1. T. Die Prinzipien der Gesellschaftslehre.--2. T. Rechtsphilosophie.--3. T. Die soziale Ordnung.--4. T. Wirtschaftsethik Galen -- 5. T. Politische Ethik.

Le traite sur les vertus, a moins d'etre simplement un traite sur des valeurs differentes, n'a sa place que dans une ethique finaliste, c'est-a-dire dans une ethique quie considere l'action morale comme un phenomene interieur, destine a perfectionner l'homme. C'est a partir de la qu'on peut se demander comment l'homme prepare son action, en acquerant des forces "doublant" la nature. Quant a savoir quelles sont les capacites naturelles exigeant une vertu, cela depend principalement de la question de savoir dans quelles (...) puissances la spontaneite naturelle ne forme pas suffisamment la fermete de caractere, necessaire a la recherche du bien. Pour Thomas d'Aquin, comme pour Aristote, la raison pratique, la volonte et les appetits sensibles sont le siege des vertus. Pour ce qui est de la raison pratique et de la volonte. l'experience commune suffirait a verifier cette opinion. en ce qui concerne les appetits sensibles, il faut d'abord resoudre la question de savoir s'ils ont vraiment un caractere moral, ou s'ils sont simplement des phenomenes psychiques. Dans ce dernier cas ils ne font que suivre les directives de la volonte morale comme les forces motrices physiques. Nous avons essaye de montrer que les appetits sensibles (Passions) ont un caracter moral. (shrink)

The philosophical debate around the impact of machine learning in science is often framed in terms of a choice between AI and classical methods as mutually exclusive alternatives involving difficult epistemological trade-offs. A common worry regarding machine learning methods specifically is that they lead to opaque models that make predictions but do not lead to explanation or understanding. Focusing on the field of molecular biology, I argue that in practice machine learning is often used with explanatory aims. More specifically, I (...) argue that machine learning can be tightly integrated with other, more traditional, research methods and in a clear sense can contribute to insight into the causal processes underlying phenomena of interest to biologists. One could even say that machine learning is not the end of theory in important areas of biology, as has been argued, but rather a new beginning. I support these claims with a detailed discussion of a case study involving gene regulation by microRNAs. (shrink)

Systems biologists often distance themselves from reductionist approaches and formulate their aim as understanding living systems “as a whole.” Yet, it is often unclear what kind of reductionism they have in mind, and in what sense their methodologies would offer a superior approach. To address these questions, we distinguish between two types of reductionism which we call “modular reductionism” and “bottom-up reductionism.” Much knowledge in molecular biology has been gained by decomposing living systems into functional modules or through detailed studies (...) of molecular processes. We ask whether systems biology provides novel ways to recompose these findings in the context of the system as a whole via computational simulations. As an example of computational integration of modules, we analyze the first whole-cell model of the bacterium M. genitalium. Secondly, we examine the attempt to recompose processes across different spatial scales via multi-scale cardiac models. Although these models rely on a number of idealizations and simplifying assumptions as well, we argue that they provide insight into the limitations of reductionist approaches. Whole-cell models can be used to discover properties arising at the interfaces of dynamically coupled processes within a biological system, thereby making more apparent what is lost through decomposition. Similarly, multi-scale modeling highlights the relevance of macroscale parameters and models and challenges the view that living systems can be understood “bottom-up.” Specifically, we point out that system-level properties constrain lower-scale processes. Thus, large-scale modeling reveals how living systems at the same time are more and less than the sum of the parts. (shrink)

We present two case studies from contemporary biology in which we observe conflicts between established and emerging approaches. The first case study discusses the relation between molecular biology and systems biology regarding the explanation of cellular processes, while the second deals with phylogenetic systematics and the challenge posed by recent network approaches to established ideas of evolutionary processes. We show that the emergence of new fields is in both cases driven by the development of high-throughput data generation technologies and the (...) transfer of modeling techniques from other fields. New and emerging views are characterized by different philosophies of nature, i.e. by different ontological and methodological assumptions and epistemic values and virtues. This results in a kind of conflict we call “epistemic competition” that manifests in two ways: On the one hand, opponents engage in mutual critique and defense of their fundamental assumptions. On the other hand, they compete for the acceptance and integration of the knowledge they provide by a broader scientific community. Despite an initial rhetoric of replacement, the views as well as the respective audiences come to be seen as more clearly distinct during the course of the debate. Hence, we observe—contrary to many other accounts of scientific change—that conflict results in the formation of new niches of research, leading to co-existence and perceived complementarity of approaches. Our model thus contributes to the understanding of the pluralization of the scientific landscape. (shrink)

