Karl Popper's methodology highlights our scientific ignorance: hence the need to institutionalize open‐mindedness through controlled experiments that may falsify our fallible theories about the world. In his endorsement of “piecemeal social engineering,” Popper assumes that the social‐democratic state and its citizens are capable of detecting social problems, and of assessing the results of policies aimed at solving them, through a process of experimentation analogous to that of natural science. But we are not only scientifically but politically ignorant: ignorant of the (...) facts that underpin political debate, which are brought to our attention by theories that, as Max Weber emphasized, can be tested only through counterfactual thought experiments. Public‐opinion and political‐psychology research suggest that human beings are far too unaware, illogical, and doctrinaire to conduct the rigorous theorizing that would be necessary to make piecemeal social engineering work. F.A. Hayek realized that the public could not engage, specifically, in piecemeal economic regulation but failed to draw the conclusion that this was due to a specific type of political ignorance: ignorance of economic theory. (shrink)

Hayek developed two contradictory epistemologies. The epistemology for which he is famous attributed dispersed knowledge to economic actors and credited the price system for aggregating and communicating this knowledge. The other epistemology attributed to human and non-human organisms alike the error-prone interpretation of stimuli, which could never truly be said to be “knowledge.” Several of the paradoxes of Hayek's economic and political thought that are explored in this symposium can be explained by the triumph of the first epistemology (...) over the second, including his historical interpretation of socialism as a planning mentality; his tendentious definitions of “liberty” and “justice”; and his opposition to economic redistribution even as he endorsed all manner of economic and social regulations. (shrink)

In “Popper, Weber, and Hayek,” I claimed that the economic and political world governed by social democracy is too complex to offer hope for rational social‐democratic policy making. I extrapolated this conclusion from the claim, made by Austrian‐school economists in the 1920s and 30s, that central economic planning would face insurmountable “knowledge problems.” Israel Kirzner's Reply indicates the need to keep the Austrians’ cognitivist argument conceptually distinct from more familiar incentives arguments, which can tacitly reintroduce the assumption of omniscience (...) against which the Austrian economists rebelled. Callahan's Reply illustrates the need to keep in mind the hypothetical, conditional nature of economic arguments. Notturno's Reply changes the subject by asserting the intrinsic value of social‐democratic participation, regardless of its outcomes—even while, like Talisse's Reply, ignoring the evidence that public ignorance and elite dogmatism probably can't be mitigated by more information or by appeals to be open minded. And Hill focuses on the very real imperfections of market and other private‐sphere decision making, without weighing the shortcomings of the political alternatives. Markets and other private‐sphere decision arenas don't have to be perfect for them to improve upon public‐sector processes. In the latter, cognitive demands tend to be much greater, because of the divergence of modern social problems from the conditions that would have faced the hunter‐gatherers whose cognitive apparatus we have inherited. (shrink)

Hayek's case for the limits of economic agents’ knowledge does not, as Greg Hill seems to suggest, imply that government should be in the business of engaging in countercyclical fiscal policy or paternalistic corrections of people's pursuit of “imaginary goods.” In the latter case, markets have corrective learning mechanisms for consumer mistakes. In the former, public‐choice and public‐ignorance problems plague government efforts to correct the business cycle. The problem of public ignorance is, in turn, Jeffrey Friedman's topic, but (...) he is unfair in condemning Hayek's abandonment of this problem in order to develop his thesis that a “planning mentality” was the source of the leftist ideas with which Hayek disagreed. Hayek was confronted by widely popular planning schemes that were endorsed by a great many of his colleagues, who were not ignorant of economics. (shrink)

Markets can be said to overcome ignorance in two senses. First, in an imaginary world of economic equilibrium, market prices can signal to consumers how they may alter their behavior so as to conform to supply and demand conditions of which they are ignorant. This is a point that was underscored by F.A. Hayek and, now, by Jeffrey Friedman. But the more important manner in which markets overcome ignorance was identified by Hayek's mentor, Ludwig von Mises, and (...) is not mentioned by Friedman: when market prices are not perfectly aligned to supply and demand conditions (and they never are), they present profit opportunities to entrepreneurs who are alert to make such discoveries. Their profit‐motivated actions then reallocate resources in a pattern more efficiently reflecting the true supply and demand conditions. It is this way of overcoming ignorance that most clearly separates the market arena from the political arena, because no corresponding corrective discovery process exists in politics. (shrink)

Jeffrey Friedman credits Popper for calling attention to our scientific ignorance, but faults him for failing to recognize that we are at least as ignorant about politics as we are about science. He also credits Hayek for realizing that the public could not successfully engage in piecemeal economic regulation, but faults him for not recognizing that this is due to the public's ignorance of economic theory. Friedman suggests that the types of ignorance overlooked by Popper and (...) class='Hi'>Hayek compromise the very possibility of democracy—or at least social democracy. He assumes, however, that the success of social democracy and “piecemeal social engineering” depend upon their ability to produce “good” policies. This does not do justice to Popper's views about democracy and piecemeal engineering, and it also presumes an underlying economism that Popper criticized—but to which Friedman and Hayek adhere. (shrink)

