This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of accusing and proposing reveals important differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison has theoretically important implication regarding the norms governing persuasive argumentation. The paper is (...) based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts. (shrink)

Heart rate variability (HRV), the change in the time intervals between adjacent heartbeats, is an emergent property of interdependent regulatory systems that operate on different time scales to adapt to challenges and achieve optimal performance. This article briefly reviews neural regulation of the heart, and its basic anatomy, the cardiac cycle, and the sinoatrial and atrioventricular pacemakers. The cardiovascular regulation center in the medulla integrates sensory information and input from higher brain centers, and afferent cardiovascular system inputs to adjust heart (...) rate and blood pressure via sympathetic and parasympathetic efferent pathways. This article reviews sympathetic and parasympathetic influences on the heart, and examines the interpretation of HRV and the association between reduced HRV, risk of disease and mortality, and the loss of regulatory capacity. This article also discusses the intrinsic cardiac nervous system and the heart-brain connection, through which afferent information can influence activity in the subcortical and frontocortical areas, and motor cortex. It also considers new perspectives on the putative underlying physiological mechanisms and properties of the ultra-low-frequency (ULF), very-low-frequency (VLF), low-frequency (LF), and high-frequency (HF) bands. Additionally, it reviews the most common time and frequency domain measurements as well as standardized data collection protocols. In its final section, this article integrates Porges' polyvagal theory, Thayer and colleagues' neurovisceral integration model, Lehrer et al.'s resonance frequency model, and the Institute of HeartMath's coherence model. The authors conclude that a coherent heart is not a metronome because its rhythms are characterized by both complexity and stability over longer time scales. Future research should expand understanding of how the heart and its intrinsic nervous system influence the brain. (shrink)

An Invitation to Formal Reasoning introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful new system formulated by Fred Sommers. This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard system employed in modern logic; most striking is its greater simplicity and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the 19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogistic, Scholastic (...) logicians, Leibniz, and the 19th century British algebraists. Term logic takes its syntax directly from natural language, construing statements as combinations of pairs of terms, where complex terms are taken to have the same syntax as statements. Whereas standard logic requires extensive 'translation' from natural language to symbolic language, term logic requires only 'transcription' into the symbolic language. Its naturalness is the result of its ability to stay close to the forms of sentences usually found in every day discourse. Written by the founders of the term logic approach, An Invitation to Formal Reasoning is a unique introduction and exploration of this new system, offering numerous exercises and examples throughout the text. Summarising the standard system of mathematical logic to set term logic in context, and showing how the two systems compare, this book presents an alternative approach to standard modern logic for those studying formal logic, philosophy of language or computer theory. Fred Sommers is Professor Emeritus, Brandeis University, USA; George Englebretsen is Professor of Philosophy, Bishop's University, Canada. (shrink)

Ethnic cleansing and other methods of political and social exclusion continue to thrive in our globalized world, complicating the idea that unity and diversity can exist in the same society. When we emphasize unity, we sacrifice heterogeneity, yet when we stress diversity, we create a plurality of individuals connected only by tenuous circumstance. As long as we remain tethered to these binaries, as long as we are unable to imagine the sort of society we want in an age of diversity, (...) we cannot achieve an enduring solution to conflicts that continue unabated despite our increasing proximity to one another. By envisioning the public as a multivoiced body, Fred Evans offers a solution to the dilemma of diversity. The multivoiced body is both one and many: heterogeneous voices that at once separate and bind themselves together through their continuous and creative interplay. By focusing on this traditionally undervalued or overlooked notion of voice, Evans shows how we can valorize simultaneously the solidarity, diversity, and richness of society. Moreover, recognition of society as a multivoiced body helps resists the pervasive countertendency to raise a chosen discourse to the level of "one true God," "pure race," or some other "oracle" that eliminates the dynamism of contesting voices. To support these views, Evans taps the major figures and themes of analytic and continental philosophy as well as modernist, postmodernist, postcolonial, and feminist thought. He also turns to sources outside of philosophy to address the implications of his views for justice, citizenship, democracy, and collective as well as individual rights. Through the seemingly simple conceit of a multivoiced body, Evans straddles both philosophy and political practice, confronting issues of subjectivity, language, communication, and identity. For anyone interested in moving toward a just society and politics, _The Multivoiced Body_ offers an innovative approach to the problems of human diversity and ethical plurality. (shrink)