„Ein jedes Ding in der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, i.e. nach Prinzipien zu handeln oder einen Willen.“ So definiert Kant in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten den Willen oder, was für ihn dasselbe ist, die praktische Vernunft. Die Moral ergibt sich sowohl unter dem formalen Gesichtspunkt ihres Geltungsanspruchs wie unter dem materialen ihrer Grundnorm, nämlich des kategorischen Imperativs, aus der Selbstanwendung der apriorischen Grundstruktur der praktischen Vernunft. Damit (...) ist die Frage beantwortet, "von woher ein unbedingtes Sollen verbindet, was der Grund seiner Verbindlichkeit ist", wie sie beispielhaft Dirk Greimann formuliert. (shrink)

Kant não apresentou o método de sua fundamentação da ética de forma explícita, num tratado próprio. Contudo, podemos compreendê-la como o evidenciar da originalidade da moral. Pois a moral não pode ser derivada de algo não-moral – tão dependência a destruiria. Com isso, a moral não pode ser provada ou justificada num sentido mais estrito, mas apenas pode ser “fundamentada”. E isso pode ser feito quando evidenciamos o lugar ou o topos e a virada ou a trope de seu originar. (...) O topos da origem da moral é, em Kant, a razão prática, sua trope é a virada desta sobre se mesma enquanto autonomia. O que segue desta fundamentação é, por primeiro, a autenticidade da moral e, com isso, sua força obrigatória incondicional, no sentido que esta não é condicionada por algo extramoral; por segundo, segue disso um critério normativo do conteúdo da moral, que é, em Kant, o Imperativo Categórico. O artigo pretende defender que o método kantiano da fundamentação da ética normativa é sem alternativa; contudo, justamente em virtude da descrição meramente formal deste método, abre se a possibilidade de realizá-lo de maneira diferente que o próprio Kant fez, com relação ao conteúdo. (shrink)

A questão do método na Ciência da Lógica (CL) é uma das mais controvertidas na discussão da filosofia de Hegel. O artigo defende a opinião de que o “método absoluto” de fato apresenta uma estrutura formal definida e distinta que seja o princípio geral de todo o desenvolvimento do sistema hegeliano (maduro). Defende essa interpretação contra mal-entendimentos, sobretudo contra aquele que um tal método geral tornaria a CL num formalismo vazio. O método hegeliano é apresentado como método do determinar, sendo (...) que a CL, fundamentalmente e originariamente, não e outra coisa que uma teoria de determinações aprióricas do pensar, i.é, de categorias, regras e formas lógicas. O artigo argumenta em favor da pretensão à universalidade e incondicionalidade que Hegel atribui a seu método. Quer mostrar que é exatamente essa incondicionalidade do método, e nada mas, que sustenta a necessidade e a imanência do proceder do pensar puro e, com isso, sustenta toda a pretensão à “ciência absoluta” e ao “idealismo absoluto” hegeliano. No final, porém, o texto oferece uma crítica interna a este método, que modifica decisivamente a pretensão de Hegel, embora não a destrua fundamentalmente. É que o próprio método contém um momento de indeterminação ou contingência. Essa crítica conduz ao conceito do “acaso” como princípio originário e intransponível de toda dialética e, com isso, de todo determinar-se. Determinação se realiza no acaso da dialética. O acaso dialético e o princípio de toda realidade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Hegel. Método. Ciência da Lógica. ABSTRACT The question of the Method in the Science of Logic (SL) is among the most controversially debated in the discussions on Hegel. This article defends the view that there actually is a definite and distinct formal structure underlying the whole development of Hegel’s (mature) system which he himself presents as the “Absolute Method”. This interpretation is defended against misunderstandings, especially against the opinion that such a method should turn the SL into a empty formalism. Hegel’s Method is explained as method of determining, the SL being primarily and fundamentally nothing else but a theory of the aprioric determinations of thinking, i.e. of categories, logical rules and forms. The article arguments in favor of the universality and unconditionality which Hegel claims for his Method. It tries to show that it is exactly this unconditionality of the Method, and nothing else, which supports the necessity and immanence of “pure thinking” and consequently supports Hegel’s claim to “absolute science” and “absolute idealism”. Finally, however, the article offers a critique of this Method, which modifies it fundamentally without destroying it totally. It is argued that there is a moment of indeterminacy or of contingency within the very Method of determining. This critique will lead to the concept of “accident” or “chance event” as original principle of all dialectics and, with this, of all determining. KEY WORDS – Hegel. Method. Science of Logic. (shrink)

