A movement asking to take race out of medicine is growing in the US. While we agree with the necessity to get rid of flawed assumptions about biological race that pervade automatic race correction in medical algorithms, we urge caution about insisting on a blanket eliminativism about race in medicine. If we look at racism as a fundamental cause, in the sense that this notion has been introduced in epidemiological studies by Bruce Link and Jo Phelan, we must conclude that (...) race is indispensable to consider, investigate, and denounce the health effects of multilevel racism, and cannot be eliminated by addressing more specific risk factors in socially responsible epidemiology and clinical medicine. This does not mean that realism about human races is vindicated. While maintaining that there are no human races, we show how it is that a non-referring concept can nonetheless turn out indispensable for explaining real phenomena. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to explore whether face recognition technology – as it is intensely used by state and local police departments and law enforcement agencies – is racism free or, on the contrary, is affected by racial biases and/or racist prejudices, thus reinforcing overall racial discrimination. Design/methodology/approach The study investigates the causal pathways through which face recognition technology may reinforce the racial disproportion in enforcement; it also inquires whether it further discriminates black people by making them experience more racial (...) discrimination and self-identify more decisively as black – two conditions that are shown to be harmful in various respects. Findings This study shows that face recognition technology, as it is produced, implemented and used in Western societies, reinforces existing racial disparities in stop, investigation, arrest and incarceration rates because of racist prejudices and even contributes to strengthen the unhealthy effects of racism on historically disadvantaged racial groups, like black people. Practical implications The findings hope to make law enforcement agencies and software companies aware that they must take adequate action against the racially discriminative effects of the use of face recognition technology. Social implications This study highlights that no implementation of an allegedly racism-free biometric technology is safe from the risk of racially discriminating, simply because each implementation leans against our society, which is affected by racism in many persisting ways. Originality/value While the ethical survey of biometric technologies is traditionally framed in the discourse of universal rights, this study explores an issue that has not been deeply scrutinized so far, that is, how face recognition technology differently affects distinct racial groups and how it contributes to racial discrimination. (shrink)

The consumption of traditional meat is currently being challenged by the rise of meat alternatives claimed to be more beneficial for the environment and non-human animals. One of the peculiarities of these products lies in their attempt to replace meat through the close imitation of its sensory qualities, which poses relevant philosophical questions: What are the purported reasons that motivate this imitation, instead of the promotion of different but sustainable foods that break with the imagery of meat eating? And, if (...) eating meat is considered morally wrong, what is the moral status of the simulation of a wrong act? Our aim is to address these questions to shed new light on the ethical claims that constitute, in fact, one of the major advantages of these products. Firstly, we introduce the aims and functions of simulating meat sensory qualities. Subsequently, we investigate whether the imitation of meat can be found morally acceptable on consequentialist grounds. Lastly, we raise the question of whether there is room for claiming that imitating meat is morally wrong even if its consequences are overall better, from the point of view of non-consequentialist ethical frameworks. We conclude that there are not compelling reasons for considering meat imitation as morally undesirable. (shrink)

This paper explores the Persistence Question about cities, that is, what is necessary and sufficient for two cities existing at different times to be numerically identical. We first show that we can possibly put an end to the existence of a city in a number of ways other than by physically destroying it, which reveals the metaphysics of cities to be partly different from that of ordinary objects. Then we focus in particular on the commonly perceived vulnerability of cities to (...) imaginary relocation; and we make the hypothesis that cities do have among their essential properties that of being surrounded by a specific geographical context. Finally we investigate the pos- sibility that a city can survive relocation in virtue of the capacity of its geographical context to survive it in the first place. We suggest that city contexts may not be essentially context-dependent in turn, and outline a possible description of the cri- teria for their persistence over time. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the question of whether nanotechnology is giving rise to new ethical problems rather than merely to new instances of old ethical problems. Firstly, I demonstrate how important it is to make a general distinction between new ethical problems and new instances of old problems. Secondly, I propose one possible way of interpreting the distinction and offer a definition of a “new ethical problem”. Thirdly, I examine whether there is good reason to claim that nanotechnology (...) is giving or will give rise to new ethical problems. My conclusion is that there are no new ethical problems in nanotechnology but merely new occurrences of certain well-known types of ethical problems. Fourthly, I consider three arguments by van de Poel (NanoEthics 2:25–28, 2008) which contradict my conclusion. I argue that my negative conclusion is consistent with the claim that certain ethical issues arising in nanotechnology may require new normative standards or new analytical tools. I conclude that it is likely that a number of ethical issues arising in nanotechnology will have a considerable impact on our ethical theories and values – and that ethical reflection on nanotechnology will be one of the mother lodes of future ethical research – in spite of the fact that no ethical problem in nanoethics will actually be “new”. (shrink)