Comparative political theory is at best an embryonic and marginalized endeavor. As practiced in most Western universities, the study of political theory generally involves a rehearsal of the canon of Western political thought from Plato to Marx. Only rarely are practitioners of political thought willing (and professionally encouraged) to transgress the canon and thereby the cultural boundaries of North America and Europe in the direction of genuine comparative investigation. Border Crossings presents an effort to remedy this situation, fully launching a (...) new era in political theory. Thirteen scholars from around the world examine the various political traditions of West, South, and East Asia and engage in a reflective cross-cultural discussion that belies the assumptions of an Asian "essence" and of an unbridgeable gulf between West and non-West. The denial of essential differences does not, however, amount to an endorsement of essential sameness. As viewed and as practiced by contributors to this ground-breaking volume, comparative political theorizing must steer a course between uniformity and radical separation--this is the path of "border crossings.". (shrink)

Fred Rush investigates the historical and conceptual structure of the development of a distinctive conception of irony in early- to mid-nineteenth century European philosophy. He explores the thought of Schlegel and Novalis, Hegel and Kierkegaard, and argues that the development of irony in this period offered an alternative to German idealism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S SCEPTICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST REASON In the section of the Treatise entitled Of scepticism with regard to reason Kume considers the mind as reflecting upon its own activities, monitors them as it were, and then adjusts them in accordance with certain principles and strategies. ^ What it discovers is that in drawing inferences, the mind sometimes errs. In the light of this knowledge, and in accordance with rational principles (...) of epistemic probabilities, it adjusts its response to any inference it makes from one of certainty to one with epistemic probability of a degree somewhat less than certainty. But this rational adjustment is itself the consequence of an inference, which will be subject to the same qualifications. By repeating this process, it seems that all certainty reduces to probability and all probability to zero. Hume's argument begins this way: Our reason must be consider 'd as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by _ the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability ; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question. 2 It is important to be clear on the logical structure of this argument. Consider an actual case of inference. This produces a state of belief or affirmation. Hume does not say that the inference does not produce truth, i.e., a true belief. But there is the possibility it does not. Nor is this a mere logical possibility. One can form the hypothesis about causes that this process of reasoning was in fact one which introduced an 91. element of error. One does not know that this hypothesis is true. But one does know that there is a certain probability that this causal hypothesis is true; as Hume puts it, it may frequently be true. Knowing that we have reasoned poorly sometimes (though not always) in the past, the hypothesis that we have on this occasion reasoned poorly has a certain probability, and we know this even though we have not verified the hypothesis for this particular occasion. On the basis of this unverified but nonetheless somewhat probable causal hypothesis we must as a matter of reason reduce the probability we attach to the belief or affirmation that was produced by the original inference. This reduction of probability is itself a matter of reasoning, however. Therefore about it, also, one can form the hypothesis that it is erroneous, and that the probability of the original affirmation was not reduced sufficiently. On the basis of this new hypothesis we must as a matter of reason reduce still further the probability of the first affirmation. And so on: as I reflect upon my use of reason, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence. (T183) The result here of the mind applying to its own activities what it discovers about itself is its ceasing to make any causal inferences. Feedback here yields the attitude of total scepticism, in the sense of rendering it reasonable that one ought totally to suspend judgment. To be sure, Hume does hold that no one is in fact such a total sceptic: Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin 'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or see the 92. surrounding bodies, when we turn cur eyes towards them in broad sunshine. (T183) Inferences from sample to population cannot but be fallible, and this is the best we can do, given the logical gap between sample and population.The argument for scepticism with regard to reason concludes not only that such inferences are fallible, that they may be wrong, but more strongly that we have the strongest of reasons for supposing that they... (shrink)

This book is a textbook designed for teaching a new subfield in political science: the emerging field of "comparative political theory". It is the first such textbook. As taught in American universities, political theory has been traditionally confined to the history of Western political thought from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Nietzsche. The editor believes strongly that this limitation is no longer tenable in our globalizing age when different cultures and civilizations are increasingly communicating and interacting with each other. (...) The text focuses on three areas: Islamic civilization, Indian civilization, and Far Eastern civilizations. In each area the text offers an introduction followed by readings dealing with ancient or classical teachings as well as modern and contemporary theoretical developments. In making these selections, the editor has been ably assisted by experts in the respective fields (Roxanne Euben, Anthony Parel, and Theodore deBary). The text is meant mainly for undergraduate classes but can be consulted with benefit also by more advanced students as well as by the general reading public. (shrink)

Third-party punishment (TPP) occurs when the perpetrator of a transgression is punished by an individual who is not the victim of the transgression and, therefore, not directly affected by it. As F...