Systems biology is sometimes presented as providing a superior approach to the problem of biological complexity. Its use of ‘unbiased’ methods and formal quantitative tools might lead to the impression that the human factor is effectively eliminated. However, a closer look reveals that this impression is misguided. Systems biologists cannot simply assemble molecular information and compute biological behavior. Instead, systems biology’s main contribution is to accelerate the discovery of mechanisms by applying models as heuristic tools. These models rely on a (...) variety of idealizing and simplifying assumptions in order to be efficient for this purpose. The strategies of systems biologists are similar to those of experimentalists in that they attempt to reduce the complexity of the discovery process. Analyzing and comparing these strategies, or ‘heuristics’, reveals the importance of the human factor in computational approaches and helps to situate systems biology within the epistemic landscape of the life sciences. (shrink)

O artigo tenciona explicar o conceito da subjetividade na Ciência da Lógica (CdL) a partir de sua forma inicial, diferentemente da maioria dos vários estudos sobre a temática, que discute as formas já mais desenvolvidas, que ocorrem dentro da Lógica do Conceito. Porém, como essa última, desde início, é “Lógica Subjetiva”, a subjetividade precisa ser constituída antes ou no ponto do começo dela. Essa subjetividade inicial e mínima explica-se por primeiro pela identificação de subjetividade e liberdade, por segundo, pela compreensão (...) da liberdade como autodeterminação. Essa autodeterminação ocorre, na CdL, pela primeira vez na “necessidade absoluta” e torna-se verdadeiramente autônoma na “relação absoluta” da “ação recíproca”. Essa, quando levada a suas últimas conseqüências, é autodeterminação conceitual ou conceito autodeterminante – e aí inicia-se o reino da liberdade. Mas isso quer dizer que liberdade, inicialmente, não é outra coisa que necessidade internalizada na determinação conceitual, isto é, autodeterminação necessária do conceito. Obviamente, o conhecer, destarte, não faz parte da forma inicial da liberdade e da subjetividade: subjetividade não é, originariamente, auto-consciente. Seu saber-de-si, a subjetividade adquire apenas, através de um desenvolvimento longo e complexo, na “Idéia”, mais especificamente na “Idéia do conhecer”, para plenificar-se na “Idéia absoluta”. O artigo conclui com uma crítica dessa transição à consciência no desenvolvimento imanente da subjetividade, mantendo que a consciência seja algo originário, não reduzível a estruturas conceituais. Palavras chaves: Hegel, Subjetividade, Liberdade, Consciência, Ciência da Lógica. (shrink)

Even though complexity is a concept that is ubiquitously used by biologists and philosophers of biology, it is rarely made precise. I argue that a clarification of the concept is neither trivial nor unachievable, and I propose a unifying framework based on the technical notion of “effective complexity” that allows me to do justice to conflicting intuitions about biological complexity, while taking into account several distinctions in the usage of the concept that are often overlooked. In particular, I propose a (...) distinction between two kinds of complexity, “mechanical” and “emergent”, which can be understood as different ways of relating the effective complexity of mechanisms and of behaviors in biological explanations. I illustrate the adequacy of this framework by discussing different attempts to understand intracellular organization in terms of pathways and networks. My framework provides a different way of thinking about recent philosophical debates, for example, on the difference between mechanistic and topological explanations and about the concept of emergence. Moreover, it can contribute to a proper assessment of metascientific arguments that invoke biological complexity. (shrink)

- A recent debate has touched upon the question of whether diseases can be understood as dysfunctional mechanisms or whether there are "pathological" mechanisms that deserve to be investigated and explained independently (Nervi 2010; Moghaddam Taaheri 2011). Here I suggest that both views tell us something important about disease but that in many instances only a systemic view can shed light on the relationship between physiology and pathology. I provide examples from the literature in systems biology in support of my (...) position. As a result of my analysis, I conclude that a perspective narrowly focusing on mechanisms is insufficient if the goal is to get a comprehensive picture of disease. (shrink)