In “Popper, Weber, and Hayek: The Epistemology and Politics of Ignorance,” Jeffrey Friedman argues that markets are superior to democratic institutions because the price system doesn't require people to make the kind of difficult counterfactual judgments that are necessary in order to evaluate public‐policy alternatives. I contend that real‐world markets require us to make all kinds of difficult counterfactual judgments, that the nature of these judgments limits the effectiveness of the price system in coordinating our activities, and that (...) the market participant who is capable of making reasonably good economic judgments can also become the kind of well‐informed citizen who is essential to democratic self‐government. (shrink)

Review of Mark Friedman's book 'Nozick’s Libertarian Project,' which is a defence of Robert Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia.'.

This book describes the philosophical principles underlying the doctrine (the political project) often called “classical liberalism”. By this expression we mean, in this book, the project for society proposed, during the second half of the eighteenth century, by David Hume and Adam Smith in Great Britain, Turgot and Condorcet in France, Thomas Jefferson in the United States and Kant and Humboldt in Germany. The differences between the principles of “classical liberalism” and those of the extreme doctrines of Milton Friedman (...) and Friedrich Hayek (often confused with 'classical liberalism') are clearly explained. -/- This book has been translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Vietnamese, Rumanian and Turkish. -/- Several scholars have done me the honor of posting a .pdf version of this work (which is no longer available in paper form). Here are three excellent versions that are easily found : -/- "Les fondements philosophiques du libéralisme jugurtha noblogs" (224 pages), "Les fondements philosophiques du libéralisme" (224 pages), in ZLibrary. -/- "Les fondements philosophiques du libéralisme abdelmagidzarrouki" (224 pages), -/- . (shrink)

This review article of The Making of Modern Liberalism and Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics centres on the different trajectories of liberal and neoliberal thought that are mapped out by these two works. It is argued that to achieve an understanding of the meeting points, continuities and discontinuities between liberalism and neoliberalism it is necessary to examine the economic and political bases of these forms of governmental reason. By doing so, it (...) is suggested that it is possible to develop a fuller understanding of what was/is new about neoliberalism as both a political and an epistemological project. (shrink)

This paper compares Joseph Heath’s critique of the just deserts rationale for markets with an earlier critique due to Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, and Friedrich Hayek. Heath shares their emphasis upon the role of luck in prices based on supply and demand. Yet he avoids their claim that the inheritance of human capital is on a moral par with the inheritance of ordinary capital, as a basis for unequal shares of the social product. Heath prefers to argue that (...) markets do not tend to reward talent as such. The paper raises some doubts about this factual claim, and argues that sweeping the issue of talent under the rug threatens to make our theory of justice less egalitarian than it would otherwise be. The paper also addresses the objection that claims of unfairness based on the arbitrariness of the distribution of innate abilities will undermine self-respect. (shrink)

Disagreements about the morality of markets, and about self-interested behavior within markets, run deep. They arise from perspectives within economics and political philosophy that appear to have nothing in common. In this book, Daniel Finn provides a framework for understanding these conflicting points of view. Recounting the arguments for and against markets and self-interest, he argues that every economy must address four fundamental problems: allocation, distribution, scale, and the quality of relations. In addition, every perspective on the morality of markets (...) addresses explicitly or implicitly the economic, political, and cultural contexts of markets, or what Finn terms 'the moral ecology of markets'. His book enables a dialogue among the various participants in the debate over justice in markets. In this process, Finn engages with major figures in political philosophy, including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Michael Walzer, as well as in economics, notably Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and James Buchannan. (shrink)

Bunge (2000) distinguishes two main methodological approaches of holism and individualism, and associates with them policy prescriptions of centralism and laissez-faire. He identifies systemism as a superior approach to both the study and management of society. The present paper, seeking to correct and develop this line of thought, suggests a more complex relation between policy and methodology. There are two possible methodological underpinnings for laissez-faire: while writers such as Friedman and Lucas fit Bunge’s pattern, more sophisticated advocates of laissez-faire, (...) such as Smith and Hayek, base their policy prescription in a methodology quite divergent from the individualism Bunge describes. (shrink)