The modern theory of computability is based on the works of Church, Markov and Turing who, starting from quite different models of computation, arrived at the same class of computable functions. The purpose of this paper is the show how the main results of the Church-Markov-Turing theory of computable functions may quickly be derived and understood without recourse to the largely irrelevant theories of recursive functions, Markov algorithms, or Turing machines. We do this by ignoring the problem of what constitutes (...) a computable function and concentrating on the central feature of the Church-Markov-Turing theory: that the set of computable partial functions can be effectively enumerated. In this manner we are led directly to the heart of the theory of computability without having to fuss about what a computable function is.The spirit of this approach is similar to that of [RGRS]. A major difference is that we operate in the context of constructive mathematics in the sense of Bishop [BSH1], so all functions are computable by definition, and the phrase “you can find” implies “by a finite calculation.” In particular ifPis some property, then the statement “for eachmthere isnsuch thatP” means that we can construct a functionθsuch thatP)for allm. Church's thesis has a different flavor in an environment like this where the notion of a computable function is primitive.One point of such a treatment of Church's thesis is to make available to Bishopstyle constructivists the Markovian counterexamples of Russian constructivism and recursive function theory. The lack of serious candidates for computable functions other than recursive functions makes it quite implausible that a Bishopstyle constructivist could refute Church's thesis, or any consequence of Church's thesis. Hence counterexamples such as Specker's bounded increasing sequence of rational numbers that is eventually bounded away from any given real number [SPEC] may be used, as Brouwerian counterexamples are, as evidence of the unprovability of certain assertions. (shrink)

We consider notions of boundedness of subsets of the natural numbers ℕ that occur when doing mathematics in the context of intuitionistic logic. We obtain a new characterization of the notion of a pseudobounded subset and we formulate the closely related notion of a detachably finite subset. We establish metric equivalents for a subset of ℕ to be detachably finite and to satisfy the ascending chain condition. Following Ishihara, we spell out the relationship between detachable finiteness and sequential continuity. Most (...) of the results do not require countable choice. (shrink)

The essay seeks to disentangle the meaning or meanings of the catch word ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’. To contribute to its clarification, the essay distinguishes between three main interpretations: empirical, normative, and practical or interactive. In the first reading, the term coincides basically with ‘‘globalization’’ where the latter refers to such economic and technical processes as the global extension of financial and communications networks. A different meaning is given to the term by normative thinkers like Kant, Rawls, and Habermas. In this reading, cosmopolitanism (...) refers to a set of moral and/or legal norms or principles governing international politics, regardless of whether these principles are derived from ‘‘noumenal’’ consciousness, an ‘‘original position’’ or rational discourse. Noting the is/ought dilemma troubling normativism, the essay introduces the further meaning of practical interaction. Indebted to the teachings of pragmatism, hermeneutics, and virtue ethics, this reading mitigates the split between norm and conduct through practical engagement and education.Keywords: globalization; liquidity; banal cosmopolitansim; normativism; pragmatism; hermeneutics. (shrink)

A very weak omniscience principle is formulated, related omniscience principlesare considered, and the theorem that a function of bounded variation is the difference of two increasing functions is shown to be equivalent to the omniscience principle WLPO. It is a so shown that an arbitrary function with located variation on an interval is the difference of two increasing functions.

This paper considers the converse of the principle that ought implies can, namely, the principle that must implies ought. It argues that this principle is the central premiss for Mill's argument that happiness is desirable (worthy of desire), and it examines the sense of must that is relevant and the implications it has for Mill's moral philosophy.

