Today it would seem that being fatigued is a fairly common physical and psychological effect of educational systems based on an increasing demand for high-yield performance quotas. In higher education, ‘publish or perish’ is a kind of imperative to perform, perform better, and perform optimally leading to an overall economy of fatigue. In this paper we provide a critical theory of what we are calling the ‘fatigue university.’ While highlighting the negative costs of fatigue, we also provide a philosophical distinction (...) between tiredness and exhaustion that disrupts the biopolitics of fatigue from the inside. To do so, we turn to Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben whose writings on exhaustion point to its educational importance. Indeed, it is through the very ‘illnesses’ of exhaustion that the biopolitics of research can be problematized and opened up for new configurations. (shrink)

What we mean to do in this Symposium is to think about education by means of the concept of ‘potentiality’ in contrast to the logic of ‘actualisation’ which is prevailing in education today. In this paper, I try to think out loud through a particular way of teaching philosophy that may fit in with a ‘potentialism’ based approach, as we have tentatively called it. In Spain, philosophy is part of the secondary education curriculum. At first glance, it might seem a (...) blessing to live in a country that deems that philosophy should have an important role in a young person’s education nevertheless, the students are usually quite lost. Students receive philosophy as a collection of lofty discourses, therefore philosophy is reduced to ‘Nietzsche said …’, ‘Aristotle said …’, thereby deactivating the potentiality of their ideas. In the following, I will argue how I believe we can reactivate the potentiality of philosophy, and how we can transpose this gesture to the teaching of philosophy at the secondary education level. (shrink)

Fichte’s Doctrine of Science of 1811 offers a sound model for explaining the conditions of semantics in its connection with the idea of freedom. Following Wolfram Hogrebe’s suggestion that the principle of contradiction works as an archaeological semantic postulate, i.e., is the implicit condition for any sentence to be meaningful, we argue that in Fichte’s definition of the phenomenon we find such a semantic postulate at a higher genetic level than the principle of contradiction indicated by Hogrebe. Moreover, the Doctrine (...) of Science of 1811 offers an analysis of the steps through which this phenomenon displays itself – i.e. Vermögen, als, Soll – which can be understood as the conditions for establishing a meaningful sentence. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre 1811 kann uns einen soliden Modell zur Erklärung der Entstheung von Semantik anbieten. Mein Beitrag fangt mit der Darstellung Wolfram Hogrebes Hypothese an, dass der Satz vom Widerspruch als archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat fungiert, d.h. als implizite Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeglicher bedeutenden Äußerung. Ausgehend dieser Idee Hogrebes, hier schlage ich vor, dass man im Fichtes Begriffe der Erscheinung ein genetisch höheres archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat als der Satz vom Widerspruch finden kann. Daraufhin bietet die Wissenschaftslehre 1811 einen Einsicht in alle Schritte, wodurch die Erscheinung sich entfaltet – Vermögen, Durch, Als, Soll – die wir als die entsprechende Bedingungen für die Herstellung eines bedeutungsvollen Satzes verstehen können. (shrink)

There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we mustn't assume that realism about consciousness incorporates (...) them, or that denying them means denying that consciousness exists. And we must assess whether they're accurate independently of how they arise. (shrink)

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true (...) self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity. (shrink)

Professor Monro presents an original view of ethics based on empiricism, which leads him to a subjectivist position about moral values. He starts by examining the central problem in moral philosophy: are moral statements objectively true, or are they expressions of preference? The first view conflicts with the empiricist beliefs current in modern thought; the opposing naturalistic theory seems to lead to moral scepticism. After discussing both views, the author presents a detailed defence of the subjectivist position. In the course (...) of his argument he gives a detailed analysis and criticism of the 'universalisability thesis', the theory that moral aspirations differ from others in being applicable to all men, and that it is this that makes them moral. He then offers an alternative account of the nature of moral attitudes. The author illustrates his explanations with straightforward analogies and examples. His clear exposition of the fundamental concepts arising in his argument makes this a book for students as well as for professional moral philosophers. (shrink)

Building on Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love this book takes up the "question of the Other" and argues that through the interpretive activities of the amorous imagination lovers come to experience one another as the Beloved.

The world is disenchanted. Rationalization, intellectualization, and scientism rule the day. We used to see the world as a magical place, but now it's just a material space. How did we get here? The shift comes in part from the rise of a certain kind of secularism, one that reduces human experiences to whatever is explainable through observation. Love? It's just a biological drive. Joy, a rush of adrenaline. Beauty, an influx of dopamine. If you can't test it, it isn't (...) true; or so the thinking goes. The Romantic Life draws upon eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romanticism to provide five strategies to re-enchant the world, five ways to imbue the world with meaning, truth, and beauty. According to the Romantics, far from being useless, encounters with impractical things like the imagination, nature, symbolism, sincerity, and the sublime give our lives a richness and depth that cannot be attained on a purely material account of the world. By learning from their example, we can come to see into the life of things, as William Wordsworth called it. We can be re-enchanted" -- taken from back cover. (shrink)

L'A. étudie le récit d'Eunapius concernant le règne d'Arcadius à partir de la mort de Théodose en 395 jusqu'en 404. Eunapius de Sarde est un sophiste, un philosophe et un historien grec païen qui a vécu de 347 à environ 414 ; il est un exemple de la rédaction helléniste et son travail peut être classé dans la fiction historique. Il s'oppose aux changements politiques, sociaux, économiques et religieux du 4e siècle ainsi qu'aux régimes de Constantin et Théodose. Son héros (...) est Julien l'Apostat. (shrink)

Writing On the Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke tells us the ideas most capable of making an impression are those related to self-preservation and society. Such ideas are bound to our passions. Passions belonging to self-preservation turn on pain or danger.1 Those belonging to society do as well, although in this work, Burke dwells exclusively on pain. Because he tells us the king of terrors is death, we might infer pain is inferior to danger, the latter more formidable. We experience (...) delight in both when they are remote and do not affect us. But this delight, or indeed pleasure of any kind, is less powerful in terms of passion. Possibly for this reason Burke declines to qualify delight or pleasure as a source... (shrink)

In his article , 97–105) R. Reneham rightly classes Sail. Cat.20.9 as a conscious imitation of Cic.Cat.1.1, but adopts the unsatisfactory explanation of parody. Such parody is, as he notes, without parallel in Sallust and ineptly distracts attention from the vigorous development of Catiline's rhetoric. Elsewhere mimesis is regularly a compliment to the author imitated, often closely functional by reinforcing a point from the parallel of a similar context . Similarly I suggest that here Sallust recalls Cicero's words to illustrate (...) that perversion of vocabulary which is the keynote of Catiline's speech: just as he misuses, for example, the terms virtus fidesque at the beginning of his speech, in stark contrast to Sallust's own definition, so he perverts the famous words of the attack which revealed his true villainy in similar savage indignatio. (shrink)