As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, governments have turned to various discretionary measures such as cash transfers to consumers and businesses with mixed results. Universal Basic Income (UBI) is back on the agenda as well. One of the main advantages of UBI, as scholars like F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James M. Buchanan have argued, is that it does not depend upon competent and benevolent government discretion—which is often in short supply—but upon pre-established rules. This paper argues (...) that the UBI scheme holds tentative promise from the point of view of improving the institutional crisis preparedness of a complex socioeconomic order. The pre-established rules of UBI buttress the rule of law framework that improves the ability of economic agents to spontaneously coordinate their actions in times of crisis characterized by radical uncertainty, disequilibrium shocks, and institutional instability. Furthermore, UBI combines the distribution of fungible resources with the delegation of independent decision-making power to millions of crisis-struck individuals and communities. Compared to discretionary tax-and-transfer schemes, the rules of UBI therefore appear more compatible with the polycentric discovery of novel solutions from the bottom-up. In times of crisis, UBI may be relied upon as one cornerstone of what I shall call the permanent crisis management framework. Having such a permanent scheme may minimize - although it does not altogether eliminate - the need for discretionary transfers, targeted intervention, and technocratic management in times of crisis. However, this theoretical model of UBI as a facilitator of polycentric crisis preparedness faces several practical challenges that need to be addressed in further research. (shrink)

Best known for reviving the tradition of classical liberalism, F. A. Hayek was also a prominent scholar of the philosopher John Stuart Mill. One of his greatest undertakings was a collection of Mill’s extensive correspondence with his longstanding friend and later companion and wife, Harriet Taylor-Mill. Hayek first published the Mill-Taylor correspondence in 1951, and his edition soon became required reading for any study of the nineteenth-century foundations of liberalism. This latest addition to the University of Chicago Press’s (...) Collected Works of F. A. Hayek series showcases the fascinating intersections between two of the most prominent thinkers from two successive centuries. Hayek situates Mill within the complex social and intellectual milieu of nineteenth-century Europe—as well as within twentieth-century debates on socialism and planning—and uncovers the influence of Taylor-Mill on Mill’s political economy. The volume features the Mill-Taylor correspondence and brings together for the first time Hayek’s related writings, which were widely credited with beginning a new era of Mill scholarship. (shrink)

In this paper, we move toward offering psychological benchmarks to measure success in building increasingly humanlike robots. By psychological benchmarks we mean categories of interaction that capture conceptually fundamental aspects of human life, specified abstractly enough to resist their identity as a mere psychological instrument, but capable of being translated into testable empirical propositions. Nine possible benchmarks are considered: autonomy, imitation, intrinsic moral value, moral accountability, privacy, reciprocity, conventionality, creativity, and authenticity of relation. Finally, we discuss how getting the right (...) group of benchmarks in human–robot interaction will, in future years, help inform on the foundational question of what constitutes essential features of being human. (shrink)

Legal systems often rule that people own objects in their territory. We propose that an early-developing ability to make territory-based inferences of ownership helps children address informational demands presented by ownership. Across 6 experiments (N = 504), we show that these inferences develop between ages 3 and 5 and stem from two aspects of the psychology of ownership. First, we find that a basic ability to infer that people own objects in their territory is already present at age 3 (Experiment (...) 1). Children even make these inferences when the territory owner unintentionally acquired the objects and was unaware of them (Experiments 2 and 3). Second, we find that between ages 3 and 5, children come to consider past events in these judgments. They move from solely considering the current location of an object in territory-based inferences, to also considering and possibly inferring where it originated (Experiments 4 to 6). Together, these findings suggest that territory-based inferences of ownership are unlikely to be constructions of the law. Instead, they may reflect basic intuitions about ownership that operate from early in development. (shrink)

Liberal-minded basic income scholars often argue that UBI has two key properties that work together to justify it. Let us call these the freedom justification and the narrative justification. On the one hand, UBI is defended because it gives people more freedom to do what they want to do. (Stigler, 1946, Friedman, 1962; Van Parijs, 1995; Widerquist, 2013) They exhibit primary concern for the purely formal properties of the regime of liberal neutrality. On the other hand, many scholars, including (...) many of the same liberal scholars, argue that UBI also pushes society substantively towards desirable social outcomes. They combine the freedom justification with substantive predictions and expectations. (Rifkin, 1995; Murray, 2016; Weeks, 2020) However, I show that both existentialist philosophy (Sartre) and complexity theory (Knight, Hayek, Schumpeter) suggest that a liberal social order is compatible, at best, with rough pattern prediction about a multiply realizable future that remains narratively open to multiple possible trajectories. Liberal neutrality, to the extent that it nourishes radical freedom, is incompatible with strong, stable narrative predictions. As Nozick put, it “liberty upsets patterns”. This is true of all liberal UBI models, and liberal institutions in general. (shrink)

The considerable attention to financial interests in clinical research has focused mostly on academic medical centers, even though the majority of clinical research is conducted in community practice settings. To fill this gap, this article maps the practices and policies in 73 community hospitals and several hundred specialized facilities around the country for reviewing clinical investigators’ financial relationships with research sponsors. Community hospitals face a substantially different mix of issues than academic medical centers do because their physician researchers are usually (...) not employees, and more of their studies are later-phase, multicenter trials. Accordingly, community physicians stand to benefit personally from per capita payments, but they tend to have less direct influence over research findings when compared with their academic peers. These and other contrasts require separate guidance for community-based organizations that takes into account their particular needs, circumstances, and institutional capacities. (shrink)

