Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...) of S’s action. Joshua Knobe (2003a) presents intriguing data that may be taken to support the second view.1 Knobe’s data show an asymmetry in folk judgements. People are more inclined to judge that S did A intentionally, even when not intended, if A was perceived as causing a harm (e.g. harming the environment). There is an asymmetry because people are not inclined to see S’s action as intentional, when not intended, if A is perceived as causing a benefit (e.g. helping the environment). In this paper we will discuss Knobe’s results in detail. We will raise the question of whether his ordinary language surveys of folk judgments have accessed core concepts of intentional action. We suspect that instead Knobe’s surveys are tapping into pragmatic aspects of intentional language and its role in moral praise and blame. We will suggest alternative surveys that we plan to conduct to get at this difference, and we will attempt to explain the pragmatic usage of intentional language. (shrink)

Evolutionary models of human cooperation are increasingly emphasizing the role of reputation and the requisite truthful “gossiping” about reputation-relevant behavior. If resources were allocated among individuals according to their reputations, competition for resources via competition for “good” reputations would have created incentives for exaggerated or deceptive gossip about oneself and one’s competitors in ancestral societies. Correspondingly, humans should have psychological adaptations to assess gossip veracity. Using social psychological methods, we explored cues of gossip veracity in four experiments. We found that (...) simple reiteration increased gossip veracity, but only for those who found the gossip relatively uninteresting. Multiple sources of gossip increased its veracity, as did the independence of those sources. Information that suggested alternative, benign interpretations of gossip decreased its veracity. Competition between a gossiper and her target decreased gossip veracity. These results provide preliminary evidence for psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity, mechanisms that might be used to assess veracity in other domains involving social exchange of information. (shrink)

Assesses the presuppositions underlying Aristotle's political theory. The principle of teleology holds that human beings strive to fulfil certain natural ends such as rationality and social cooperation; the principle of perfectionism holds that the good for human beings consists in the attainment of these ends; the principle of community holds that individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the authority of the community, including the state ; and the principle of rulership holds that the community can (...) function successfully only if order is imposed on it by rational agents. This chapter considers the extent to which these principles may be defended against powerful objections that have been raised by modern philosophers and scientists. Finally, it is pointed out that the modern theory of rights, which assumes a version of extreme individualism, faces serious difficulties, so that Aristotle's theory of rights, based on a moderately individualistic theory of justice, is an alternative still worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

Describes Aristotle's life and historical context. Discusses the place of politics––the science of the polis ––within Aristotle's taxonomy of science and of virtue. Provides an overview of Aristotle's argument, emphasizing the role of nature, justice, and rights. Describes the four main presuppositions of Aristotle's argument: natural teleology, perfectionism, community, and rulership. Also distinguishes and explains the different modes of interpretation employed in this book and in other works on the history of political thought.

The central dilemma concerning randomized clinical trials (RCTs) arises out of some simple facts about causal methodology (RCTs are the best way to generate the reliable causal knowledge necessary for optimally-informed action) and a prima facie plausible principle concerning how physicians should treat their patients (always do what it is most reasonable to believe will be best for the patient). A number of arguments related to this in the literature are considered. Attempts to avoid the dilemma fail. Appeals to informed (...) consent and mechanisms for minimizing the resulting harm are important for policy, but informed consent is problematic and mechanisms for minimization of harm do not address the dilemma. Appeals to some sort of contract model of justification are promising and illuminating. Keywords: randomized clinical trials, ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Small wonder: finitude and its horizons -- The underside of modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel -- Empire or cosmopolis: civilization at the crossroads -- Confronting empire: a tribute to Arundhati Roy -- Speaking truth to power: in memory of Edward Said -- Critical intellectuals in a global age: toward a global public sphere -- Social identity and creative praxis: hommage á Merleau-Ponty -- Nature and artifact: Gadamer on human health -- Borders or horizons?: an older debate revisited -- Empire and (...) faith: sacred non-sovereignty -- Appendix: A. The dignity of difference: a salute to Jonathan Sacks -- B. Religion and rationality: Habermas and the early Frankfurt school -- Nomolatry and fidelity: a response to Charles Taylor. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism seeks a political ethics of world togetherness and a political aesthetics that can contribute to this task critically and imaginatively. Regarding political ethics, I explore the world as a “cosmopolitan mind” composed of “dialogic voices” and threatened by neoliberalism, neofascism, and other nihilistic “oracles.” I also construct a criterion for determining which public artworks (1) resist oracles and (2) help us imagine a “cosmopolitan democracy” and its political ethics. The latter includes the concordance of three ethico-political virtues—solidarity, heterogeneity, and (...) fecundity (creating new voices through the interplay among other voices)—and must appeal to different peoples worldwide. I also examine how this political ethics and aesthetics can be applied to nonhuman life and non-sentient formations in a non-anthropocentric manner; indeed, how the cosmos in its entirety and plurality can also be thought of as voices and participants in the cosmopolitan mind and its artistic expression. Moreover, I contend that my ontology of dialogic voices and proposed public art criterion, like the cosmopolitan mind itself, are “events” or “becomings.” This means that there can never be an articulation of the ontology that is final nor a public art criterion that could curtail the imaginative reach of art. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary exploration concerning how the ethics of research on human subjects may differ when we move from the well-discussed context of research on therapies to the less-discussed context of research on enhancements. A number of differences are described. There are some features that make such research more morally problematic in certain ways, but some of the features may actually ameliorate some of the moral tensions that exist in human subjects research. It is hoped that this analysis (...) will aid and encourage discussion of the topic that could help guide those who intend to carry out such this research. (shrink)

What is it for me to do something is the question discussed in the present paper. It has been suggested that my doings are elicited by tryings, intentions, and other causal mechanisms. These theories do not offer any convincing analysis of what it is for me to act. Insight is sought by looking at some case studies involving temporary loss of the ability to move oneís body. What the case studies show, I conclude, is that when I move my body (...) in the normal way, I do not first have to do something else that causes my body to move. Normal actions are events bodily beings can generate spontaneously . An essential condition for having this kind of control is inside awareness of the body. When inner awareness of the body is lost, control can be taken over by visual awareness. But then movement loses its spontaneous character and depends on planning and intense concentration. One can think of the self from which my actions flow, as the mental life to which they belong, or as the consciousness that controls them. (shrink)

Fetal alcohol syndrome , the most common avoidable human birth defect, is the extensive irreversible brain damage caused by heavy prenatal alcohol exposure. Following the discovery of FAS in 1973, a multidisciplinary research community began applying discipline-specific methods to investigate the mechanisms underlying FAS and its consequences for the victims’ cognition and social behavior. An academic biomathematician and statistician, since 1984 I have collaborated with one American research group studying this condition.

We relate the classifiability of a complete finitary first-order theory in the sense of S. SHELAH to the determinacy of the class of -saturated models in the sense of stationary logic.

Markets, law, and regulation are intimately intertwined. Thus, recent studies (by Morton Keller and Donald McCloskey et al.) of the intersection between public policy and the economy are both necessary and welcome. But the absence in these works of a nuanced conceptualization of the critical, constructive role of civil authority in the creation and maintenance of open, competitive markets, and the virtual absence of a concern for and understanding of the engines of real economic growth, results in scholarship that only (...) weakly articulates the profound linkage between civil authority, open markets, and economic growth. (shrink)