Experimental “localism” stresses the importance of context‐specific knowledge, and the limitations of universal theories in science. I illustrate Latour's radical approach to localism and show that it has some unpalatable consequences, in particular the suggestion that problems of external validity (or how to generalize experimental results to nonlaboratory circumstances) cannot be solved. In the last part of the paper I try to sketch a solution to the problem of external validity by extending Mayo's error‐probabilistic approach.

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning (...) the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing. (shrink)

Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.

Research indicates that religious values and ethical behavior are closely associated, yet, at a firm level, the processes by which this association occurs are poorly understood. Family firms are known to exhibit values-based behavior, which in turn can lead to specific firm-level outcomes. It is also known that one’s family is an important incubator, enabler, and perpetuator of religious values across successive generations. Our study examines the experiences of a single, multigenerational business family that successfully enacted their religious values in (...) their business. Drawing upon intergenerational solidarity and values-based leadership theory, and by way of an interpretive, qualitative analysis, we find that the family’s religious values enhanced their cohesion and were manifested in their leadership style, which, in turn, led to outcomes for the business. Our findings highlight the processes that underlie the relationship between religious values and organizational outcomes in family firms and offer insights into the role of solidarity in values-based leadership. (shrink)

Pragmatic vindicatory genealogies provide both a cause and a rationale and can thus affect the space of reasons. But how far is the space of reasons affected by this kind of genealogical argument? What normative and evaluative implications do these arguments have? In this paper, I unpack this issue into three different sub-questions and explain what kinds of reasons they provide, for whom are these reasons, and for what. In relation to this final sub-question I argue, most importantly, that these (...) arguments are ambiguous about what they give us reasons for, meaning that they can be interpreted both as justifications for recognizing the normative standing of certain norms, values, and practices - and thus for living by them - and as excuses for those that do so. I illustrate this point by reference to the genealogical vindication of honour cultures, showing how the vindicatory argument can illuminate such case as one of excusing moral ignorance. Drawing on legal theory and moral philosophy, I show that different evaluative and normative implications hang on the result of the interpretation as either justification or excuse, and show that this ambiguity is a virtue rather than a limitation. (shrink)

The first full-scale commentary on the Cratylus, one of Plato's most difficult and intriguing dialogues.

The idea of a distinctively political normativity came under sustained fire lately. Here I formulate, test, and reject a moderate and promising way of conceiving it. According to this conception, political normativity is akin to the kind of normativity at play in all-things-considered judgments, i.e., those judgments that weight together all the relevant reasons to determine what practical rationality as such requires to do. I argue that even when we try to conceive political normativity in this all-things-considered way, and even (...) when we do not concede from the get-go that moral reasons necessarily trump or override normative reasons of a different kind, political normativity is still reducible to morality, because the peculiar content of all-things-considered political oughts can be explained by the interplay of general moral principles and contextual facts that do not obtain exclusively in political scenarios. If my arguments are correct, I provide political realists with one more reason to withdraw from the metaethical battle over the idea of a distinctively political normativity and show that the moralist approach is defensible against a prima facie promising, but ultimately untenable, alternative. (shrink)

The auctions of the Federal Communication Commission, designed in 1994 to sell spectrum licences, are one of the few widely acclaimed and copied cases of economic engineering to date. This paper includes a detailed narrative of the process of designing, testing and implementing the FCC auctions, focusing in particular on the role played by game theoretical modelling and laboratory experimentation. Some general remarks about the scope, interpretation and use of rational choice models open and conclude the paper.

