Navigating organizations through a changing environment is central to leadership. Thus, innovativeness has proven to be critical to the process of achieving strategic competitiveness (Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 1998). This skill is particularly needed when the firm is confronted with the unique challenges of a religious organization. The existence of innovation and the dependencies that encourage or restrict its existence in this environment are largely unknown. Utilizing a sample of 250 religious organizations in five geographical areas this research explores the (...) impact of the leader tenure on the degree of organizational innovation. An analysis of variance for innovative strategy use across the three tenure groups was significant, F (2, 247) = 6.08, p < 0.01, which indicated innovation differences across the three levels of leader tenure. Post hoc analysis indicated that the low tenure leadership group was associated with lower levels of innovation than either of the other groups. Detailed findings are presented and the managerial implications and suggestions are provided. This research has strong implications for implementation of leadership development and strategic management of the increasing number of socially conscious organizations and organizations with large volunteer components. (shrink)

Sumner B. (Barney) Twiss, who died in 2023, was for ten years a General Editor of the Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE). He was a frequent contributor of articles, a member of the JRE Editorial Board, and a member of the journal's Board of Trustees. In this article, colleagues and students reflect on some of his many contributions, not only to the JRE but to the broader discursive fields of comparative religious ethics and human rights.

This is the first book to offer the best essays, articles, and speeches on ethics and intelligence that demonstrate the complex moral dilemmas in intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Some are recently declassified and never before published, and all are written by authors whose backgrounds are as varied as their insights, including Robert M. Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; John P. Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown (...) University; and Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and recipient of the Owens Award for contributions to the understanding of U.S. intelligence activities. Creating the foundation for the study of ethics and intelligence by filling in the gap between warfare and philosophy, this is a valuable collection of literature for building an ethical code that is not dependent on any specific agency, department, or country. (shrink)

Evolutionary ethics has a long history, dating all the way back to Charles Darwin.1 Almost immediately after the publication of the Origin, an immense interest arose in the moral implications of Darwinism and whether the truth of Darwinism would undermine traditional ethics. Though the biological thesis was certainly exciting, nobody suspected that the impact of the Origin would be confined to the scientific arena. As one historian wrote, 'whether or not ancient populations of armadillos were transformed into the species that (...) currently inhabit the new world was certainly a topic about which zoologists could disagree. But it was in discussing the broader implications of the theory...that tempers flared and statements were made which could transform what otherwise would have been a quiet scholarly meeting into a social scandal' (Farber 1994, 22). Some resistance to the biological thesis of Darwinism sprung from the thought that it was incompatible with traditional morality and, since one of them had to go, many thought that Darwinism should be rejected. However, some people did realize that a secular ethics was possible so, even if Darwinism did undermine traditional religious beliefs, it need not have any effects on moral thought.2 Before I begin my discussion of evolutionary ethics from Darwin to Moore, I would like to make some more general remarks about its development.3 There are three key events during this history of evolutionary ethics. First, Charles Darwin published On the Origin of the Species (Darwin 1859). Since one did not have a fully developed theory of evolution until 1859, there exists little work on evolutionary ethics until then.4 Shortly thereafter, Herbert Spencer (1898) penned the first systematic theory of evolutionary ethics, which was promptly attacked by T.H. Huxley (Huxley 1894). Second, at about the turn of the century, moral philosophers entered the fray and attempted to demonstrate logical errors in Spencer's work; such errors were alluded to but never fully brought to the fore by Huxley. These philosophers were the well known moralists from Cambridge: Henry Sidgwick (Sidgwick 1902, 1907) and G.E. Moore (Moore 1903), though their ideas hearkened back to David Hume (Hume 1960). These criticisms were so strong that the industry of evolutionary ethics was largely abandoned (though with some exceptions) for many years.5 Third, E.O. Wilson, a Harvard entomologist, published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975 (Wilson E.O. 1975), which sparked renewed interest in evolutionary ethics and offered new directions of investigation. These events suggest the following stages for the history of evolutionary ethics: development, criticism and abandonment, revival. In this paper, I shall focus on the first two stages, since those are the ones on which the philosophical merits have already been largely decided. The revival stage is still in progress and we shall eventually find out whether it was a success. (shrink)

The expressivist theory in metaethics has a historical lineage dating back to the work of the great philosopher David Hume. Among the major metaethical alternatives to expressivism are constructivist theories, theories that have an origin in the work of another great philosopher, Immanuel Kant. One of the best-known and most influential recent formulations of such a view is due to John Rawls. There has been a great deal of discussion of the relationship between expressivism and deflationary theories of truth. (...) In stark contrast, there has been very little discussion of the relationship between constructivist theories and deflationary theories of truth. I argue that Rawlsian constructivists should adopt a minimalist theory of truth. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 144-149, January 2022.