Occam’s razor refers to the idea that among competing explanations the simplest should be preferred. This principle has been understood and defended in different ways. Some systems biologists argue that traditional molecular biology is misguided because it relies on an unjustified application of Occam’s razor. I analyze which version of the principle is relevant in this context and ask whether the allegation stands up to scrutiny by looking at actual research. I defend the traditional approach by arguing that its use (...) of Occam’s razor is innocuous and by showing that systems biology heavily relies on considerations of simplicity as well. (shrink)

In the Wissenschaftslehre 1804-II, Fichte claims to both continue and correct Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I reject this double claim by demonstrating that Fichte’s engagement with Kant is guided by altered premises that make the affiliation to Kant’s transcendental philosophy seem implausible. These divergences culminate in an opposing understanding of unity between the two philosophers, which can be revealed by attention to Fichte’s objections to the KdU. Fichte’s thesis that Kant established three absolutes instead of one absolute is based on Fichte’s (...) own demand for an absolute unity that is not differentiated in itself, which is also reflected in his transposition of Kant’s concept of the root to the KdU. In section 2, I attempt a precise exegetical reconstruction of Fichte’s concept of the absolute, as well as of his thesis of Kant’s triple absolute. In section 3, I raise three interconnected objections to this: first, Fichte’s critique is actually based on an accusation of dualism, which is suggested both by his own concept of the absolute and the programme of the KdU (section 3.1). Second, however, Kant’s two absoluta should be seen more as constructions by Fichte rather than as revealing problems immanent to Kant’s philosophy (section 3.2). Third, these divergences can be traced back to Fichte’s own understanding of unity, which gives rise to his objections to the KdU in the first place (section 3.3). (shrink)

Kant shows that a fundamental theory of normativity and morality can give neither an explanation nor an explication of normativity, but can only articulate and render explicit its origin. It can do so by indicating the place or topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the topos of normativity is the will qua practical reason and its trope is the general, typically instrumental use of this reason, i.e. reflection. The trope of the origin of morality (...) is autonomy, i.e. practical reason turning on itself and thus becoming pure practical reason, thereby establishing its own form as law: the categorical imperative. Consequently, fundamental ethics serves two functions : formally, it provides evidence for the originality or authenticity of morality; materially, it gives a criteriological principle for the content of morality. The article argues that Kant was right in his view of the foundation of ethics, but was wrong in the manner in which he met the requirements thus established. The topos of normativity and, consequently, of morality cannot be reason, but must be consciousness or, more precisely, knowledge de se; and its fundamental trope cannot be reflection, but must be what can be described as a conversion of consciousness. This conversion can be identified with philein in the sense of Aristotle. It has four different aspects: desire, cognition, benevolence, and recognition. When philein is reciprocal and lived, philia ensues. Friendship is then described as the topos of the origin of Normativity and Morality. (shrink)

Ausführlich dargestellt werden die Verhältnisse der Sprachforschung in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, mit einer Dokumentation der Verfolgten und ins Exil Getriebenen (insgesamt 301 verfolgte Personen) und einer ausführlichen Darstellung der Forschungssituation im 'Reich'. Ausgehend von dieser Darstellung wird die Entwicklung der Sprachforschung (nicht nur in Deutschland) seit dem 19. Jahrhundert skizziert"--Back cover.

Kant did not explain the method of his foundation of ethics expressly. However, we can comprehend it as the demonstration of the originality of morality. For morality cannot be derived from anything non-moral – such a relation of derivation would destroy it. Therefore, there cannot be a justification or proof of morality in the strong sense, there can only be a “groundwork”, as the term “Grundlegung” is normally translated in English. This groundwork or grounding consists in disclosing the place or (...) topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the first is the will as practical reason; the latter is the turn of the will towards itself as autonomy. The result of such groundwork is, first, the evidence of the authenticity of morality and, hence, its unconditional validity – since such original validity is not conditioned on anything extra-moral. Second, we get a normative criterion for the contents of morality, which in Kant takes the form of the Categorical Imperative. The article seeks to defend the view that there is no alternative to Kant’s method of the foundation of ethics. However, by describing this method in a purely formal way, the author aims to open up thepossibility to implement it in another way and with other results than Kant does. (shrink)