To improve on the argument presented by classical economists, many authors have tried to rely as much as possible on a value-free approach. In this paper, reasons to reject the propositions made by neoclassical economists are briefly recalled. We then turn toward Kirzner’s proposition which is to evaluate a policy, or a rule, according to the extent to which it promotes coordination. This proposition, however, must also be rejected because, if it introduces some dynamics in the picture, it is a (...) dynamics towards equilibrium, while real life, entrepreneurial dynamics can either be towards coordination or discoordination. Coordination is not monotonously linked to progress. It therefore appears preferable to rely on Hayek’s notion of order; a notion specifically designed to allow progress to take place, while maintaining a ‘satisfactory’ level of coordination. For such an order to prevail, any rule or policy deliberately introduced must be compatible with the existing order, that is, it must protect legitimate expectations. Following a reflection on the definition of ‘legitimacy’ we then reach the conclusion that the quest for a value-free welfare economics is lost, and that even the quest for a value-free economics will have, in a certain sense, to be left, or at least reconsidered.Afin d’améliorer l’argument présenté par les économistes classiques, beaucoup d’auteurs ont essayé de se reposer autant que possible sur une approche sans jugements de valeur. Dans cet article, nous rappelons brièvement les raisons de rejeter les propositions faites par les économistes néoclassiques. Nous nous tournons donc vers la proposition de Kirzner qui est d’évaluer une politique, ou une règle, par rapport à la manière dont elle promeut la coordination. Cependant, cette proposition doit aussi être rejetée car si elle introduit une dynamique dans l’analyse, c’est une dynamique du côté de l’équilibre, alors que dans la vie réelle, la dynamique entrepreneuriale peut initier plus de coordination ou plus de discoordination. La coordination n’est pas liée de manière monotone au progrès. Il apparaît aussi préférable de se rattacher à la notion d’ordre de Hayek, notion construite précisément pour permettre au progrès d’avoir lieu, tout en maintenant un niveau “satisfaisant” de coordination. Pour qu’un tel ordre existe, toute règle ou politique délibérément introduite doit être compatible avec l’ordre existant, c’està- dire, qu’elle doit protéger les anticipations légitimes. Après une réflexion sur la définition de “légitimité”, nous arrivons à la conclusion que la quête d’une science économique du bien-être sans jugement de valeur est un échec, et que la quête d’une science économique sans jugement de valeur doit être, dans un certain sens, abandonnée ou au mieux reconsidérée. (shrink)

In this article, we first offer a model of design knowledge types and their interrelationships in value sensitive design. Then we demonstrate that value sensitive design is a formative framework, which provides a shaping influence on practice, enables creative appropriation, and supports theory and method development.

ABSTRACT Popper's attitude to traditions is fundamentally rationalistic. He analyses traditions, along with other institutions and practices, in terms of their efficiency in promoting goals which can be specified independently of the traditions themselves. Hayek, by contrast, looks at traditions in terms of their contributions to the survival of the culture in which they are embedded, something whose evaluation may be opaque even to people within the culture. Both these approaches are flawed compared to Oakeshott's insistence that traditions are (...) not goal‐oriented, and that goals cannot be specified independently of agents’forms of life. Oakeshott's views constitute a via media between Popperian rationalism and Hayekian anti‐rationalism. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s fame as the ‘founder’ of economics has led to him being claimed as an inspiration by many subsequent thinkers. This chapter examines the claims of a particular group of thinkers who have identified Smith as an intellectual inspiration and forefather. The ‘New Right’ thinkers who participated in the revival of classical liberal political and economic ideas in the second part of the twentieth century have made a particular claim on Smith and this chapter takes this claim seriously and (...) explores its validity. Cutting through the rhetoric, it examines what three representative thinkers of this ‘school’, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Friedrich Hayek, actually say about Smith and what they claim to have learned from him. (shrink)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is facing two crises: a potentially explosive Ebola epidemic and a major insurgency. But they are not wholly distinct from each other: the first is intertwined with the second, and public mistrust and political violence add a dangerous dimension to the Ebola epidemic. The World Health Organization and other health emergency responders will increasingly find themselves fighting outbreaks in insecure, misgoverned or ungoverned zones, possibly experiencing active conflict. Yet the WHO has neither the mission (...) nor the capabilities to navigate these security threats. We cannot expect that the usual public health strategy will succeed when health workers’ lives are directly imperiled and community resistance runs deep. Tackling health emergencies amidst complex humanitarian crises requires fresh thinking. Here, we offer a blueprint for fighting diseases in complex humanitarian emergencies. The building blocks of security and trust include high‐level political support, street‐level diplomacy, community engagement, enhanced funding, and protection of health professionals working in conflict or disaster zones. (shrink)