This article responds to David Steinberg's proposal in favor of an organ donation system that gives allocation preference to people who agree to donate after they die. This article challenges the notion that organ taking is morally impermissible and questions Steinberg’s program on the grounds that it would unfairly discriminate against these people by deprioritizing their claims to the kidney supply. Relatedly, the article suggests that Steinberg’s proposal effectively coerces people to opt in, thus calling into question the legitimacy (...) of the consent on which their decisions were predicated. (shrink)

Die 1990 gegründete Reihe, die auf eine Anregung von Mazzino Montinari zurückgeht, publiziert Quellenmaterialien zu Nietzsches Leben, seinem Umkreis und seiner Wirkung. Die Supplementa stellen somit eine Ergänzung zu den Kritischen Ausgaben von Nietzsches Werken (KGW) und Briefen (KGB) dar.

Things could have been different, but could it also have been different what things there are? It is natural to think so, since I could have failed to be born, and it is natural to think that I would then not have been anything. But what about entities like propositions, properties and relations? Had I not been anything, would there have been the property of being me? In this thesis, I formally develop and assess views according to which it is (...) both contingent what individuals there are and contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are. I end up rejecting these views, and conclude that even if it is contingent what individuals there are, it is necessary what propositions, properties and relations there are. -/- Call the view that it is contingent what individuals there are first-order contingentism, and the view that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are higher-order contingentism. I bring together the three major contributions to the literature on higher-order contingentism, which have been developed largely independently of each other, by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. I show that a version of Stalnaker's approach to higher-order contingentism was already explored in much more technical detail by Fine, and that it stands up well to the major challenges against higher-order contingentism posed by Williamson. -/- I further show that once a mistake in Stalnaker's development is corrected, each of his models of contingently existing propositions corresponds to the propositional fragment of one of Fine's more general models of contingently existing propositions, properties and relations, and vice versa. I also show that Stalnaker's theory of contingently existing propositions is in tension with his own theory of counterfactuals, but not with one of the main competing theories, proposed by David Lewis. -/- Finally, I connect higher-order contingentism to expressive power arguments against first-order contingentism. I argue that there are intelligible distinctions we draw with talk about "possible things", such as the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars. Since first-order contingentists hold that there are no possible stars apart from the actual stars, they face the challenge of paraphrasing such talk. I show that even in an infinitary higher-order modal logic, the claim that there are uncountably many possible stars can only be paraphrased if higher-order contingentism is false. I therefore conclude that even if first-order contingentism is true, higher-order contingentism is false. (shrink)

Well-known results due to David Makinson show that there are exactly two Post complete normal modal logics, that in both of them, the modal operator is truth-functional, and that every consistent normal modal logic can be extended to at least one of them. Lloyd Humberstone has recently shown that a natural analog of this result in congruential modal logics fails, by showing that not every congruential modal logic can be extended to one in which the modal operator is truth-functional. (...) As Humberstone notes, the issue of Post completeness in congruential modal logics is not well understood. The present article shows that in contrast to normal modal logics, the extent of the property of Post completeness among congruential modal logics depends on the background set of logics. Some basic results on the corresponding properties of Post completeness are established, in particular that although a congruential modal logic is Post complete among all modal logics if and only if its modality is truth-functional, there are continuum many modal logics Post complete among congruential modal logics. (shrink)

With the help of American friends, he revised the book and published it anew six years later. The present volume is the third version of the biography, completed in 1908 but never published in Salt's lifetime.

Rudolf Steiner. The Riddles of Philosophy, Presented in an Outline of Their History. Two Volumes, 645 pp. Originally translated by Fritz C. Koelln in 1973; translation substantially revised and corrected by David W. Wood (Great Barrington MA: Chadwick Library Edition, 2018).

Review of The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp.

How was creativity understood in the distinctive artistic practices of eighteenth-century Japan? How were its artists able to maintain consistently inventive creative pathways over extended periods? Artistic creativity is sometimes assumed to derive from chance, opportune, or accidental events. For early Western creativity theorists like Graham Wallas,1 Alex Osborn,2 or Robert Fritz 3 such fortunate moments of illumination engendered creative innovation. The invention of synthetic dyes,4 Japanese haboku “splashed ink painting,” or Jackson Pollock’s spatters of paint all involved elements (...) of chance. Given favorable conditions and alert minds, serendipity can contribute to... (shrink)