In the present paper, it is shown that Kant in his theory of fine art from the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment proves to be a proponent of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which art is, first, a source of non-trivial knowledge and, second, this knowledge also has aesthetic relevance. This issue has been raised several times in the recent research literature, but has not been substantiated, or only briefly. Central to this is Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas, with which fine art (...) symbolizes intellectual ideas of various genesis and with which his theory of art acquires a content-aesthetic dimension. Discussing recent research literature, an interpretation for the conception of aesthetic ideas and the accompanying expressive dimension of fine art is offered in a first part. Based on this, it will be shown in a second part that Kant hereby proves to be a representative of aesthetic cognitivism; this is shown by the fact that his theory of art confirms both criteria of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

A questão “por quê ser moral”, que foi formulada expressamente no contexto do debate filosófico acadêmico por Francis Herbert Bradley, divide os leitores quando buscam sua resposta em Kant. Uns acham, como Gerold Prauss, que Kant negue a possibilidade de tal resposta e diga que a moral precisa ser aceita como um fato simplesmente dado, o “fato da razão”. Contudo, como tal imediatismo ou “decisionismo transcendental” parece insatisfatório, um outro grupo defende a assim chamada “interpretação do agente racional”, onde este (...) último apresenta o valor supremo, absoluto, que fundamenta a moral e, com isso, apresenta a razão em virtude da qual devemos agir moralmente. Mas tal valor absoluto ou já é moral, mas então a resposta dada à questão “por quê ser moral” entra num círculo vicioso. Ou tal valor faz a moral depender de algo fora da moral o que, conforme Kant, destruiria toda moral. A solução do problema é a seguinte: Kant não deriva a moral de um pressuposto extramoral nem pressupõe a própria moral como simplesmente dada, mas explica o originar da moral. Ela origina da razão prática pela volta dessa razão sobre si mesma que constitui sua autonomia. Por este seu originar, a moral não é uma mera derivação de algo pressuposto, mas algo radicalmente novo, original, autónomo. Pelo outro lado, existe, sim, uma fundamentação da moral, i.e., um processo compreensível de sua constituição. Com isso, Kant evita o imediatismo: a moral não precisa ser simplesmente aceita como um fato puro, mas pode ser compreendida pela razão. (shrink)

Some features of Hegel’s Philosophy of History make it hardly acceptable in the 21st century. It proposes a final destination (Endzweck) of history, together with a principle of rational, dialectic necessity to take it there. In fact, these conceptions are not as absurd as they may seem to contemporary eyes. Nevertheless, the article doesn’t pretend to defend them, but aims to show that there is, behind these two, a third principle which is well worth to be defended –and which, in (...) fact, can systematically maintained without support from the other two. This we can call the “Principle of ethical asymmetry in history”. However, we also can name it by the formula Hegel himself coined: the “progress in the consciousness of liberty”. To explain this idea, the article evidences that the fundamental characteristic of all normativity is practical knowledge de se. In morality or ethics, this turns reflexive and self-determining. Liberty in Hegel’s sense effectively realizes this knowledge de se not only in a formal and abstract way, as in Kant, but concretely in history and in specific communities. However, since liberty in this process always remains linked to that normative self-comprehension which constitutes our practical self-consciousness, the processes of historical realization of liberty are normatively irreversible. Precisely for this process has an element of objective and unconditional aspect. The article concludes with some remarks as to how this principle of ethical asymmetry in history can serve as a basis of e new ethical theory which is strongly normative and, at the same time, sensitive to historic context an human finitude. (shrink)

As normas da moral são as regras sob as quais o indivíduo livre limita livremente sua liberdade em prol da liberdade geral. As normas da lei são regras sob as quais o indivíduo livre é forçado a limitar sua liberdade em prol da liberdade geral. Com isso quase todos os filósofos modernos concordam. A ideia genial e central da filosofia prática de Hegel é que as normas tanto da moral quanto da lei não são limitações da liberdade, mas o cumprimento (...) dela, porque nelas e somente nelas a liberdade se realiza. O conceito dessa realidade geral da liberdade nas normas éticas é a “eticidade”. Essa concepção Hegel desenvolve a partir da reflexão, necessariamente chega à compreensão de que o cumprimento pleno de sua liberdade consiste na eticidade. O presente artigo tenta expor esse nexo lógico-conceitual. Em seguida, oferece algumas indicações concretas para a situação política atual, para, por fim, apontar um defeito que inclusive o conceito hegeliano de liberdade tem. (shrink)