1. The Real Claim of the Chicago School If anything dramatic has happened in economic theory over the last one hundred years – namely, since the advent of marginalism – then, everyone agrees, it was not the rise of the Chicago neo -classical school which, after all, only synthesized the various versions of marginalism, but the Keynesian Revolution. Assessments of this revolution were repeatedly invited, particularly by opponent, chiefly from Chicago. F. A. von Hayek has explicitly and bitterly blames (...) Keynes for all our economic troubles; Harry Johnson has repeatedly declared the most revolutionary work of Keynes, his General Theory of 1936, so poor that but for its author's name on its title page it would have totally flopped. Can such a flop cause so much damage? Are these two assessments – of Hayek and of Johnson – in conflict or no t? Don Patinkin has raised a different question: how different is Keynes from his Chicago opponents, say, Milton Friedman? How many heads need roll, to use his metaphor, before a revolution may be declared? Patinkin sees Keynes as slightly deviant but stil l a member of the mainstream – the mainstream of the mainstream being Friedman and his Chicago followers, of course. Now, can a minor deviant be a flop? Can minor deviations from the true blue doctrine be to blame for all of our economic woes? I do not kno w. Joan Robinson sees in Keynes a minor deviation from classical theory because he said once his correction of classical theory is implemented, that theory takes over once again. Moreover, Samuelson and Friedman have endorsed a (poor) version of Keynes' theory of shortterm relative price and ignored his general theory of price and money. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission declared that allowing medical providers to advertise directly to consumers would be “providing the public with truthful information about the price, quality or other aspects of their service.” However, our understanding of the advertising content is highly limited.ObjectiveTo assess whether direct-to-consumer medical service advertisements provide relevant information on access, quality and cost of care, a content analysis was conducted.MethodTelevision and online advertisements for medical services directly targeting consumers were collected in two major urban (...) centres in Nevada, USA, identifying 313 television advertisements and 200 non-duplicate online advertisements.ResultsBoth television and online advertisements reliably conveyed information about the services provided and how to make an appointment. At the same time, less than half of the advertisements featured insurance information and hours of operation and less than a quarter of them contained information regarding the quality and price of care. The claims of quality were substantiated in even fewer advertisements. The scarcity of quality and cost information was more severe in television advertisements.ConclusionThere is little evidence that medical service advertising, in its current form, would contribute to lower prices or improved quality of care by providing valuable information to consumers. (shrink)

For many economists, including those who have made the most marked contribution to the development of the discipline, their work has to be understood in the context of the rhetorical strategy they were pursuing – what they wanted to persuade us of and how they wanted to do it. The paper identifies two fundamental rhetorical strategies of laissez-faire resting on entirely distinct ontological foundations. What distinguishes these two strategies is the way they articulate the individual with the general interest, how (...) they relate the micro to the macro. The two strategies discussed in the paper are characterised by the stance they take on a fundamental ontological issue, the way in which the things which appear to us in the world are related to the things or matters which compose them. A reductionist approach suggests that we can understand an entity at one level as a congeries. An entity in this view is just an aggregate of entities at a lower, substrate level – a purely external unity. The properties and behaviour of an entity can then be understood in terms of the properties and behaviour of the constituent lower-level components, taken in isolation. In this approach, phenomena at some level are regarded as having just the qualities enjoyed by its lower-level, substrate elements, writ large. The contrary, holistic, stance is to view the qualities of phenomena at one level as emergent at that level, and to assert that an entity can be understood as a product of the inter-relations between its component parts. We have, then, a pair of contrasted approaches: a polarity which is productive in the study of schools of thought, of competing methodologies, and of rhetorical strategies in economics. The paper applies this approach to the work of Smith, Keynes, Hayek, Lucas and Friedman. (shrink)

In this new book, Michael Friedman argues that Kant's continuing efforts to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the sciences is of the utmost ...

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of social phenomena, and to determine the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive character and status as social phenomena. In chapter I it is argued that the most important difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the former have to employ intentional criteria to identify their (...) explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails in the physical. In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of social phenomena should adopt. In chapter III the contention that the social sciences deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended, and the main implications of this contention for social analysis are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle predictable is discussed. In chapter IV the structural properties of formal scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle of rationality', are discussed. In chapter V the central questions behind the methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology is consistent with methodological individualism. Finally, it is claimed that the principle of methodological individualism does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal phenomena. In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running through the five preceding chapters are drawn together in a brief summary of the most important points raised by this thesis. (shrink)