Are there universal values of right and wrong, good and bad, shared by virtually every human? The tradition of natural law argues that there is. Drawing on the work of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, whose analyses have touched upon issues related to original sin, trespass, guilt, and salvation through reparation, in this 2006 book C. Fred Alford adds an extra dimension to this argument: we know natural law to be true because we have hated before we have loved and have (...) wished to destroy before we have wanted to create. Natural law is built upon the desire to make reparation for the goodness we have destroyed, or have longed to destroy. Through reparation, we earn salvation from the most hateful part of ourselves, that which would destroy what we know to be good. (shrink)

I would like to record my thanks to Paul Thompson for useful conver sations over the years, and also to several generations of students who have helped me develop my ideas on biological theory and on Darwin. My wife has, as usual, been more than helpful; in particular she typed a good portion of the manuscript while I was on leave a few years ago, more now than I like to remember. My parents were both looking forward to holding a (...) final copy of this book. I only regret that my mother did not live long enough to see its completion. I must also thank the publishers and their staff. They have been re markably patient about meeting deadlines - promises were repeatedly made and then, owing to family situations, had to be broken - and for this I am considerably in their debt. I would further like to thank the following authors and publishers for permission to use their work: R. C. Lewontin, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change, Figure 1, p. 14; © 1964 Columbia University Press; reprinted here by kind permission of the author and publisher. F. Wilson, 'Goudge's Contribution to the Philosophy of Science', in L. W. Sumner, J. G. Slater, and F. Wilson (eds.), Pragmatism and Purpose: Essays in Honour of T. A. Goudge; © 1964 University of Toronto Press; reproduced here in part by kind permission of all the editors and the publisher. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Comparative Religious Ethics: Everyday Decisions for Our Everyday Lives by Christine GudorfFred GlennonReview of Comparative Religious Ethics: Everyday Decisions for Our Everyday Lives CHRISTINE GUDORF Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. 256 pp. $49.00In Comparative Religious Ethics, Christine Gudorf identifies her primary audience as those “seeker-skeptical students” who see value in the study of religion but who eschew organized religion. She contends that a comparative study of religious ethics—in which (...) students explore the ethical decisions they face every day within the context of a range of religious traditions—will draw them into exploring not only their own moral sensibilities but also those religious traditions. I submit that her textbook accomplishes exactly that.No stranger to textbooks in religious ethics, Christine Gudorf has presented us with a well-organized book. The initial chapter is fairly traditional in its approach to the question of ethical method. She rehearses the same threefold pattern found in most textbooks centering on rules, ends, and virtues. Gudorf does much more with rule-based ethics than with teleological ethics, giving the impression that religious ethics is fundamentally rule-based. While this may be true to some degree, there has been far more attention given to teleology in religious ethics than she acknowledges. Her emphasis on connecting theological and religious frameworks to social analysis is helpful and reflects the orientation of many who teach undergraduates in this area. A weakness of the book is that some chapters connect the religious traditions with ethical issues more directly than others. While I tend to be in agreement with much of Gudorf’s own perspective, I sensed at times that she could have made more direct connections between ethical issues and particular religious tradition’s ethical teachings. I might also note that at points the social analysis was a bit long—especially in discussing the history of certain ideas—which might be boring for some undergraduates.Gudorf covers topics that have more experiential relevance for undergraduates than is usually found in social ethics textbooks. This is a good thing because it enables her to cover issues that have the most interest for undergraduates. By drawing on what they are interested in, this textbook is able to lead them into an analysis of the structural components of these issues (rather than zoning out, as undergraduates are prone to do). For the most part, the chapters treat each issue evenly, although the chapter on clothing is a bit short. While there [End Page 236] might be some topics I would like to see added, no text can adequately address everything.The author has a great deal of expertise with case studies, and for the most part the case studies she includes are helpful primarily because their narrative structure and length lend themselves to more sustained and nuanced discussion. The discussion questions, film suggestions, and web resources at the end of each chapter are helpful pedagogical aids. The addition of a glossary is important, but I am glad that she explains most of the terms in the chapters (most students do not take the time to review the glossary).Undergraduates will be able to understand the material Gudorf covers in this book because it connects well with the issues they face on a daily basis. In bringing in her own perspective and experiences as she deliberates about ethical issues—I especially like the discussion of what to do with the homeless on street corners—Gudorf makes this book a bit more distinctive and personal than some other textbooks that attempt to be more “objective.” In all likelihood, I will use this book in my comparative religious ethics class. There is a wealth of material and insight in it that my students and I would find engaging. [End Page 237]Fred GlennonLe Moyne CollegeCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and (...) causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction. (shrink)