Certain passages in Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’ are often taken to show that non-vacuous sentential operators associated with a certain parameter of sentential truth require a corresponding relativism concerning assertoric contents: namely, their truth values also must vary with that parameter. Thus, for example, the non-vacuity of a temporal sentential operator ‘always’ would require some of its operands to have contents that have different truth values at different times. While making no claims about Kaplan’s intentions, we provide several reconstructions of how such (...) an argument might go, focusing on the case of time and temporal operators as an illustration. What we regard as the most plausible reconstruction of the argument establishes a conclusion similar enough to that attributed to Kaplan. However, the argument overgenerates, leading to absurd consequences. We conclude that we must distinguish assertoric contents from compositional semantic values, and argue that once they are distinguished, the argument fails to establish any substantial conclusions. We also briefly discuss a related argument commonly attributed to Lewis, and a recent variant due to Weber. (shrink)

This article reviews the notion of 'noûs' and the verb 'noein' in pre-Socratic philosophy: it brings together research carried out since Kurt von Fritz's famous articles of 1945-1946, taking into account 20th and 21th centuries studies, in particular the ones of James H. Lesher, Shirley D. Sullivan, Rossana Stefanelli and Favio Stella. This paper also focuses on the conception of 'noûs' in the thought of Xenophanes, who links it with divinity and thus anticipates the important contribution of Anaxagoras. Finally, (...) it examines the conception of 'noûs' and 'noein' in Parmenides, in whose Poem it is closely linked to his conception of Being. (shrink)

We appreciate Fritz’s thoughtful analysis of the asymmetry between legal protections for negative and positive conscience claims and are particularly interested in further exploring the conc...

This paper is about the semantic analysis of referentially opaque verbs like seek and owe that give rise to nonspecific readings. It is argued that Montague's categorization (based on earlier work by Quine) of opaque verbs as properties of quantifiers runs into two serious difficulties: the first problem is that it does not work with opaque verbs like resemble that resist any lexical decomposition of the seek ap try to find kind; the second one is that it wrongly predicts de (...) dicto (i.e. narrow scope) readings due to quantified noun phrases in the object positions of such verbs. It is shown that both difficulties can be overcome by an analysis of opaque verbs as operating on properties. This is a strongly modified version of a paper entitled lsquoDo We Bear Attitudes towards Quantifiers?rsquo that I have presented at conferences in Gosen (Gesellschaft für Sprachwissenschaft), Ithaca (SALT I), and Konstanz (Lexikon). I owe a special debt to Hans Kamp and Arnim von Stechow for shaping my views on the subject of this paper during the past ten years or so. Comments from and discussions with the following friends and colleagues have also led to considerable improvements: Heinrich Beck, Steve Berman, David Dowty, Veerle van Geenhoven, Fritz Hamm, Irene Heim, Wolfgang Klein, Angelika Kratzer, Michael Morreau, Barbara Partee, Mats Rooth, Roger Schwarzschild, Wolfgang Sternefeld, Emil Weydert, Henk Zeevat, and three referees. (shrink)

We examined cynicism as a mediator of the influence of managers’ mission-congruent communication and behavior about ethical standards (a form of supervisory behavioral integrity) on employee attitudes and intended behavior. Results indicated that cynicism partially mediates the relationship between supervisory behavioral integrity and organizational commitment, but not the relationship between supervisory behavioral integrity and intent to comply with organizational expectations for employee conduct.

New Essays on Plato assembles nine original papers on the language and thought of the Athenian philosopher. The collection encompasses issues from the Apology to the Laws and includes discussions of topics in ethics, political theory, psychology, epistemology, ontology, physics and metaphysics, and ancient literary criticism. The contributions by an international team of scholars represent a spectrum of diverse traditions and approaches, and offer new solutions to a selection of specific problems. Themes include the Happiness and Nature of the Philosopher-Kings, (...) Law and Justice, the Tripartition of the Soul, Appearance and Belief, Conditions of Recognition, Ousia or What Something Is, the Reality of Change and Changelessness, Time and Eternity, and Aristotle on Plato. (shrink)

The war on terror is commonly characterized as a fundamentally different kind of war from more traditional armed conflict. Furthermore, it has been argued that, in this new kind of war, different rules, both moral and legal, must apply. In the first part of this paper, three practices endemic to the war on terror -- torture, assassination, and enemy combatancy status -- are identified as exceptions to traditional norms. The second part of the paper uses these examples to motivate a (...) generalized account of exceptionalism; a taxonomy of different exceptionalisms is derived, including temporal, spatial, and group-based exceptionalisms. The third part of the paper considers the ethical status of exceptionalism, paying particular attention to the group-based exceptionalisms that are argued to be prevalent in the war on terror. It is concluded that there is nothing inherently wrong with group-based exceptionalism and, furthermore, that the proper locus of ethical evaluation lies not with the norms that are being excepted, but rather with the groups that are being excepted from them. (shrink)