With a new foreword by Paul Kelly 'I regard Hayek's work as a new opening of the most fundamental debate in the field of political philosophy' - Sir Karl Popper 'This promises to be the crowning work of a scholar who has devoted a lifetime to thinking about society and its values. The entire work must surely amount to an immense contribution to social and legal philosophy' - Philosophical Studies Law, Legislation and Liberty is Hayek's major statement of (...) political philosophy and one of the most ambitious yet subtle defences of a free market society ever written. A robust defence of individual liberty, it is also crucial for understanding Hayek's influential views concerning the role of the state: far from being an innocent bystander, he argues that the state has an important role to play in defending the norms and practices of an ordered and free society. His arguments had a profound influence on the policies of Thatcher in the 1980s and resonate today in visions of the 'Big Society'. First published in three separate volumes, this Routledge Classics edition makes one of his most important books available in a single volume. Essential reading for understanding the background to the recent world economic turmoil and financial crisis, it also foreshadows the subsequent heated debate about regulation and political governance if such disasters are to be avoided in the future. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Flage Lesley Friedman "The chiefexercise of the memory," Hume tells us, "is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position."1 On Daniel Flage's interpretation ofHume, however, it is the only exercise ofthe memory (1985a, 1985b, 1990). Flage's account can accommodate onlymemories of complex ideas; he disallows the possibility of 'preserving* a simple idea in its simplicity. Yet there is an example of a (...) purely simple impression in the Treatise; and since for every impression there is in principle a corresponding idea which we can later recall, this example establishes the existence of a purely simple memory-idea. In what follows I will provide support for this claim, Flage's counterarguments (this volume) notwithstanding. Flage argues that given any perceived object, say a coloured dot, there is a visual field in which we perceive it. This field and the impression we receive from it, "must be a complex impression, that is, an impression that is composed of indefinitely many colour points. In this respect it is analogous to a pointillist painting or, to use a more contemporary example, a computer array composed of pixels" (1993, 190). Flage is probably right about this; from our point of view, it is implausible to suggest that there is any purely simple background, or worse, that there is no impression ofa background at all. Nonetheless, my concern is with what Hume thought and not with what is plausible orimplausible; and Hume does give an example ofa "background" that is notcomplex, namely, the scenarioinwhichwe perceive points oflight in darkness. We may observe, that when two bodies present themselves, where there wasformerly an entire darkness, the onlychange, that is discoverable, is in the appearance ofthese two objects, and that all the rest continues to be as before, a perfect negation oflight, and of every colour'd or visible object. This is not only true of what may be said to be remote from these bodies, but also of the very distance; which is interpos'd betwixt them; that being nothing but darkness, or the negation of light; without parts, without composition, invariable and indivisible. (T 57, bold italics added) I originally considered the ink spot experiment and theidea ofred in the dark as examples ofpurely simple impressions. Let me try this Volume XLX Number 1 199 LESLEYFRIEDMAN again, elaborating a bit more on the latter (what I take to be Hume's example of a version of the ink spot experiment). Early on in the Treatise Hume speaks of"that idea ofred which we form in the dark" (T 3). Let us then consider a red spot in complete darkness. Flage and I agree that this spot is qualitatively simple. Our disagreement is rooted in the nature ofthe "background," in this case the darkness. Flage claims that "the sighted-person sitting in the dark has an impression or impressions, namely, an impression of darkness" (1993, 190); and therefore the impression we have of the spot of red in darkness is not purely simple. In support of this claim he cites the followingevidence: Hume's remarks that (1) "the sighted-person sitting in the dark "receives no other perception... than what is common to him with one born blind' " (ibid., 189; T 55-56), and (2) "the idea of utter darkness can never be the same with that of vacuum" (T 56). Let me take each ofthese in turn. Presumably, the first quote is cited in order to estabUsh that the blind person does indeed have a perception (impression) of darkness. This cannot be right; ifsuch a person had an impression ofdarkness, he would also have an idea of darkness, and if we look to the part of the sentence which Flage leaves out of his quotation, we find the following: "and 'tis certain such-a-one [that is, a blind person] has no idea either of light or darkness" (T 56). Hume's point is simple: the reason that the blind person has no idea ofdarkness is because he has no impression of darkness; and we are in the same position as him when we are sitting in the dark. Nor does the second quote provide evidence for the... (shrink)

The defence of the market and economic freedom have been the main objectives of the investigations by liberal thinkers such as Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, F Hayek and L Von Mises. Bearing in mind that the first two economists are the maximum exponents of the Chicago School and the last two of the Austrian School, it is often concluded that the theories of both schools are similar. This book demonstrates that in reality, there is no convergence or complementariness (...) to be found between both schools of thought. The anthropological categories, contributed by Mises, allow us to understand all human phenomena from the view of the man who acts. In this view, economics is part of a philosophical system whose core is the creative capacity of people. Becker’s work, on the other hand, is concentrated on the generalization of the _homo economicus_ as the basis for explaining all human behaviour. He generalizes the maximizing principle to explain all human reality, and extends the scope of the application of a so-called scientific and technical view of the world. In this key volume, an important read for those in the fields of economic theory and political economy, Javier Aranzadi argues, in essence, that the tradition of Hayek and Mises encourages a humanistic liberalism, whereas the Chicago School proposes only a technical humanism. (shrink)