Improving the evidence in public health is an important goal for the health promotion community. With better evidence, health professionals can make better decisions to achieve effectiveness in their interventions. The relative failure of such evidence in public health is well-known, and it is due to several factors. Briefly, from an epistemological point of view, it is not easy to develop evidence-based public health because public health interventions are highly complex and indeterminate. This paper proposes an analytical explanation of the (...) complexity and indeterminacy of public health interventions in terms of 12 points. Public health interventions are considered as a causal chain constituted by three elements and two levels of evaluation. Public health interventions thus differ from clinical interventions, which comprise two causal elements and one level of evaluation. From the two levels of evaluation, we suggest a classification of evidence into four typologies: evidence of both relations; evidence of the second but not of the first relation; evidence of the first but not of the second relation; and no evidence of either relation. In addition, a grading of indeterminacy of public health interventions is introduced. This theoretical point of view could be useful for public health professionals to better define and classify the public health interventions before acting. (shrink)

The idea of a distinctively political normativity came under sustained fire lately. Here I formulate, test, and reject a moderate and promising way of conceiving it. According to this conception, political normativity is akin to the kind of normativity at play in all-things-considered judgments, i.e., those judgments that weight together all the relevant reasons to determine what practical rationality as such requires to do. I argue that even when we try to conceive political normativity in this all-things considered way, and (...) even when we do not concede from the get-go that moral reasons necessarily trump or overrides normative reasons of a different kind, political normativity is still reducible to morality, because the peculiar content of all-things-considered political oughts remain explainable through general moral principles and contextual facts that do not obtain exclusively in political scenarios, but in many others too. If my arguments are correct, I provide political realists with one more reason to withdraw from the metaethical battle over the idea of a distinctively political normativity and show that the moralist approach is defensible against a prima facie promising, but ultimately untenable, alternative. (shrink)

In this article, we show how the phenomenon of self-deception when adequately analyzed, can be incorporated into a predictive processing framework. We describe four strategies by which a subject may become self-deceived to account for typical cases of self-deception. We then argue that the four strategies can be modeled within this framework, under the assumption that a satisfying account of motivation is possible within predictive processing. Finally, we outline how we can ground this assumption by discussing how such a systematic (...) model of motivation may be developed using the distinction between a world-model and a self-model. (shrink)

En 1576 l'humaniste Antoine de Laval produit à partir du texte de l'édition princeps publiée la même année à Paris par l'exilé florentin Jacopo Corbinelli la première version en langue française des Ricordi de Francesco Guicciardini. La traduction répond à la nécessité, très vivante en France à la fin du XVIe siècle, de préparer une sorte de vademecum pour la formation du souverain, capable de fournir des modèles universels adaptables à des situations et des contextes disparates dans la pratique (...) politique des ambassadeurs, des conseillers et des secrétaires. Dans un moment de crise du rôle et des fonctions de la souveraineté, Antoine de Laval offre une collection de préceptes pour la cour, afin de défendre l'unité et la stabilité de la monarchie."--Back cover. (shrink)

The traditional approach to the analysis of knowledge sees it as a true belief meeting further conditions. I discuss an empirical challenge to this traditional approach, which I call the argument from development. Briefly, the argument is that belief cannot be conceptually prior to knowledge because children acquire the concept of knowledge first. Several prominent scientists and philosophers have argued that this latter claim is supported by many findings with infants and young children. Here, I defend the traditional approach by (...) raising three challenges to the argument from development: the competence-performance challenge, the double-standard challenge, and the underdetermination challenge. I conclude that the developmental data are fully compatible with children acquiring the concept of belief first. In closing, I also argue that further research is needed to investigate when children acquire a concept of knowledge. (shrink)

I answer the questions raised by commentators, and clarify what Understanding Institutions tried to achieve.

Questions represent a crucial tool of interaction between parents and children from a very early age. This study aims to investigate which function – argumentative or explanatory – most characterizes Why-questions asked by children to their parents in a natural setting such as mealtimes at home. Why-questions asked by 13 children – eight girls and five boys aged between three and seven years – coming from 10 middle- to upper-middle-class Swiss and Italian families with a high socio-cultural level were analyzed. (...) In the corpus, the explanatory function largely characterizes children’s Why-questions. Questions we observed play fundamentally an educational role, since they favor the acquisition of new information and the transmission from parents to children of parental behavioral models. The argumentative Why-questions, less frequently asked by children in our sample, are also important from an educational point of view. By these questions children challenge their parents to make clear the reasons behind their opinions, suggestions, rules and prescriptions, which are often largely implicit. Altogether, the results of this study indicate that both the explanatory and argumentative types of children’s Why-questions have a knowledge-seeking function, that is, children asking such questions are seeking knowledge of something. (shrink)

