put forth a new kind of affective exhaustion. Being forced to stay at home, diminish social interactions and reduce the scale of their everyday mobility, many people experienced boredom, sluggishness, and existential immobility. While state-imposed pandemic policies changed rapidly, everyday life remained strangely unmoving. A sense of being stuck unfurled―as if not only social life, but time itself had come to a halt. At the same time, there was a latent sense of tension and increased aggressiveness which (...) became manifest not only in protests and riots, but also in the texture of everyday life. In this contribution, we argue that both of these states―the feeling of being stuck, and the feeling that this putative tranquility is nothing but the calm before a storm―can be conceptualized as affective stasis. Through a rearticulation of the ancient concept of stasis, we show that these two at first glance incongruous affective conditions are intricately entangled. In Ancient Greek, the term stasis meant “stand, standing, stance”. Being used in a wide variety of contexts―politics, navigation, sports, rhetoric, medicine, and others―stasis took on different meanings which can be semantically organized around two opposite poles: one is the total absence of motion, and the other is an event of radical and often violent social and political change. Drawing on affect theory, phenomenology, and ancient Greek semantics, we propose affective stasis as a novel conceptual framework for political phenomenology. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt Kooperation und Konkurrenz als zwei zentrale Mechanismen in den Vordergrund, die zur Etablierung des Instituts für Sozialforschung (IfS) und der Entstehung der „Frankfurter Schule“ im Laufe der 1950er Jahre geführt haben. Nach ihrer Rückkehr aus dem amerikanischen Exil nach Frankfurt am Main kooperierten die Leiter des IfS, Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock und Theodor W. Adorno mit amerikanischen Militärbehörden, westdeutschen Erziehungspolitikern, deutschen Soziologen und Professoren an der Universität Frankfurt in der Absicht, die deutsche Bevölkerung im demokratischen Sinne (...) zu erziehen und das IfS wieder zu etablieren. Für diese Kooperation war entscheidend, dass alle genannten Akteure ein gemeinsames Ziel vor Augen hatten, nämlich die Demokratisierung Westdeutschlands und die Konstituierung der Soziologie als „Demokratisierungswissenschaft“. Gleichzeitig konkurrierten die zahlreichen Institute für Sozialforschung in Westdeutschland um finanzielle Ressourcen, um Deutungsanspruch der empirischen Forschungsergebnisse und um die Frage, wie mit der deutschen NS-Vergangenheit umgegangen werden soll. In den späten 1950er Jahren, als die erste Phase der Institutionalisierung der Soziologie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ihrem Ende zuging, verstärkte sich die Konkurrenz unter den Soziologen und kumulierte schließlich im Positivismusstreit von 1961. Die intensivierte Konkurrenz in den späten 1950er Jahren und die Auseinandersetzungen unter den Soziologen um 1960 waren wichtige Mechanismen bei der Herausbildung der Bezeichnung „Frankfurter Schule“, unter der das IfS in den 1960er Jahren bekannt wurde. (shrink)

Este trabajo estudia la relación entre escepticismo pirrónico y medicina en el escenario contemporáneo a partir de una caracterización del escepticismo contemporáneo y de las escuelas médicas del presente. Para ello se propone (i) que hay un tipo de saber que corresponde a la noción de una experiencia purificada por la epokhé y es el conocimiento narrativo, (ii) que la Medicina Basada en Narraciones (MBN) es la escuela médica que se pueda vincular con el proyecto neopirrónico y (iii) que MBN (...) es un caso testigo para analizar el rol criteriológico del conocimiento narrativo. This paper studies the relationship between Pyrrhonian skepticism and medicine in the contemporary scenario and tries to offer a characterization of contemporary skepticism and of present day medical schools. We propose (i) that there is a kind of knowledge that corresponds to the notion of an experience purified by epokhé which is the narrative knowledge, (ii) that Narrative Based Medicine (MBN) is the medical school that can be linked to the neopyrrhonian project and (iii) that MBN is a leading case for analyzing the criteriological role of narrative knowledge. (shrink)