Here we have a new edition of Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, one that will become essential for scholars alongside the new Norton and Norton edition of Hume's Treatise. L. A. Selby-Bigge's nineteenth century edition provided a good text to nineteenth century standards—good enough for it to become the standard for many years. But times change, and we now, quite reasonably, ask for more. Beauchamp's new edition provides a text and apparatus that is a vast improvement; it will surely replace (...) Selby-Bigge's as the common reference text for scholars and students. To be sure, scholars at least will not for many years be able to do without the latter's edition: so many have come out over the years with the references to the pages of this edition, that we will still have to refer to the older edition. But students have a new and very useful edition. (shrink)

Adorno and Horkheimer critically develop the concept of the “culture industry” in the third chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment. The treatment there has some right to be considered one of the core texts in Critical Theory's philosophy of art. This essay discusses the main claims and arguments of that work, as well as earlier essays in Adorno's music theory and later essays that turn to film aesthetics. Attention focuses on illuminating the basis for Adorno and Horkheimer's views on the culture (...) industry in light of their social ontology and epistemology, their account of aesthetic form, and their conception of commodity as style. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill proposed that all policy precepts, be they in the areas of morality or prudence or aesthetics, are all subordinate to the precepts of the Art of Life. The value which he assumes in defining the Art of Life is the Principle of Utility. This principle, being normative rather than fact, can admit of no proof based solely on deductive inference. Yet Mill proposed considerations that he believed capable of rationally persuading one to accept his principle as the (...) basic principle for the Art of Life. This paper aims to evaluate this argument. In particular, it tries to show that a crucial step, often thought to be a logical howler, is not to be so simply dismissed. It is shown that if one accepts certain theses from Mill's philosophy of science and of social science, concerning the composition of causes, then the crucial step is fully justified. It is also suggested that these theses of Mill's philosophy of science are mistaken. So Mill's proof of utility is, after all, unsound, but the reconstruction proposed shows it to be much more plausible and much more philosophically interesting than is often thought. (shrink)

Beyond intuitions: A biological interpretation of cognition How can the study of cognition become an ordinary science that is intrinsically connected to the other natural sciences? Since the cognitive revolution in and around psychology, ‘cognition’ has become the standard term to refer to the processes that make us – humans – intelligent. The interpretation of this cognitive domain and cognition itself, however, has never become really clear. First, cognition is a mental concept that is conceptually linked with theories and ideas (...) that are not self-evidently connected to the world as described by the natural sciences. In addition, cognition tends to remain a phenomenon that we recognize ‘on sight’, without the need for an explicit demarcation criterion, a ‘mark of the cognitive’. In this paper, I abandon this intuition-based demarcation of cognition and propose an unequivocal biological one. This biological demarcation does not build on our current intuitions concerning cognition and in any many cases will not be in line with these. As a consequence, the direct conceptual connection between cognition and the traditional notion of ‘mind’ will be cut and the term ‘cognition’ will acquire a fundamentally different meaning. However, the term ‘cognition’ can and will be maintained, as with its new meaning it still refers to the processes that make us humans – as well as other organisms – intelligent: it still covers the scientific domain that its original form was meant to cover, although now with some additional areas. The proposal states that cognition is to be interpreted as the interactions between organisms and their environments together with the organismal structures specifically involved in this interaction. This proposal gives a specific material foundation to cognitive phenomena, which can act as the empirical basis for existing and new cognitive theory formation that will place human cognition unequivocally in the wider framework of living organizations. Some of the implications of the proposal will be further illustrated by differentiating between agents and organisms. When organisms rather than agents form the focal point for cognition, due consideration can be given to ongoing research on intelligence in bacteria, plants and fungi, as well as research concerning the fundamental roles played by nervous systems in animals. (shrink)

Brette criticizes the notion of neural coding as used in neuroscience as a way to clarify the causal structure of the brain. This criticism will be positioned in a wider range of findings and ideas from other branches of neuroscience and biology. While supporting Brette's critique, these findings also suggest the need for more radical changes in neuroscience than Brette envisions.