In the creation of maps, scientific knowledge related to mathematics and physics combines with knowledge specific to graphic or artistic disciplines. Since all maps are artifacts whose aesthetic qualities convey information that simultaneously engages the fields of ontology, epistemology, and politics, they are objects of undeniable interest for philosophical inquiry. This introduction to the 5th issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts reviews the latest literature and key topics surrounding the relationship between philosophy, cartography (...) and mapmaking. (shrink)

This paper shows the state of the art regarding the possibilities of intervention for the economic and social inclusion of young people Not engaged in Employment, Education, or Training through Massive Open Online Courses in the countries of the European Union, in order to identify and compare good practices and didactic models aimed to contrast the social and economic vulnerabilities of young people. The systematic review, carried out on both generalist and more properly educational databases, has revealed the poor relationship (...) between the two topics in literature, each one moreover only recently made the subject of articulated research. The field of study is therefore open and invites further reflection on its possible developments. Matching NEETs’ needs and business companies’ requirements, students’ motivation during the learning path, keeping balance between e-learning and face-to-face lectures, tutors’ involvement along the course, and relationships with stakeholders remain the main issues identified in the various papers reviewed. (shrink)

In this work we extend results from [4], [3] and [2] about propositional calculi with graded modalities to the predicative level. Our semantic is based on Kripke models with a single domain of interpretation for all the worlds. Therefore the axiomatic system will need a suitable generalization of the Barcan formula. We haven't considered semantics with world-relative domains because they don't present any new difficulties with respect to classical case. Our language will have, as in [1], constant and function symbols, (...) but they will have a rigid interpretation. In this instance the terms will be considered rigid designators, that is, their interpretations will be the same in all possible worlds (cfr. [5]). Nevertheless we will not consider languages with identity: in this way we avoid the problems of identity in modal contexts. On the other hand, we think that in that context would arise essentially the same problems which occur in classical predicative modal logic. Finally we will consider only denumerable languages because the extension to non denumerable ones isn't conceptually problematic. (shrink)

1. La ricerca della verità come fondamento del pensiero giuridico-politico di S. Agostino.--2. Le due città di S. Agostino.

Understanding Institutions offers a theory that is able to unify the two dominant approaches in the scientific and philosophical literature on institutions. Moreover, using the ‘rules-in-equilibrium’ theory, it tackles several ancient puzzles in the philosophy of social science.

Examines the relationship of Derrida’s writings on architecture to his methodology of deconstruction and to deconstrutivism in architecture. Between 1984 and 1994 Jacques Derrida wrote and spoke a great deal about architecture both in his academic work and in connection with a number of particular building projects around the world. He engaged significantly with the work of architects such as Bernard Tschumi, Peter Eisenman, and Daniel Libeskind. Derrida conceived of architecture as an example of the kind of multidimensional writing that (...) he had theorized in Of Grammatology, identifying a rich common ground between architecture and philosophy in relation to ideas about political community and the concept of dwelling. In this book, Francesco Vitale analyzes Derrida’s writings and demonstrates how Derrida’s work on this topic provides a richer understanding of his approach to deconstruction, highlighting the connections and differences between philosophical deconstruction and architectural deconstrutivism. “Although there has been some discussion of the intersection of deconstruction and architecture in the past, mostly among architects and architectural critics, Vitale’s work is distinguished by the fact that it is written by a true philosopher who has a much more acute sense than has usually been the case of the philosophical underpinnings of Derrida’s exchanges with Tschumi, Eisenman, and others. Vitale is throughout concise, precise, insightful, and often brilliant.” — Geoffrey Bennington, author of Interrupting Derrida. (shrink)