Este manuscrito pretende plantear dos ideas: la primera problematiza el origen de la universidad en tanto creación humana en sentido pragmático (Kant, 1800), para luego abordarlo en perspectiva histórica desde tres momentos: Medieval, Clásico y Ancestral, retomando autores como Rashdal (1895), Haskings (1923), Ureña (1919), Ribeiro (1971) y Dussel (2004); posteriormente se plantea el origen de la universidad más allá de su historicidad, en el interior del ser humano como cultivo de la virtud y el conocimiento poiesis en Platón (380 (...) a.C/1999). La segunda idea implica comprender que desde su origen la universidad como politeia desde la apropiación de algunos planteamientos aristotélicos (s,f/1883) y arendtianos (1997), ha posibilitado pensarse como un escenario de movilización social o continuidad del orden social establecido, donde se reflexiona críticamente en la necesidad de actualización de la universidad entre poiesis y politeia como potencia para recuperar su sentido primigenio, en tanto actitud que brota del interior del ser humano. (shrink)

Cette étude présente le problème des rapports entre la philosophie platonicienne de l�amour et la théologie chrétienne dans la pensée de Marsile Ficin à travers l�étude du Nachleben, au temps des Médicis, de l�érotique des garçons comme paradigme de toute relation philosophique. Au fondement des théorisations ficiniennes sur l�amour se trouve le problème de l�illégitimité des relations charnelles entre mâles, clairement établie par la théologie morale de la scolastique médiévale. Ficin reprendra donc le texte du Banquet platonicien, afin de le (...) commenter sous l�angle d�une nouvelle «fantasmatique des images amoureuses», qui définit la nature astrologique des rapports entre les amants et peut finalement conduire à la mélancolie amoureuse. Chez Ficin, le recours aux Anciens est multiple, surtout dans le domaine de la théorie de l�amour, mais leur philosophie est reçue et réinterprétée, bien que d�une manière conflictuelle, dans le cadre de la théologie chrétienne traditionnelle. (shrink)

In the deep joint work Deleuze-Guattari there is the demand of consider it as a political theory of literature, a literary politics. The following paragraphs, to some extent respond to that demand, enroll the Deleuze-Guattari micropolitics in a concatenation between the revolutionary and artistic machines, in this case, literary. Considering this conjecture, in this article we propose to address the relationships between the concept of minor literature, the spatial dynamics and the informative order.

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

At APr 2.4 57a36–13, Aristotle presents a notorious reductio argument in which he derives the claim ‘If B is not large, B is large’ and calls that result impossible. Aristotle is thus committed to some form of connexivity and this paper argues that his commitment is to a strong form of connexivity which excludes even cases in which ‘B is large’ is necessary. It is further argued that Aristotle’s view of connexivity is best understood as arising from his analysis of (...) affirmation and negation in terms of combination and separation: a proposition that separates two terms cannot entail a proposition that combines the same two terms. In order to motivate this account of connexivity, this paper interprets Aristotle as emphasising the predicative structure, especially the copulae, of the argument’s component propositions. The arguments for this are based on a consideration of the larger context of APr 2.2–4. A reconstruction of the argument using propositional variables does not fully capture Aristotle’s intentions. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the notion of social pathology, presenting it as a distinctive critical resource of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, in which tradition he places himself, and as an alternative to the mainstream liberal approaches in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the developments of Honneth's writing on this notion and offer an immanent critique, with a particular focus on his recent major work "Freedom's Right". Tracing the use of, and problems (...) internal to, Honneth's concept of social pathology serves to demonstrate his increasing reformism. It also serves to catalogue some of the dead ends that Critical Theory should avoid in taking up the idea of social pathology. The implication is not that this idea should be dropped. Rather, the paper is undertaking the necessary step of clearing the ground for further progress to take place on the question of what role the idea of social pathology can and should play in Critical Theory. The paper is critical in nature (and relentlessly so), but ultimately serves a constructive purpose. (shrink)

I discuss a contemporary solution to the dynamic problem of old evidence (POE), as proposed by Sprenger. Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does (...) not resolve the problem. I consider several potential responses. (shrink)

According to Karen Neander’s causal-informational teleosemantics, the contents of perceptual states depend on the etiological response functions of sensory-perceptual systems. In this paper, I argue that this theory is, despite its virtues, unable to explain how humans and other animals are capable of perceiving properties with which no sensory-perceptual system has ever been confronted. After rejecting Neander’s own proposal in terms of second-order similarity and a proposal inspired by Ruth Millikan in terms of simplicity, I offer a solution which equates (...) functions with manifestations of dispositions that made a difference to evolutionary success. My suggestion is able to generate determinate and plausible contents for new perceptual states while still preserving the idea that etiological functions explain evolutionary success. (shrink)