1. The Real Claim of the Chicago School If anything dramatic has happened in economic theory over the last one hundred years – namely, since the advent of marginalism – then, everyone agrees, it was not the rise of the Chicago neo -classical school which, after all, only synthesized the various versions of marginalism, but the Keynesian Revolution. Assessments of this revolution were repeatedly invited, particularly by opponent, chiefly from Chicago. F. A. von Hayek has explicitly and bitterly blames (...) Keynes for all our economic troubles; Harry Johnson has repeatedly declared the most revolutionary work of Keynes, his General Theory of 1936, so poor that but for its author's name on its title page it would have totally flopped. Can such a flop cause so much damage? Are these two assessments – of Hayek and of Johnson – in conflict or no t? Don Patinkin has raised a different question: how different is Keynes from his Chicago opponents, say, Milton Friedman? How many heads need roll, to use his metaphor, before a revolution may be declared? Patinkin sees Keynes as slightly deviant but stil l a member of the mainstream – the mainstream of the mainstream being Friedman and his Chicago followers, of course. Now, can a minor deviant be a flop? Can minor deviations from the true blue doctrine be to blame for all of our economic woes? I do not kno w. Joan Robinson sees in Keynes a minor deviation from classical theory because he said once his correction of classical theory is implemented, that theory takes over once again. Moreover, Samuelson and Friedman have endorsed a (poor) version of Keynes' theory of shortterm relative price and ignored his general theory of price and money. (shrink)

From its inception with the first number of the magazine of opinion National Review and up to the advent of the Presidency of Richard Nixon the early American conservative movement struggled with the rising tide of civil rights protest and reform. This article examines the correspondence and published primary sources penned by leading members of the American conservative movement so as to offer a comprehensive, chronologically ordered assessment of the evolution of the views on racial inequality offered by the key (...) constituent ideological subcommunities within the American conservative movement: the traditionalists gathered around the pages of National Review, the “neoliberals” led by Milton Friedman y Friedrich von Hayek, the Southern, white conservatives and, lastly, the neoconservatives, which headed by Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz articulated much of such views in a manner palatable to a significant segment of the American political mainstream. (shrink)

The subjectivism of the Austrian school of economics is a special case of Dewey's transactional philosophy, also known as pragmatism or pragmatic epistemology. The Austrian economists Carl Friedrich Menger (1840-1921) and Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) adopted an Aristotelian deductive approach to economic issues such as social behavior and exchange. Like Menger and Mises, Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) viewed scientific knowledge, even in the social sciences, as asserting and aiming for objective certainty. Hayek was particularly critical of attempts to (...) apply the empiricism of the natural sciences in the social sciences. Though Hayek was not a positivist in the sense ascribed to Milton Friedman (1912-), because he accepted the possibility of final, objective certainty, Hayek's view of scientific knowledge was closer to that of the logical positivists of the Vienna circle than to Dewey's pragmatism. Mises' a priorism, asserting and aiming for apodictic certainty, represented a more extreme form of objectivism even than Hayek's. Mises was similar in this regard to non-Austrian axiomatists such as Gerard Debreau (1921-2005), though he joined Hayek in eschewing mathematical formalism. In Dewey's contrasting view, the scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing to the scientific community, offering more profound insight or more efficacious practical applications. Alternative ways of knowing which do not offer practical or intellectual benefits are to be rejected. Both the radical subjectivism of the Austrian school and Dewey's transactional strategy justify rejection of the mirage of social justice. Dewey's knowledge as ways of knowing suggests a broader and more fundamental critique of the socialist position in the calculation debate. The arguments presented by the Austrian school can be reformulated in terms of Dewey's pragmatic philosophy. (shrink)