When investigating the nature of culinary works, it is easy to take for granted that they all share the same ontology. This paper argues that, on the contrary, the ontology of culinary works is really threefold. Some culinary works are edible concrete particulars, or dishes, as many of us may first assume. But others are types, or multiply realisable abstract entities. And, while some of these types are determined by one recipe, others are rather chased after by their indefinitely many (...) recipes. So, there are really three kinds of culinary works; only those belonging to one of the three are edible per se; and, each kind has a very different relationship to recipes. Indeed, it is very doubtful that culinary works consisting in edible concrete particulars are suitable to have one or more recipes: by exploring what are the requirements for being a recipe, the paper also examines under what necessary conditions there is a recipe for preparing a culinary work qua concrete particular. (shrink)

A laughter that will bury you: the morality of plant-based meat irony When plant-based meats enter the foodscape, they face the challenge of how to communicate their nature and function to consumers: one strategy for navigating the tension between portraying conventional meat as something to be replaced and affirming their unique meaty tastiness is through ironic claims and performances. This paper seeks to analyse the moral stance of irony in plant-based meat advertisements, specifically when this irony involves the death of (...) animals. Firstly, it presents an argument showing that, from the standpoint of veganism, ironising about animals’ death can be a moral wrong. Secondly, by relying on an interpretation of irony that leverages its potential for subverting and criticising hegemonic viewpoints, it is shown that this kind of irony can serve as a form of resistance aimed at dismantling the pervasive indifference towards the killing of animals for producing meat. (shrink)

By introducing the possibility of producing meat either from plants or from animal stem cells, technological innovations have opened the door to considering meat as an artefactual object, defined by the functions it is designed to perform. Under this interpretation, plant-based and cultivated meat would be regarded as full-fledged meat. By analysing the notion of artefactuality, this paper reviews the main definitions of “artefact” and evaluates whether meat meets these criteria. It then examines whether a functional account of meat aligns (...) with the development of functions in the philosophy of artefacts. Ultimately, the paper concludes that, like certain other food categories, “meat” is well suited to be interpreted as a functional concept apt to incorporate novel instances. (shrink)

Although the presumption that norms are necessarily expressed by words has traditionally prevailed in the scientific community, some scholars are challenging verbal-centrism in the normative domain. While sympathising with this cause, this paper argues that not every case in which a norm is expressible by a non-verbal sign is a case in which that norm is genetically or ontologically word-free. After mapping the different relations that can exist between a sign and a norm, the paper shows that the holding of (...) many of them should not be taken per se as evidence for the thesis that some norms are genetically or ontologically word-independent, no matter that the sign is non-verbal. In particular, the paper analyses why some eminent examples of normative non-verbal signs like red traffic lights, traffic warden’s outstretched arms, referee’s whistles, and word-free no smoking signs, are not good evidence for the claim that some norms are not produced by or do not consist of verbal signs. (shrink)

Naïve realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct visual perceptual relation to temporally distant facts or objects. I first show that this answer entails that some visual perceptions—i.e., those that are direct relation between us and an external material object that has visually changed, or ceased to exist, during the time lag—should also count as illusions and hallucinations, respectively. I then examine the possible attempts by the naïve realist to tell such (...) perceptions apart from illusions and hallucinations, and after showing the inadequacy of the answers relying on a mere counterfactual or causal criterion, I explain why the problem is solved by introducing a view of visual perception as temporally extended into the past of objects and, in particular, as consisting in the whole causal chain of events or states of affairs going from external material objectxto subjectS. But this solution is not immune from defects for the naïve realist. I show that this view of perception raises a number of significant concerns, hence leaving the issue of the time lag problem still open for naïve realism. (shrink)

