Deutsch is a social psychologist whose research over the past forty years has been concerned mainly with cooperation and competition. This collection of articles assembles his work on how people's social behavior affects and is affected by their conceptions of justice. The central claim is that the influence is mutual: "Deutsch's crude law of social relations" states that "the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also tend to elicit that type of social relationship".

Chapter V attempts to provide the elements of a solution to the problem of how terms in theoretical sciences acquire their reference. Its proposal is that a theory of reference-acquisition for theoretical terms should acknowledge the fact that what fixes the reference of a theoretical term is typically the embedding theory as a whole, not an austere causal description like 'the item causally responsible for event E.' It is argued that there are epistemic reasons for the existence of this phenomenon, (...) and an attempt is made to show how, by appealing to these reasons, it is nonetheless possible to understand the reference-determining role of theories in such a way that occurrences of a term embedded in incompatible theoretical frameworks can often be interpreted as co-referential. ;Chapter IV is an interlude. It argues for the relevance of the theory of reference to the topic of intertheoretic reduction. It does this by attempting to demonstrate that intertheoretic reduction in the natural sciences requires intertheoretic identities involving theoretical terms, and that making sense of such identities demands a theory of reference-acquisition for theoretical terms. The chapter also argues that the problem of how mathematical terms secure their reference precludes an obvious extension of this model to examples of reduction in mathematics. It further criticizes attempts to make sense of mathematical reductions in terms of concepts of ontological reduction, and it suggests that much recent work on ontological reduction, especially the attempt to exclude all-out 'Pythagorean' reductions, is flawed through its failure to take referential semantics seriously. ;Chapter II contains exposition and criticism of both the descriptivist account of reference and Kripke's version of the 'causal' account of reference. The latter account is represented as a recursive account, with a base clause specifying how terms initially acquire their reference and a recursion clause specifying how the ability to use a term with a certain reference is transmitted to other users . It is argued that the Kripkean formulation of referential intentions at the reference-transmission stage is flawed, in part because the formulation makes his account unable to capture the dynamics of the way in which a person's use of a term may undergo reference-shifts without these shifts in reference being intended. ;The third chapter suggests an alternative account. It motivates and sketches a mixed causal-descriptivist theory speaker's reference, formulated in terms of first-order referential intentions, and then uses this theory to sketch aspects of a mixed causal-descriptivist account of term reference, formulated in terms of second-order intentions to intend the 'right' object . It is argued that such an account provides a plausible solution to a number of problems confronting Kripke's account, including that of unintended reference-shifts. ;This dissertation consists of five chapters whose unifying theme is the theory of term-reference. The first chapter offers an overview and critical comparison of two opposing approaches to the topic of reference: the semantic holism of Quine-Davidson, and the semantic atomism of those who treat reference as a relation that grounds the assignment of truth-conditions to sentences. The chapter argues that the apparent theoretical importance of referential intentions, emphasised in Saul Kripke's work on reference and argued for in detail in chapter III of the dissertation, provides strong support for semantic atomism, since such intentions are used to explain reference-assignments and, indirectly, truth-conditions. (shrink)

Studies in philosophy: I. Tufts, J.H. On moral evolution. II. Willcos, W.F. The expansion of Europe in its influence upon population. III. Woods, R.A. Democracy a new unfolding of human power. IV. Sharp, F.C. An analysis of the moral judgment. V. Woodbridge, F.J.E. The problem of consciousness. VI. Norton, E.L. The intellectual element in music. VII. Raub, W.L. Pragmatism and Kantianism. VIII. Lyman, E.W. The influence of pragmatism upon the status of theology.--Studies in psychology: IX. Delabarre, E.B. Influence of surrounding (...) objects on the apparent direction of a line. X. Swift, E.J. Beginning a language; a contribution to the psychology of learning. XI. Pierce, A.H. An appeal from the prevailing doctrine of a detached subconsciousness. XII. Woodworth, R.S. The cause of a voluntary movement. XIII. Burnett, C.T. An experimental test of the classical theory of volition. (shrink)

The moral worth of attorneys has traditionally been judged in terms of compIiance with legal codes of ethics. These codes, ostensibly designed to promote smooth and equitable functioning of an adversary system, are manifestations of a rule utiIitarian moral system. This paper argues that ethical attorneys have a higher calling than rule compIiance and that "moral commitment," which combines commitment to "right" solutions and moral courage, is a superior yardstick for measuring their moral worth.

The topic of fictional objects and their nature is a familiar one, the topic of fictional properties less so. This article focuses on the way artefactualism – now arguably the most popular form of realism about fictional objects – might be extended to give an account of fictional properties. After describing what seems the most developed such extension, the article articulates a serious problem it faces, before showing how artefactualism about fictional properties would benefit from certain insights contained in an (...) alternative abstract-object version of fictional realism. (shrink)

Frederick Brenk is a specialist, but, as this third volume of his collected essays makes clear, a multiple specialist, as skilled in dealing with visual materials as with texts, with epigraphy as with prosopography, with Christian writers as with pagan, with Egypt as with Greece, with style and language as with philosophy and religion. Few scholars have such wide learning, and fewer still can use it to weave together insights from so many different ways of thinking, feeling, seeing, and (...) writing. (shrink)

Frank B. Ebersole died recently. Here I remind philosophers of the thinking of this reclusive philosopher who brought out the value of Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophers should "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." I illustrate Ebersole's singular thinking by focusing on his philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance metaphor.

The interplay of Greek and Roman motifs in the Marcellus eulogy at the end of the Sixth Book of theAeneidpresents a complicated study in literary history. The association of roses with the dead is more Roman than Greek, but perhaps not so much so as one might imagine. Roses are not entirely absent from the Greek milieu, and in fact Vergil apparently drew on Greek rose motifs for the eulogy. Archaeology reveals that roses were an important symbol on tomb stelai, (...) along with the epigraphical references to roses. In general the rose in Greek inscriptions was reserved for girls, but at least one is for a boy, and another for a youth of twenty-two. Moreover, Vergil may well have been alluding to Bion's (?)Lament for Adonis, where the rose motif has striking importance. (shrink)

This collection contains many stimulating and important articles from the Plutarch renaissance, especially on the interaction between divine and human worlds, ...

In his treatise On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch tries to explain the meaning of a statue or image of Zeus in Crete, which had no ears. An Egyptian or Egyptianizing image with separate ears, perhaps on a stele, incomprehensible to Greeks, but common in Egypt, might have given rise to Plutarch’s bafflement and fantasy interpretation.Dans son traité De Iside et Osiride, Plutarque essaie d’expliquer la signification d’une statue ou d’une image de Zeus en Crète, qui n’avait aucune oreille. Une image (...) égyptienne ou « égyptianisante » avec des oreilles séparées, peut-être sur une stèle, incompréhensible aux Grecs mais commune en Égypte, pourrait avoir provoqué la perplexité de Plutarque et son interprétation fantaisiste. (shrink)

Crowe presents the evolution of Lonergan's thinking on Christology in the context of the radical developments contained within his other theological writings.

Commentary on a previously published article: Brown, Patrick. “System and History in Lonergan’s Early Historical and Economic Manuscripts” The Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 1:1 (Summer 2001) 32-76.