Liberalism generally holds that legitimate political power is limited and is to be impartially exercised, only for the public good. Liberals accordingly assign political priority to maintaining certain basic liberties and equality of opportunities; they advocate an essential role for markets in economic activity, and they recognize government's crucial role in correcting market breakdowns and providing public goods. Classical liberalism and what I call “the high liberal tradition” are two main branches of liberalism. Classical liberalism evolved from the works of (...) Adam Smith and the classical utilitarian economists; its major 20th century representatives include Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. The high liberal tradition developed from John Stuart Mill's works, and its major philosophical representatives in the 20th century are John Dewey and, later, John Rawls. This paper discusses the main distinguishing features of the classical and the high liberal traditions and their respective positions regarding capitalism as an economic and social system. Classical liberals, unlike high liberals, regard economic liberties and rights of private property in productive resources to be nearly as important as basic liberties. They conceive of equality of opportunity in more formal terms, and regard capitalist markets and the price system as essential not only to the allocation of production resources, but also as the fundamental criterion for the just distribution of income, wealth, and economic powers. High liberals, by contrast, regard the economic liberties as subordinate to the exercise of personal and civic liberties. They are prepared to regulate and restrict economic liberties to achieve greater equality of opportunities, reduce inequalities of economic powers, and promote a broader conception of the public good. And while high liberals endorse markets and the price system as essential to allocation of productive resources, they do not regard markets as the fundamental criterion for assessing just distributions of income, wealth, and economic powers and positions of responsibility. The paper concludes with some reflections upon the essential role that dissimilar conceptions of persons and society play in grounding the different positions on economic justice that classical and high liberals advocate. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy has enjoyed renewed attention as an egalitarian alternative to contemporary inequality since it seems to uncompromisingly reassert the primacy of the state over the economy, enabling it to defend the modern welfare state against encroaching neoliberal markets. However, I argue that, when understood as a free-standing approach to politics, Kant’s doctrine of right shares essential features with the prevailing theories that legitimate really existing economic inequality. Like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, Kant understands the (...) state’s function as essentially coercive and, in justifying state coercion, he adopts a narrow conception of political freedom that formally preserves the right to choose while denying that the range of choices one actually has can be a matter of justice. As a result, Kant cannot identify various forms of social pressure as potential injustices even as he recognizes their power to create and sustain troubling inequalities. For both Kant and the neoliberals, the result is that economic relations almost never count as unjust forms of coercion, no matter how unequal they are. Views that identify coercion as the trigger for duties of justice are thus particularly ill-suited to orient us to contemporary inequality. (shrink)

This volume is a tribute by his peers, and by younger scholars of the next generation, to Harvey M. Friedman, perhaps the most profound foundationalist since Kurt Godel. Friedman's researches, beginning precociously in his mid-teens, have fundamentally shaped our contemporary understanding of set theory, recursion theory, model theory, proof theory and metamathematics. His achievements in concept formation and theory formulation have also renewed the standard set by Godel and Alfred Tarski for the general intellectual interest and importance of (...) technical work in foundations. Friedman pioneered the now well-established and flourishing field of Reverse Mathematics, whose aim is to calibrate the intrinsic logico-mathematical consistency-strength of all the important theorems of mathematics. He has relentlessly pursued the full extent of the incompleteness phenomena into which Godel provided the first revealing glimpse. The Godel--Friedman program, as it is now deservingly called, seeks to find simple, natural and elegant mathematical statements of a combinatorial nature, that can be proved to be independent of set theory even when extended by powerful large-cardinal existence axioms. (shrink)

It has been accepted since the early part of the Century that there is no problem formalizing mathematics in standard formal systems of axiomatic set theory. Most people feel that they know as much as they ever want to know about how one can reduce natural numbers, integers, rationals, reals, and complex numbers to sets, and prove all of their basic properties. Furthermore, that this can continue through more and more complicated material, and that there is never a real problem.

In this paper, I defend Rudolf Carnap's Principle of Tolerance from an accusation, due to Michael Friedman, that it is self-defeating by prejudicing any debate towards the logically stronger theory. In particular, Friedman attempts to show that Carnap's reconstruction of the debate between classicists and intuitionists over the foundations of mathematics in his book The Logical Syntax of Language, is biased towards the classical standpoint since the metalanguage he constructs to adjudicate between the rival positions is fully classical. (...) I argue that this criticism is mistaken on two counts: (1) it fails to fully appreciate the freedom with regard to the construction of linguistic frameworks that Carnap intended his Principle to embody, and (2) Friedman's objection underestimates the extent to which the evaluation of a framework is task-relative. I conclude that Tolerance is not self-undermining in the way that Friedman claims it is. While this is a restricted conclusion -- and is not a vindication of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics tout court -- it nonetheless suggests that his tolerant perspective has been dismissed too quickly, even by his supporters. (shrink)

The polarization and charges of “post-truth” that mark contemporary politics may have its source, ultimately, in a crisis of epistemology, which is characterized by a tension between different forms of naïve realism—the view that reality appears to us directly, unmediated by interpretation. Perhaps too schematically, those on the right tend to be first-person naïve realists in treating economic and social realities as accessible to the ordinary political participant by simple common sense, while those on the left tend to be third-person (...) naïve realists in treating credentialed experts as forming a consensus—a new common sense. In treating reality as transparent enough to be legible either to oneself or to a group of experts, both sides tend to treat disagreement as a motivational problem—a problem of bad faith, motivated reasoning, perversity, and refusal to see the truth—rather than as an epistemic problem caused by the possibility that each side may hold a different set of interpretive frameworks that determines how and what it sees of reality. In obviating the possibility of genuine disagreement, the epistemological crisis is quite naturally transformed into a political crisis. (shrink)