Joining voluntary thematic initiatives can be a means for firms to legitimate their business activities. However, a lack of review mechanisms could create incentives for free-riding. This might lead to a lower commitment to the initiative’s principles, and endanger its credibility and its members’ legitimacy benefits. Whether members of voluntary initiatives take advantage of the opportunity to free-ride has not been analyzed empirically so far. To fill this research gap, we investigate from an institutional theory perspective the actual implementation behavior (...) of publicly listed signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) in a difference-in-differences and an event study setting. Our empirical results show that, after signing, UN PRI signatories integrate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in their business activities significantly more than matched non-signatories from the financial sector, indicating the commitment of the signatories to the UN PRI in general. However, while the initial members show a high commitment to the initiative’s principles by increasing their ESG integration performance substantially, new members signing at a later stage of the initiative perform considerably less, and thus undermine the UN PRI’s credibility. We derive implications for voluntary thematic initiatives to avoid such a development. (shrink)

Drei Arten der Freundschaft gibt es nach Aristoteles. In der ersten, der Freundschaft im vollen und eigentlichen Sinn, lieben sich die Freunde aufgrund ihrer charakterlichen Vortrefflichkeit, in der zweiten, weil sie sich Lust bereiten und in der dritten, weil sie sich nützlich sind. Alle drei Freundschaftsformen erfordern Gegenseitigkeit und Unverborgenheit der Gesinnung. Bezüglich eines weiteren Kriteriums scheint der Text auf den ersten Blick undeutlich zu sein : das Wohlwollen ist zunächst Bestandteil der allgemeinen Freundschaftsdefinition, wird dann aber nach Meinung der (...) meisten Interpretatoren auf die Tugendfreundschaft eingeschränkt. John M. Cooper hat dagegen bereits 1976 die These aufgestellt, alle drei Formen der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles implizierten das Wohlwollen im vollen Sinn seiner Aristotelischen Definition. Dagegen hat vor allem A. W. Price argumentiert, dass es Wohlwollen im vollen Sinn nach Aristoteles nur in der Tugendfreundschaft gebe. Diese Position ist inzwischen so selbstverständlich geworden, dass Coopers Interpretation z. T. gar nicht mehr erwähnt wird. Ich möchte mich für die These Coopers einsetzen und dabei seine Argumente präzisieren und verstärken. (shrink)

In her book Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant. The Violence and the Charity, Morganna Lambeth presents a comprehensive, compelling and original assessment of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in the 1920s. She places Heidegger's controversial claim that the transcendental imagination is the original root of cognition in the centre of her interpretation and fleshes its implications out throughout her book, gauging its significance from multiple angles (e.g., with regard to the advantages of Heidegger's reading over the readings of (...) other post-Kantian philosophers). Thereby, she not only manages to bring much clarity into the often dark and twisted claims Heidegger articulates through Kant's voice but also convincingly defends many of them. Generally, Lambeth aims to vindicate the significance of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant which, as she lays out, has received little acceptance in Anglophone Kant scholarship and is often met with the conviction that it is primarily informative about Heidegger's own philosophy into which he urges Kant violently (a view supported by Heidegger's later self-criticisms). Lambeth proposes a different and quite attractive story, suggesting that Heidegger is deeply engaged with Kant's own thought and offers a novel and “genuine interpretation of Kant” instead of looking into “a distorted mirror in which he can see only himself." In this vein, the conclusion of Lambeth's book assesses the merit of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant with regard to topics of contemporary Kant scholarship (metaphysics, discursivity, conceptualism, idealism, historicism). But Lambeth also makes a strong and original case for the significance of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant for Heidegger's own thought. As she argues, Heidegger develops his “temporal idealism” of Being and Time further when interpreting Kant. (shrink)

This article is the first English translation of Gadamer's early essay “On the Idea of a System in Philosophy” (“Zur Systemidee in der Philosophie”) from 1924. Influenced by Marburg Neo-Kantianism and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, Gadamer is concerned with the problems that arise with the idea of systematicity in philosophy. In particular, he focuses on conceiving of an idea of a system that does justice to the historical variability of philosophical thoughts. He shows that systematicity and history are, in fact, not (...) in tension but deeply intertwined because of the foundation philosophy has in factical and historical human life. Gadamer, therefore, already anticipates some of the most characteristic ideas of his later magnum opus Truth and Method. The translator's Introduction contextualises this essay in both its relation to Marburg Neo-Kantians and Heidegger's thought, highlights the most significant continuities to Gadamer's mature philosophy, and provides an overview of the essay's main arguments. (shrink)