PurposeThis study aims to explore the ethical and social issues of tattoo recognition technology and tattoo similarity detection technology, which are expected to be increasingly used by state and local police departments and law enforcement agencies.Design/methodology/approachThe paper investigates the new ethical concerns raised by tattoo-based biometrics on a comparative basis with face-recognition biometrics.FindingsTRT raises much more ethically sensitive issues than face recognition, because tattoos are meaningful biometric traits, and tattoo identification is tantamount to the identification of many more personal features (...) that normally would have remained invisible. TSDT’s assumption that classifying people in virtue of their visible features is useful to foretell their attitudes and behaviours is dangerously similar to racist thought.Practical implicationsThe findings hope to promote an active debate on the ethical and social aspects of tattoo-based biometrics before it is intensely implemented by law enforcement agencies.Social implicationsTattooed individuals – inasmuch as they are more controlled and monitored – are negatively discriminated in comparison to un-tattooed individuals. As tattooing is not uniformly distributed among population, many demographic groups like African–Americans will be overrepresented in tattoos databases used by TRT and TSDT, thus being affected by disproportionately higher risk to be found as a match for a given suspect.Originality/valueTRT and TSDT represent one of the new frontiers of biometrics. The ethical and social issues raised by TRT and TSDT are currently unexplored. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en évidence l’unité qui sous-tend les travaux de Pierre-Yves Raccah relevant des champs divers tels que théorie de l’argumentation, éthique, épistémologies générale et morale, philosophie des sciences et sciences cognitives. Dans un premier temps, appuyé sur sa conception argumentative de la justification, je montrerai que son antifondationnalisme moral est une conséquence directe de la prise en compte de la reponsabilité en éthique et tout particulièrement de l’exigence relative à la méta-éthique : les êtres (...) humains sont totalement responsables de leurs positions morales aussi bien que des actions exécutées par rapport à ces positions morales. Dans un deuxième temps, mes interrogations seront portées à son anticonventionnalisme aussi bien qu’à ses considérations concernant les métapréférences, qui sont mis en œuvre pour pouvoir maintenir la responsabilité dans le domaine des prescriptions. Pour terminer, je mettrai en lumière que son épistémologie générale est fondée sur la thèse selon laquelle nous sommes moralement responsables des théories scientifiques aussi bien que des constats empiriques acceptés comme vrais, la responsabilité étant pertinente dans le domaine des descriptions fondées sur l’empirisme. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to show that a certain degree of hunger, intended as a material and psychological condition of the diner, can become a constitutive property of a culinary work. One may believe that the best possible argument supporting this thesis is one relying on the general assertion that an author’s stipulative authority over the features of his or her work, if adequately exercised, is absolute. Quite the contrary, I show that we should prefer a different and more (...) specific argumentative strategy based on the twofold fact that the conventions ruling over culinary works are peculiarly less stringent than in many other art fields, and that hunger has a very special status with regard to culinary works, in the sense that fixing the degree of hunger of the diner may serve to fix the appropriate conditions for any minimally acceptable perceptual experience of a culinary work to take place. (shrink)

If causalism is a complete theory of what it is to behave intentionally, it also has to account for intentional omissions. Carolina Sartorio, 513–530, 2009) has developed a powerful argument, the Causal Exclusion for Omissions, showing that intentional omissions cannot be explained by causalism. A crucial claim in the argument is that there is a causal competition between a mental omission and the mental action performed instead. In this paper I reject the argument by demonstrating that there is no causal (...) competition ever between an omission and the action performed instead. I propose what I call the Realisationist Conception of Omissions, which consists in considering omissions as multiply realisable absences whose realisers are specific positive actions. I further argue in favour of the Determinationist Conception of Omissions, according to which the relation between omissions and their realisers is a determinable/determinate relation. Since there can be no causal preemption between a determinable and its determinates, there can be no causal preemption between omissions and the actions performed instead, and causalism is safe. I also show that this view of omissions has some other independent advantages – like for example that of solving the problem of the spatio-temporal localisation of omissions. (shrink)

While many authors agree that a necessary condition for considering nanoethics as a new distinct field of inquiry is that some ethical problem arising in nanotechnology be new, I argue that we have good reasons to consider nanoethics as a new distinct field of applied ethics, although we have no good reason to think that any new ethical problem shows up in it. In fact, I claim that nanoethics will ask us to reshape our ways of conceiving reality, the relationship (...) between ourselves and the external world, and the whole ethical dimension of such relationship – and this is enough for considering it as a new distinct field of inquiry. Then I offer a view of what is part of nanoethics and what is not, and in particular I argue that – under an account of ‘ethics’ and ‘nanoethics’ as battlefields for arguments supporting rival ethical conclusions – even a description of what people ethically think about nanotechnology, or a description of nanoethics itself, are not part of nanoethics. Finally I consider the possibility of a consequentialist bias affecting nanoethics: I admit that risks have inappropriately monopolised the debate and that some interesting nanoethical issues may have nothing to do with risks, but I also stress that it is particularly difficult to adopt a non-consequentialist view in nanoethics, because non-consequentialism presupposes that consequences are going to fall within a known range of possibilities, and this presupposition is not attainable in nanotechnology. (shrink)

Although philosophers have been concerned with truth since at least the age of Plato, the last thirty years have witnessed a veritable explosion of the philosophical debate on this topic. The touchpaper which lit the fuse for this was undoubtedly the Deflationist Renaissance (half a century after the seminal work of F.P. Ramsey) due, in the Seventies, both to the Quinean disquotational interpretation of the Tarskian truth definitions and to the development of the prosentential theory of truth by D. Grover, (...) J. Kamp and N. Belnap, and, from the second half of the Eighties onwards, to the forceful defences of deflationary conceptions provided by H. Field and P. Horwich. The philosophical struggle on deflationism has been thought-provoking: by arguing on the merits and shortcomings of such a conception, philosophers have come to broaden and deepen the discussion on truth beyond the boundaries of deflationism. The varieties of problems tackled by the essays in this book highlight how the land of Truth is still far from having been totally explored, and how, in this intellectual endeavour, real progresses can be achieved. (shrink)